

Fall 1994

Global Migration and European Integration

Guy de Lusignan
Indiana University

Follow this and additional works at: <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls>



Part of the [Immigration Law Commons](#), and the [International Law Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

de Lusignan, Guy (1994) "Global Migration and European Integration," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 12.

Available at: <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol2/iss1/12>

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.



JEROME HALL LAW LIBRARY

INDIANA UNIVERSITY
Maurer School of Law
Bloomington

Global Migration and European Integration

GUY DE LUSIGNAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Is it not ironic? Over the same period, the Cold War ends with the implosion of the communist bloc, the Berlin Wall falls, and the European Single Market and the European Economic Area come into being. The western world rejoices at the birth of new democracies and "Euro-optimism" reaches a climax with the European Council of Maastricht. However, this period is also marked by the resurgence of nationalism accompanied by the most gruesome civil wars and ethnic cleansing operations in Europe since World War II.

The free movement of people and the opening of borders within the European Union raise fears in the Member States of renewed waves of legal and illegal immigrants and of refugees seeking political asylum. Political uncertainties in our present world economy appear more serious than under communism.

Without a doubt there is a global migration crisis. First, since 1960 over 35 million people from the developing countries have taken up residence in the industrialized economies (including about 6 million illegally) and approximately 1.5 million more join them each year. Second, as a result of poverty, drought, and ethnic and civil wars, there are migratory movements within the developing countries as well as redeployment of populations in central and eastern Europe (for instance, following the reunification of Germany and the return of former Soviet Union soldiers to Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine). Third, 12 to 15 million people are internally displaced in developing countries and about 14 to 16 million more can fairly be termed political refugees, five percent of whom find their way to the rich countries.¹

* Visiting Professor, Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs (SPEA), Bloomington, formerly Deputy Director, Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, Washington D.C.

1. The United Nations Development Program Human Development Report 54-55 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. Report].

All these movements are seen by many in the West as a serious threat to the region and its wealth. Europeans in particular are worried

at the increasingly ominous evidences of a new migration of peoples from the east and from the south. There is more to this than xenophobia. As the Modern Age began five hundred years ago, the danger of invasions of Europe (a recurrent danger that had existed for more than a thousand years) began to vanish. At the end of the Modern Age that prospect, though in different forms, appears again.²

This paper will first discuss four main reasons for concern. Secondly, it will reflect briefly on the cases of Africa and France.³ The third and final part will conclude by giving a response to global migration from a European perspective.

II. FOUR REASONS FOR CONCERN

A. *The Population Issue*

World population increased from 2 to 4 billion people between the 1920s and the mid-1970s. In 1990 world population was estimated at over 5 billion. The population of the twelve members of the European Union was estimated at 345 million in 1992, that is, 6.5% of total world population, compared with 9.6% in 1960. It is projected that by 2025 world population will be around 8.5 billion while the population of the twelve members of the European Union will decline, both as a percentage of total world population (to 4%) and in absolute numbers, dropping to 340 million.⁴

As is clear from these numbers, Europe's population, like that of North America and of Japan, is aging. In the course of the early years of the next

2. JOHN LUKACS, *THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND THE END OF THE MODERN AGE* 195 (1993).

3. The author is deliberately not discussing the migration aspects in unified Germany in light of the excellent paper published in this Journal by Professor Jost Delbrück. Jost Delbrück, *Global Migration—Immigration—Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept of the Nation-State*, 2 *IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.* 45 (1994).

4. STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 1992 REPORT 80-93 [hereinafter EUROSTAT].

century (2000-2020), it is expected that the over-sixty age group will grow from 22% to 27% of the population. The active group, aged between 20 and 59 and whose numbers will drop from 55% to 53% of the population over the same period, will have to take care of the older group. Furthermore, they will have the burden of supporting and educating the under-twenty age group, a group whose numbers will also drop over the period from 23% to 20% of the population.⁵

Population pressure, as the consequence of increased poverty in the least developed countries as well as in the industrialized countries, has produced legal and illegal immigrants and refugees, shanty towns, ghettos, urban criminality, unemployment, and homelessness. Population pressure and high unemployment nourish hopelessness and despair among the youth who do not see a bright future. This bleak reality stimulates them to lash out desperately and viciously at the symbols of consumer society.

