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Do Independent Directors Curb Financial Fraud? The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform†

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Do Independent Directors Curb Financial Fraud?
The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform†

S. Burcu Avci*, Cindy A. Schipani** & H. Nejat Seyhun***

In this Article, we argue that the U.S. corporate governance rules put too much faith in the independent board members and insufficient emphasis on the shareholders to control and monitor top management. Given the agency problem between the board of directors and the shareholders, outside directors can be captured by management, thereby leading to inadequate checks on management. The evidence presented in this Article shows that outside board members do not exercise sufficient controls on management even when management has gone awry. To solve this agency problem, we propose increasing the power of the principals: make shareholder resolutions binding on management, require a one share, one vote rule to increase the voting rights of shareholders, give the shareholders the ability to directly nominate and/or actively vote against board members, and decrease shareholders’ barriers to exercising these rights by creating corporate platforms for beneficial owners to register and vote their shares.

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INTRODUCTION

Around the turn of the millennium, a slew of corporate scandals involving outright fraud, including those at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Adelphia Communications, among others,1 plagued capital markets and shook investor confidence to the core. Faced with this runaway corporate malfeasance by managers of large firms, Congress decided to discipline the managers by increasing the supervisory role of the board of directors. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX or “Act”)2 was passed by Congress in an effort “[t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”3 This was not, of course, the only option for Congress. Congress could have also increased the direct supervisory role of the shareholders. This alternative Congress decided not to pursue. We are now more than fifteen years down the road from the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, and we are now in a position to observe how well Congress’s choices have been working so far.

The actions Congress decided to take not only included increasing the potential criminal and civil fines and sentences for securities fraud, but also attempted to address corporate governance failures by adding a requirement that certain board members be independent4 and rules regarding the composition of audit committees.5 For example, SOX demanded that the audit committee be comprised of entirely independent directors6 and include at least one financial expert.7 In addition, SOX included rules requiring outside auditors be independent.8

3. Id. at pmbl.
4. See Green, supra note 1, at 46.
5. Id. at 38.
6. Id.
8. Id. § 301.
One would have hoped these SOX-created independent watchdogs would reduce the incidents of securities fraud and result in better governance. Yet, our analysis of the number of class action settlements for claims of financial fraud for settlements greater than $10 million shows no significant decrease since the adoption of SOX. We presume that settlements of over $10 million indicate serious concern of the board evidencing the viability of the suit. The dollar amount for analysis was chosen to reduce the incidence of strike suits in our data. Thus, the lack of a significant decrease in these claims seems to indicate that it may have been unreasonable to expect independent directors—who almost by definition are not privy to the day-to-day affairs of the firm—to have enough incentives or information to ferret out complex, and likely hidden, fraud.

Moreover, and perhaps even more troubling, our data also show that independent directors are not necessarily immune from the temptations of financial fraud, particularly with the gains to be had from backdating stock options. SOX’s reliance on them may simply have transferred oversight responsibilities from compromised and ill-informed board members.

An alternative approach to the SOX mandates would have been to empower the shareholders directly and enable them to exercise a greater degree of direct oversight over the managers. First, it does not make logical sense for the shareholders to cede some of their supervisory role to the managers, the very same people that they are trying to supervise. This is a nonstarter. But this is exactly what happens when the managers vote shareholders’ proxies as they see fit. Second, the system of tracking the shareholders and registering all ownership of the security in the name of the shareholders is a long-ignored reform that puts the United States even behind most developing countries. It is now nearly ten years following the Madoff scandal, and the United States still does not register securities directly in shareholders’ names. This simple reform should put an end to all future Madoff-like scandals. Finally, the cost to shareholders from directly exercising their supervisory role and communicating with managers would be minimal in this electronic age. Companies could set up secure websites to allow shareholders to review corporate issues and vote their choices.

We recommend that Congress take another look at this issue. Granted, although some shareholders are not privy to the day-to-day affairs and unless their holding is substantial, may rationally stay ignorant, there are also shareholders with substantial holdings who could be further empowered to provide an effective check on both the managers and the board of directors. To this extent, we thus propose that shareholder resolutions bind management (subject to minimum participation levels), one share to be required to have one vote, as well as for shareholders to have the ability to directly nominate and/or actively vote against board members.

9. To exclude strike suits, we require a minimum settlement amount of $10 million. The years 2001–2002 appear to be anomalous due to the recession and cratering stock market. We find that between 1996 and 2000, 42.4 lawsuits per year for an average annual total of $3.3 billion were settled for $10 million or more, while the corresponding numbers between 2003 and 2008 are 42.4 lawsuits per year and average annual total of $3.1 billion. While there are no ongoing cases from the pre-SOX period, the post-SOX numbers exclude a total of thirteen ongoing cases.
We find that the outside directors have failed with everyone else on the board to monitor management. In this regard, we investigated the timing and backdating of executive compensation options between 1996 and 2015. In this study, we find that outside directors manipulate their option grants like the top executives do. Similar to options given to the top managements, outside directors use dating and timing techniques to manipulate stock options granted. Our evidence shows that they employ backdating, spring-loading, and bullet-dodging games to increase the value of their options. Backdating, among other techniques, provides remarkable profits to outside directors. Application of these techniques for late-reported grants increase outside directors’ compensation by substantial amounts. Specifically, management received extra compensation amounts of 9.2%, 14.9%, and 4.1% for the 1996–2002 period, 2003–2006 period, and the 2007–2014 period, respectively. For outside directors, the comparable numbers are 7.0%, 10.3%, and 7.5%, respectively. For large, late-reported option grants, abnormal returns increase even further.

Our evidence strongly suggests that outside directors are not fulfilling the monitoring responsibility placed on them by SOX. We recommend that the solution lies not in strengthening the board of directors, but by strengthening the power of the shareholders. We make three specific recommendations. First, we recommend that multiclass voting structures should be eliminated. The multiclass voting structures exacerbate the conflict between shareholders and management and lead to inferior outcomes. Our second recommendation is to make shareholder resolutions binding on the board of directors. Currently, management typically ignores the nonbinding shareholder resolutions. Finally, we recommend that plurality voting be eliminated and replaced by majority voting for the board of directors. Majority voting shifts the relative power to elect the directors away from management to the shareholders.

To address these issues, this Article is organized as follows. Part I reviews some of the financial frauds giving rise to SOX, followed in Part II by a discussion of the legislative response, focusing on the corporate governance provisions of the legislation. In Part III, we outline the role of directors and shareholders and analyze impediments to the power of shareholders to oust board members. Our empirical study, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of SOX reforms to decrease the number of viable class action suits for financial frauds as well as evincing board complicity in the fraudulent backdating of stock options, is presented in Part IV. Next, Part V offers proposals for reform to empower shareholders in their oversight role. Concluding remarks follow.

