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Disciplining Corporate Boards and Debtholders Through Targeted Proxy Access

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Disciplining Corporate Boards and Debtholders
Through Targeted Proxy Access

MICHELLE M. HARNER*

Corporate directors committed to a failed business strategy or unduly influenced by the company’s debtholders need a dissenting voice—they need shareholder nominees on the board. This Article examines the biases, conflicts, and external factors that impact board decisions, particularly when a company faces financial distress. It challenges the conventional wisdom that debt disciplines management, and it suggests that, in certain circumstances, the company would benefit from having the shareholders’ perspective more actively represented on the board. To that end, the Article proposes a bylaw that would give shareholders the ability to nominate directors upon the occurrence of predefined events. Such targeted proxy access would incentivize boards to manage difficult operational and financial situations more proactively, while creating a reasonable oversight mechanism for shareholders if those efforts fail. Moreover, the urgency of a company’s situation when a targeted proxy access provision is triggered may warrant more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements, thereby more readily introducing the shareholders’ perspective into distressed situations. These refinements to traditional proxy access methodology also could benefit companies considering or adopting general proxy access. Nevertheless, the Article suggests that targeted proxy access is a more tailored solution that mitigates many of the concerns articulated in the proxy access debate and provides a better balance between management autonomy and accountability.

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INTRODUCTION

The corporate boardroom is not for the faint of heart. Corporate directors frequently are called upon to make real time decisions involving complex financial and operational matters. The stakes are high, and the choices are hard. Directors are required to act in the best interests of the company, but conflicts of interest, lenders or investors with different agendas, or other factors may influence their judgment. And once directors have made a decision and committed to action, it is frequently difficult to reverse course.

Consider RadioShack Corp., a ninety-four-year-old company sold through a chapter 11 bankruptcy case and now existing as a shell of its former self. Prior to the bankruptcy, RadioShack was slow to innovate, suffered eleven consecutive quarters of losses, and experienced significant turnover in key executive positions. Yet despite these warning signs, RadioShack churned along and continued to hold onto hope of a turnaround. The company’s last effort to achieve that objective was financed through a rescue loan package that ultimately led to the bankruptcy sale.

Perhaps RadioShack was destined to fail: the victim of an all-too-familiar creative destruction story of an industry (i.e., brick-and-mortar electronics stores) that had outlived its useful life, being replaced by new, more modern forms of product delivery. Alternatively, perhaps internal conflict or outside influences stymied the board of directors, which failed to implement a creative reconstruction plan that would have better positioned the company for the new economy. Could a new or different perspective have presented better prospects of saving RadioShack? This Article suggests that the answer is “yes,” and it underscores the value of, and the role for, shareholder

1. See infra Parts I.A–I.B.
2. The difficulties in changing course may stem from a variety of factors, including operational challenges and commitment bias on the part of the directors and management team. See infra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
3. For a detailed case study of RadioShack, see infra Part II.D. The purchaser in the bankruptcy sale bought RadioShack’s trademark and 1733 of RadioShack’s more than 4000 stores. Lisa Fickenscher, RadioShack Has a New Strategy After Its Brush with Death, N.Y. Post (Nov. 26, 2015, 8:19 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/11/26/radioshack-has-a-new-strategy-after-its-brush-with-death/ [https://perma.cc/2QU7-3CRS] (noting scope of bankruptcy sale); see infra Part II.D. The remaining stores were closed, causing thousands of employees to lose their jobs, lessors to lose rental income, and suppliers to lose a customer. See Fickenscher, supra.
4. See infra Part II.D
5. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPERTEVER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950) (explaining creative destruction generally as the “process of industrial mutation . . . that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
nominees on the board in such a situation. It further suggests the use of a well-crafted proxy access bylaw to implement the proposal. 6

Boards of directors do represent the interests of shareholders generally, but that perspective can become lost in the complex and often time-sensitive situations facing corporate boards, particularly in times of financial distress. A targeted proxy access bylaw would allow eligible shareholders to nominate candidates for the board precisely at a time when others—lenders, distressed debt investors, or special interest groups—may have the board’s attention. 7 A more direct shareholder perspective could act as a counterbalance to the external, frequently biased interests represented by these other players, providing boards with greater leverage in negotiations and possibly more restructuring alternatives.

Shareholders of public companies are increasingly using shareholder proposals to seek bylaws that would grant proxy access to certain categories of shareholders in all director elections. 8 The most common proxy access proposals allow shareholders owning at least three percent of the company’s stock for at least three consecutive years to nominate a certain number of director candidates. 9 The nominating shareholder typically must make specific representations and disclosures in connection with the nomination, and the company must include the nominating shareholder’s statement in support of the nominees in its proxy materials. 10 Not all companies,

6. In an ordinary election proxy, the company (through its current board) identifies individuals to nominate for open board seats and includes the names of these individuals in the company’s proxy materials, including the company’s proxy card. Shareholders may use the proxy card to vote for directors in lieu of attending the annual meeting. “Proxy access refers to shareholders’ ability to nominate directorial candidates of their choice to the corporation’s proxy statement.” Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 1259, 1260 (2009).

7. See infra Part II.B.


9. These guidelines generally follow the proxy access rules announced by the SEC in 2010. See infra Part III.A; see also, e.g., SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, MEMO SERIES THE 2015 Proxy Season: Proxy Access Proposals (2015), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/firmmemo_07_30_15_proxy-access-proposals.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KD8-5A3L] (outlining the general terms of proxy access bylaws proposed to, and adopted by, companies); Bo Becker & Guhan Subramaniam, Improving Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2013) (noting that in the context of the 2012 proxy season, “[t]he two successful proposals both imposed an ownership threshold/holding period requirement of 3%/3 years, identical to the abandoned Rule 14a-11, while all of the unsuccessful proposals had lower thresholds, typically 1%/1 year” (emphasis in original)).

10. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2015) (setting forth Schedule 14N, which applies to nominations under proxy access bylaws and includes various disclosures by the nominating
however, are willing to adopt such bylaws; indeed, not even all shareholders support proxy access on such a blanket basis.

The views on proxy access vary both in the business community and academic literature. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) generally supports proxy access meeting certain criteria, including the three percent, three-year ownership provisions discussed above. In fact, ISS released guidelines indicating that it may recommend a vote against directors if a board’s implementation of proxy access contains certain provisions that it views as problematic. On the other side of the debate, the Business Roundtable has suggested that “companies may have no choice but to consider litigation” to keep shareholders’ proxy access proposals off their ballots.” The voting results on proposed proxy access bylaws suggest that institutional shareholders tend to support such proposals more readily than retail shareholders.

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12. ISS suggests that it “may issue an adverse recommendation if a proxy access policy implemented or proposed by management contains material restrictions more stringent than those included in a majority-supported proxy access shareholder proposal with respect to the following . . . .” INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 11, at 19. The examples provided include ownership requirements above the three percent, three-year levels, aggregation limits below twenty shareholders, and restrictions on the number of directors to be nominated by shareholders below twenty percent of the board. Id. at 19–20.


Moreover, some large shareholders have adopted a case-by-case approach to assessing proxy access proposals.15

Academics and other commentators acknowledge various advantages and disadvantages to proxy access. Supporters argue that proxy access can facilitate greater director accountability, enhanced communications among directors and shareholders, and general governance efficiencies.16 Those who oppose proxy access emphasize that it can distract directors and management, allow special interests to gain board representation, and add unnecessary cost and delay to the election process.17 As with most worthy debates, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle and depends on the particular company, its unique circumstances, and the makeup of its shareholder base.18

The targeted proxy access proposal suggested by this Article strikes an appropriate balance among these competing considerations. It would not grant proxy access in all cases. To the extent a company is doing well, the management of the company should be in the hands of the board and management team without the potential distraction and costs of shareholder proxy access. If the company experiences difficulties that are not timely addressed, however, shareholders should have greater access to the ballot to facilitate and assist in the company’s turnaround efforts. Both boards and shareholders may be able to support such a balanced approach.

Notably, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a kind of

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15. Institutional shareholders and private funds typically scrutinize proposals and consider the need for the bylaw and the terms of the proposal. See, e.g., David Benoit, BlackRock Takes Its Own Advice on Proxy Access, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Oct. 7, 2015, 4:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/10/07/blackrock-takes-its-own-advice-on-proxy-access/ [https://perma.cc/C2A8-EAAB] (noting that BlackRock was giving its shareholders an opportunity to vote on a proxy access proposal at its annual meeting and that, with respect to other companies, “BlackRock and others have said they’ll review each company’s proposed rule individually”).

16. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. L. 329 (2010) (advocating for proxy access as a default regulatory rule and outlining governance benefits); Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 824–30 (highlighting benefits of proxy access in context of increasing board-shareholder dialogue); Fairfax, supra note 6 (positing that proxy access is more effective than other shareholder governance tools).


contingent proxy access in 2003 that would have given shareholders the ability to nominate directors through the proxy statement under certain circumstances unrelated to a company’s financial health.\(^{19}\) Although some opposed the concept, others supported such a refined approach to proxy access.\(^{20}\) Similar to the SEC’s 2003 proposal, the targeted proxy access discussed in this Article rests on the notion that not all companies may benefit from proxy access in all cases. The targeted proxy access proposal, however, differs from the prior SEC proposal in two important respects: companies and shareholders would implement such proxy access through private ordering (and not federal regulation), and they would tailor the triggers to the particular company, avoiding the complexity and uncertainty that plagues a one-size-fits-all approach.\(^{21}\)

The effectiveness of targeted proxy access would depend largely on the terms of the bylaw itself, which should be drafted and evaluated on a company-by-company basis. In general, the triggers for proxy access should be objective and well defined—for example, a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a restructuring, refinancing, or forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or a certain number of consecutive quarters of significant losses.\(^{22}\) The Article draws on concepts and terminology familiar to public companies under the disclosure guidelines established by the SEC for the Form 8-K: Current Report to guide the applicable triggers.\(^{23}\) The bylaw also should seek to align the interests of the company and the shareholders eligible to nominate directors once the bylaw is triggered.\(^{24}\) Accordingly, both the percentage and duration of ownership should be considered; proponents of targeted proxy access could follow the three percent, three-year ownership model currently invoked in many proxy access proposals, or they could recognize the urgency of the triggers and invoke more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements and an accelerated nomination process akin to that granted preferred stockholders under many certificates and exchange listing requirements.\(^{25}\)

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19. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,680–81 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (explaining the triggers under the 2003 proposal as (i) one of the company’s nominees “received withhold votes from more than 35% of the votes cast at an annual meeting” or (ii) a shareholder proposal to adopt a shareholder nomination procedure “received more than 50% of the votes cast on that proposal at the meeting”).

20. See id. at 56,681.

21. Id.

22. See infra Part III.B (including proposed language for a targeted proxy access bylaw).


24. See infra Part III.B.

25. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00(C) (2016), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanual_313.00&manual=lcms/sections/lcm-sections/ [https://perma.cc/XKD6-AJ55] (“Preferred stock, voting as a class, should have the right to elect a minimum of two directors upon default of the equivalent of six quarterly dividends. . . . The preferred stock quorum should be low enough to ensure that the right to elect directors can be exercised as soon as it accrues.”); see also infra notes 211–19 and accompanying text (discussing potential modifications to shareholder
In addition to proxy access mechanics, the Article emphasizes the importance of detailed shareholder disclosures and position statements to the utility of targeted proxy access. Shareholders nominating directors should be required to provide at least two kinds of individual disclosures: (i) information about their own holdings to allow boards and other shareholders to evaluate whether the interests of the nominating shareholders are generally aligned with the company, or whether the nominating shareholders instead hold an adverse agenda; and (ii) the qualifications, experience, and other relevant information about their nominee(s). Shareholders also should endeavor to submit a position statement for the proxy materials that supports their nominees and explains their justifications for the requested change in leadership.

As discussed in Part I.B, information provided to shareholders by management may be biased or limited in scope and perspective. The Darden Restaurants, Inc. case study set forth in Part II.C illustrates the problems posed by such limited disclosures and how more robust disclosures by a shareholder in the context of a proxy contest may assist a company and its shareholders. Admittedly, boards and management resist competing informational disclosures in proxy materials. Nevertheless, on balance and in cases of underperforming management or distressed situations, such disclosures challenge management to make better decisions and encourage shareholders to hold management accountable if warranted. The case studies and targeted proxy access discussed in this Article highlight the potential value to proxy access in distressed situations, whether under a targeted or a more general proxy access bylaw. The design of targeted proxy access, however, offers incentives and benefits not available through more traditional, general proxy access methodology.