As Europe's people age and their fertility rate declines, population growth, particularly in the southern Mediterranean basin and in sub-Saharan Africa, may produce a mass migration into western Europe.⁶ Similarly, as insecurity and political instability prevail, minorities in central Europe will flee west for fear of oppression and wars. This is not confined to Europe only; similar fears have prompted immigration movements from Haiti and central America to North America.

B. The Unemployment Crisis

The industrialized and rich economies, especially in western Europe, have been hurt by the most serious unemployment since the Great Depression. Seventeen million people, more than 11% of the labor force, are unemployed in the European Union today. Recession and loss of jobs have stricken all classes and employment categories: from young university

5. See *id.* at 80-93.

6. This points to the need for immigration into western Europe, particularly beyond the years 2000-2025. Despite the present unemployment, immigrants will be needed to fill jobs such as those involved with taking care of the elderly. This view is shared by some scholars, see, e.g., Thomas Straubhaar, *Allocational and Distributional Aspects of Future Immigration to Western Europe*, 26 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 462, 477-78 (1992), but it is contended by others that a "considerable reserve of . . . labor in Europe . . . yet remain[s] to be mobilized." David Coleman, *Does Europe Need Immigrants?*, 26 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 413, 433 (1992).

graduates to unskilled and skilled manufacturing workers to mid and high-level cadres, technicians, managers, and professionals.

C. *Economies in Transition*

The economies in transition of the former Soviet Union—above all Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus—face increasing difficulties. Most of the population of these countries does not understand, or rather does not accept, the implications of democracy, development, and free-market economy resulting from the end of the Cold War and of communism, namely a shift out of the “command economy” or “State capitalism.”

People in these countries resent the reforms that their leaders claim are necessary to become full partners in a free-market world economy. The people are also not prepared to make more sacrifices than those they made under the earlier regime. Some even say that they were better off under the old regime, as harsh and oppressive as it was.

Thus, the results of recent parliamentary elections (e.g., in Russia) show how the people do not want to face the reasons for their predicament. A zone of uncertainty has arisen that is a potential source of destabilization and unrest. This zone also threatens European integration and peace.

D. *Income Disparities*

However, in the long run the most daunting worry is the persistent disparity of income between the poorest and the richest. The one billion people constituting the lower 20% of world population contribute only 1.4% of world gross national product (GNP), 1.0% of world savings, and 1.3% of world investment. As for the upper 20%, who number less than one billion, their share is 82.7% of world GNP, 81.2% of world trade, 94.6% of commercial lending, 80.6% of world domestic savings, and 80.5% of world domestic investment.⁷

This disparity is where the danger lies. This is what is likely to put at stake the future of world peace and the stability of the global economy as the twenty-first century approaches. It is no wonder so many are discussing the fear of clashes of civilizations or cultures.⁸

7. U.N. Report, *supra* note 1, at 34-38.

8. See generally LUKACS, *supra* note 2; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*,

III. CASES IN POINT: AFRICA AND FRANCE

A good illustration of this trend in immigration issues is the case of Africa and France. France still entertains close ties with Africa for historical and sentimental reasons.

African migration movements would in themselves be worth a paper. For the sake of brevity and conciseness it should be stressed here that Africa continuously experiences intercontinental flows of political refugees or others in addition to those who result from regional and interregional tribal wars. These occurrences result from the marginalization of African "nation-states" following the aftermath of independence. African "quasi" States, to use the expression of Ari Zolberg,⁹ have permitted their governments to open diplomatic representations with their "special" friendly countries, especially those within the U.N. system, so that they might take part in an intense dialogue with the Bretton Woods Institutions. Yet, despite their resources and the ingeniousness of their people, these African States have been discredited by autocratic-"kleptocratic" regimes that have plunged them, over the last two decades, into economic and political chaos and social degradation.

