58 Federal Communications Law Journal 263 (2006)
This brief Article responds to Randolph May's article, Recent Developments in Administrative Law-The FCC's Tumultuous Year in 2003: An Essay on an Opportunity for Institutional Agency Reform, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1307 (2004). Taylor disputes May's anecdotal evidence that the FCC's poor handling of the Triennial Review and the media ownership proceedings are symptomatic of a broad agency inefficiency that should be remedied by drastically cutting the size of the FCC and placing it under the exclusive control of the executive branch to ensure electoral accountability. Taylor argues that while these suggestions may have value, such a rush to action should not be premised on anecdotal evidence, but instead must rest on a more empirical, objective undertaking that would study the FCC's track record. Furthermore, Taylor points out that there are numerous other avenues for reforming the communications regulatory regime: Congress, states, and international organizations. Taylor concludes by analogizing the United Kingdom's OFCOM to the FCC proposed by May. He argues that though OFCOM's centralized structure and greater accountability have advantages, it also results in a more partisan regulatory process with less transparency. Further, the delays and inefficiencies that May criticizes in the FCC may be inherent in any agency decisionmaking that solicits and invites public comment, regardless of the agency's structure.
"Rethinking Reform of the FCC: A Reply to Randolph May,"
Federal Communications Law Journal:
2, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol58/iss2/3