Despite the potential value of targeted proxy access, boards, shareholders, and other stakeholders may demur. Boards may be hesitant to cede control, even when their performance or the challenges faced by the company suggest a new approach or perspective is necessary. Shareholders may believe the proposal is too limited and that they should have greater access to the ballot regardless of how the board and company are performing. And other stakeholders (e.g., bondholders or employees) may question shareholders’ interests in the company as the company’s financial distress grows more severe. The proposal considers these and other potential barriers to the effectiveness of targeted proxy access. Importantly, the proposal incorporates important safeguards and strikes a balance based on an objective that benefits all sides: a profitable and stable company. A board of directors of a company with a targeted proxy access bylaw will have every incentive to manage the company’s operational and financial challenges more proactively and avoid the triggers of the bylaw. Shareholders and other stakeholders of that company should be well served by eligibility requirements, including the mandated holding period, to allow more effective shareholder intervention in times of distress.

26. See infra text accompanying notes 217–19 (discussing proposed disclosures in more detail and their relation to the disclosures required by the SEC’s Schedule 14N under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101).
27. See infra Part I.B.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra Parts III.B–III.C.
30. See infra Part III.C (examining the potential implementation challenges to the targeted proxy access proposal).
as a result, with shareholders having appropriate recourse if management fails in those efforts.\textsuperscript{31}

Part I of the Article frames the primary underlying issue: potentially ineffective or conflicted decision making by boards of directors, particularly in times of financial distress. This section provides an overview of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties and explains how those duties fail to provide adequate guidance in certain circumstances. Part II then discusses in more detail one such circumstance—boards making decisions in the presence or under the influence of activist investors. Notably, both shareholder and debtholder activism can impact board decision making. This section sets forth two different case studies—one of Darden Restaurants, Inc. and one of RadioShack Corp.—to illustrate different approaches to activism and potential consequences for the targets. Part III draws on the prior sections, including the case studies, to develop the justifications for, and key features of, the targeted proxy access bylaw. The Article concludes by discussing the potential value for all stakeholders of the additional information and new perspectives offered by targeted proxy access and the presence of shareholder nominees on the boards of distressed companies.

I. THE PROBLEM: FIDUCIARIES SERVING MULTIPLE MASTERS

A board of directors manages the affairs of the corporation for the benefit of the corporate entity and its shareholders.\textsuperscript{32} This division of management and ownership creates agency costs, as no one shareholder necessarily has the economic incentive to monitor the board and hold it accountable.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, a board must possess a certain level of autonomy to govern a corporation effectively.\textsuperscript{34} Striking the

\textsuperscript{31} As a company’s insolvency deepens, shareholders arguably have less of an interest in the company and may have skewed incentives with respect to the company’s alternatives for preserving value. Accordingly, the timing of any shareholder intervention is an important consideration in designing and implementing targeted proxy access. Part III.B proposes triggers that permit shareholder intervention during the early stages of financial or operational distress. It also proposes limitations on that access as a company’s financial condition deteriorates. \textit{See, e.g., infra note 212.}

\textsuperscript{32} State law generally delegates all management authority to the board of directors of the corporation. \textit{See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction . . . . of its board of directors . . . .”). A company’s insolvency may impact the beneficiaries of directors’ duties. \textit{See infra note 40.}


\textsuperscript{34} \textit{See, e.g.,} Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, \textit{Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board}, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 424 (2001) (“Rather than being agents, directors play a role that more closely resembles that of an autonomous trustee or fiduciary who is charged with serving another’s interests.”); Donald C. Langevoort, \textit{The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
appropriate balance between board autonomy and accountability is an ongoing challenge in corporate governance law.  

A company experiencing financial distress perhaps illustrates this challenge most vividly. The board of a distressed company needs the financial flexibility to, for example, incur additional debt or refinance old debt; change operational course; and implement layoffs, consolidations, closures, or other restructuring decisions. Nevertheless, the extent of each of these measures and what is reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances are in many respects subjective determinations. Many questions arise: Is the board jeopardizing the long-term health of the company by implementing short-term remedies? Is the board moving too slowly or too quickly? Who is benefiting most from the board’s decisions—shareholders, creditors, or the board?

State corporate law attempts to guide a board’s determinations in these and other scenarios through either common law or statutory fiduciary duties. Board members and senior officers generally owe a duty of care and loyalty to the corporate entity and its shareholders. Financial distress not only blurs the boundaries of these

Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 801–03, 813–19 (2001) (explaining the three primary functions of a board, including monitoring, and how an appropriate balance of independent and insider directors can mitigate biases that otherwise impede a board’s effectiveness).


36. For a general discussion of issues facing boards of directors of financially distressed companies, see Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205 (2014). See also Stephen J. Lubben, The Board’s Duty To Keep Its Options Open, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 817, 819 (2015) (“[S]tate corporate law imposes a duty on the board to carefully consider any decision that will foreclose a future board’s choices. In times of financial distress, this duty includes an obligation to carefully consider the effects of a particular decision on future restructuring options.”).


38. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 7–12 (2011) (describing general duties of fiduciaries). Whether directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties are based in common law or statute (or some combination of the two) varies by state. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (2011) (“A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee, in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation.”); Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999) (“Code § 13.1-690(A) does not abrogate the common law duties of a director. It does, however, set the standard by which a director is to discharge those duties.”); see also MODEL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–8.31 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (standards of conduct and liability for directors); Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Weavable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (2011) (“The [Delaware] General Assembly has never addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, leaving that subject entirely to the judiciary, which has likewise largely neglected these duties. The General Assembly, however, has addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate directors, but not to permit curtailing or negating those duties.” (footnote omitted)).

39. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (“In the past, we have
fiduciary duties, but it also creates opportunities for conflicts of interest and self-dealing on the part of multiple parties. This section examines existing checks on a board’s autonomy and accountability, highlighting weaknesses that often lead to corporate governance failures and shareholder loss.

A. Overview of a Board’s Fiduciary Duties

Corporate board members and senior officers are fiduciaries. These individuals generally owe fiduciary duties, including duties of care and loyalty, to the corporate entity and its shareholders. In theory, such obligations should deter misconduct and produce beneficial outcomes. In practice, however, fiduciary duties are limited in implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors. We now explicitly so hold.” (footnote omitted); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). See generally Silberglied, supra note 37.

40. Questions arise concerning whether directors continue to owe their fiduciary duties solely to the corporation and shareholders as the corporate entity approaches insolvency. Some courts suggest that such duties may be owed to the corporate enterprise, which includes stakeholders other than shareholders. The Delaware Supreme Court has clarified “that the creditors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency have no right, as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the corporation’s directors.” N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007); see also Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]e hold that there is no fiduciary duty prescribed under California law that is owed to creditors by directors of a corporation solely by virtue of its operating in the ‘zone’ or ‘vicinity’ of insolvency.”). The Delaware Chancery Court has further explained that creditors may bring derivative claims against corporate officers and directors for alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties when the corporation is insolvent and that such standard does not require the corporation to be “irretrievably insolvent.” Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 556–61 (Del. Ch. 2015).

41. Silberglied, supra note 37.

scope and effect, as well as by the reality that the decisionmakers are human, and there rarely is one correct answer.

The duty of care requires board members and officers to serve the corporation in good faith and with the same level of diligence, care, and skill of a reasonably prudent businessperson. Although the standard sounds stringent, a board’s duty of care and resulting decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, which is a rebuttable presumption that the board acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the best interests of the corporation. Plaintiffs typically find it difficult to overcome the directors are interested or lack in board composition, see

43. See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 785 (2011) (arguing that “the board of directors in a large public corporation is ineffective to perform the functions assigned to it and should thus be eliminated in favor of a governance system that more accurately reflects corporate decision making”). For in-depth discussions of limitations on board effectiveness based on board composition, see Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127 (2010); Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1453–56 (2011).


45. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[T]t appears that directors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances. Their duties are those of control, and whether or not by neglect they have made themselves liable for failure to exercise proper control depends on the circumstances and facts of the particular case.”).

46. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“The business judgment rule has been well formulated by Aronson and other cases[ that it] ‘is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.’ [. . .] Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process
the business judgment rule and succeed in litigation against corporate directors and officers, unless the plaintiffs can demonstrate a breach of the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty is fairly broad and encompasses self-dealing, conflicts of interest, and bad faith. Importantly, alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty are not protected by the business judgment rule.

The literature concerning fiduciary duty litigation suggests that relatively few judgments are entered against corporate directors and officers. Rather, such litigation often is resolved in favor of the defendants at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage, or settled prior to trial. Most of the literature also questions the value of any judgment or settlement to the corporation because—the monetary component typically covers primarily attorneys’ fees, and the promised corporate governance reforms are either of nominal impact or already in place. Two notable exceptions to this general rule are in the context of governance failures and securities litigation: the outside directors of WorldCom and Enron agreed to pay approximately $24 million and $13 million, respectively, to settle securities class action litigation against them relating to collapse of their companies.

that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available." (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (omission in original)).

47. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labelled the business judgment rule.”).

48. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith. . . . ‘[A] director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.’” (quoting Guttmann v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).


50. Id. at 59 (“Under any formulation of the business judgment rule, it operates as a defense asserted in shareholder derivative actions that challenge a decision made by a corporation’s board of directors. Procedurally, defendants have been allowed to assert their business judgment defense on a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, and at trial.”(footnote omitted)).

51. See generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007) (studying risk factors relevant to directors’ and officers’ liability insurance markets and analyzing merits and results of director and officer litigation); Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) (discussing general perception that shareholder derivative litigation lacks meaningful value for corporate shareholders and presenting evidence that such litigation may do little to enhance corporate governance measures at targeted firms).

52. See, e.g., Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057, 1059 (2006) (study discusses WorldCom and Enron settlements, but finds that such personal liability for outside directors is the exception rather than the rule).
Despite its low success rate, fiduciary duty litigation arguably has a strong deterrent effect. No director or officer wants to be embroiled in years of very public litigation, even if they know they likely will succeed in the end. Moreover, fiduciary duties do provide general guidance for directors and officers—a basic framework for making the tough decisions. Unfortunately, the flexibility in this framework may allow external factors to compromise its utility.

Consider the following two scenarios: In the first, the board is evaluating a sale of the company to an insider. In the second, the board is contemplating a rescue-financing package that will significantly increase the corporation’s leverage and decrease its operational discretion. In both scenarios, the board must balance the interests of the company and its shareholders. Most boards also will at least analyze the impact of the transaction on employees, officers, creditors, and perhaps their own professional careers. The influence of each respective factor on the board’s decision will depend to some extent on the governing law, but likely also will be driven in some part by the parties at the negotiating table.

Notably, existing best practices treat these two scenarios very differently. Many corporations will utilize independent board committees or special approval procedures for interested party transactions to mitigate the influence of external factors in the first scenario. Such protective measures are not the norm, however, in the second scenario. Yet directors in the second scenario may face significantly more pressure from particular interest groups, increased opportunities for conflicts of interest and self-dealing, and arguments that some duties are owed to creditors if the company is in fact insolvent. The next section considers these competing factors and their potential consequences for the company and its shareholders.

B. Additional Challenges for a Board of a Distressed Company

A company experiencing financial distress can invoke a number of alternatives to ameliorate its distress and return to profitability. It can implement operational changes that reduce costs and streamline production or the provision of services. It can sell noncore assets or pursue strategic partners. It also can explore balance sheet

53. See id. at 1056 (“The principal threats to outside directors . . . are the time, aggravation, and potential harm to reputation that a lawsuit can entail . . . .”)

54. Although many states have statutes that permit boards to consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders in making decisions, commentators debate the impact of these statutes (and, notably, Delaware does not have a constituency statute). See, e.g., Andrew Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance 195–99 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 Wash. Forest L. Rev. 761 (2015); see also supra note 40 (discussing directors’ duties in the context of insolvency).


adjustments to enhance liquidity or obtain additional financing until the underlying source of the distress is resolved. Financing alternatives can include a new debt or equity offering, an out-of-court workout with existing lenders, a refinancing with new lenders, or an in-court reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.57

In any event, the board of a distressed company must make difficult choices. The board must, for example, weigh the interests of creditors and shareholders. Financial distress exemplifies the traditional conflict between creditors and shareholders, with creditors often desiring a more conservative course sufficient to pay off the debt and shareholders often wanting more aggressive action resulting in debt repayment and equity value for shareholders.58 The board also likely will consider the interests of the company’s employees and the company’s relationships with suppliers and communities.59 The one alternative that in theory could satisfy all of these competing interests—that is, resolving the company’s financial distress out-of-court through a workout or refinancing that does not require significant closures or layoffs—may not be attainable. Nevertheless, a board may pursue such an alternative at all costs.