I. PREQUEL TO SOX: OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL FRAUDS OF THE EARLY 2000S

On July 25, 2002, Congress passed SOX, which became law on July 30, 2002. SOX was the federal government’s response to the highly publicized corporate scandals that followed the tech boom of the late 1990s. The seven months before SOX’s enactment saw four of the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history, most famously those of Enron and WorldCom. The reports that emerged in the aftermath attributed these

11. Brooke Masters, Enron’s Fall Raised the Bar in Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.ft.com/content/9790ea78-1aa9-11e1-ae14-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/3S43-
bankruptcies to the fraudulent practices of top executives, with the help of corporate accounting firms, lawyers, and internal audit committees. These companies hid their debts and toxic assets from creditors and shareholders, but they could not keep meeting financial obligations, which in turn pushed them to finally reveal massive losses after restating their earnings. Revelation of the frauds wreaked havoc on the stock market, resulting in Congress “hurriedly pass[ing] a measure that would toughen criminal fraud penalties to curb corporate wrongdoing.”

A. Enron

Before its collapse in 2001, Enron Corporation had been viewed by many as a poster child for American industry and innovation. Once natural gas industry was deregulated in the 1980s, Enron, a traditional and asset-heavy gas pipeline company, quickly saw an opportunity in the trading business. By the 1990s, Enron transformed into a market maker and trader in energy commodities and related derivatives. Enron, at its peak, accounted for approximately twenty-five percent of all energy trading in the United States. The markets Enron headed provided significantly lower transaction costs for utility companies requiring fuel sources. Development of technologies and the internet allowed Enron to conduct most of its trading online. As a result, Enron became “the biggest e-commerce company in the


world—and carried a bubble-era stock price to match.\footnote{18} In just fifteen years, Enron had reached the rank of the seventh largest American company by market capitalization.\footnote{19}

In October of 2001, because of accounting revisions, Enron disclosed “a half-billion-dollar million after-tax charge against earnings and disclosed a $1.2 billion reduction of shareholders’ equity.”\footnote{20} The market met this news with no immediate reaction: utility and energy companies were still willing to do business with Enron,\footnote{21} and investment rating agencies were reluctant to downgrade Enron’s bonds.\footnote{22} But investors—who had paid little attention to Enron’s books during the corporation’s boom years—began to insist on explanations. Investors were particularly concerned with complex, potentially self-dealing transactions with partnerships organized through Enron’s chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow, which had not been apparent in the company’s financial statements.\footnote{23} Wall Street was skeptical about CEO Kenneth Lay’s attempts to alleviate investors’ concerns.\footnote{24} The SEC, after opening an informal investigation into Enron in August, launched a formal inquiry.\footnote{25}

Any hopes of Enron’s survival were quickly quashed as further revelations about Enron’s accounting and business practices came to light. The two limited partnerships that induced the $1.2 billion write-off were just the tip of the iceberg: according to Enron’s 10-K filing, the company engaged in thousands of transactions using affiliates and separate special-purpose entities (SPEs) to insulate the company’s earnings from short-term volatility resulting from its trading activities.\footnote{26} The accounting treatment afforded to SPEs allowed Enron to slough off its bad debts and toxic assets

\footnote{18} Eichenwald, \textit{supra} note 17.  
\footnote{19} See \textit{id.}; see also Coy et al., \textit{supra} note 16.  
\footnote{20} Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, \textit{The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What We’ve Learned; How To Fix It} 7 (2006).  
\footnote{22} See \textit{id.} Some have argued that large credit rating agencies are themselves conflicted because they take fees from the corporations whose debt they rate. See Jerry Hirsch & Thomas S. Mulligan, \textit{Safeguards Failed To Detect Warnings in Enron Debacle}, L.A. Times (Dec. 14, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/dec/14/business/la-fi-enron (https://perma.cc/7Y9V-FLJY]. The head of the team at Standard \& Poor’s that handled Enron also acknowledged that the firm faced pressure not to downgrade Enron precipitously. \textit{Id.} (“We take care not to over-react to any developing situation so that we don’t cause a deterioration [in a company’s finances] rather than just opine on it.”) (alteration in original).  
\footnote{23} See Berenson \& Oppel, \textit{supra} note 21.  
\footnote{24} See \textit{id.} (explaining the fall in Enron’s stock after Lay provided limited disclosure after a large write-off in shareholders’ equity resulting from the self-dealing transactions with partnerships).  
while simultaneously inflating profits, provided that enough of the SPE’s equity was held by an unrelated party. In many of Enron’s transactions with its SPEs, either Enron, an affiliate, or an Enron executive held the equity via a series of complex corporate structures and sham asset sales. When some of these transactions came under scrutiny in the fall of 2001, their prior accounting treatment was disqualified and Enron was forced to consolidate these SPEs in its financial statements.

Enron utilized many other accounting maneuvers to misrepresent its financial health. For example, the company reported artificial gains and reduced losses by characterizing the company’s borrowings as sale-and-purchase transactions and bootstrapping its own stocks. Enron also exploited mark-to-market accounting, requiring Enron to assign real-time fair market values to its derivative positions. Playing this game, Enron would use excessively optimistic assumptions. Enron’s long-term energy trading contracts were also plagued by issues surrounding unclear valuations.

As revelations of these questionable accounting practices piled up, the public’s attention turned to the cracks in Enron’s corporate governance. Disclosures of self-dealing practices began with the announcement that the CFO of Enron, Andrew Fastow, had been compensated $30 million for managing the limited partnerships

27. To summarize, the accounting treatment of SPEs would allow profits from transactions between Enron and its affiliate SPE to pass through to Enron’s income statement. Provided that certain requirements were met, Enron could also move debt into its affiliate SPEs and preserve its credit rating. An investment-grade credit rating was crucial to Enron’s trading and derivatives operations. See Are Current Financial Accounting Standards Protecting Investors?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 21–22 (2002) (statement of Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards Board).

28. For an SPE to obtain off-balance-sheet treatment, it must satisfy particular rules of consolidation accounting. SEC accounting rules required that (a) a majority of the entity’s equity be controlled by an unrelated party, and (b) the unrelated party’s equity investment be three percent or greater. Id. at 21; William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 868 (2013); Neal Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entities—Use or Abuse?—The Real Problem—The Real Focus, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 97, 97 (2007); Steven L. Schwarz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2002).


30. In the case of its infamous Chewco SPE, for example, “Enron’s earnings for 1997 through mid-2001 were retroactively reduced by $405 million . . . [and the] consolidation increased its total indebtedness by $628 million.” Id. at 1309.

31. To expand on this accounting trick: “[L]oans to Enron from outside sources were booked as revenue, and then ‘churned’ by transfers to and from SPEs and booked again as profits by both Enron and the SPEs . . . .” Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003).

32. “Under [mark-to-market] accounting, even though the position remains open and gain or loss has not yet been realized, the firm’s income statement reflects the gain or loss implied by the contract’s current value.” Bratton, supra note 15, at 1303.


