Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2000

Publication Citation

36 Stanford Journal of International Law 23 (2000)

Abstract

Solutions to the problem of international bankruptcy are generally framed as either universalist (arguing that international bankruptcies should be administered in a single forum) or territorialist (arguing in favor of multiple local bankruptcies). This article seeks to expand this debate by using traditional conflicts theory to examine the problem of cross-border bankruptcy. It analyzes the current regime under which cross-border bankruptcies are administered in U.S. courts, concluding that this regime operates as a multilateralist (jurisdiction-selecting) regime. Concluding that multilateralism is an appropriate method for resolving choice-of-law issues in international insolvency, the article analyzes some possible refinements to the current system. It argues that a more pointedly multilateralist approach would better serve the goals of the international bankruptcy regime.