People flee sub-Saharan Africa for several reasons, the first of which is to seek jobs and food in Europe and to send money back home. Second, when they acquire full residency, they bring their family to their new "home." People flee also for fear of war, of ethnic cleansing, or of political instability.¹⁰ Finally, they flee, and may do so in larger numbers in the future, because integrist and fanatics shatter their citizens' hope for peace, freedom, and a better quality of life.

In Europe, France has the longest and most diverse immigration experience. For the last two centuries, France has shown itself ready to grant political asylum to all opponents of oppression, injustice, and totalitarianism. After World War I, when heavy casualties precipitated a

FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, 23; Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 44, 48.

9. See Aristide R. Zolberg, *Changing Sovereignty Games and International Migration*, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 153, 168-69 (1994).

10. Despite a few encouraging signs, the democratization process in sub-Saharan Africa still leaves a lot to be desired. One gleam of hope is the elections and constitutional changes in South Africa, which are the outcome of seventy years of fighting against apartheid. These events could have an extraordinary influence in other parts of Africa.

serious domestic population decline, France opened to migrant labor. First came the Italians and the Poles, then the Spaniards following the Spanish War, and after World War II and the rise of the decolonization movements, workers came from Africa. More recently, France has attracted immigrants from Asia (namely Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Vietnam) and from central Europe, as have other members of the European Union.

Many of these workers, including Africans from both north and south of the Sahara, settled in France and obtained either permanent resident alien status or citizenship. Moreover, until recent legislative changes, citizenship came automatically to their children born in France. According to former territorial legislation based on *jus soli*, any child born in France of foreign parents became French without any special procedure, provided the parents had resided primarily in France for the preceding five years. It is interesting to note that children of Algerians born after January 1, 1963, are French as long as their parents were born before July 3, 1962, when Algeria was part of France. Today one million French people are descendants of north African migrant laborers, a substantial group of which is less than twenty-five years old and plays an important role in French social, political, and youth movements.¹¹ In sum, today about 14 million people—that is, one quarter of France's population—have a grandfather, grandmother, father, or mother who was an immigrant and thus are French citizens under *jus soli*.¹²

Furthermore, what has turned migration into a migration *crisis* is the flow of illegal immigrants and of refugees (particularly those from African countries and from other developing countries) who request political asylum but who in so many cases are in fact "illegal economic workers." In addition, since 1989-1990, refugees from the former Yugoslavia and from Romania have exacerbated the traditional flows of asylum and job seekers

11. They are part of those 600,000 young people who worry about jobs and a safe future. Many of them, graduates, students, school drop-outs, and unemployed, demonstrated in March 1994 with courage and determination in Paris and in other important cities of France against the unemployment crisis and the inefficiency of the government.

12. In addition, there are 3.6 million foreign residents in France: 1.6 million are nationals from other European Union (EU) members; 2.1 million are nationals from non-European Union members, of whom 1.3 million are north African nationals. Less than half of this foreign population—1.6 million—are women, both from EU and non-EU countries. Finally, each year about 100,000 foreigners obtain French nationality through naturalization. See Philippe Bernard, *Polémiques à Strasbourg*, LE MONDE, May 10-11, 1992, at 9; Philippe Bernard, *L'immigration de travailleurs n'a jamais cessé*, LE MONDE, Dec. 17, 1992, at 12; Philippe Bernard, *Des modalités d'entrée et de séjour beaucoup plus restrictives*, LE MONDE, June 11, 1993, at 9.

from sub-Saharan Africa. From a broader perspective, the question to address is whether migration represents a threat to the notion of a nation-state other than from an "anthropological" viewpoint, that is, the fear of the "decay" of the species: the "fear that a certain race or culture will be overwhelmed in a sea of 'lesser' peoples."¹³

In our globally interdependent economies, the notions of national sovereignty and of nation-state are becoming illusory; yet, too many people still want to think otherwise. For decades French authorities have demonstrated a sad inconsistency in very willingly accepting foreigners while, at the same time, expressing regrets and xenophobia.¹⁴