34. Bratton, supra note 15, at 1304.
that gave rise to the $1.2 billion write-off.\textsuperscript{35} Additionally, Fastow and many members of Enron’s board of directors, including members of its audit committee, benefited from accounting manipulations, receiving consulting fees or cash donations to their favored charities.\textsuperscript{36} These “perks” were often funded by the same special-purpose entities that were being used to hide debt.\textsuperscript{37}

The self-enriching practices of Enron’s management did not stop there. Shortly before Enron filed for bankruptcy, the company generously gave its former CEO, Kenneth Lay, at least $67.4 million.\textsuperscript{38} Enron also gave “retention bonuses” totaling over $100 million dollars to other members of top management to keep them at Enron.\textsuperscript{39} Just before Enron filed for bankruptcy, “about forty top employees received their entire deferred compensation in cash . . . an option that was not available to lower-level employees.”\textsuperscript{40} The amount paid out to senior executives between restatement of earnings and filing of bankruptcy was a stunning $681 million.\textsuperscript{41}

Enron’s generosity stopped at the top management level as lower-level Enron employees’ severance payments were capped at $13,500 per employee, the equivalent of two weeks’ pay for some of them.\textsuperscript{42} What made these favored-employee payments even more egregious was that Enron encouraged its employees to invest their 401(k) funds in Enron stock.\textsuperscript{43} However, Enron had prohibited its employees from selling company shares preceding the earnings restatement, so that lower-level employees who had invested 401(k) funds in Enron could do nothing as their retirement funds declined in value.\textsuperscript{44} During this period, the media picked up on the pay disparity

\textsuperscript{35} It should be noted that the two partnerships in question, and Fastow’s role in them, were not completely hidden in the fall of 2001. They had been disclosed, albeit in extremely opaque terms, in a footnote to Enron’s 2000 financials. See Enron, Annual Report 2000, at 48 (2001); see also Enron, Annual Report 1999, at 59 (2000).

\textsuperscript{36} Hirsch & Mulligan, supra note 22 (“In one instance, a director was put on the payroll as a consultant and on several other occasions the company made large contributions to nonprofit groups that directors were involved with.”).

\textsuperscript{37} Id.


\textsuperscript{39} Kathryn Kranhold & Mitchell Pacelle, Ex-Enron Workers Pursue Bonuses Given to Executives Before Collapse, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023819019250366920 [https://perma.cc/4VHK-JLSS].


\textsuperscript{41} Hamilton, supra note 31 (citing Kranhold & Pacelle, supra note 39).


between top management and lower-level employees. Lower-level employees accused executives of conducting $1.1 billion in insider stock sales during the blackout, dumping their shares in anticipation of negative news reaching the public.

On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. By that date, Enron’s share price had fallen to sixty-one cents per share, and approximately “$3.5 billion of its bonds [were] trading at just a quarter of their face value.”

B. Global Crossing, Qwest, Adelphia, and WorldCom

The Enron scandal was the first in a wave of corporate debacles that filled news headlines and fueled public outrage. Many of the companies embroiled in scandal were commonly recognizable names, such as AOL, Time Warner Inc., Rite Aid Corp., and Xerox Corp. Misleading accounting practices were particularly widespread in the telecom industry: between January and June 2002, over 100 telecom companies restated earnings, most of which had passed public accounting muster. The scandals involving Global Crossing, Qwest, Adelphia, and WorldCom exemplify some of the fraudulent accounting practices and self-dealing that paved the road to the enactment of SOX.

1. Global Crossing

Global Crossing was a main player in the telecom industry almost immediately after it came into existence but soon became bankrupt from accounting fraud: its trick of choice was liberal use of “pro forma accounting,” a reporting technique that presents results based on certain assumptions, allowing companies to stray significantly from generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Using pro forma accounting, Global Crossing left off its financial statements many items that would be considered expenses by GAAP. The company dismissed concerns that certain cash amounts on Global Crossing’s financial statements were inflated, noting that “its auditor, Arthur Andersen, had signed off on its annual reports that reflected the cash revenue.”

52. See Cunningham, supra note 49, at 931–32.
53. Id. at 931.
The SEC eventually launched an investigation into Global Crossing. 54 As Global Crossing later admitted, the company shredded documents even after the documents had been requested by the SEC as part of its investigation. 55 In April 2002, Global Crossing filed for bankruptcy, and then in August, they made a deal with their creditors to sell the business to a group of investors. 56 Like the executives at Enron, Global Crossing’s executives profited from the inflated value of their company’s stock. CEO Gary Winnick received over $730 million from Global Crossing stock before Global Crossing filed for bankruptcy. 57 To maintain the value of his stock in light of the impending collapse, Winnick purchased “collars,” which preserved a large portion of his shares’ value. 58

The Global Crossing board was filled with conflicts of interest. Several people on the audit committee were close to Winnick. Maria Logamasiano, who was Winnick’s personal banker, was on Global Crossing’s audit committee and Winnick was on her company’s board of advisors. She, along with one other member of the Global Crossing audit committee, eventually resigned due to conflicts. 59

2. Qwest

On July 28, 2002, Qwest Communications International Inc. (“Qwest”) announced that it would restate earnings for 1999–2001, due to improper recognition of capital investments as profits. 60 This disclosure came on the heels of announcing about a $1 billion reduction in its revenue prediction for the next year and write-downs of $20–30 billion. 61 Moreover, Qwest revealed that it was close to violating covenants in its loan agreements that required it to maintain certain debt-to-EBITDA ratios. Following this succession of bombshells, Qwest entered into settlement negotiations with the SEC. 62

Qwest came into being during the telecom boom of the 1990s and made the mistake of excessively investing in various resources. 63 To artificially inflate its financial

54. Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, Founder Winnick May Kick in Funds To Aid Global Crossing, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023657919482376440 [https://perma.cc/7CNP-KD87].
56. Cunningham, supra note 49, at 932.
57. Romero, supra note 55.
58. Berman & Sender, supra note 54.
60. Id.
63. Qwest Says, supra note 61.
64. Cunningham, supra note 49, at 932.
statements, Qwest teamed up with other providers of domestic telephone services to create gimmick transactional accounting via “swap transactions.” In these transactions “Qwest sold capacity on [its own network] to another carrier and booked the revenue, while at the same time buying a nearly identical amount from the other company.” These deals had no purpose other than boosting revenues while capitalizing costs. These swaps became a mainstay of the industry, but—as the top executives at telecom companies realized—they were not sustainable. Shortly before its collapse, Qwest noted that its executives collected close to $500 million by selling shares from 1999 to 2001. Buttwo people’s earnings stood out—one former CEO earned close to $230 million, and “Qwest’s largest single shareholder . . . made almost $1.5 billion by selling his shares in May 1999.”

3. Adelphia

In late March 2002, Adelphia announced that it had failed to report $2.3 billion in debt. The price of Adelphia stock crashed and the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) delisted the stock. Later on that year, during the month of May, Adelphia did not satisfy terms of multiple bank loan and bond agreements. Shortly after, the company filed for bankruptcy. During 2001, it came out that several Rigas family members, who were on the company’s board, had committed various frauds and misappropriated funds. In May, all the Rigas family members resigned. Then in June, more truth came out: “the company announced that it had overstated revenues and cash flow by another $500 million over the previous two years”; a couple more board members announced their resignation. The next to go was the company’s auditor. The collapse continued in July when the founder, John Rigas, was arrested along with his two sons for corporate looting and “bank, securities, and wire fraud, in effect

65. Shawn Young, Qwest To Restate $950 Million in Revenue From ‘Swap’ Deals, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2002), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1032735861697679593 [https://perma.cc/DNG4-WR3C].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Hamilton, supra note 31, at 17.
71. Id. at 17–18.
73. Hamilton, supra note 31, at 23.
74. Recine, supra note 59, at 1542.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Hamilton, supra note 31, at 23.
79. Id.
operating a multibillion-dollar scheme to defraud investors and creditors. In an attempt to reduce company debt, the Rigas family had been purchasing additional stock—but with money borrowed from the company. They used some of this money to fund a golf course and African safari vacations.

