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THE CONTROL OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

MAURICE GARNIER†

When sociology became a separate discipline, several individuals observed that one form of social organization—bureaucracy—demanded study because of its increasingly important role in modern societies, a role likely to increase in importance over the foreseeable future. Weber, Michels and others spent much of their effort analyzing bureaucracies, as did Marx, who saw clearly that such a form of social organization would play a central role in the transformation of bourgeois society.[1]

We can isolate two broad trends in the study of complex organizations. The theoretical seeks to understand and predict characteristics of bureaucracies. The second, often the motive behind the first and here termed the applied, seeks to understand bureaucracies for their social relevance. Obviously, these two trends depend heavily on each other. The distinction between them is one that involves the motivation of the researcher more than anything else.

These trends still exist today. Military organizations are only one special form of bureaucracy, and it is no accident that the two trends described above—the theoretical and the applied—can be found among those specializing in the study of military affairs. Yet, it must be acknowledged that power, or more correctly control, is a concept absent from most studies of the military. It is only very recently that this concept has been reintroduced in the study of bureaucracies, military ones in particular.[2]

The main criticism to be levied in this essay is that military sociol-

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1. *See generally* M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947); R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (paperback ed. 1966). These theorists, and Michels particularly, were concerned about the concentration of power in a few hands and the implications of such concentration for a democratic form of government. While Michels was more concerned with the problems of internal democracy, *i.e.*, with the problem of the control of a bureaucracy by its members, he nevertheless was explicitly aware of the problem of external control, *i.e.*, the problem of organizational control by outsiders. This concentration of power caused bureaucracies to be perceived as agents of social power and thus requiring study for very practical reasons. This is the perspective taken in this paper.

2. *See* C. PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 199–202 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PERROW].

ogists have failed to focus on military bureaucracies as centers of power. Put differently, the concept of organization control as the term is usually utilized, that is, how one controls an organization and not how members of organizations are controlled, has been avoided.[3] By abandoning this concern, sociologists have missed more than an opportunity to make theoretical contributions;[4] they have contributed to our understanding of military organizations, and to our ability to manipulate them, to a far lesser extent than they could have had they focused on this important concept. It must be said, in all fairness, that in the study of organizations the general notion of power has been consistently neglected (an omission that sociologists of knowledge ought to study). Even a contemporary sociologist who examines power relations within bureaucracies[5] fails to point out that bureaucracies are also instruments of power (*i.e.*, instruments with which other organizations can be shaped and with which outcomes can be made more likely to occur).[6]

Before presenting the details of our argument, our own bias should be stated. This bias is that military organizations are only executors of the will of elected representatives. In order for that will to be informed, specialists in the usage of violence must be consulted, and the bureaucratic phenomena that lead generals to recommend various policies (purchase of certain weapons, given size of armed forces, etc.) must be fully understood by those who will listen to such recommendations. In this way the legislator's critical abilities will be maximized. The role of social scientists is, therefore, to provide elected policy makers with the understanding to appraise recommendations made to them, and to ensure implementation of their policy decisions by the organizations charged with executing them. In short, according to this view: (1) military organizations are bureaucracies that must be controlled; (2) this control implies some very specific behavior by policy makers; and (3) bureaucracies, as servants of the people, should not be abused by those governing them.

We can now examine a few major interests of military sociologists that document the failure of these researchers to consider power and control as relevant variables.[7] Likewise, we will briefly examine the work

3. *See, e.g.*, Etzioni, *Organizational Control Structure*, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 650 (J. Marsh ed. 1965).

4. One goal which might be pursued is the linkage between theories of social and of organizational control; the latter could thus be an intrinsic part of theories of social organization.

5. M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964).

6. PERROW, *supra* note 2, noted this omission, but systematic empirical research following his general recommendations has yet to be published.

7. The assumption is that, if social scientists considered power, they would inevitably consider control, and this is why we concentrate on control. Social scientists see

of some political scientists and, finally, we will offer some suggestions. The focus here emphasizes the practical contribution that social scientists can make to the citizens' control over their governmental apparatus. Nevertheless it includes as well the obvious point that purely theoretical contributions can be made, and made significantly.

SOCIOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

It may seem strange that sociologists have ignored power when examining military, or any other, organizations. It is therefore necessary to focus, if somewhat briefly, on the kinds of issues that sociologists have probed when studying military organizations. It must be remembered that this study did not really start until the Second World War. Therefore, there is no reason to expect military sociologists to have done more than, say, industrial sociologists, who are part of a much older specialty. Put another way, some basic understanding and some basic facts had to be gathered before a critical perspective could be applied to military sociology.

Social Origins of Military and Political Leaders

Space forbids a systematic review of all that military sociologists have written.[8] Instead, we discuss several areas of study as examples of the kinds of concern that have dominated the field. These examples show that sociologists were not really consistent themselves. It can be assumed that all of those who spent years studying military organizations were committed to the notion of civilian control: they believed in a diffuse, and perhaps not totally conscious, way that the military was an instrument of the state and that the instrument was to be controlled by Congress and the President. This premise was often forgotten, however, and sociologists embarked on investigations that were of no obvious use to social planners. These investigations, however, were often useful to military planners; and, while military and civilian requirements are not necessarily in opposition, the danger exists that social scientists have become agents of the military when, in reality, their beliefs should put them in the service of elected officials.

One concern of military sociologists, which is clearly related to the applied trend but which ignores considerations of control, has been that of social origins. This concern has a long history. Basically it involves

control as an *applied* consideration, while power is a more theoretical concept (but one with clear applied implications).

8. For a review of the literature, see generally K. LANG, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF WAR: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE WITH ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1972).

the question whether certain elites, in this case generals and admirals, come from a given social stratum or have been educated in certain institutions. For purposes of historical analysis, or for exploring whether a society is open or closed, this kind of question is obviously relevant. It may be worthwhile to know that in Britain the army is slowly abandoning the practice of recruiting officers from the nobility and gentry and that France is experiencing the same trend. However, in order to understand these trends, a relatively thorough awareness of the social context is necessary. Knowing that a large proportion of generals comes from the nobility is not terribly useful; one must *also* know whether or not generals are important policy makers, and that question is society-specific.

This focus on recruitment may stem indirectly from a concern with control. In the Prussian military, which has influenced so many other military organizations (the American in particular), the officers were drawn from the nobility because of the policies initiated by Frederick William I. As a result, some historians and sociologists have jumped to the conclusion that social origins, by fostering homogeneity within the officer corps, facilitated control over the military. They have further concluded that a homogeneous organization could more easily control the state than could a military organization in which officers were from quite heterogeneous backgrounds.[9] The fact is that the Prussian nobility's control over the army and, in turn, the army's control over the whole country resulted from several very specific circumstances, particularly the impoverishment of the nobility.

Other circumstances have spawned control of military organizations by one social group. England, for example, is a well-known case of an army which draws most of its officers from the gentry. However, it is often forgotten that the gentry's control was made almost inevitable by the difficulty of obtaining a secondary education. If attending secondary schools is related to one's social background and if educational requirements are imposed, then the professions that impose such educational requirements will be composed exclusively of those individuals who have attended such schools. In the case of Britain, control of the military was not really translated into control of other institutions. In Prussia, though, the military was able to make policies; indeed members of the military were able to have laws passed giving them a special status in the realm.[10] In the United States, the military has not historically played an

9. *See* M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PORTRAIT 79–103 (1960) [hereinafter cited as JANOWITZ]; A. VAGTS, A HISTORY OF MILITARISM (rev. ed. 1959); G. CRAIG, THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 1640–1945 (1955) [hereinafter cited as CRAIG].

10. CRAIG, *supra* note 9, at 10–22.

important political role even though it, too, has drawn its officers from a distinct social group—the upper middle class, especially the upper middle class of the South. In short, examining social origins for the purpose of determining organizational control is short-sighted; such a view ignores the use to which control is put.

Some historians or sociologists might argue that social origins of generals are important, but the social origins of politicians are also important. Whenever the origins of the two groups coincide, one can postulate the existence of a common ideology within the two groups, a great facility of communication between the groups and, therefore, a likelihood that politicians will be co-opted by the military.[11] Such an argument seriously hinders our understanding of the contemporary situation.