In such steadfast pursuit, a board may be justified in its approach, or it may be blinded by heuristics, denial, or the influence of a particular constituent.60 For example, a board and the officers may believe that they have the talent and experience to turn around the company’s financial situation if simply given enough time.61 They may be committed to a particular course of action that they designed and implemented.62 They may not recognize the severity of the company’s financial condition.63 Notably, some or all of these and similar conditions may cause a board


58. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP. L. 491, 514 (2007) (“Once a corporation issues debt, shareholders have an incentive to over-invest in risky projects, while creditors have an incentive to avoid risk. Because shareholders, as residual claimants, share the risk of loss with creditors but reap the gains from success, they have an appetite for risk that increases with leverage.”); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing shareholder-bondholder conflict generally).

59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

60. See supra note 44.


62. See Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783, 796–97 (2003) (discussing framing or anchoring bias as “the tendency to view a given problem in different terms depending on the perspective from which the problem is viewed”).

63. See Harner & Griffin, supra note 36, at 208 (explaining that “[o]strich syndrome refers to management’s tendency to stick its collective head in the sand and ignore the warning signs of financial distress until it is too late to effectively resolve that distress.”).
to back the company into a negotiating corner with lenders, creating a “win-win” situation for the lender and a “partial win-complete loss” situation for the company and its stakeholders.

Why do these conditions create a win-win for the lenders only? It boils down to basic negotiating theory: the lenders have something that the board desperately wants and will give most anything to get; the board also likely has little to offer the lenders in return. The result often is a workout or new financing package that stacks the deck in favor of the lenders, with extremely tight covenants for the company and veto rights for the lenders. If the company is able to use the financing to resolve the underlying distress, everyone wins, including the lenders, who will be repaid in full at extremely high rates. If the company is unsuccessful, the lenders still win, but in this scenario they do not share the victory. The lenders likely will be able to take over the company and either continue to run it for their own benefit (after downsizing or fixing any operational issues), sell it as a going concern (typically at a large profit), or foreclose on the assets for a recovery to the exclusion of all other stakeholders.

From the lenders’ perspective, the win-win scenario described above is fair and equitable, as all parties are getting exactly what they bargained for. Indeed, the lenders generally are entitled to the benefit of their bargain. From the company’s perspective, a win for the lenders only likely means a loss—perhaps significant losses—for the company’s other stakeholders. In particular, the company’s existing shareholders will be wiped out, existing creditors (other than the winning lenders) will receive little if any recovery on their claims, and many (if not all) of the company’s employees will be laid off.


65. This strategy often is referred to as a loan-to-own situation, in which the lender’s primary objective is “controlling and owning the reorganized company upon the debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy.” Michelle M. Harner, Paul E. Harner, Catherine M. Martin & Aaron M. Singer, Distressed Debt Investing, in ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS: INSTRUMENTS, PERFORMANCE, BENCHMARKS, AND STRATEGIES 303, 306–08 (H. Kent Baker & Greg Filbeck eds., 2013) (exploring investment strategies with respect to distressed companies); see also Harner, supra note 57, at 714 (explaining loan-to-own investment strategy).

66. In a bankruptcy case or out-of-court liquidation scenario, creditors are generally paid according to federal bankruptcy law or state law priorities, which pays secured creditors first, followed by general unsecured creditors, followed last by equity holders. There are frequently multiple tranches of creditors within each general category, and each class of creditors must be paid in full before a lower class can receive any distributions. Consequently, in many instances, unsecured creditors receive nominal recoveries and equity holders receive nothing. In addition, employees lose their jobs and trade creditors lose business. See, e.g., Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail To Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 2 (2009) (statement of Steve Cohen, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law) (“Before [its bankruptcy] filing, Circuit City was one of the Nation’s largest retailers, with more than 700 store locations, and more than 34,000 employees. In less than 4 months after
the fault of the winning lenders; these losses are the risk for which the company bargained. The crux of the issue thus lies in the bargain itself. It also suggests that the board and officers need additional information and assistance in making pre-insolvency decisions.

This suggestion does not mean that boards are incapable of serving the corporation’s interests. Many boards are very effective, and most directors work hard to try to get it right. The corporate governance landscape is, however, complicated. Particularly as a company approaches distress, directors are called upon to separate noise from substance. The presence of activists can blur this distinction. Accordingly, the Article next analyzes the role of activists before evaluating tools to improve board decisions.

II. CONFOUNDING FACTORS: ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS AND DEBTHOLDERS

Historically, corporate activism has had a negative connotation and has been most frequently associated with corporate raiders and vultures.67 “Activists” are viewed as threats to existing management with an interest only in short-term profitability and self-benefiting transactions. The corporate raiders of the 1980s often are held up as the face of activism, and “greed is good” is thrown out as its slogan.68

Although there is undoubtedly some truth to that notion, activists are not a monolithic group, and some of their tactics may work to benefit not only themselves, but also other corporate stakeholders. This Part examines the role of shareholder and debtholder activists in corporate America and concludes with a detailed case study of each.

A. Shareholder Activism

Most shareholders, particularly those owning stock in larger corporations, are passive investors.69 They make a fixed monetary investment when they purchase their

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69 For an interesting commentary on the performance of activist versus passive shareholders in 2014, see Stephen Gandel, Passive Investors Crushed the Activists in 2014,
stock, and they then rely on the corporation’s board and officers, and perhaps other investors, to manage and grow the value of their investment. Moreover, many shareholders hold stock in larger corporations through mutual funds or other third-party managed investment vehicles, thereby further removing them from active management of the company. This passive investor model exacerbates the agency costs associated with the American model of the corporation (i.e., separation of ownership and management).

Not all shareholders, however, are passive investors. Some shareholders strategically invest in companies where they perceive a need for change. That change may involve replacing management or the board, pursuing acquisitions or asset dispositions, restructuring operations, or encouraging the company to adopt other measures that arguably would unlock value if implemented correctly. Although some such changes could improve the value of the company over the longer term, many changes have a shorter-term focus.

For example, some activist investors call upon boards to use cash reserves to repurchase stock or make larger dividend payments to shareholders. This move


70. See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808 [https://perma.cc/578V-8FR6]) (“For example, the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization in 1950, to about 67% in 2010. The shift has come as more American families participate in the capital markets through pooled-investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs).” (footnotes omitted)).

71. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.

72. For a general overview of strategies pursued by activist shareholders, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085 (2015); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729 (2008); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. Corp. L. 51, 58–59 (2011). See also ACTIVIST INSIGHT, ACTIVIST INVESTING: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 10–12 (2015) (“Demands for board change have long accounted for the lion’s share of activist campaigns, with M&A-related activity a close second. But a spike in balance-sheet activism in 2013 had returned to normal in 2014, with activists diversifying their objectives to include other governance and more business strategy demands.”).

73. For an example of the debate concerning the impact of activist shareholders and short-termism, compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 449 (2014).

pushes value out to shareholders, but may do so at the expense of the company’s longer-term interests—for example, the company accordingly may invest less in research and development, or in maintenance and upgrade initiatives. The company’s cash reserves also may ultimately prove insufficient to sustain the company through an economic downturn or other unforeseen event. Moody’s has warned bondholders that such uses of a company’s cash may weaken the company’s longer-term prospects and, consequently, its ratings.75

Activist investors also analyze a board’s operational decisions, from the selection of director candidates to how the company makes its products. For example, Elliott Management sent a letter to the board of Citrix Systems suggesting a new plan for operational and managerial improvements.76 This letter stated in part:

Today, Elliott is formally requesting a meeting with the Board to share the details of an operational plan that we believe will create tremendous value for stockholders. What we call the “New Citrix” Operating Plan (the “New Citrix Plan”) was developed through exhaustive research and with the help of a full team of operating partners with proven experience turning around software companies . . . .

The New Citrix Plan is based upon two driving principles: the need for i) fundamental change and ii) effective oversight. The key components for fundamental change are as follows:

1) Implementation of Operational Best Practices: Citrix’s cost structure is the result of years of layered complexity and expenses. The structure has become highly inefficient in terms of actual cost and is also ineffective at generating revenue growth. We have identified numerous opportunities throughout the organization for significant improvement, which we believe will result in both superior revenue performance and a more efficient use of resources.77

The letter identified product management as one such opportunity for operational improvement: “Citrix’s product portfolio is too broad for its scale and contains far too many underperforming product lines that consume valuable resources, have low or negative (i.e., loss-making) return profiles, and serve as distractions.”78 Citrix’s stock price rose after Elliott announced its 7.1% ownership stake and its communications with the Citrix board.79


77. Id. (emphasis in original).

78. Id.

79. See Tiernan Ray, Citrix Surges 7%: Price Targets Zoom as Activists Elliott Call for Change, BARRON’S: TECH TRADER DAILY (June 11, 2015, 12:07 PM), http://blogs.barrons.com
Activism that evaluates and questions a board’s decisions may provide valuable oversight and discipline. For this reason, some commentators herald activism as a necessary and meaningful check on management that enhances management’s accountability. Others perceive activism as a channel for shareholder engagement with management. As SEC Chair Mary Jo White observed in her comments on activism: “Increasingly, companies are talking to their shareholders, including so-called activist ones. That, in my view, is generally a very good thing. Increased engagement is important and a growing necessity for many companies today.” Academic studies also suggest that activism can enhance shareholder value. These commentators raise concerns regarding, among other things, activists’ motivation and their typical focus on short-term returns. The potential misalignment among the interests of the activist, other shareholders, and the corporate entity does undercut any generalization about constructive activism. Nevertheless, as discussed below in Part III, with appropriate safeguards, activism may circumstantially work to serve the interests of the corporation.

https://perma.cc/9MJX-KA9C. Citrix responded to Elliott’s letter with the following statement:

Citrix has always maintained an ongoing dialogue with our shareholders, and we welcome their input. We will review Elliott’s suggestions and respond as we do with all shareholders who engage with us. The Citrix Board and management team continually evaluate ideas to drive shareholder value and are committed to acting in the best interests of all our shareholders.


80. See supra note 72.  
82. See supra note 72; see also Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009) (reviewing literature). For a general description of data showing a short-termism effect, see Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013).  
83. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012); P. Alexander Quimby, Note, Addressing Corporate Short-Termism Through Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2013); Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7TWB-KLGE]; see also Roe, supra note 82, at 987–91 (reviewing literature on short-termism and offering theoretical and factual counterarguments).  
84. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2010).
B. Debtholder Activism

Investors not only pursue activist agendas as shareholders, but also as debtholders. In addition, an investor may hold both stock and debt and use that multitranche investment to further its activist interests and influence over the company. An activist debtholder typically has the greatest leverage once the target company starts to experience financial distress or some kind of liquidity event. In those instances, the debtholder can try to extract governance or transactional concessions from the board in exchange for a forbearance agreement or restructuring of the underlying debt.

One common activist-debtholder strategy is the “loan-to-own” situation. An investor will extend new or additional credit to (or agree to restructure its existing credit with) a company in exchange for covenants in the loan documents that provide the investor with indirect control over decisions such as whether the company can sell assets, pay certain other debt obligations, incur additional obligations, or file a bankruptcy case. The financial covenants also are set fairly tight, giving the company a chance—but not too great of a chance—of meeting its restructuring objectives. The failure of the company to do so basically turns over control of the company and ownership of the assets to the activist debtholder.

A loan-to-own strategy can be effected inside or outside of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. For example, in 2012, Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, Inc.—an ethanol producer in the Midwest—defaulted on its loan obligations and, after receiving a short forbearance agreement from its lenders, initiated a debt-for-equity exchange with its lenders to resolve the default. The lenders received 92.5% of the

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85. See Harner, supra note 57, at 750–54 (explaining activist-debtholder strategies); see also, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009); Casey & Henderson, supra note 42, at 376–83 (discussing creditor influence on firm governance); Michelle M. Harner, Jamie Marincic Griffin & Jennifer Ivey-Crickenberger, Activist Investors, Distressed Companies, and Value Uncertainty, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167 (2014) (detailing an empirical study of the role of hedge fund investors in distressed debt and reviewing strategies and potential impact of such funds); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REV. 115 passim (2009) (discussing creditor influence on firm governance).

86. See infra Part II.D (RadioShack case study); see also Harner, supra note 67, at 162–63 (providing examples of such investment strategies).


88. See Harner, supra note 67, at 165–69 (providing examples of a loan-to-own strategy).

company’s stock, with the remaining equity held by preexisting shareholders. The Aventine’s lenders included several hedge funds and private equity firms. The CEO appointed by the lenders after the change in the ownership was a consultant to several private equity firms, with extensive turnaround experience. In July 2015 Aventine merged with Pacific Ethanol, an ethanol producer in the western United States.