4. WorldCom

WorldCom, which began as a local telecom firm in 1983, had ballooned into the nation’s second largest long-distance telecom carrier by 2000. The company based its expansion model on acquisitions of other telecom companies, often financed with its own stock. At the same time, the company—with the help of senior employees and officers—employed several accounting schemes to artificially boost earnings. Under the direction of the CFO, the company improperly capitalized $3.8 billion in expenses, intending to depreciate them over time. This accounting caused WorldCom’s EBITDA to be overstated by the same amount. Another trick involved overestimating losses from uncollectable phone bills. These entries were corrected during periods of poor performance to boost profits. A similar trick was applied to properties WorldCom obtained through its acquisitions: the company would intentionally “write down” the value of acquired properties to mitigate future declines in earnings.

By 2000, WorldCom was suffering from the same problems that plagued many other telecom companies. It had overinvested in fiber-optic cable, and the excess capacity undermined WorldCom’s earnings by lowering the cost of its services. WorldCom’s first move to deal with expenses was to write down reserves on its balance sheet—which ended up saving the company over $1 billion. The company also counted as capital expenditures, instead of operating expenses, so-called “line

80. Id. at 23–24 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id.
86. Id.
87. Cunningham, supra note 49, at 936.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 934.
90. See id.
92. Cunningham, supra note 49, at 934.
costs,” which are disbursements paid to other telecom companies to access their networks.93 This ploy allowed WorldCom to spread costs out over longer time periods, reducing WorldCom’s expenses in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 by at least $2.6 billion.94

When John Sidgmore became WorldCom’s new CEO in April 2001, he ordered an internal audit of the company’s books.95 After investigating the company’s capital expenditure records, it was discovered that several billion dollars’ worth of line costs were recorded as capital expenditures, rather than as expenses.96 Not only that: apparently the line costs had properly been recorded as expenses initially, but had been transferred to asset accounts during the account closing process.97 Internal auditors reported all this information to the chair of the audit committee—not long after, this committee chair, the CFO, and the controller were all fired.98

Like Enron, WorldCom had employed Big Five accounting firm Arthur Andersen as its external auditor. In February 2002, Andersen reported to the company’s board audit committee that there had been no significant transactions or changes in accounting policies in the past year, and that the company had strict internal controls in place to detect false financial reporting.99 These statements were untrue. In June of 2002, WorldCom admitted to overstating its earnings in earlier years by close to $4 billion by “treating expense items as capital investments”—which was the largest restatement of earnings an American corporation had ever admitted.100 The company’s credit rating nosedived, and an additional $3 billion in improperly recorded expenses was discovered, adding more to the already record high restatement of earnings.101

The consequences of WorldCom’s fall were massive. WorldCom reduced their workforce by a staggering ten percent from 2001 to 2002—which equaled more than 20,000 employees.102 A large number of the employees who were laid off were blue-collar workers who had built WorldCom’s massive fiber-optic network.103 From 1999 to 2002, WorldCom’s stock price fell from $60 to less than $1.104 While lower-level employees were being let go in huge numbers, over $280 million was given to

93. Peter Elstrom, How To Hide $3.8 Billion in Expenses, BUSINESSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 41.
95. Elstrom, supra note 93.
96. Id.
98. Cunningham, supra note 49, at 935.
101. Id.
102. Recine, supra note 59, at 1543.
103. Id.
104. Id.
top executives from a two-year bonus retention program. Eventually, approximately $1.4 million originally promised to executives went to fund severance packages for lower-level employees, but the amount covered fewer than half of the employees who had been let go.

II. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

A. Legislative History of SOX

Attempts at legislative reform were met with resistance by the Bush administration and conservative members of Congress. Although mounting evidence of widespread corporate fraud fueled discussions between Congress and the administration on potential reform measures, progress stalled due to disagreements over the measures’ policy objectives. President Bush’s early reform proposal was a “ten-point plan” that focused on oversight. The President’s initial proposals were criticized as failing to “draw real blood” that would hold corporate executives accountable.

In June 2002, the political dynamic finally shifted because of the WorldCom scandal. By that point, the outcry had reached a fever pitch. Regulation of financial reporting and corporate governance were issues of peak salience and importance to the general American public. Consider, for example, as noted by Prentice and Spence, a June 2002 article in USA Today entitled How Did Business Get So Darn Dirty?, which argued that greed was one of the main answers. Prentice and Spence also pointed to a Gallup poll in 2002 showing that the percentage of people considering “big business” to be a major threat to America’s future had increased by fourteen points from the two years prior. Democrats jumped to make these scandals an issue in their election campaigns the following November. In making his case for the necessity of comprehensive reform, Senator Leahy did not mince words:

105. Id.
106. See id.
113. Id. at 1850–51.
114. Langevoort, supra note 111.
Enron has become a symbol for the torrent of corporate fraud scandals that have hit the front pages and battered our financial markets. Tyco, Xerox, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossings, the list goes on.

The things that happened at Enron did not happen by mistake. They were not the result of one or two “bad apples.” Senior management at Enron, assisted by an army of accountants and lawyers spun an intricate web of deceit. They engaged in a systematic fraud that allowed them to secretly take hundreds of millions of dollars out of the company. This kind of fraud is not the work of a lone fraud artist. Rather, it is symptomatic of a corporate culture where greed has been inflated and honesty devalued.

Unfortunately, as I have said and as the experts warned at our February 6 hearing, Enron does not appear to have been alone. Each week we read of corporation after corporation that has engaged in misconduct, and these are not small or marginal corporations. These are major mainstays of corporate America. The web of deceit woven by such publicly traded companies ensnares and victimizes the entire investing public who depend on the transparency and integrity of our markets for everything from their retirement nest eggs to their children’s college funds.\textsuperscript{115}

The House of Representatives introduced H.R. 3763, the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002,\textsuperscript{116} on February 14, 2002. The bill was sponsored by Republican House Representative Michael G. Oxley, Chair of the House Financial Services Committee.\textsuperscript{117} Like the reform proposals proposed by President Bush, the primary focus of H.R. 3763 was transparency in, and oversight of, corporate accounting practices.\textsuperscript{118} Unlike the final rule, it contained no provision for increased criminal penalties—unsurprising, given that the House Financial Services Committee typically lacks jurisdiction over criminal issues.\textsuperscript{119} Even though H.R. 3763 contained provisions similar to those shaping the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the Sarbanes proposal, the Oxley-sponsored bill was decidedly more friendly to corporate interests. The bill largely let the SEC decide how to regulate auditors.\textsuperscript{120} It contained fewer curbs on consulting by auditors and would have permitted private groups to form one or more

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{118} Id. § 2.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ann Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the Mind Like the Prospect of a Hanging: The Criminalization of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 125, 130 (2004).
\end{itemize}
oversight boards for the accounting industry. House Democrats offered their own bill, as well as a set of proposed amendments to Oxley’s bill, both of which the House majority rejected. The House passed H.R. 3763 by a vote of 334 to 90 on April 24, 2002. The next day, it was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in the Senate. The Senate version, S. 2673, brought up in the Senate in June, dealt mostly with “accounting reform and not criminal sanctions.” Neither committee, however, normally had jurisdiction over criminal matters.