Politicians and generals are usually at least middle-aged and, therefore, have substantial careers behind them. Their careers are more likely to have shaped their thinking, and to a far greater extent, than have their upbringings. There is thus no assurance of similar understanding. The fact that both share upper middle-class origins is, by the time these men are in their fifties, relatively unimportant. Career is likely to have been an important influence on most professionals. Individuals from widely differing backgrounds can end up with remarkably similar attitudes, given effective socialization.[12] Origin, therefore, is unlikely to explain much; even in cases for which origin seems the most plausible answer.[13]

In short, while the potential for understanding social control existed in the study of social origins, the realization has fallen short of expectations. This is disappointing especially when one realizes that virtually all studies of military organizations find it necessary to discuss social origins. As has been argued, such a focus is not particularly useful for

11. Or, at a minimum, one can postulate that the military will be better able to make its views known and accepted, the political leaders already understanding and accepting the military's views.

12. *See generally* Garnier, *Changing Recruitment Patterns and Organizational Ideology: The Case of a British Military Academy*, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 499 (1972).

13. It has been argued, for example, that the changing recruitment of the officer corps in Latin America's armies explains the relatively leftist stance taken by several of that area's military regimes. However, close examination could probably reveal common career patterns among officers engaged in politics. *See generally* MILITARY RULE IN LATIN AMERICA: FUNCTIONS, CONSEQUENCES, AND PERSPECTIVES (P. Schmitter ed. 1973); Johnson, *The Latin American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society*, in THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 91 (J. Johnson ed. 1962). Indeed, whenever social origins have been studied, they have usually been shown to have only a very small effect. For instance, the French Army's involvement in politics was more the result of career experiences than of social origins, whose contribution is only marginal in explaining the coup of 1958. *See* J. AMBLER, SOLDIERS AGAINST THE STATE: THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS 1945–1962, at 128–45 (1966).

understanding the influence of military organizations on society, and particularly on politics. By understanding, it should be emphasized, we do not mean only the kind of intellectual satisfaction that arises from knowing how a social system works. Rather, in addition to this intellectual satisfaction is the need to understand sufficiently the workings of military organizations so that political leaders can knowingly and accurately manipulate the organization with certain ends in mind.

The End of Limited "Professionalism"

Another related research tradition within sociology is the study of professions. Military officers are sometimes considered professionals since they have formal training, are controlled by peers, and so forth. However, the fact that they have only one setting within which to exercise their skills reduces the similarities to teachers, doctors and lawyers.[14] The issue of professionalism is not simply academic; more is involved than arguing about which occupations to include in or exclude from the professions. Some sociologists have suggested that, in addition to technical skills, officers should be fully equipped for the complex role they play in modern societies. In other words military officers, because they obviously operate within a political context, should become experts in political matters.[15] In fact, a number of officers now hold doctoral degrees in the social sciences, and a decreasing proportion of the armed forces is ever engaged in combat.[16] An increasing proportion of the armed forces is, in fact, engaged in activities that bear only a distant and unclear relationship to the country's defense. Some officers serve in the State Department, and others serve in purely political capacities (congressional liaison officers, for example).

Given that the military is a very large organization which includes many very talented individuals, it is normal that such individuals should serve the state in other than military capacities. However, such individuals still remain within the military hierarchy. Viewed differently, tax monies are being used to educate officers who will know how to replace civilian civil servants, should the need arise. Even more important, military officers are now perfectly capable of influencing political decision-makers about matters bearing little relationship to military affairs. Knowledge is not necessarily neutral, yet members of Congress are now being given information and interpretations that they cannot challenge because the individuals presenting them possess such high qualifications. These

14. Wilensky, *The Professionalization of Everyone?*, 80 AM. J. SOC. 137–58 (1964).
15. JANOWITZ, *supra* note 9.
16. M. JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1971).

interpretations, in turn, may be erroneous, partly because they are not subject to scrutiny. This apparent "professionalization" of officers is taken by some sociologists as evidence that military organizations are adapting to new circumstances. However, the broadening of the officer's role may, in fact, constitute a phenomenon that has little to do with the professions and far more to do with the power of a given organization to spread its sphere of influence.[17]