Alternatively, lenders can extend postbankruptcy (a.k.a. debtor in possession) financing to the company to fund a chapter 11 case designed to sell the company to the lenders under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A § 363 sale can be accomplished fairly quickly under existing law, and lenders can acquire exceptionally clean title to the assets through a sale free and clear of all liens and encumbrances under § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. The potential downside to this strategy under chapter 11

90. See S&P Glob. Mkt. Intelligence, supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. The biography of Mark Beemer, former CEO of Aventine Renewable, explained that “Beemer is an advisor to numerous private equity firms in the ethanol space; he is a member of the Turnaround Management Association, the RFA, and the National Grain and Feed Association.” Management Team, AVENTINE RENEWABLE ENERGY, INC., http://www.aventinerei.com/en/about/management_team/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20140306172410/http://www.aventinerei.com/en/about/management_team/].
94. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor, with court approval, to provide certain protections to lenders extending credit to the debtor postpetition. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). Accordingly, lenders often have an incentive to extend such credit. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1905, 1906 (2004) (“[T]he generous terms offered to DIP financers have encouraged lenders to make loans to cash-starved debtors, and that these lenders have used their leverage to fill a governance vacuum that was created by the enactment of the 1978 Code.”). This postpetition financing also may be necessary to fund the debtor’s chapter 11 case to the point of a sale of the company in the case. In fact, the terms of the postpetition facility may require such a sale.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f) (2012) (authorizing asset sales out of the ordinary course of business and free and clear of any liens and interests in such assets, respectively, under certain circumstances). Under Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(2), a debtor typically must provide twenty-one days’ notice by mail of “a proposed use, sale, or lease of property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of business, unless the court for cause shown shortens the time or directs another method of giving notice.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). Nevertheless, courts may approve proposed asset sales on a much quicker basis. See, e.g., Order Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 363, and 365 and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002, 6004 and 6006 Authorizing and Approving (A) the Sale of Purchased Assets Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and (B) Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008), 2008 WL 4385983 (sale approved within seven days of petition date); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing issues with quick asset sales in bankruptcy).
is that most bankruptcy courts require the company to subject the lenders’ bid, which frequently is a credit bid of the amount owed by the company under the loan documents, to a public auction process. For example, an affiliate of Silver Point Capital, which was pursuing a loan-to-own strategy and was the stalking horse bidder in a chapter 11 sale process, lost its attempt to acquire print company Standard Register Co. Silver Point’s credit bid was $275 million, and the winning bid, submitted by the Taylor Company, was $307 million.

Similar to shareholder activism, commentators debate the utility of debtholder proactivity. Debtholder activism that identifies and replaces ineffective or fraudulent management or helps management recognize the advantages of rightsizing the company’s operations through a restructuring may add value for the corporate entity. Debtholder activism that is pursued, however, solely for the economic interests of the activist may significantly undervalue the company or dismantle a company with other viable restructuring alternatives, provided that the company was given sufficient time to restructure. These risks exist because a debtholder looking to buy the company wants to pay as little as possible, which frequently results in a low valuation that wipes out all junior creditors and shareholders. Likewise, a debtholder that

96. See Debtors’ Motion for (I) an Order (A) Establishing Sale Procedures Relating to the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Approving Bid Protections; (C) Establishing Procedures Relating to the Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases, Including Notice of Proposed Cure Amounts; (D) Approving Form and Manner of Notice of All Procedures, Protections, Schedules, and Agreements; (E) Scheduling a Hearing to Consider the Proposed Sale; and (F) Granting Certain Related Relief; and (II) and Order (A) Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets and (B) Authorizing the Assumption and Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in Connection With the Sale. In re Standard Register Company, No. 15-10541, (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 12) Doc. No. 23, 2015 WL 1440853; see also Peg Brickley, Standard Register Files for Bankruptcy with Plans for Sale, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2015, 12:01 FM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/standard-register-files-for-bankruptcy-with-plans-for-sale-1426164844 [https://perma.cc/X6JU-LD92].


99. For example, an activist debtholder often will seek to purchase the company’s assets in a going concern bankruptcy sale by credit bidding the amount of its debt claim against the company. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (authorizing credit bidding by secured creditors). Unless the activist debtholder is also willing to pay cash in amount above its debt claim, the company will not have any cash or assets remaining after the sale to pay the claims of junior creditors or the interests of equity holders.
wants to own the company for strategic reasons (e.g., to prevent competition with another portfolio company or to capitalize on synergies with a certain aspect of the target company’s business) may not only undervalue the company, but also significantly affect the company’s employee and vendor relationships.

The following section details two different situations involving faltering companies and activist investors. These case studies illustrate the potential strengths and weaknesses of activism in this context. They also inform the proposal made in this Article to enhance the prospects of distressed companies and their stakeholders through targeted proxy access.

C. Case Study: Darden Restaurants, Inc.

Darden Restaurants, Inc. traces its origins to Bill Darden, who opened his first restaurant at the age of 19 in 1938. Since that time, the company has expanded and contracted and changed ownership several times. Activist investors have influenced at least some of these changes, particularly in recent years.

Darden’s expansion started with the success of its Red Lobster restaurants in the 1970s. In 1970, General Mills acquired the restaurant chain and, in 1982, introduced The Olive Garden. General Mills spun off Darden in 1995, with Darden becoming an independent publicly traded company on the New York Stock Exchange. Although Darden is most commonly associated with Red Lobster and Olive Garden, Darden has owned (and in many instances continues to own) other well-known niche restaurants, including Bahama Breeze, LongHorn Steakhouse, Smokey Bones, The Capital Grille, and Yard House.

Darden’s first major financial disappointment occurred in 1997, when the company recorded an annual loss of $91.03 million and closed fifty-five stores. This

100. Our History, DARDEN, http://www.darden.com/about/photo_history.asp [https://web.archive.org/web/20150510060813/https://www.darden.com/about/photo_history.asp]. References to Darden before 1995 are to the business operations ultimately owned by Darden after the 1995 spin-off. As described below, Darden, Inc. was not formed until 1995. Id.; see also Gen. Mills Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 8, 1996) (“During the fiscal year ended May 28, 1995 the company spun off its restaurant operations as a separate, free-standing company, Darden Restaurants, Inc.”).


102. Id.


setback was, however, temporary, and Darden was able to remedy most of the problem through operational improvements at its Red Lobster and Olive Garden restaurants.\textsuperscript{106} The company then experienced a period of continuous growth and increased profits, with only minor interruptions, until late 2007.\textsuperscript{107}

After that time, Darden struggled to meet investors’ and management’s expectations. Operational adjustments, such as opening new “combo” locations featuring Red Lobster and Olive Garden, did not succeed,\textsuperscript{108} and expansion plans failed to boost revenues.\textsuperscript{109} Darden entered a particularly tumultuous period in late 2012 and 2013.\textsuperscript{110} Darden reported a 37.6% drop in first-quarter profit in 2013 compared with

restaurants in the United States and Canada, and sixteen Olive Garden restaurants in the United States).

\textsuperscript{106} Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 5–6 (Sept. 25, 1998) (discussing in Exhibit 99 press release that there was fifty percent growth in first quarter earnings and double-digit increases in comparable restaurant sales).


\textsuperscript{108} \textit{See} Sandra Pedicini, \textit{Darden Restaurants Tests Combo Olive Garden/Red Lobster for Smaller Markets}, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 24, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-01-24/business/os-hybrid-olive-garden-red-lobster-20110124_1_red-lobster-olive-garden-darden-restaurants (https://perma.cc/NK3B-4MC2) (reporting that Darden was pairing its two marquee brands in single-building locations in markets that could not support separate locations for the two); \textit{see also} Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1–2 (July 18, 2014) (describing these locations as “synergy restaurants” housing a Red Lobster and Olive Garden in the same building and noting that of six “synergy restaurants,” two were closed in anticipation of the sale of Red Lobster and the remaining four would be converted into Olive Garden restaurants).


\textsuperscript{110} \textit{See} Darden Rests., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (July 18, 2014) (describing and anticipating the economic conditions that could interfere with performance). For example, on the same day in September 2013 that the company announced weak first-quarter earnings, the company also announced that it was cutting eighty-five jobs at its Orlando headquarters and the retirement of its second-in-command, COO Drew Madsen. Sandra Pedicini, \textit{Darden Restaurants Reducing 85 Corporate Positions; COO Drew Madsen Leaving}, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Sept. 20, 2013), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-09-20/business/os-darden-layoffs-20130920_1_darden-restaurants-olive-garden-central-florida-restaurant-professor
that same period in the previous year.111 Although analysts had expected earnings of 70–72 cents per share in the first-quarter of 2013, the actual mark was well below that at 53 cents per share.112 The company’s stock dropped 7% the day the news of the weak earnings and job cuts broke and closed at $45.78 per share.113 Notably, although Darden’s bigger name brands struggled in the first quarter of 2013, Darden’s specialty group out-performed them, showing a 0.5% rise in sales.114 This likely fueled activist investors’ later calls for big-brand spinoffs.

In December 2013, Darden tried to calm investors’ unrest and calls for change with a restructuring plan aimed at increasing shareholder value.115 The major prongs of Darden’s plan included spinning off its Red Lobster brand and reducing new unit expansion.116 Darden was under continuing pressure from one of its shareholders, Barington Capital Group, to spin off its underperforming chains.117 News of the planned spin-off and worse-than-expected earnings drove the stock price down by 5% to $50.17.118

Shortly after the company’s announcement, another shareholder, Starboard Values LP, came out against the Red Lobster spin-off.119 Starboard owned approximately 6.2% of Darden’s stock at the time,120 and it had been lobbying Darden “to consider other options, such as splitting off its property as an independent real estate investment trust.”121 Darden ignored Starboard’s suggestions, even though

[https://perma.cc/93D5-KG6F]; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Sept. 20, 2013, 7:35:45 AM).

111. Pedicini, supra note 110; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 20 (Sept. 30, 2013).

112. Pedicini, supra note 110; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 20 (Sept. 30, 2013).

113. Pedicini, supra note 110.

114. Id.; Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99 (Form 8-K) 1–2 (Sept. 20, 2013, 7:34:25 AM) (providing a press release on first-quarter sales from Darden’s specialty restaurants reporting “same-restaurant sales increases of 3.2% at The Capital Grille, 2.7% at Bahama Breeze, and 2.1% at Eddie V’s, offset partially by declines of 4.4% at Seasons 52 and 1.5% at Yard House”).


118. Id.


120. See Sharf, supra note 119.

Barington ultimately supported Starboard’s request for a shareholder vote on the proposed spin-off. Darden spun off Red Lobster without a shareholder meeting or vote. Starboard ultimately pursued and won a proxy battle to take over Darden’s board by nominating a slate of directors to replace all twelve members.

To support its proxy contest, Starboard produced a 294-slide presentation that walked shareholders through Darden’s missteps, both financial and operational, and offered concrete solutions to improve the company’s performance. For example, two slides, titled “Breadsticks: just one example of food waste,” explained how Olive Garden’s practice of serving its unlimited breadsticks in excessive quantities beyond the customers’ requests or needs reduced margins and profitability. Another slide then suggested the consequences:

/darden-investor-starboard-starts-proxy-battle-over-red-lobster.html [https://perma.cc/2QV2-L8ED], Starboard asserted that Darden was selling Red Lobster for just $100 million more than the value of the chain’s real estate, which could be sold tax-free. Darden disagreed with Starboard’s analysis, asserting that the proposed sale would generate about $1.6 billion in proceeds. Darden planned to use $1 billion of the proceeds to retire debt and the remainder to fund a share buyback program of as much as $700 million. See Sharf, supra note 119; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Exhibit 99.2 (Form DEFA14A) (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:48:53 PM) (providing a presentation discussing Starboard’s proposal).