Sarbanes’s bill “passed out of the Senate Banking Committee on a vote of 17 to 4” and reached the Senate floor in July, where it was subject to numerous amendments. In general, the Republicans in Congress favored the relaxed oversight and governance standards in the Oxley bill, while the Democrats sought to strongly regulate markets. Both Democrats and Republicans eagerly embraced stronger criminal sanctions, however.

In the end, the Senate decided to incorporate their bill with the Oxley Act. On July 15, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner introduced the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 5118, allowing even tougher criminal sanctions for accounting and auditing wrongdoings at public companies; the bill passed by a vote

121. Bowman, supra note 107, at 396. Other features of Oxley’s bill include: a prohibition against independent auditors of publicly traded companies offering certain kinds of non-audit services, a prohibition against exercising improper influence on the conduct of outside audits, a requirement of “real time” disclosure of financial information, a prohibition of insider trades during pension fund blackout periods, and a series of congressional mandates for “studies” of analyst conflicts of interest, corporate governance practices, SEC enforcement actions, and credit rating agencies.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

122. See generally Comprehensive Investor Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. (as introduced on Feb. 28, 2002). The Act would have created a single national accounting oversight board under the direct supervision of the SEC with specific legislative grants of authority, stringent requirements of independence of members of the accounting oversight board from the large public accounting firms, a wider ban on non-audit services by auditing firms for corporations they audit, a ban on tying investment analyst compensation to the performance of the investment bank for which they work, criminal penalties for destruction of audit records, and a substantial increase in the SEC’s enforcement budget.

Bowman, supra note 107, at 397 (footnotes omitted).


124. Tracey & Fiorelli, supra note 119, at 131.

125. Id.

126. Id. at 132.

127. Id.

128. Bowman, supra note 107, at 398.

129. Id. at 400.

130. See id.

131. Recine, supra note 59, at 1547.
of 391 to 28 in the House the next day.\textsuperscript{132} In conference, the bill’s more severe penalties were incorporated into the Act.\textsuperscript{133} Congress also grafted the criminal provisions from the Leahy bill (S. 2010) onto the accounting reforms and implemented the modified White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act.\textsuperscript{134} All the text from the Senate’s bill was included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was then signed into law by the President on July 29.\textsuperscript{135}

B. SOX

In this Part, we focus on the corporate governance reforms required by SOX. These include the requirement that a majority of the members of the board of directors be outside directors as well as the mandate requiring an audit committee and the independence of all its members. Additionally, the board must disclose whether the audit committee membership includes at least one financial expert—as further defined in the accompanying SEC regulations—and if not, why. It also requires independence of the outside auditor. These provisions are discussed next.

1. Audit Committees

The audit committee requirements of the Act were meant to enhance the ability of the board of directors to monitor management and outside auditors.\textsuperscript{136} Most of these requirements, however, did not represent a significant departure from SEC and stock exchange requirements then in place. Despite its limited power to regulate the conduct of directors and officers,\textsuperscript{137} the SEC has shaped the corporate governance standards embodied in the SOX Act in two main ways: by imposing disclosure requirements directly on companies, and by encouraging national stock exchanges to develop listing standards.

As early as the 1970s,\textsuperscript{138} the SEC supported establishment of audit committees “to make management more accountable to the board and to emphasize the function of the board in monitoring the activities of the management.”\textsuperscript{139} The SEC required

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{133} \textit{Id.}, see H.R. Rep. No. 107-610 (2002) (Conf. Rep.).
\bibitem{135} Recine, \textit{supra} note 59, at 1547.
\bibitem{137} The Supreme Court has held that the SEC’s authority to regulate the conduct of officers and directors of public companies not involving “deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure” is limited. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
\end{thebibliography}
disclosure in the company’s proxy materials regarding whether the company had an audit, nomination, or compensation committee, together with the membership, number of yearly meetings, and functions of such committee, if they existed.140

Around this same time, national stock exchanges followed the SEC and began requiring certain corporate governance standards as a condition to being listed. For example, according to the Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules, the two largest stock exchanges in the world by market capitalization,141 a listed company must have an audit committee consisting of independent directors.142 Early versions of Nasdaq and NYSE listing standards imposed fewer requirements on the audit committee.143 For example, the Nasdaq originally only required that a majority of the audit committee be independent.144

The major accounting fiascoes in 1998,145 particularly the widespread practice of “earnings management,”146 led the SEC to reevaluate the role of audit committees.147 Then-Chairman Levitt, emphasizing “the crucial role of boards of directors as representatives of the shareholders” and noting the audit committee’s responsibility “to ensure that shareholders receive relevant and reliable financial information,” proposed that the audit committee play a more active oversight role by meeting more frequently and asking tough questions.148 The audit committee could then become more critical of the CEO and CFO.149

110378loomis.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS8H-LKAV].
144. Id.
145. See Cunningham, supra note 49, at 926.
As part of a larger plan to improve financial reporting quality, Chairman Levitt tasked the NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) with forming a “blue ribbon” panel to “improve audit committee performance.”\(^{150}\) In response to recommendations issued by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) in 1999,\(^{151}\) the NYSE and Nasdaq imposed substantial changes to their corporate governance and listing standards (“the BRC revisions”).\(^{152}\) The changes included requiring that: the audit committee consist of at least three “independent directors”;\(^{153}\) all audit committee members be “financially literate”;\(^{154}\) at least one member have financial or

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151. Blue Ribbon Comm. on Improving the Effectiveness of Corp. Audit Comms., Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1067 (1999). The BRC recommendations included the following:

1. That the NYSE and NASD adopt a new definition of independence for purposes of the audit committee;
2. That the NYSE and NASD require that the audit committee be composed solely of independent directors;
3. That the NYSE and NASD require that listed companies’ audit committees have a minimum of three directors, each of whom is “financially literate,” and that at least one member have accounting or related financial management experience;
4. That the NYSE and NASD require that listed companies’ audit committees have a written charter, approved by the full board, that specifies the scope of the committee’s duties, structure, processes, and membership requirements;
5. That the SEC require audit committees make certain disclosures in the company’s proxy statement relating to the audit committee’s written charter.
6–7. That the NYSE and NASD require that listed companies’ audit committee charter address the relationship between the outside auditor and audit committee;
8. That Generally Accepted Auditing Standards require that the outside auditor “discuss with the audit committee the auditor’s judgments about the quality, not just the acceptability, of the company’s accounting principles.”
9. That the SEC require all reporting companies to include an audit committee letter in the Form 10-K containing certain disclosures; and
10. That the outside auditor be required to discuss with the audit committee certain matters, including adjustments, management judgments and estimates, new accounting policies, and disagreements with management.