Despite the probability that power and control are involved here, the notion of power has been ignored. Only the naive can consistently assume that professionals always put the interest of clients first. It is therefore dubious to assume, as so many writers in this area are wont to do, that increased professionalism is necessarily a guarantee that the civilian sector will control the military.[18] Rather, as Finer so correctly points out, increased professionalism may simply mean a greater likelihood that the military will become involved in political matters because professionalism implies knowledge of what the goal should be as well as how that goal should be reached.[19]

In defense of social scientists studying the military, it should be noted that political leaders have not often asked for their assistance. In contrast, the military has long employed social scientists who have turned their attention to such matters as race relations, recruitment, and drug use.[20] Since sociologists, as well as other members of the American society, believed that the military was, for the most part, being put to a legitimate use, there was really no need to question the military's control. Indeed, it is very likely that those sociologists who sought employment in the military generally held favorable opinions of the military's general purpose. Critics of the military stayed outside and often were not sufficiently familiar with the operation of military organizations to be taken seriously. The situation changed, and it seems likely that those sociologists who argue that officers ought to broaden their skills have failed to realize that such broadening would not necessarily make officers more subservient to elected officials.[21]

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17. Since there is evidence showing that military personnel are more "expensive" than their civilian counterparts, it would seem financially advisable to limit officers to activities they alone can perform, a point recently made by William Hauser, a serving officer. *See generally* W. HAUSER, AMERICA'S ARMY IN CRISIS *passim* (1973). For a scholarly discussion of Hauser's thesis, see Lovell, *No Tunes of Glory: America's Military in the Aftermath of Vietnam*, 49 IND. L.J. 698, 713 (1974).

18. *E.g.*, S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS, ch. 1 (1957) [hereinafter cited as HUNTINGTON].

19. *See generally* S. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK, ch. 1 (1962).

20. *See, e.g.*, HANDBOOK OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS (R. Little ed. 1971).

21. Among these sociologists, Janowitz is the most prominent. The assumption they share is that professionalism is in itself a form of control because it involves the

This discussion of professionalism uncovers several important points. One involves the line between what is military and what is civilian. This line has become virtually impossible to draw, although having it might prove very beneficial. The other issue involves a matter usually not discussed by sociologists, namely, civil-military relations. This confusion between what is military and what is civilian has arisen because officers now perform such essentially civilian functions as diplomatic work and public relations. This expansion of the military into formerly civilian spheres has not been matched, at least recently, by a similar expansion of civilians into military matters. Certainly, no one believes that a uniform or a suit per se is an important element in policy making. Thus the real question is not who does what, but who controls whom; this question has not been specifically asked by sociologists.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

Political scientists have raised the question of organizational control through their analysis of civil-military relations. Much comparative work has been done in this area, some of it very informative.[22] Political scientists have not been able to tell political decisionmakers how to control military organizations, although some have suggested that professionalism and its values guarantee civilian dominance.[23] Several political scientists have shown that American politicians are no longer controlling the military because it is already so large and influential that many political leaders have acquired vested interests in a strong military establishment.[24] The whole idea of a military-industrial complex has been widely discussed, and the notion has recently received important empirical treatment.[25]

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internalization of certain values: in the American case, values stressing the dominance of civilian control. The problem with that assumption is that officers genuinely feel that they are not violating the necessity for civilian control. Rather, they are moving into a void, a movement made inevitable by changing technological and social factors and, also, by the general notion that professional ethics require the practitioner to be prepared for all eventualities. *See generally* Lang, *Military Career Structure—Emerging Trends and Alternatives*, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 487 (1972).

22. *See generally* J. HUREWITZ, MIDDLE-EAST POLITICS: THE MILITARY DIMENSION (1969); THE MILITARY REVENUES: CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (H. Bienen ed. 1968); S. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK (1962); HUNTINGTON, *supra* note 18.

23. HUNTINGTON, *supra* note 18, ch. 1.

24. *See generally* J. DONOVAN, MILITARISM, U.S.A. (1970) [hereinafter cited as DONOVAN]; S. MELMAN, PENTAGON CAPITALISM (1970).