Last year's reform of French immigration legislation, prompted by conservative Minister of Interior Charles Pasqua, was endorsed by most parties with the exception of those from left and center-left wings. This fact is very revealing of the present climate in France. Indeed, demonstrations in France against immigrant communities, mostly Arab or black African, are condemned by political parties regardless of their political coloration. Still, the main objective of the present French conservative government is to keep the extreme right-wing parties from exploiting the deteriorating situation for *electoral* purposes. In other words, there is a demonstration of political concern over immigration growth, but none of these concerns stems from humanitarian or democratic considerations.

Since January 1, 1994, French authorities have taken measures to restrain illegal immigration and to control the entry of refugees. In addition, the French Minister of Interior also wants to make it harder for *legal* immigrants to acquire French citizenship, especially those from Arab or Islamic countries. New policies reduce work permits, refuse visas for family reunification, and prevent additional wives from polygamous marriages from entering the country. These policies thus give enforcers less flexibility than in the past in applying *jus soli*.¹⁵ Furthermore, the policies are unwise when viewed in light of previous demographic surveys of the French

13. See PAUL KENNEDY, *PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY* 39 (1993).

14. The French have always fought against racism and fascism. This fact has not prevented the split in French society regarding the independence of Algeria, between those in favor of keeping Algeria as part of France and those against it. Similarly, the history of Vichy France, Pétain, and the French pro-Nazi militia, perturbs the French public.

15. In its annual report published in March 1994, the French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights condemned the Pasqua Law on immigration, this law being in contradiction with the right of expatriation or the "right to leave" as per article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Estimates compiled in 1991 show that depending on the extent of the drop in the domestic fertility rate, France will require after the year 2000 around 150,000 and 165,000 immigrants per year, half men and half women.¹⁶

IV. A CRITICAL VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE

Similar feelings and policies toward immigration are found among other members of the European Union, for example, in Germany and in Italy. Among the EU nations, migration is a very high-risk, complex, and politically charged issue, one that implicates a range of other diplomatic, social, and economic issues. What follows is a critical analysis of some of these issues and a listing of some suggested solutions.

First, since 1992, borders are open in theory and may be crossed with no controls for European citizens. From the start, however, the free movement of persons has raised serious problems. Controls and protections are needed against drug smugglers, illegal immigrants, terrorists, and political refugees. In particular, the Convention of Schengen of 1985 was aimed at harmonizing restrictions among the twelve members of the European Union (especially for asylum seekers), and at assuring that no refugee wins asylum by coming overland through another country that had not granted asylum.¹⁷ Yet the Convention has had no practical effect because the police forces of EU nations lack adequate computing information systems. Another explanation could be the difficulties in trying to apply the Convention in the context of differing national laws, traditions, and political concerns.

Second, without agreeing with John Lukacs that the "respect for the Europe of Brussels is melting away perhaps even faster than the respect for the League of Nations had [sic] before the Second World War,"¹⁸ we cannot but deplore, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the EU nation-states' lack of courage, hesitation, and incoherence at the outburst of nationalism and of ethnic cleansing. In the Balkans, traditional, calculating,

16. See *ÉCONOMIE ET STATISTIQUE*, July 1991 (Report of the French Institut National De La Statistique et Des Études Économiques).

17. Out of the twelve Members of the European Union, nine have signed the Convention, while the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland have opted out. T.M.C. ASSER INSTITUUT, *FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN EUROPE: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCES* 39, 51 (1993).