See id. at 1072–76.


153. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.01(B)(2)(a) (1999).

154. Id. § 303.01(B)(2)(b).
accounting experience;\textsuperscript{155} each audit committee have a written charter;\textsuperscript{156} and each audit committee receive a description of the number of relationships between the company and a director or her family member that would foreclose a finding of independence.\textsuperscript{157}

To complement the BRC revisions, the SEC heightened its disclosure requirements with respect to audit committees. Each proxy statement must disclose whether the company has an audit committee.\textsuperscript{158} Audit committees are required to vouch for the accuracy of financial statements.\textsuperscript{159} disclose whether they signed off on the financial statements, state whether an audit committee’s written charter spells out the committee’s duties, and submit any charter to the SEC every three years.\textsuperscript{160}

Under section 301,\textsuperscript{161} SOX mandates that all public companies appoint an audit committee of the board of directors.\textsuperscript{162} Each audit committee is to be “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight” of the external auditor, and the auditors are to report directly to the audit committee.\textsuperscript{163} According to this section, an audit committee must put an internal system into place that deals with various complaints, including complaints about accounting and other related matters within the corporation.\textsuperscript{164} To encourage financial reporting quality and independent external auditing, section 301(3) imposes an independence requirement on each

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{155} Id. § 303.01(B)(2)(c).
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Id. § 303.01(B)(1).
  \item \textsuperscript{157} Id. § 303.01(B)(1)(c), (B)(3); see generally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 140, at § 4.2.
  \item \textsuperscript{159} “[E]ach audit committee is required, on the issuer’s annual Form 10-K, to disclose whether its recommendation that the financial statements be included in the annual report was based on its discussions with management and the independent accountant.” James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 306 (2003).
  \item \textsuperscript{160} Cunningham, supra note 49, at 938.
  \item \textsuperscript{162} SOX offers the following definition:
    The term ‘audit committee’ means—(A) a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer; and (B) if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board of directors of the issuer.
  \item \textsuperscript{158} Id. § 205 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(58)). SOX added a new section 3(a)(58) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} Id.; see also Audit Committee Release, supra note 136136, at § II(B)(1).
  \item \textsuperscript{164} Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1157 (2004).
\end{itemize}
member of the audit committee. To be independent, an audit committee member should not be “an affiliated person” with respect to the company and should not “accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee” from the firm.

Section 301 grew out of a sense that public company boards had failed their oversight responsibilities and become beholden to the whims of the top executives—as SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson pointed out, “Many boards have become gradually more deferential to the opinions, judgments and decisions of the CEO and senior management team. . . . [which] has been an obstacle to directors’ ability to satisfy . . . [their] responsibility.” This was a massive change because general corporate law had typically been a state, not federal issue.

The SEC, on April 25, 2003, did a couple things. First, the SEC required, in compliance with section 301, each national securities exchange and national securities exchange association give it a list of amendments or proposed changes. Second, “the SEC required only that audit committee members be independent,” instead of the entire board. Additionally, the SEC was supposed to, per SOX section 407, put out rules that required companies to disclose if (and if not, why) the audit committee has at least one financial expert as a member, as the term is defined by the SEC. In defining “financial expert,” the Act considers a member’s qualifications through her “education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting officer.” An “understanding of GAAP, and experience in preparing or auditing of financial statements” can also be considered “financial expertise” according to the Act.

The SEC implemented this mandated course of action later in March 2003. The SEC released rules requiring all public companies to disclose whether they had a financial expert on their audit committees and explain the reason why if they did not. The SEC attempted to make sure that these financial experts did not have greater liability than other board members by stating that the financial experts would not have “greater duties or obligations under the securities laws,” and limited the term “expert” so certain provisions in securities laws would not apply. Whether someone is a financial expert is determined by the board of directors.

165. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301 (amending the Securities Exchange Act, § 10A(m)(3)).
166. Id.
169. Johnson & Sides, supra note 164, at 1158.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1175.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1176.
176. Id.
2. Auditor-Client Relationships

Under section 201 of SOX, which adds section 10A(g) to the Exchange Act of 1934, external auditors are prohibited from providing certain kinds of non-audit services to their audit clients. For example, they may not provide “financial information systems design and implementation” services, bookkeeping services, “appraisal or valuation services,” “actuarial services,” “internal audit outsourcing services,” “management functions or human resources” services, “investment banking services,” “legal services,” and other services that might be determined by regulation to be impermissible. Furthermore, public companies are required to disclose the dollar value of audit and audit-related services versus permitted non-audit services.

Additionally, SOX section 203 includes both term limits and restrictions on the external auditor. Although the original idea of having a mandatory periodic rotation of audit firms was dropped, section 203 as enacted requires that audit engagement partners and audit reviewing partners—that is, the highest-ranking employees of a public accounting firm—be rotated off the engagement after five years. Furthermore, public accounting employees may not switch over and become employees of a client they have audited until a certain “cooling off” period has run.

Section 202 requires, with an exception for some de minimis services, that all services provided from an auditor and to an issuer have pre-approval from the audit committee. These pre-approvals must be disclosed, pursuant to the Exchange Act, in a company’s periodic reports.

C. Other Relevant Provisions

There are several other relevant provisions in SOX aimed at improving the governance of corporations. They are described briefly below.

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178. Id.
179. According to Coates & Srinivasan, supra note 168, at 630–31 (citation omitted):
While SOX prohibited audit firms from providing many (but not all) types of consulting services to their audit clients, just slightly preceding SOX, four of the then Big 5 audit firms spun off their consulting arms into separate entities in 2000 and 2001 . . . . Despite this drastic change in business models arising from the spin-offs, consulting services still account for a large share of revenues for the big audit firms. Non-audit fees to audit clients as a proportion of total fees fell from almost 51 percent of fees in 2002 to about 21 percent in 2005, and have remained steady at that level since then until recently, and were around 22 percent in 2012. But these services are now largely provided to companies that are not audit clients.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 206 (adding Securities Exchange Act § 10A(l)).
183. Johnson & Sides, supra note 164, at 1177.
184. Id.
1. Loans to Officers

Section 402 generally prohibits public companies from “directly or indirectly mak[ing] loans to their officers” and directors. This section also interfered with normal practices at many public companies, such as “travel advances, personal use of a company car,” and others.

2. Code of Ethics Disclosure

Section 406 mandates that public companies take action in several ways related to code of ethics disclosures, including publicly disclosing whether the company has any adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, has made any changes to it, and if the company granted any waivers from the code. Later, the SEC issued rules requiring public companies to disclose whether a code of ethics has been adopted and to file the code with the SEC. A code of ethics must require:

(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships;
(2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in reports and documents that a registrant files with, or submits to, the Commission and in other public communications made by the registrant;
(3) Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules and regulations;
(4) The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code to an appropriate person or persons identified in the code; and
(5) Accountability for adherence to the code.

