53 Federal Communications Law Journal 427 (2001)
This Article argues that the congressional delegation of public interest authority to the FCC likely violates the nondelegation doctrine that inheres in the constitutional separation of powers scheme and that, even if the courts do not hold the public interest delegation unconstitutional, Congress should revise the Communications Act to set forth more specific guidance for the FCC. In today’s environment of “convergence,” in which competition is flourishing across communications sectors, Congress should not shirk its responsibility to establish fundamental policy for an industry that contributes so much to the overall health of our economy. This Article argues that Congress should not wait to be compelled by the courts to replace the public interest standard with more specific guidance to the FCC, guidance which hopefully will provide an unmistakable roadmap toward a deregulatory end game consistent with a competitive marketplace.
May, Randolph J.
"The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?,"
Federal Communications Law Journal:
3, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol53/iss3/3