124. See Turner, supra note 121; see also Darden Rests., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 16, 2014).


126. Starboard Value, Investor Presentation, supra note 125, at 104–05.
Despite having far more stores than any of its peers, Darden does not show economies of scale in food costs. In fact, Darden’s food costs are near the highest in the industry. . . . We believe the primary driver of Darden’s food cost problem is poor execution and discipline around food waste, portion size, and preparation.127

Starboard ended the slide presentation with a summary of “Why Darden is compelling,” Starboard’s priorities, and its plan for the company.128

Although Darden reported losses for the second quarter of fiscal year 2015 (i.e., the first quarter following the board’s replacement),129 it has consistently outperformed since.130 Darden reported improved revenue and sales for the third and fourth quarters131 and was identified as one of the “hottest dividend stocks of 2015.”132

**D. Case Study: RadioShack Corp.**

Similar to Darden, RadioShack has a long history dating back to 1921, when it opened as a small shop in Boston.133 The company initially focused on radios, expanding to other audio equipment in the 1950s and then to electronic calculators and computers in the 1970s.134 RadioShack experienced financial distress early in its lifecycle; in fact, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy when Tandy

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127. *Id.* at 102 (emphasis omitted).
128. *Id.* at 286.
130. See, e.g., Press Release, Darden Rests., Inc., Darden Restaurants Reports Fiscal 2017 First Quarter Results; Increases Earnings Outlook for the Full Fiscal Year; and Announces New Share Repurchase Authorization (Oct. 4, 2016), https://investor.darden.com/investors /press-releases/press-release-details/2016/Darden-Restaurants-Reports-Fiscal-2017-First-Quarter -Results-Increases-Earnings-Outlook-For-The-Full-Fiscal-Year-And-Announces-New-Share -Repurchase-Authorization/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/J32Y-VPKY] (“I’m pleased with our performance during the quarter and the progress we made against our strategic initiatives,” said CEO Gene Lee. ‘We continued to gain market share and our same-restaurant sales growth outperformed the industry by a considerable margin. We also returned significant capital to shareholders in the form of our regular dividend and $196 million in share repurchases.’”).
Corp. purchased it in 1963. Tandy was able to turn around the company by branding it as a “hobby store”—a place where you could purchase whatever you needed to build the latest gadget. The strategy was successful, and the company grew from 100 stores in 1966 to over 1000 stores by 1971. It also started generating a profit just two years after the Tandy acquisition.

For most of the 1970s and 1980s, RadioShack was the store for everything electronic. It was able to stay ahead of the curve and capture the market on new innovations such as the the CB radio, the personal computer, and the cellular phone. RadioShack began to falter, however, in the 1990s, and it never really regained its footing.

RadioShack’s management tried altering the company’s offerings and business model to improve the company’s overall performance. By the late 1990s, RadioShack stopped manufacturing personal computers and cellular phones, and it began opening big-box type retail stores that each specialized in certain electronic products. The concept stores experiment failed, and each was shuttered or sold by the end of the 1990s.

RadioShack’s permanent decline began in 2005, with significant management turnover and increasing diminution in value. From 2005 to 2014, the company experienced six changes at the CEO position, and its shares lost almost all of their value. The company also experienced eleven consecutive quarters of losses before

135. See Brustein, supra note 133 Tandy was a leather company, which was trying to diversify in the 1960s. Tandy ultimately exited the leather industry in 1975 and focused on the electronics side of the business. Tandy was publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and it changed its name to RadioShack in 2000, then trading under the symbol RSH. See A Brief History of RadioShack, RADIOSHACKCATALOGS.COM, http://www.radioshackcatalogs.com/history.html [https://perma.cc/3B2D-KABS].

136. See Brustein, supra note 133.

137. See id.


139. See Brustein, supra note 133; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138.

140. See Brustein, supra note 133; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138; see also Tandy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 30, 1994) (discussing various stores in Item 1 and divestiture of computer manufacturing businesses and cellphone manufacturing business in sections on “Discontinued Operations” and “Sale of Joint Venture Interest”).

141. See Davidoff Solomon, supra note 138; see also Tandy Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 5 n.6 (May 12, 2000) (titled 1996 Business Restructuring).

142. See Brustein, supra note 133; Anne D’Innocenzo & Michelle Chapman, RadioShack Stock Closes Below $1 per Share, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER (June 20, 2014), http://www.staradvertiser.com/breaking-news/radioshack-stock-closes-below-1-per-share/ [https://perma.cc/E222-BLYC] (“RadioShack’s stock closed below $1 per share Friday for the first time in its history, reflecting investors’ concern over what lies in store for the long-struggling consumer...
filing for bankruptcy in early 2015.\textsuperscript{143} Notably, RadioShack did not file for bankruptcy quietly—it tried vigorously to avoid it.\textsuperscript{144} The question becomes whether those efforts and the prebankruptcy actions of its lenders helped or ultimately hurt the company and its shareholders.

As RadioShack struggled to rebrand itself in 2012 and 2013, it secured a financing package of $835 million to refinance its existing debt and provide additional liquidity.\textsuperscript{145} The package consisted of a $585 million secured credit facility provided by a group of lenders led by GE Capital and a $250 million term loan provided by Salus Capital Partners, LLC.\textsuperscript{146} Both loans contained a number of restrictive covenants, including one that limited the number of stores that RadioShack could close in any fiscal year.\textsuperscript{147} This particular covenant would prove problematic.


\textsuperscript{143} See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz & Michael J. de la Merced, \textit{RadioShack Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy After a Deal with Sprint}, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/radio-shack-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8DAJ-4PNW]. The losses also are documented in RadioShack’s public filings for the period beginning in April 2012 and ending with the bankruptcy filing. See, e.g., RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 24, 2012); RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 25, 2012); RadioShack Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 3 (Dec. 11, 2014) (reporting net loss of $161.1 million for the quarter ending on November 1, 2014, compared to net loss of $135.9 million for the quarter ending on October 31, 2013); RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 11, 2015) (announcing filing of Chapter 11).

\textsuperscript{144} RadioShack Corp., Exhibit 99.1 (Form 8-K) (Sept. 11, 2014) (providing a press release titled “RadioShack Reports Second Quarter Financial Results,” discussing restructuring efforts).


\textsuperscript{146} Id.

\textsuperscript{147} Id. at Exhibit 10.1, 66 (sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement between RadioShack and General Electric Capital); id. at Exhibit 10.3, 43 (sec. 5.2(d) of credit agreement between RadioShack and Salus Capital Partners, LLC).

the life of the loan agreement. Salus and Cerberus denied RadioShack’s numerous requests for a waiver of the restriction without certain fees, terms, and conditions, which RadioShack found unacceptable (and expensive). As one commentator observed, “[T]his is also a bit of a game of chicken—if the banks play hardball too much, RadioShack may end up being forced to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which will leave the banks fighting over the scraps.”

Shortly thereafter, RadioShack began exploring financing and restructuring alternatives with one of its shareholders, Standard General L.P. Standard General provided the following description of these discussions in its September 2014 Schedule 13D filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission:

Standard General has been in discussions with the Company regarding a proposal on a business operating plan and certain ways to improve the Company’s liquidity position in advance of the holiday shopping season. Proposals under discussion include Standard General and certain other investors (the “New Investors”) purchasing loans and other commitments under the Company’s asset backed credit facility (the “Credit Facility”) from its existing lenders. Under such a proposed transaction, Standard General and certain other New Investors may propose to subordinate their investment in the Credit Facility to other investors in order to improve the near-term liquidity available to fund the Company’s holiday working capital needs. Pursuant to such a proposal, the investment by the New Investors could be the first step of a broader recapitalization of RadioShack proposed to be completed by early 2015, which may include Standard General and certain other New Investors acquiring preferred equity convertible into common equity, board nomination rights and corresponding changes to the Company’s structure.

Standard General’s Schedule 13D also revealed that it owned 9.8% of RadioShack’s common stock, with related entities owning additional shares and with it having options to purchase three million additional shares. Standard General and a group of investors purchased RadioShack’s $535 million credit facility from GE Capital and immediately amended the facility to provide the company with additional liquidity. The investors also entered into a

149. Harris, supra note 148.
150. See RadioShack Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 8, 2014); see also Committee Rule 2004 Motion, supra note 148, at 12 (“In connection with the October 2014 Transaction, RadioShack incurred $31.8 million in financing fees as well as approximately $142 million in additional obligations, despite the fact that the company had suffered losses in the previous 11 quarters.” (citation omitted)).
151. See Harris, supra note 148 (quoting Anthony Chukumba of BB&T Capital Markets).
153. Id.
Recapitalization and Investment Agreement, under which the investors would convert their debt into a substantial percentage of RadioShack’s equity if certain conditions were met. This additional liquidity infusion allowed RadioShack to operate through the 2014 winter holiday season, but it did not solve RadioShack’s underlying operational and financial problems. RadioShack also failed to satisfy the conditions of the Recapitalization and Investment Agreement.

Accordingly, RadioShack filed for bankruptcy in February 2015. The bankruptcy filing was premised on a prenegotiated sale of the entire company to Standard General and other investors through a credit bid of the prebankruptcy debt held by those investors. The bankruptcy case took several different twists and turns, but Standard General ultimately was the successful bidder for substantially all of RadioShack’s assets.

For purposes of this Article, (GRF), each an affiliate of Standard General. Moreover, other investors were partners or members of GRH and GRF. See Declaration of Carlin Adrianopoli in Support of First Day Pleadings at 7, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Adrianopoli Declaration].

155. See RadioShack Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-3) (Dec. 12, 2014) (describing terms of the rights offering to RadioShack’s “legacy shareholders” (i.e., existing shareholders other than the investor group) and the issuance of convertible preferred stock to Standard General and others in the investor group that would be convertible into 20–50% of the company’s common stock in exchange for debt cancellation if certain conditions were met).

156. See Adrianopoli Declaration, supra note 154, at 14.

157. Id. at 2.

158. See Debtors’ Combined Motion for Entry of Orders: (I) Establishing Bidding and Sale Procedures; (II) Approving the Sale of Assets; and (III) Granting Related Relief, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 5, 2015). “General Wireless [i.e., Standard General] was the stalking-horse bidder for the stores with a bid valued at $145.5 million, comprised of $117.5 million in the form of a credit bid of the credit agreement loans, $18.6 million in cash, and $9.4 million in assumed liabilities.” Alan Zimmerman, Bankruptcy: RadioShack Asset Sale to Standard General Nets Court OK, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2015, 6:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2015/03/31/bankruptcy-radioshack-asset-sale-to-standard-general-nets-court-ok/ [https://perma.cc/UNN7-TLD6]. Standard General’s credit bid was reduced to approximately $112 million based on a dispute with RadioShack’s other prepetition lender, Salus. Id. For example of the various allegations asserted against Standard General and others involved in RadioShack’s prebankruptcy restructuring efforts, see Committee Rule 2004 Motion, supra note 148, at 23–30.

159. See Order Authorizing (I) the Sale of Certain Assets of the Debtors Free and Clear of All Claims, Liens, Liabilities, Rights, Interests and Encumbrances; (II) the Debtors To Enter into and Perform Their Obligations Under the Asset Purchase Agreement and Certain Ancillary Agreements; (III) the Debtors To Assume and Assign Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases; and (IV) Granting Related Relief, In re RadioShack Corp., No. 15-10197(BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 1, 2015); see also Zimmerman, supra note 158 (explaining, among other things, that Standard General’s winning bid also included an agreement with Sprint for a small cash infusion and a commitment to a “store within a store” concept going forward).

160. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 158 (“Despite all the [turmoil] associated with the competition for the RadioShack assets, at the end of the day it would appear to mean little for
it is important to note that although some of the company’s stores continue to operate in a modified form under the new ownership, Standard General was the primary beneficiary of the sale. The corporate entity was not restructured in any meaningful way that benefited its long-term sustainability or the interests of its prebankruptcy shareholders, creditors, employees, and other stakeholders.

E. Takeaways from the Case Studies

The Darden and RadioShack case studies illustrate two very different approaches to activism. Some commentators may find both approaches troublesome, and some may view them as equally valuable. Undeniably, both activists were pursuing strategies that each believed to be in their own respective best interests; acknowledging the self-interest and general motivation to increase the investor’s own return on investment, which are present in all activism, facilitates a more meaningful analysis.

Starboard approached Darden as an owner, offering critiques of management and operations that it believed were depressing the company’s overall value. Starboard not only criticized, but it also offered potential management and operational solutions. It disseminated its analysis and additional information to all of the company’s shareholders. Starboard did not extract any fees or value that would not also be received proportionally by all of the company’s shareholders. Although Starboard’s slate of directors now runs the company, those directors were vetted with and voted on by Darden’s shareholders. Darden also is continuing to operate on a much stronger platform, with improved performance and likely returns to shareholders.

Standard General, on the other hand, first approached RadioShack as a shareholder, but with a plan to own the company’s debt—indeed, a secured position at the most senior level of the company’s debt structure. Standard General does not appear to have offered any operational or restructuring expertise to the company, and it did not facilitate the dissemination of information to other shareholders. Rather, Standard General appears to have situated itself in a position in which it would win regardless of whether the company restructured or not. In addition, at least based on allegations in the bankruptcy case, some investors participating in Standard General’s prebankruptcy extension of credit to the company also sold credit default swaps on RadioShack that would have become payable if RadioShack defaulted prior to January 2015. Consequently, Standard General held multiple positions throughout RadioShack’s capital structure and was focused more on capturing the company’s creditors, most of whom were destined to see a minimal, if any, recovery regardless of who was declared the winner.”