The SEC promulgated rules to implement sections 406 and 407 in March of 2003—the section 407 SEC rules expanded section 406 to cover disclosure of any code of ethics that applies to a company’s CEO.

3. Forfeiture of Certain Bonuses and Profits

Under section 304, “if a public company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, as a result of misconduct,” then the company’s top executive officer and financial officer:

185. Id.
186. Karmel, supra note 149, at 105.
187. Lyman Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. L AW. 147, 153 n.38 (2007).
189. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b).
190. Johnson & Sides, supra note 164, at 1185.
[M]ust reimburse the corporation for (i) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received by such person during the twelve-month period following the first public issuance of the defective report and (ii) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the corporation during that twelve-month period. ... [This Section was intended to] force[e] the principal officers of the company to pay more attention to the company’s financial reporting and to dissuade management from focusing on short-term gain.  

III. THE ROLES OF THE BOARD AND THE SHAREHOLDERS

A. The Board of Directors

Boards of directors have always been a traditional element of American corporate governance. In the early days, boards were responsible for managing the day-to-day business of corporations. 192 “This was because they were made up primarily of controlling shareholders and managers selected by those shareholders.” 193 Lately, in the era of highly dispersed ownership of corporations, directors usually perform their duties on a part-time basis. 194 Recognizing this trend, modern corporate laws call for management of the corporation to fulfill the boards’ duties. 195 “Traditionally, it is said that the board sets corporate policy, makes the major decisions, and delegates to management the task of carrying out policy and those decisions.” 196 As an independent governing body, the board is supposed to be separate from senior management. 197 An independent board, in theory, does not have substantial ties to top management and thus will be comfortable objecting with them, as needed. 198 The reality draws quite a different picture.

The absence of a controlling shareholder increased the role of the CEO, reducing the board to an “advisory rather than supervisory” 199 role. The Gordon and Mace studies even found that contemporary management, setting a corporation’s policies and making certain major decisions, limited the boards’ role to providing “formal approval (almost never disapproval) of those policies and decisions.” 200 Boards, being inferior to management, slipped into a rubberstamping role. Supervision is also

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191. Id. at 1181–82.
192. See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 788 (2011).
193. Id.
196. Id.
197. Alces, supra note 192, at 789.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Gevurtz, supra note 195, at 395–96 (citing ROBERT AARON GORDON, BUSINESS
undermined by another factor: management often participates in the handpicking of directors before elections; directors now often “owe their positions to the officers they are supposed to supervise, and they rely upon those same officers for the information they use in supervising them.”

Monitoring is another function of boards in corporate governance. The board is responsible for discovering bad faith or incompetence, and for the “hiring and firing of senior management, particularly the chief executive officer.” In practice, however, boards face a challenging task of detecting managerial malfeasance directly, typically acting on a part-time, irregular basis. As Professor Adams and colleagues note, a board would rely “on the actions of outside auditors, regulators, and, in some instances, the news media,” or on the information provided by a CEO. The explanation is simple: directors do not have time to pay close attention to monitoring tasks. Monitoring of management is often collegial, where directors learn from management “why the officers recommend a particular course of action and officers are not perceived as inferior to directors when the board makes most of its business decisions.”

In addition, directors serve in a counseling or advisory role. A board may provide input on matters “about which one or more board members are expert[s].” Boards may also give advice or opinions to top management about general business matters. Occasionally, a corporate board may also act as a mediator between shareholders and managers, or other constituencies such as creditors.

Performing a managerial function, the board ultimately decides major corporate issues, such as bringing certain lawsuits on the company’s behalf, selling the corporation, buying or merging with other companies, dividend distributions to shareholders, and the corporation’s capital structure. As evidence of the board’s influence over corporate governance practices, a study of 1500 S&P firms from 1998 to 2004 linked weak corporate governance and backdating.

201. Alces, supra note 192, at 789.
202. Id.
203. Gevirtz, supra note 195, at 396.
205. Id.
206. Alces, supra note 192, at 795.
207. Adams et al., supra note 204, at 64.
208. Alces, supra note 192, at 798.
211. Daniel W. Collins, Guojin Gong & Haidan Li, Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 403, 405 (2009).
were present: more inside and gray directors on the board, independent directors appointed by the incumbent CEO, director compensation in options, and CEOs serving as the chair of the board.\textsuperscript{212} Another study found correlations between measures of CEO influence, such as lower numbers of independent directors, longer CEO tenure, and opportunistically timed stock grants.\textsuperscript{213}

\textbf{B. Shareholders}

In contrast, the shareholders’ role in corporate governance has traditionally been limited.\textsuperscript{214} Corporate law relies on the principle of separation of ownership and control\textsuperscript{215}: shareholders own the corporation and the board manage the business. Shareholders who oppose the business decisions of the board or management cannot affect change directly: they can only exit,\textsuperscript{216} sue,\textsuperscript{217} or vote.\textsuperscript{218} Thus, shareholder rights can be divided into four groups: economical, litigation, control, and informational. Shareholders vote at annual meetings which, at least in theory, should provide “a channel for communication between shareholders, the board, and management.”\textsuperscript{219} On time-sensitive matters, shareholders may convene a special shareholder meeting to vote on the issue.\textsuperscript{220}

1. Shareholder Voting: An Overview

A fundamental right of the shareholder is the election of directors.\textsuperscript{221} Delaware Chancellor William Allen has described shareholder voting as “the ideological

\textsuperscript{212} Id. at 406.

\textsuperscript{213} Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, \textit{Lucky CEOS and Lucky Directors}, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2365 (2010). The Bebchuk et al. study covered the time period 1996–2005. In this Article, we extend the analysis to 2015 to show that these practices are still ongoing.


\textsuperscript{216} Recent studies have increasingly focused on the impact of “exit” with respect to large, institutional investors. For a review of the literature, see Alex Edmans, \textit{Blockholders and Corporate Governance}, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 23, 24 (2014).


\textsuperscript{220} Id.

\textsuperscript{221} Velasco, \textit{supra} note 215, at 417.
underpinning” that “legitimizes the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own.”

A fully informed shareholder vote ratifies board action, even if it is in favor of a “voidable” transaction.

Yet, shareholder voting power has frequently proved to be an ineffective way to control management in highly dispersed corporations. Individual shareholders who own a small percentage of stock are unlikely interested in investing their time and energy in costly monitoring activities. Empirical evidence shows that successful challenges of management by a rival team seeking to run the company better are quite rare. In addition to costs, shareholders are likely uncertain about a rival team’s future capabilities. Shareholders often stay conservative, giving preference to current management, even when feeling dissatisfied. The case is different in corporations with a high amount of institutional ownership. “Institutions are more likely than other shareholders to vote at all, more likely to vote against manager proposals, and more likely to vote for proposals by other shareholders.” Skeptics, on the other hand, view activist institutional investors as extracting short-term profit at the expense of long-term growth.

2. Shareholder Voting Rights

Under the Delaware General Corporations Law (DGCL), each stockholder is entitled to vote at a meeting of stockholders or by proxy. In addition, each stockholder has one vote for each share, unless the corporate charter provides otherwise. There are several circumstances that require a shareholder vote. Under Delaware law, shareholders elect the board of directors.