25. S. ROSEN, TESTING THE THEORY OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1973). This is another, albeit related, issue. The theory of a military-industrial complex is important in this context simply because it argues that the military cannot be controlled due to the close relationships that exist between civilian and military leaders. Therefore, no control mechanism exists, either formal or informal, and none can exist due to the absence of motivation among elected political leaders. However, it must be

Yet another related issue involves what has been called militarism or militarization. These notions point to the very large participation of a significant segment of the American male population in the military. Such participation exposes American males to military doctrines and ideologies.[26] Upon leaving the military, such individuals are responsive to the claims made by professional military men and thus put no pressure upon their elected representatives to deny the military's requests. Such a claim has received very little empirical treatment, and it seems that the attribution of influence is questionable. Being responsive to military ideology may be related to one's conservatism just as much as, if not more than, it is related to one's participation in the military. Further, it is worth noting that many societies have had universal conscription for decades and that such societies are not called militaristic. In the past the vast majority of males over a certain age in Switzerland and other European countries were members of the military and, to this day, all Swiss men must serve. Only extremely radical critics of those societies have suggested that they were militaristic, and, usually, such criticisms have involved the nature of the economy far more than the military itself. It would seem, therefore, that looking at the society at large will not tell our political representatives how to control organizations, particularly military organizations.

This does not mean that political scientists are able to tell political decisionmakers how to control bureaucracies. One important reason is that few, if any, decisionmakers ever bothered to ask. A review of the standard texts on public administration clearly reveals that financial control is often treated as sufficient for organizational control.[27] Some texts do not even raise that question; they emphasize instead the existence of statutes as, one assumes, sufficient to obtain such control. It is very likely that business organizations know how to control their sub-organizational systems to a far greater extent than does the public sector; this at least is the impression one receives when comparing business texts with texts on public administration.

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said that, in spite of its popular appeal, the theory of the military-industrial complex receives little empirical support when closely scrutinized. At best, the evidence is unclear. Indeed, once the existence of a military-industrial complex is questioned, one realizes that large organizations cannot realistically be viewed as monoliths. There are conflicts within the armed forces and among contractors. At best, one can possibly show that, in certain instances, the rules of competition are bent and that such limited competition is made possible by the acquiescence of many elected officials. In its pure form, which so often implies a conspiracy, the theory of the military-industrial complex is not really tenable.

26. DONOVAN, *supra* note 24.

27. *E.g.*, F. NIGRO & L. NIGRO, MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1973); I. SHARKANSKY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1972).

If one wants answers to the problem of control, then attention should be paid to the large body of literature dealing with Congress and congressional politics. While in many ways not as systematic as one would like (at least not as systematic as a sociologist would like), there is little doubt that such political scientists have not only raised the question explicitly, but have also provided some tentative answers.[28]

Informal Congressional Constraints: Proposals for Reform

Officially, the General Accounting Office (GAO) is supposed to exert control over the federal government.[29] As an arm of Congress, that office basically has the function of auditing. The definition of "audit" seems to be broadening, and that office seems to be moving toward using the practices that have been standard in the business world for many years: surveys, effectiveness, duplication of functions, and so on. This expansion of the audit function is important; but it cannot do justice to the many other issues that arise when we measure the extent to which governmental bureaucracies are fulfilling the requirements set by Congress. Obviously, a certain amount of interpretation must occur. However, there is little doubt that many pieces of legislation originate within the confines of the bureaucracy. It also seems that members of Congress and various committees do not always understand the scope of what is proposed to them.[30]

Part of the reason for their failure to understand is that Congressmen have three general functions: they legislate, they represent their constituencies, and they control or supervise the Executive. The last function is usually de-emphasized, particularly since those Congressmen whose ideology might lead them to criticize the military do not always sit on committees handling such matters. Especially in the Senate, important informal norms dictate obedience to specialization ideals; specialization is thought indispensable and those individuals with the inclination to question military policies may in fact never develop the necessary expertise. Further, specialized committees are usually not staffed with experts; if

28. *See generally* J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1964); L. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS (1973); Dexter, *Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy*, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 175 (R. Peabody & N. Polsby eds. 1969). The recommendations to be made draw heavily on this literature.

29. *See* R. BROWN, THE GAO: UNTAPPED SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (1970).