161. At the time of its bankruptcy filing, RadioShack had 4400 company-operated stores, 1100 dealer-franchised outlets, and 21,000 full- and part-time employees. Adrianopoli Declaration, supra note 154, at 3. Reports indicate that Standard General will maintain approximately 1723 of those operating locations. See Zimmerman, supra note 158.

162. See supra Part II.C.

163. See supra text accompanying note 124.

164. See supra text accompanying note 131.

165. See supra Part II.D.

166. See supra note 158.
returns— arguably to the exclusion of all others— through a takeover of the company as opposed to an operational or financial restructuring.

Notably, each of the above investment strategies is well known and used by various entities in the industry.167 This Article does not challenge the validity or propriety of either strategy. The Article does suggest, however, that one form of activism may hold greater value for the corporate entity itself and for more of the corporation’s stakeholders. The challenge is identifying means to encourage a more Darden-like approach to distressed companies, recognizing that not all such efforts will prove successful and that all activism has the potential to reallocate value against the interests of a majority of the company’s stakeholders. The following Part considers the various alternative activist strategies and draws on the case studies to develop and propose the targeted proxy access bylaw—a tool that would utilize the discipline and expertise often present in activism and enhance value for the corporate entity and more of its stakeholders.

III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: PROXY ACCESS WHEN A COMPANY NEEDS IT MOST

Conventional wisdom posits that debt disciplines management.168 Debt financing subjects management to, among other things, conduct covenants, financial and performance metrics, and active oversight by lenders. In theory, such provisions should encourage responsible management and reduce agency costs. In reality, debt financing can cause management to take excessive risks, limit the company’s future operational and restructuring alternatives, and make the company vulnerable to takeover bids by distressed debt investors.169 Accordingly, conventional wisdom may not hold true in every case. A company approaching or facing financial distress may need an appropriate dose of shareholder activism to discipline management and preserve value.


169. As a company incurs more debt to try to prolong its life and fix the financial or operational problems, directors may be more aggressive on the premise that the company and shareholders have nothing to lose. Such conduct, however, can damage any remaining value at the company. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining dilemma faced by directors of distressed companies and basis for theory of deepening insolvency); see also U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Stanley, 297 S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (citing, where creditor brought action arguing that board approved excessive spending, expert report opining that “that despite numerous ‘red flags,’ the directors ‘were in total support of the business strategy of ‘swinging for the fences’ in order to try to pay off the Senior Preferred Stock and return control of [TransTexas] to Stanley’” (alteration in original)).
That said, not every kind of shareholder activism is value enhancing.\textsuperscript{170} The activism needs to fit the problem. In the context of financial distress, the tool should encourage management to acknowledge the company’s issues in a timely manner, to explore all options, and to be open to new approaches and perspectives. It also should strive to enhance management’s leverage in negotiations with creditors and other stakeholders. All too often, management of a financially distressed company has waited too long to address the issues underlying the company’s distress, has borrowed more money to buy additional time, and, as a result, ends up negotiating the end deal with lenders with little or no bargaining power.\textsuperscript{171} As explained below, the targeted proxy access bylaw is designed to incentivize management to proactively manage operational and financial distress and to provide shareholders with access to the ballot when management fails in those efforts.

This Part provides a brief history of proxy access rules and regulations, and discusses the current state of proxy access initiatives. It explores the basic parameters of proxy access proposals and reviews the ongoing debate concerning the utility of proxy access. It then explains the targeted proxy access proposal in greater detail, identifying key elements of such a bylaw, proposed language, and potential implementation issues. It concludes by suggesting the tailored nature of the targeted proxy access proposal better addresses potential governance inefficiencies than more general proxy access initiatives.

\textit{A. An Overview of Proxy Access}

The Darden case study illustrates how activist shareholders can use a proxy contest to effect change.\textsuperscript{172} The typical proxy contest involves an activist shareholder, who likely owns more than five percent of the company’s stock and has made required disclosures under section 13D of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”).\textsuperscript{173} The activist shareholder will initiate (or continue) conversations with management to glean knowledge and begin outreach to other shareholders on an informal basis.\textsuperscript{174} The activist shareholder is careful not to trip the solicitation rules of the Exchange Act until it is ready to begin filing materials with the SEC.\textsuperscript{175} Solicitations may begin prior to the filing of the proxy statement, but the activist

\textsuperscript{170} See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 83–84.
\textsuperscript{171} See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 83–84; see also \textit{supra} Part II.B.
\textsuperscript{172} See \textit{supra} Part II.C.
shareholder must file any written materials used in the solicitation with the SEC.\footnote{176} These additional solicitation materials may contain significantly more information than the proxy statement, as disagreements between the company and the activist shareholder often play out more visibly in “fight letters” and other communications with shareholders that, under the rules, are filed with, but not precleared by, the SEC.\footnote{177}

An activist shareholder pursuing a proxy contest may put forth a full or partial slate of directors to challenge the company’s proposed slate.\footnote{178} The activist shareholder’s proxy materials and proxy card are sent separately from those of the company. In the typical proxy contest, each side bears its own costs, and the contest can be quite expensive.\footnote{179} DuPont Chemical reportedly spent $15 million to defeat a proxy contest launched by an activist shareholder, Trian Fund Management.\footnote{180} Although some data suggest that proxy contests create value regardless of the outcome, proxy contests are rare and may not facilitate a change in the board.\footnote{181}

Not only are proxy contests expensive, they also are often quite ugly.\footnote{182} A proxy contest is by definition adversarial. The company’s directors do not want the activist shareholder’s nominee(s) on the board, and they likely disagree with the facts and arguments asserted by the activist shareholder to support the proxy contest. There are no predetermined grounds for a valid or useful proxy contest. The activist shareholder’s objectives may be bona fide and in the best interests of the company; they

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{176}{See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-12 (2015) (allowing certain kinds of solicitations prior to the filing of the proxy statement).}
\footnote{177}{See John C. Wilcox, Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors: Unintended Consequences and the Case for Reform of the U.S. Proxy System, in SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk ed., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 3), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/proxy-access-roundtable-09-materials/Wilcox,John_Shares.pdf (explaining tools often used by activist shareholders in intense proxy contests).}
\footnote{178}{See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2) (2015) (setting forth proxy requirements).}
\footnote{179}{See Michael J. Goldberg, Democracy in the Private Sector: The Rights of Shareholders and Union Members, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 393, 409 (2015) (“The high cost of proxy fights have made them rare, and this is exacerbated by free rider problems, and rational apathy on the part of shareholders with easy exit available through the Wall Street Rule.”).}
\footnote{180}{See Jeff Mordock, DuPont Spent $15M To Keep Activist Investor off Board; USA TODAY (May 19, 2015, 11:18 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/business/2015/05/19/dupont-spent-15m-proxy-fight/27575179/ [https://perma.cc/THK5-TLVX].}
\footnote{181}{See Donald M. DePamphilis, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring Activities 100 (8th ed. 2015) (citing studies and finding that “[d]espite a low success rate, proxy fights often result in positive abnormal returns to target shareholders regardless of the outcome’’); see also Christopher Takeshi Napier, Resurrecting Rule 14a-11: A Renewed Call for Federal Proxy Access Reform, Justifications and Suggest Revisions, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 843, 867–69 (2015) (reviewing studies assessing value of shareholder contests and suggesting more recent studies indicate value creation).}
\footnote{182}{The public opinion campaign that often accompanies a proxy battle can reach far and wide. See, e.g., Stephen Gandel, DuPont Activist Battle Spreads from Wall Street to Academia, FORTUNE, (Apr. 21, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/04/21/dupont-activist-battle-spreads-from-wall-street-to-academia/ [https://perma.cc/6ZAC-BAZW] (describing the public exchanges and accusations between the activist shareholder engaged in a proxy fight with DuPont and a Yale University professor).}
\end{footnotes}
also may be purely self-motivated and based on agenda adverse to other stakeholders.\textsuperscript{183} Regardless of the objective, the fight that ensues can be very disruptive for the company and its ongoing operations and should not be undertaken lightly.

Proxy access, which generally allows qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain percentage of the board through the company’s proxy materials, does not eliminate the adversarial nature of the process. The simple act of a shareholder putting forth its own nominee suggests a lack of confidence in the current board and directly challenges the board’s management of the company. In most cases, the board likely will oppose the shareholder nominees, and that effort still requires time and money that otherwise could be devoted to the company’s operations. Nevertheless, proxy access can cabin the dispute and mitigate some of the costs associated with a proxy contest.

Proxy access initiatives are not new,\textsuperscript{184} but they garnered increased attention after Congress passed the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd Frank Act”).\textsuperscript{185} The Dodd Frank Act authorized the SEC to adopt proxy access rules,\textsuperscript{186} and the SEC was quick to pass a rule—Rule 14a-11—that required

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{183} See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469–VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *7–10 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (reviewing exchanges between the company’s chair, president, and CEO (William Ruprecht) and the activist investor (Third Point) in the contest of a challenged shareholder rights plan, and quoting Ruprecht as saying, “The motivation for that [proxy] fight is only peripherally about returning capital. It is about being on Sotheby’s Board. Mick McGuire needs that as validation, and Loeb wants that for ego.”); Joe Nocera, \textit{Investor Exits and Leaves Puzzlement}, \textit{N.Y. Times} (May 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/business/30nocera.html?pagewanted=all\&r=0 [https://perma.cc/XYA8-79EW] (noting that activist investor William Ackman “had begun the proxy fight [at Target] not because he had a $1 billion-plus investment in Target shares that was seriously underwater—not at all!—but because ‘we never want Target to be referred to as a “once-great company”’
\item \textsuperscript{184} See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hirsh, supra note 16, at 330 (“The ability of shareholders to place director nominees on the company’s proxy materials is an issue that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has been considering for over sixty years.”); Jill E. Fisch, \textit{The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access}, \textit{61 Emory L.J.} 435, 440–47 (2012) (describing history of proxy access).
\item \textsuperscript{186} See § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012)) (authorizing the SEC to adopt rules that, among other things, include “a requirement that a
public companies to include shareholder nominees in their proxy materials. The legislation and the resulting rule were grounded in general concerns regarding the lack of board accountability during the 2008 financial crisis and a belief by some that proxy access could mitigate that problem. Rule 14a-11 was short-lived, however, as it was successfully challenged in court. The SEC has not taken any further action on a definitive proxy access rule.

In connection with Rule 14a-11, the SEC also passed an amendment to Rule 14a-8 that authorized the use of shareholder proposals to initiate changes to the board nomination process. As the SEC explained:

[W]e are amending Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to preclude companies from relying on Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to exclude from their proxy materials shareholder proposals by qualifying shareholders that seek to establish a procedure under a company’s governing documents for the inclusion of one or more shareholder director nominees in the company’s proxy materials.

Under the shareholder proposal rules, a company must include the shareholder proposal in its proxy materials unless the company has grounds to exclude it.

solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of directors of the issuer”).

187. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 CFR pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) (“The new rules will require . . . a company’s proxy materials to provide shareholders with information about, and the ability to vote for, a shareholder’s, or group of shareholders’, nominees for director”);


189. See Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156.


191. Companies have tried to exclude proxy access proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(9) (direct conflict; SEC took no position on this exclusion during 2015 proxy season), Rule 14a-8(i)(10) (substantial implementation), and Rule 14a-8(i)(11) (duplication), as well as Rules 14a-8(i)(7) (ordinary business) and 14a-8(i)(3) (contrary to rule), with varying degrees of success. See, e.g., Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing exclusions under Rules 14a-8(i)(7) and 14a-8(i)(3)); SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 9, at 3–8 (reviewing grounds for excluding proxy access proposals); Elizabeth A. Ising & Kasey L. Robinson, Recent Developments Related to the SEC’s Shareholder Proposal Rule, B U S. L. T O D A Y, July 2015, at 1 (discussing exclusion of proxy access proposals and Third Circuit’s Wal-Mart decision).
Shareholders then vote on any shareholder proposals included in the company’s proxy materials at the annual meeting.

Shareholders were slow to embrace the shareholder proposal alternative for gaining access to the company’s proxy materials. They are, however, using it more frequently, with varying degrees of success. The most common proxy access bylaw: (i) requires a shareholder to own a certain percentage of stock (e.g., three percent), (ii) requires the shareholder to have owned the stock for a continuous period of time (e.g., three years), (iii) limits the number of nominees that a shareholder may submit (e.g., twenty percent of the board), and (iv) may limit the number of shareholders that can act collectively as a group.

Companies have responded in different ways to shareholder proposals concerning proxy access. Some have opposed the proposal, some have supported the proposal or reached a settlement with the shareholder, and some have tried to preempt the shareholder proposal by adopting a board-proposed proxy access bylaw. Regardless of approach, many companies appear concerned by, and skeptical of, proxy access bylaws.