18. LUKACS, *supra* note 2, at 196.

short-sighted, pre-World War II diplomacy seems at first to have overtaken a sense of "Europeanness" without which European integration will reach a dead end. This fact is not only regrettable but unacceptable and incomprehensible. In this regard we fully share the views of scholars such as Jürgen Habermas, who said:

[W]e really have to start taking the phenomenon of a multicultural society seriously. In Europe, the composition of the population is changing and this is taking place in a difficult economic climate with high unemployment and an impression conveyed by the media that ethnocentrism and the nation are once again a matter of central importance. [At the same time, there is a manipulation in countries of immigration where] xenophobic sentiments can be used as a safety valve for growing discontent.¹⁹

Habermas's remarks are quite in line with those of others who argue that our western democracies are facing dual crises of confidence: a crisis of society vis-à-vis its institutions and its political class, and a crisis of the citizenry (communities, masses) among themselves.²⁰ These crises explain the inefficiency and the insecurity, particularly in the countries facing change and economic transition. For migrants and refugees, it has become a crisis of solidarity. A similar situation exists for Africans and Arabs in France who feel rejected both within and outside French society.

Presently, academics in Europe hold essentially similar views on the tragic events in central Europe (for example, Bosnia) and in Africa (for example, Rwanda). Passions and anxieties arising among both the "rich" and the "poor" may further fuel individual violence and may lead to a return to man's most primitive destructive and barbarian instincts.²¹

This is the meaning of unrest and civil wars in the former Marxist-Leninist block (e.g., Armenia, Georgia, etc.), in addition to the tragedies in the Balkans and in Africa. The racist movements and violence in western Europe against immigrants and refugees, such as in Germany in 1993

19. "More Humility, Fewer Illusions" *A Talk Between Adam Michnik and Jürgen Habermas*, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 24, 1994, at 24, 25.

20. See, e.g., Pierre Hassner, *Un entretien avec Pierre Hassner: Nous entrons dans un nouveau Moyen Âge*, LE MONDE, Oct. 27, 1992, at 2.

21. See Guy de Lusignan, *Political Conditions of Development: Africa in the Year 2000 and Beyond 22*, in READINGS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, Paper #32, Jan. 1994).

against Turks and Vietnamese, are more than an anticipation of what could happen on a wider scale in the course of the next century should nations fall back into renewed nationalistic violence as a result of political shifts, such as those of the latest elections in Italy or Russia.

Third, there is a most provocative thought—that of a new “*Limnes*” or border that might inspire the richest countries (with their own internal problems and their own poor) to block migration from poorer countries. Recalling Rome’s destruction of Carthage as its attempt to protect the Empire, the West also might be tempted to raise a “divide” to protect itself and its civilization from the “new barbarians,”²² for instance by establishing new international relations and privileged bonds with “buffer” States, free zones, or ports around a delineated border.²³ While such “protection” would be hateful and unrealistic, another danger should also be prevented: the temptation of regional, political, trade blocks such as NAFTA, the European Union, and the Pan East Asian group with their respective associated partners, to live in autarky and act in an atmosphere of competing hegemony.

In conclusion, the integration of Europe has come to a crossroads. It is sufficient to emphasize the inconsistency between the aspirations toward a “European Consciousness” and a political union, and the determination among most governments to preserve the privileges of the nation-state against the global interests of the European Union and of its members. At the moment when the European Union must decide upon a further enlargement, when a European Parliament welcomes newly elected parliamentarians and receives increased responsibilities, the leadership of the Union appears shaken.

Not only will the “new” configuration of Europe be determined by the limits of European enlargement, but equally important will be: what kind of Europe the Europeans want or are ready to accept, and how can they express their preferences about it? In other words, how does Europe see itself in the twenty-first century? Will Europe not also become socially and

22. JEAN-CHRISTOPHE RUFFIN, *L'EMPIRE ET LES NOUVEAUX BARBARES RUPTURE NORD-SUD* 145 (1991).

23. Actually this thought seems similar to Huntington’s point in *Clash of Civilizations*, *supra* note 8, regarding the reappearance of the ideological division of Europe between western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, and referring to William Wallace’s eastern boundary of western Christianity in the year 1550. See WILLIAM WALLACE, *THE TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN EUROPE* 16-17 (1990).

ethnically different—not only economically different—from twentieth century Europe? As for the future of the nation-state, at least in Europe, is it not tied to the future constituent powers of the European Union?