30. Indeed, a very recently proposed reform of Congress would precisely divide the work of committees into two parts, one involving legislation, the other supervision. It seems reasonable to assume that a substantial part of that supervision would be effected by a specialized staff or, possibly, by an expanded GAO. *See* RIESELBACH, *supra* note 28, at 372-78 (1973).

they have experts, they have an insufficient number of them. As a result, the executive branch is often unchallenged. Obviously, the assumption here is that legislators want to challenge executive policies. While challenge is not always necessary, it seems that many Congressmen are only too willing to support administration policies, and this acquiescence often stems from their ignorance of the matters at hand. Far larger and more professionalized staff on congressional committees might alleviate some of these problems. Those who advocate more professionalized military personnel should also urge that legislators employ professionals whose function would be to scrutinize all the implications of military proposals. This kind of activity is not, in itself, new; nevertheless, it should be vastly expanded in scope and become an integral part of the appropriations process.

It should also be noted that Congress will not be able to control the military if that bureaucracy is not organized along lines which facilitate such control. A little-known report states:

> Effective civilian control is impaired by a generally excessive centralization of decision-making authority at the level of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary's ability to selectively delegate authority and decentralize management, while still retaining personal authority on major policy issues of the Department, is seriously inhibited by the present organizational structure.[31]

The notion of control, therefore, goes far beyond the issue discussed here. It also includes, in all likelihood, a rather substantial reorganization of the Pentagon to enable Congress to control the various Secretaries who, in turn, will be able to control their various departments effectively.[32]

CONCLUSIONS

The assumption implicit in this discussion is that the military should be controlled by elected officials because it tends to involve itself in matters far beyond the scope of national defense. If the lines between civilian and military matters are too indistinct, we might also want to examine congressional functions for part of the explanation. Because no systematic control mechanism exists, individual Congressmen have long involved themselves in details that clearly fall within the purview of the military.[33]

31. BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 1 (1970).

32. *See generally id.*

33. In addition, some Congressmen and Senators have made arrangements with senior officers such that in return for equipment appropriations, bases could be located

If political leaders want to control the military, they must be willing to trust generals and admirals sufficiently to let them run that organization. This is a notion that does not necessarily invalidate the control we have advocated in this discussion. On the contrary, if policies are made clear and if accountability constitutes an integral part of the control that has been advocated here, then generals can become far more effective in carrying out their duties because political considerations will no longer be necessary. They will have been considered by political leaders or, perhaps, by members of the State Department.

The other responsibility of Congress is more complex and probably applies more to the President and the Cabinet than to Congress itself. This responsibility involves listening to the advice given by military specialists when such advice is needed. There is no need to maintain an elaborate military establishment if the opinions of those charged with running it are not sought when needed. Obviously, at no time must our political leaders lose their critical abilities; yet there has been a tendency in the recent past to disregard the military advice of those competent to give it. Conversely, there has been too great a willingness on the part of military leaders to agree that any operation was possible.[34]

Not surprisingly, this discussion has returned to the topic of professionalism. More sharply drawn lines between the military and the civilian domains would constitute an important improvement upon the present situation. Subsequently, the development of structures to improve the information flow to political decisionmakers would benefit both the military and Congress.

It can be hoped—and there are strong indications that such efforts will be forthcoming in the near future—that sociologists and political scientists will raise questions regarding organizational control. The early writers on bureaucracy were struck by the social power concentrated in bureaucracies.[35] That impression is no less valid today. Obviously, the kind of detailed work on communications, organizational structures, span of control, and so forth, that has characterized the field must continue. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that bureaucracies are instruments, and that instruments must be controlled. Scholars can play an important role by sensitizing elected officials to the need for such control. The emergence of military sociology as a viable specialty within sociology may result in examinations of power, since that subject is not

in a certain district, even if that location made no military or organizational sense.

34. *See generally* S. LOORY, DEFEATED: INSIDE AMERICA'S MILITARY MACHINE, pt. III (1973), reviewed in Lovell, *supra* note 17.

35. *See* notes 1–5 *supra* & text accompanying.

being addressed in organizational sociology. Furthermore, there is a growing awareness among sociologists that their findings must become more policy oriented, that is, that the variables they isolate must be subject to manipulation rather than be merely descriptive. It should also be added that the social research done under military auspices can be used by outsiders to help in controlling the military. However, before that can occur, legislators must realize that such control is necessary and, just as important, that it does not imply meddling.