B. The Targeted Proxy Access Proposal

The current approach to proxy access is an all-or-nothing proposition. Shareholders either have the ability to nominate directors in the company’s proxy materials or they do not. But such an approach misses a valuable opportunity to tailor proxy access proposals to situations that objectively could benefit the company and strike a more appropriate balance between management autonomy and accountability.

A targeted proxy access bylaw would allow the board to manage the company, free of challenges through proxy access, so long as management of the company was well in hand. The board of a company that is profitable and stable—even if some shareholders believed the company could be doing even better—would not face a challenge through proxy access. Notably, activist shareholders could still launch

192. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. For examples of the literature supporting proxy access, see supra note 16.
193. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
194. For example, during the 2015 proxy season, seventy-eight companies included a shareholder proposal on proxy access with an opposition statement; sixteen companies voluntarily adopted proxy access; six companies negotiated resolutions; seven companies included both a shareholder and a company proposal; two companies supported the shareholder proposal; and one company provided no board recommendation. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 9, at 14–15.
195. For an example of the literature opposing or raising concerns with proxy access, see supra note 17.
196. As noted in Part I and discussed further below, the SEC proposed contingent proxy access in 2003. The target access proposal discussed in this Article, however, differs in significant ways from the prior SEC proposal. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text; see also Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
197. This approach mitigates concerns regarding conflicting interests among a diverse and very dispersed shareholder body, as well as potential short-term objectives of the activist investor. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
campaigns against management, but they would not have the benefit of the company’s proxy materials.\footnote{198} To that end, a targeted proxy access bylaw may deter some campaigns prior to the targeted proxy access trigger. It also may color shareholders’ perspectives of activist campaigns launched prior to a triggering event: Are such efforts for the primary benefit of the activist, or the company and larger shareholder body? A targeted proxy access bylaw also could have a prophylactic effect by encouraging executives to manage difficult operational and financial situations more proactively.\footnote{199} Although management rarely intends to make decisions that worsen the company’s performance or deepen the company’s financial distress, directors and managers often are overly optimistic about their decision-making skills and will take that chance.\footnote{200} Directors and managers may, however, consider a broader range of options to mitigate potential distress, knowing the consequences if they are too slow or too limited in their approach. Likewise, to the extent management tries and fails, the targeted proxy access bylaw would introduce a new perspective and arguably change the tenor of the discussions earlier in the process. Shareholders no longer would have to wait or launch expensive standalone proxy contests to help management implement a turnaround plan. The triggers, if appropriately crafted, would allow more timely intervention.\footnote{201}

The terms of the targeted proxy access bylaw are key to its effectiveness. A board or shareholder proposing such a bylaw needs to consider not only the factors identified above in the context of a more general proxy access bylaw, but also the triggers that would grant the targeted proxy access to shareholders.\footnote{202} Although each company should tailor its bylaw to its particular situation and industry, a proponent of the bylaw should consider the following:

\begin{itemize}
\item For example, activist shareholders may launch a proxy campaign to encourage boards to distribute value to shareholders though dividends or share buy-back plans. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
\item In this respect, targeted proxy access is a form of “offensive” activism. See, e.g., Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1015 (2014) (discussing potential value to offensive activism, including in the context of proxy access); Cheffins & Armour, supra note 72, at 58–61 (distinguishing between offensive and defensive forms of shareholder activism).
\item Conflicts of interest may skew management’s incentives to make good decisions. In addition, hubris also may impede decision-making. For a discussion of conflicts and cognitive biases impacting board decisions, see supra Part I.B.
\item As discussed supra in Part I.B, a board may have “ostrich syndrome” with respect to the company’s financial or operational distress. A board that ignores or delays addressing the company’s financial or operational issues potentially impairs the company’s ability to restructure effectively and subjects the company to significant outside influence from debtholders. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
• **Triggers.** Use triggers that are objective and easy to identify. Triggers could include a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a restructuring, refinancing, or forbearance to avoid a material default under a credit facility or bond issuance; a downgrade by one of the major ratings agencies; or a certain number of consecutive quarters of significant losses (or misses on other significant financial metrics). The concepts of “material definitive agreement” and “direct financial obligation” under the SEC’s Form 8-K, Current Report, could guide the kinds of agreements subject to the triggers.\(^{203}\) A disclosure required by Form 8-K, Item 2.04, Triggering Events that Accelerate or Increase a Direct Financial Obligation, could also serve as a trigger.\(^{204}\) In the case of RadioShack, the company experienced a loss of $139 million, suspended dividend payments to shareholders, and was downgraded by the ratings agencies in 2012–2013.\(^{205}\) Any one (or all) of these events could have triggered a targeted proxy access bylaw. In that instance, one or more shareholder nominees could have been seated prior to the company signing its subsequent financing agreements. The triggers should be designed to give the existing board an opportunity to fix an identified problem, but not prolong and thereby exacerbate the problem. A board proposed bylaw would allow the board to establish reasonable parameters while recognizing some accountability if it fails. For example, a target proxy bylaw could provide:

> **Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company shall include in its proxy statement for [any subsequent annual or special]**\(^{206}\) **meeting of**
shareholders, the name of any person timely\textsuperscript{207} nominated for election (each a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the Board of Directors by an individual Eligible Shareholder or a group of up to [twenty] Eligible Shareholders. [If the Company’s next annual meeting is more than ninety days following the Trigger Event, the Company’s board of directors shall notice a special meeting of shareholders for a date not more than sixty days following the Trigger Event for purposes of implementing this provision.\textsuperscript{208} The Company also shall include the Required Information\textsuperscript{209} in any such proxy statement containing the names of any Shareholder Nominee.

The term “Trigger Event” means (i) a material default or event of default under the Company’s credit agreements, bond indentures, or other material financing agreements [or could use “material definitive agreements”] that is not cured within the grace period provided by the

and until another triggering event. Second, timing matters in distressed situations. Depending on the kinds of triggers, the bylaw could contemplate a special meeting of shareholders within, for example, sixty days of the trigger event to facilitate more timely intervention. See, e.g., \textsc{Del. Code Ann. tit.} 8, \textsection 211(d) (2011) (“Special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws.”). Trigger events designed to identify distress as early as possible may not need such accelerated proxy access.

\textsuperscript{207} The timeliness of the submission is important. Many proxy access proposals use a timeframe similar to advance notice bylaws:

\[\text{Not more than one hundred fifty (150) calendar days and not less than one hundred twenty (120) calendar days prior to the anniversary date of the date (as specified in the Corporation’s proxy materials for its immediately preceding annual meeting of shareholders) on which the Corporation first mailed its proxy materials for its immediately preceding annual meeting of shareholders.}\]

\textsc{Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.}, \textit{supra} note 202, at 13. Notably, shorter time periods may be warranted in the targeted proxy access context, where elections should take place shortly after the trigger event. For example, a thirty-day submission period may work well with a special meeting of shareholders called on sixty days’ notice.

\textsuperscript{208} See \textit{supra} note 206 (discussing timing concerns with the implementation of targeted proxy access and the potential use of special meetings to address these concerns).

\textsuperscript{209} The term “Required Information” should include the Shareholder Information, Nominee Information, and Shareholder Position Statement described below. The following is an example of a definition for Required Information:

“Required Information” that the Corporation will include in its proxy statement is the information provided to the Secretary concerning the Shareholder Nominee(s) and the Eligible Shareholder that is required to be disclosed in the Corporation’s proxy statement by Section 14 of the Exchange Act, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and, if the Eligible Shareholder so elects, a written statement, not to exceed 500 words, in support of the Shareholder Nominee(s)’ candidacy (the “Statement”). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Article II, Section 15, the Corporation may omit from its proxy materials any information or Statement (or portion thereof) that it, in good faith, believes would violate any applicable law or regulation . . . .

\textsc{Whole Foods Mkt., Inc.}, \textit{supra} note 202, at 14.
applicable agreement;\textsuperscript{210} (ii) the Company’s entry into a refinancing agreement, restructuring agreement, forbearance agreement, or similar agreement to avoid or resolve a material default or event of default under the Company’s credit agreements, bond indentures, or other material financing agreements [or could use “material definitive agreements”]; (iii) a downgrade of the Company’s debt obligations of two or more ratings within a consecutive twelve month period by one of the major ratings agencies; or (iv) the Company sustaining net losses, as reflected on its income statement, for four or more consecutive quarters.\textsuperscript{211}

- Alternative Proposal on Timing and Nomination Process. The value of targeted proxy access stems largely from its potential to assist companies in identifying and remedying financial and operational distress in its early stages. Indeed, a company that lingers in distress too long may have no viable restructuring options. In such a scenario, the shareholders arguably have little or no interest in the company; in other words, they have missed their opportunity to add value to the going concern.\textsuperscript{212} As such, the vesting of the right to board representation needs to occur in a timely manner; waiting too long to grant shareholders this right could significantly limit the provision’s utility. Likewise, the right arguably should lapse after a period of unresolved distress. Accordingly, proponents of targeted proxy access may consider a provision similar to that often granted holders of preferred stock—namely, the right to designate two additional directors to the board in a relatively short period of time following the trigger event.\textsuperscript{213} Such a provision could provide:

\textsuperscript{210} A board and shareholders should identify triggers that work best for the company’s business and capital structure and provide sufficient early warnings to allow meaningful intervention in the company’s turnaround. Simply referencing the term “material definitive agreement” may cover all necessary agreements. \textit{See supra} note 203 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{211} A board and shareholders may want to use additional or alternative triggers. Such triggers could focus on Items 2.03 and 2.04 of Form 8-K, or even the company receiving a going concern qualification from its auditors. A company likely would not want to rely solely on the going concern qualification because, depending on the industry and the nature of the company’s operations, such trigger may or may not provide sufficient early warnings of the company’s distress.

\textsuperscript{212} Commentators debate the value of shareholders’ interests in a company as that company approaches insolvency. As explained at Part I, Delaware courts have determined that near-insolvency does not change the focus of directors’ duties. \textit{See, e.g., supra} note 40. Nevertheless, incentives shift as a company approaches insolvency, and shareholders may be willing to take on significantly greater risk than advisable at that point in the company’s lifecycle. In fact, the shareholders’ perspective could become value destructive, rather than value enhancing. For this reason, a company may want to include a safety valve in its targeted proxy access provision that “shuts off” the access after a certain period of time in distress or upon certain objective financial benchmarks. A company and its stakeholders also could at that point mandate the appointment of a chief restructuring officer, or the addition of a restructuring expert or creditor representative to the board, to better represent all interests in what likely will be a liquidation or sale event.

\textsuperscript{213} \textit{See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra} note 25, at
Upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Company’s shareholders shall have the right to elect two additional directors to the Company’s board of directors (“Special Voting Right”). The Company shall include in its proxy statement for any subsequent annual or special meeting of shareholders, the name of any person timely nominated for election (each a “Shareholder Nominee”) to the Board of Directors pursuant to the Special Voting Right by an individual Eligible Shareholder or a group of up to [twenty] Eligible Shareholders. If the Company’s next annual meeting is more than ninety days following the Trigger Event, the Company’s board of directors shall notice a special meeting of shareholders for a date not more than sixty days following the Trigger Event for purposes of implementing this provision. The Company also shall include the Required Information in any such proxy statement containing the names of any Shareholder Nominee. The Special Voting Right shall terminate on a date that is [three] years following the Trigger Event (the “Termination Date”) and the term of the directors then serving pursuant to the Special Voting Right shall end immediately prior to the Company’s next regularly scheduled annual meeting of shareholders.

- **Shareholder Eligibility and the Relevance of the Holding Period.** Include percentage ownership and holding period requirements that align the interests of the shareholder nominating directors with the company; limit the number of nominees that may be submitted by shareholders and included in the company’s proxy materials; and permit, with reasonable limits, participation by groups to allow a more diverse representation of shareholders to participate. These requirements are very similar to the basic provisions included in general proxy access bylaws. Nevertheless, proponents of targeted proxy access may want to ease the eligibility requirements—including the mandated holding period—given the urgency of the issues presented by the Trigger Event. For example, a three-year holding period may impede an activist investor’s ability

§ 313.00(C) (setting forth minimum voting rights of preferred stockholders in listed companies, including the right to elect two directors to the board “upon default of the equivalent of six quarterly dividends”).

214. Proponents of this kind of targeted proxy access certainly could enlarge the number or percentage of additional directors that are elected pursuant to the provision. The mere presence of two dissenting or alternative voices may, however, prove sufficient in many cases. This kind of provision may require an amendment to the company’s bylaws or certificate to enlarge the board as necessary to accommodate the additional directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2011). Proponents also may want to include language that prohibits the Company from otherwise enlarging or altering the number of directors on the board while the provision is in effect.