Indeed, the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and its implementation demonstrate the difficulties of European integration. Europeans have seemed bruised since the end of the Cold War despite the climax reached when the treaty was signed. Stanley Hoffman wonders whether European integration is only the toy of technocrats in Brussels and of politicians in the capitals, “a purely economic and bureaucratic construction that shows few signs of becoming a nation.”²⁴ This raises one of today’s most serious problems for a united Europe: its “democratic deficit.” Indeed, the issue of a greater involvement of the people of Europe in “common European” activities is of paramount importance for the future of the integration. Not only should the actual powers of the European Parliament be further reinforced, but the chairmanship of the European Council and of the Commission should also become accountable vis-à-vis the European citizenry. Since this is not at all the case today, it appears imperative to protect and enhance further European identities, as a group of nations, of regions, and of cultures. If the nation-state has become “relativized” within the context of a single market,²⁵ a larger span of freedom has to be given to the local authorities so that Europeans who retain their national citizenship have the real feeling that they are part of the decisionmaking and implementation processes. Indeed, this should be conceived at the regional or provincial level (for example, in Catalonia, Lombardia, the Flemish and the Wallon provinces, Scotland, and Wesphalia).²⁶ Through decentralized participatory democracy within the Union, nations may become somehow revitalized, provided they act in favor of the Union and not against it.

Nevertheless, there remains the everlasting issue of the worldwide economic and social disparities that are conducive to migrations and conflicts. At the end of the day, this issue can be solved and consolidated

24. Stanley Hoffman, *Goodbye to a United Europe?*, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 27, 1993, at 27, 31; see also Stanley Hoffman, *Balance, Concert, Anarchy, or None of the Above*, in *THE SHAPE OF THE NEW EUROPE* 196, 194-220 (Gregory F. Treverton ed., 1992).

25. See Zolberg, *supra* note 9, at 162.

26. I would admit gladly that this argument merits a much more in-depth analysis. It encompasses the limits of the notion of Europeanness as well as its coexistence or cohabitation with its peers in the western world.

only by two parallel sets of imaginative and aggressive policies. The first set, the easiest, would involve a comprehensive reappraisal of multilateral and bilateral aid to make it more effective and more coherent to the aspirations of the people of developing countries, and more respectful of the limits of growth.²⁷

The second set is much more complex and difficult. It will require a better understanding of the costs and benefits of free trade among countries and their political trading blocks—their corresponding “common markets” or economic-monetary unions. The people of the industrialized countries will have to acquire better skills and be better trained in high technology and services in order to get jobs, and they must accept that their future lies outside of manufacturing and farming. Only through these efforts can the people of the industrialized countries remain competitive and continue to earn the high wages they receive relative to other countries, for instance, those in central and eastern Europe.

Countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Chile, and Mauritius have demonstrated how to achieve sustainable development and have become highly competitive. Thanks to their high performance ratings, they are coming closer to the industrialized economies. Thus, their experience has to benefit those countries who have not yet succeeded and whose population growth, political instability, and non-development are at least partly responsible for global migration.

In short, only through better and more efficient trade relations and aid policies is global migration likely to stabilize in the long term. Meanwhile, the people of the developing countries will have to adapt themselves to a new concept of international affairs, one that is no longer dominated by east-west confrontation nor based on a north-south dialogue. They will need to continue to make the necessary adjustments in institutions, capacity-building, and in governance. This will not be achieved overnight and thus these countries will not quickly put an end to migrant labor.²⁸

27. In particular, the respective roles and procedures of the European Union, the United Nations, and the Bretton Woods institutions should be seriously reconsidered.

28. For instance, east-west migration is likely to continue but governments should respond with a stricter system of regulating legal *and* illegal immigration while recognizing the economic benefit of such immigration. The European Union should encourage free trade beyond the present European Economic Area and it should support major aid packages that will introduce reforms in the economies in transition. See RICHARD LAYARD ET AL., EAST-WEST MIGRATION 52, 63 (1992) (a report of the World Institute for Development Economics Research).