215. See supra note 207 (discussing the timeliness of submissions).

216. See supra note 206 (discussing timing concerns with the implementation of targeted proxy access and the potential use of special meetings to address these concerns).

217. See supra note 209 (discussing an example of these disclosures).

218. See supra notes 193, 201 and accompanying text.
to use targeted proxy access to the benefit of the company. Thus, even companies with a general proxy access provision may want to provide enhanced access rights in the particular circumstances defined by the Trigger Event. The facts and circumstances of the company’s distress may, on balance, outweigh any short-termism concerns and tilt in favor of a shorter holding period requirement.

- **Shareholder Disclosures.** Require detailed disclosures by the shareholder nominating directors. These disclosures should include not only information about its beneficial holdings in the company, but also any related derivative products, debt, or other interests it may hold, directly or indirectly, in the company. To supplement the disclosures required in Schedule 14N, companies and the SEC may want to consider a definition of “economic interest” similar to the following definition of “disclosable economic interest” under Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure: “any claim, interest, pledge, lien, option, participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or derivative right granting the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value, acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest.”

  Understanding the economic interests of the nominating shareholder and its potential agenda are particularly important in the distressed context, as evidenced by the RadioShack case study.

- **Nominee Disclosures.** Require specific disclosures concerning the nominee, including all relevant information that is provided by the company with respect to its nominees. Notably, the trigger allowing proxy access may help shareholders identify nominees offering skills relevant to the particular issues plaguing the company.

219. See Sharfman, supra note 17, at 410–11.
220. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2016). Schedule 14N and many proxy access bylaws focus on disclosures concerning the nominating shareholder’s ownership in securities entitled to vote, and whether any such securities have been loaned or are subject to a short sale. Although this information is helpful, it does not necessarily provide the complete picture of the nominating shareholder’s interest in the election. For thoughtful articles regarding the issues posed by conflicting and undisclosed ownership positions, see Roberta S. Karmel, *Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?*, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93 (2010); Usha Rodrigues, *Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership*, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011).
221. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. The author is the associate reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, but she was not serving in such capacity when Federal Rule 2019 was amended to include the definition of disclosable economic interest in 2011. See also Harner, supra note 67 (suggesting that the SEC amend Schedule 13D and the related rules to require disclosure of information concerning debt, as well as equity securities).
222. See supra Part II.D.
• **Shareholder Position Statement.** Define the scope (and word count) of the statement in support that the nominating shareholder may include in the proxy materials.\(^{224}\) This may be one of the trickier aspects of a targeted or general proxy access proposal because the information should explain why the shareholder believes a new approach is necessary. Disseminating this competing perspective is important and valuable in the distressed context. Nevertheless, it may also be unpalatable to the board. A company should permit statements—even those adverse to, or critical of, management—provided they are grounded in facts supported by public documents and do not otherwise violate applicable law.\(^{225}\)

The Darden case study illustrates the importance of both timely intervention and the dissemination of information to all shareholders.\(^{226}\) Notably, companies and shareholders can benefit from these attributes of proxy access whether the company proposes a targeted proxy access bylaw or already has adopted a more general proxy access bylaw. Strategic and thoughtful use of proxy access—only when and as necessary—is an important consideration in assessing the value of shareholder intervention. The factors identified in this section with respect to targeted proxy access also can and should guide shareholders in using general proxy access to help companies in operational or financial distress. A key benefit to a targeted proxy access bylaw, however, is that it focuses the use of proxy access on instances that more objectively warrant intervention.\(^{227}\)

**C. Potential Challenges to Targeted Proxy Access**

Notwithstanding the suggested benefits to targeted proxy access, implementation may encounter resistance. For example, boards may oppose such a bylaw because it still impedes on autonomy and, unlike general proxy access, suggests that the board may fail at some point in the future. Likewise, shareholders may not believe the proposal goes far enough. And as with any new initiative, there are costs to being among the first to adopt the proposal, including risks associated with the untested

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225. For example, General Electric’s proxy access bylaw provides: The Eligible Shareholder may provide to the Secretary, within the time period specified in Article VII Section D for providing notice of a nomination, a written statement for inclusion in the Company’s proxy statement for the meeting, not to exceed 500 words, in support of the Shareholder Nominee’s candidacy (the Statement). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Article VII, the Company may omit from its proxy materials any information or Statement that it believes would violate any applicable law, rule, regulation or listing standard. Gen. Elec. Co., supra note 202, at 9.
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. See supra notes 201–06 and accompanying text (discussing competing considerations and balance struck by targeted proxy access).
effectiveness of the concept and increases in the cost of credit. This subpart briefly addresses the potential concerns of each side to this debate.

Proxy access (whether targeted or general) can subject management to increased scrutiny and challenge. General proxy access introduces the possibility that management will devote time and money defending its position and warding off proxy access contests on an annual basis. Under the timeline used in many proxy access bylaws, that could consume three to four months out of every year. That is a significant period of time during which management may be distracted by things arguably external to the core operations of the business. Although hopefully shareholders would be more selective and thoughtful in invoking proxy access rights, the concern has merit.

A targeted proxy access bylaw would mitigate this concern by defining the situations in which proxy access will be available. It would not be an annual contest. It also would be somewhat in the control of the board to manage. A board may not always be able to anticipate events causing operational or financial distress, but it does often have red flags warning of potential problems. A targeted proxy access bylaw may encourage boards to more readily see and address such red flags. That said, the trigger of the targeted proxy access bylaw as the company is facing a distressed situation arguably could be more disruptive than in other circumstances. For this reason, the balance discussed above in defining the triggers is critical.

A shareholder likewise may oppose targeted proxy access in favor of a more general approach that would give shareholders access in any annual election. This perspective is understandable, given that shareholders cannot predict in advance when they would like to intervene more directly in management’s decisions. Activist shareholders do not limit their campaigns to distressed situations. Rather, they often seek changes at companies that otherwise are profitable and stable. Notably, the targeted proxy access bylaw would not prevent them from pursuing those campaigns. It would, however, limit their ability to use the company’s proxy materials to situations defined in the bylaw triggers.

These potential concerns are not new. In fact, some were raised with respect to the SEC’s 2003 contingent proxy access proposal, which would have given shareholders the ability to nominate directors under certain circumstances unrelated to a company’s financial health, as well as during its consideration of Rule 14a-11. Supporters of triggers believed “that such a requirement would serve as a useful indicator of the companies with demonstrated governance issues.” Those who

228. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to general proxy access).
229. See supra notes 202, 207 (providing example of language used in advance notice and general proxy access bylaws).
230. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing management’s delay in addressing distress and harmful effects for company).
231. See supra notes 8, 16, 197 and accompanying text (discussing arguments of proponents of general proxy access).
232. See supra Parts II.A, II.B (discussing various objectives of activist campaigns).
234. Id. at 56,681.
opposed triggers expressed “concern that triggering events would cause significant delays and introduce undue complexity into the rule.” The SEC ultimately elected not to include triggers in Rule 14a-11 because, among other things, it suggested that a limited federal proxy rule might not give full effect to shareholders’ state law rights.

The advantages and disadvantages to targeted proxy access noted in the context of the SEC’s rulemaking process are generally valid points. The question in many ways becomes what are the objectives of federal proxy rules and how can they best protect shareholders’ rights. Shareholders should have the ability to exercise their state law rights to vote on directors. Should they also have the ability, however, to nominate directors in all cases? Part of the related challenge is the diverse and often very dispersed nature of public company shareholders, as well as the fact that shareholders generally owe no fiduciary duties to the company or other shareholders. A company, and arguably even applicable law, better protect the interests of all shareholders if the designated fiduciaries (i.e., boards) have the ability to nominate directors, subject to appropriate safeguards in situations where boards fail in their duties.

Targeted proxy access strikes that balance, pursuing a path in the first instance that allows the company’s fiduciaries to nominate directors and operate the business in the best interests of the company and all shareholders. Individual shareholders who potentially have competing interests or adverse agendas do not initially have those rights, but the board knows those shareholders may gain such rights in certain circumstances. As one proponent of triggers suggests, “‘triggered’ proxy access would give shareholders an avenue for dealing with unresponsive boards, but protect companies from the threat of a proxy access challenge in the absence of a serious governance or strategic matter.”

Interestingly, neither side necessarily wins by adopting a targeted proxy access bylaw, but each side has the potential to succeed in the long run. A board may also proactively adopt a targeted proxy access bylaw to signal strength and confidence to the market, backstopped by the shareholders’ proxy access as defined in the bylaw triggers. Although no board likes to admit the potential for failure, it is a reality of doing business. Targeted proxy access allows a board to define the parameters of the

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. For a thoughtful exploration of shareholders’ rights under state law and how the right to vote and the right to nominate interact, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 Del. J. Corp. L. 117 (2014).
238. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (“Under Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”).
240. Ratings agencies could consider whether companies have adopted targeted proxy access as an appropriate oversight mechanism to protect the company’s financial health in rating a company’s debt.
accountability tool and thereby eliminate the need for a more general proxy access bylaw.

Finally, boards may anticipate lenders increasing the cost of credit if the company adopts a board- or shareholder-proposed targeted proxy access bylaw. This concern, although understandable, does not withstand scrutiny, provided that the bylaw is adopted prior to any operational or financial distress. Lenders extending credit to a financially healthy company likely would view such a bylaw as a neutral or positive attribute.²⁴¹ To the extent the bylaw is appropriately designed, the bylaw also should protect the lenders’ investment and strengthen the company’s ability to repay the debt upon maturity. A distressed debt investor looking to take over the company through a bankruptcy or out-of-court restructuring may not approve of a targeted proxy access bylaw, but such investors often have a different agenda or assessment of the company’s risk profile.²⁴² A distressed debt investor may view targeted proxy access as a potential impediment to a rescue loan or refinancing structure that protects the investor on the downside through significant lender control provisions. Notably, this is exactly the kind of leverage the proposal seeks in part to mitigate.

As with any proposal, the effectiveness of targeted proxy access lies in the details of each company’s bylaw. The underlying objectives of incentivizing proactive management of financial or operational distress and increasing accountability for related failures should guide the development of the proposal. Moreover, these objectives and the balanced approach offered by targeted proxy access make it a useful tool for both boards and shareholders interested in the long-term success of the company.

CONCLUSION

Boards make hard decisions. They are called upon to vet various opportunities and alternatives for their companies and, in the process, must determine the best way forward. Although directors’ fiduciary duties flow to the corporate entity and, in most situations, shareholders, directors’ decisions affect numerous other individuals and entities.²⁴³ The voices and interests of these other parties can make even simple decisions noisy and complex, and may influence directors’ deliberations.

Noise and complexity grow as a company’s profitability shrinks. Boards of distressed companies face competing demands from creditors, shareholders, and employees. The decisions at hand are of the “bet the company” nature, and the stakes are extremely high. Moreover, the directors’ fiduciary duties typically remain unchanged, but the company’s senior debtholders may be the only parties at the negotiating table.²⁴⁴ Boards, their companies, and their shareholders would benefit from activism that balances leverage and also helps boards make better decisions.

²⁴¹ See Jayanthi Sunder, Shyam V. Sunder & Wan Wongsunwai, Debtholder Responses to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund Interventions, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3318 (2014) (“We compare loan spreads before and after intervention and show the effects of heterogeneous shareholder actions. Spreads increase when shareholder activism relies on the market for corporate control or financial restructuring. In contrast, spreads decrease when activists address managerial entrenchment.”).
²⁴² See supra Part II.B.
²⁴³ See supra Part I.B.
²⁴⁴ See generally supra Parts I.B, II.B.
The targeted proxy access bylaw would do exactly that. The proposal would channel shareholder activism to situations in most need of intervention. It would allow qualifying shareholders to nominate a certain percentage of the board, thereby introducing new perspectives and potentially targeted expertise to the board. Importantly, the urgency of the company’s situation when a targeted proxy access provision is triggered may warrant more lenient shareholder eligibility requirements, thereby more readily introducing the shareholders’ perspective into distressed situations. Targeted proxy access also would facilitate the dissemination of additional information to shareholders—information that may counter management’s story and challenge the status quo. Unlike a more general proxy access bylaw, however, directors would not be open to proxy access contests on an annual basis and would face such contests only if they fail to navigate any operational or financial distress in a timely manner.

Although any proxy access can facilitate needed intervention in times of distress, a targeted proxy access bylaw strikes a better balance. It gives a board the autonomy necessary to run a company effectively, but provides a safety valve for shareholders in the event the board fails. Overall, such a bylaw offers a reasonable compromise to the proxy access debate and has the potential to help companies and shareholders preserve value in distressed situations.

245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See supra Part III.B.