Charter and bylaws amendments also require shareholder approval. Professor Bebchuk refers to such amendments as “rules-of-the-game” decisions. Certain major corporate decisions also require a

222. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). Similarly, Professor Lucian Bebchuk, one of the foremost proponents of increasing shareholder power, describes the U.S. corporation as “a 'representative democracy' in which the members of the polity can act only through their representatives and never directly.” Bebchuk, supra note 218, at 837.


224. Bebchuk, supra note 194, at 688.


228. Id. § 211.

229. Id. § 211.

230. Id. § 242(b) (Supp. 2016). The company’s state of incorporation can also be changed subject to shareholder vote, but also requires initiation by management. Id.

231. Id. § 109 (Supp. 2016).

shareholder vote, such as mergers or a sale of all or substantially all the assets, commonly referred to as “game-ending” decisions. Under NYSE rules, shareholder approval is required for equity compensation plans; in certain self-dealing transactions; or if the issuance of stock increases the number of outstanding shares or voting power by twenty percent or more.

The Dodd-Frank Act provides shareholders of public companies with an advisory vote on compensation paid to executives (“Say on Pay”) as well as golden parachute payments in the case of a merger or acquisition. The Act produced immediate favorable results. During the 2011 proxy season, for example, management in some public companies “either changed the company’s pay practices in response to the possibility of an unfavorable shareholder vote, or offered additional disclosure explaining pay practices that had come onto the shareholder radar screens.”

It is well-settled, however, that the board of directors initiates all major corporate decisions; “[s]hareholders may not initiate any such decisions.” Thus shareholders have only a veto power. A veto power on important business matters presumably gives shareholders some form of control over the corporation, or at least preserves an important mechanism. Yet, as Professors Thompson and Edelman note, “[v]oting plays a limited role in corporate decisionmaking, much more limited than in the public sphere.”

3. Director Elections

Under Delaware law, shareholders elect the board of directors with the board acting as “a surrogate for and in the interests of the shareholders.” As Professor Velasco noted, “[i]n theory, this should give shareholders ultimate control over the business. In practice, however, it does not.” Some scholars have commonly recognized that “the reality is that management, and not shareholders, generally selects the directors.” Because of the highly-dispersed nature of corporate ownership, “the CEO [is] able to run the daily operations of the firm and [can] handpick

233. § 251(c) (Supp. 2016).
234. Id. § 271.
235. Bebchuk, supra note 218, at 837.
236. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03 (2015).
238. Id.
240. Bebchuk, supra note 218, at 836.
241. Id. at 846–47.
243. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011).
246. Gevurtz, supra note 195, at 396.
nominees to the board,” placing boards effectively in an inferior position to the CEO. In addition, shareholders often prefer to sell their shares if they disagree with management, rather than voting or contesting elections—a less costly choice.

“Typically there is only one slate of nominees, presented by the board itself, and directors can be elected by a simple plurality.” It should be noted that many corporations have recently changed the procedure, requiring the vote of a majority of the shares cast. Under the former system, if only one shareholder voted, the nominees would still be elected. Any shareholder may nominate a candidate for elections, but first, such proposal must be submitted to the board. If the board rejects the proposal, the shareholder may choose to engage in a “proxy contest” to include the candidate in elections, or give up the idea. This is an expensive and time-consuming endeavor, which would require the shareholder “to file Schedule 14A with the SEC, hire a proxy solicitor, and often engage in an expensive public campaign to support their nominee or nominees,” with reimbursement by the corporation only if the nominee is elected.

4. Factors Undermining Democratic Shareholder Voting

Even if shareholders are dissatisfied with the current board and choose to challenge the incumbents, the rate of their success is highly discouraging. The entrenchment of incumbent boards is reflected in the empirical data: a 2011 survey of Russell 3000 companies reported that of 16,822 candidates nominated for board seats, only 26 candidates were proposed by shareholders; “the success rate for these incumbent candidates was 99.9%, compared to 46% for the candidates proposed by shareholders.” Professors Becker and Subramanian calculated that “[o]nly 69 director seats, or 0.4% of total director elections, presented a choice for shareholders of U.S. companies in 2011.”

a. Financial Costs to Challenging an Incumbent Board

It is very typical for a publicly traded corporation to have only one candidate for each board position; this candidate is almost always nominated by management. Only current management can utilize corporate funds to solicit proxy votes for its
slate of director candidates. The challenging party must finance its own proxy materials. Unsurprisingly, bearing the full cost of challenging management candidates represents a significant impediment to shareholder power. If a shareholder wants to place candidates on the corporate ballot, the shareholder “must absorb the printing costs, postage costs, and legal costs of mounting a full-blown proxy solicitation, and these costs can amount to millions of dollars.” This asymmetry “ultimately leads to lessened accountability by the incumbent board and management to shareholders.” As Professor Bebchuk notes, “[w]hile potential challengers have insufficient incentive to invest in mounting a proxy contest, incumbents have excessive incentive to invest in opposing a challenge: they have an incentive to spend more than is optimal from the shareholders’ collective perspective.”

In addition, there is an issue of sharing the benefits of winning a contest. If the challenging party wins the election, the shareholder waging the proxy contest will be reimbursed for proxy solicitation expenses. And yet, on the benefit side, the shareholder will receive only its pro rata interest of the increased price of his or her shares. Thus, there is an obvious discouraging factor to engaging in a proxy contest: the benefit will be shared among all shareholders, “while the risk of loss (the costs) is borne” solely by the challenging party.

Charles Elson presents an interesting solution to this problem: to provide reimbursement of reasonable expenses to challengers who lose by only a small percentage. Presumably, a challenger with low chances to win will not engage in the contest. By participating, they would expose themselves to a great risk of losing by a substantial vote margin, depriving the challenger of the right for reimbursement.

b. Shareholder Uncertainty and Costs

Convincing shareholders that a rival team will perform better is not an easy task. Incumbent candidates would have a better track record of performance at a particular company, thus making their plans less hypothetical. A rival team would have a difficult time presenting “as complete a picture of their plans as the incumbents can,” with incumbents relying on their experience from past years. Additionally, rival teams may not be able to specify their CEO pick well in advance, as such candidates may not be willing to engage in conversations with rival team members, whereas shareholders generally know the name of the CEO nominated by the incumbents at

260. Elson, supra note 258, at 18.
261. Bebchuk, supra note 194, at 690 (emphasis omitted).
262. Mourning, supra note 214, at 1153.
263. Id.
264. Elson, supra note 258.
265. Bebchuk, supra note 194, at 692.
the time of elections. Thus, the incumbents are more predictable in the future, making them less risky for individual shareholders.

Another challenge a rival team may face is shareholder passiveness and lack of interest in election: many shareholders fail to vote. This failure to vote accords with rational choice theory: when one vote is unlikely to change the election’s outcome, the individual’s “tangible benefit of the outcome of an election is modest” at best, if there is one at all. The collective action/free-riding problem comes into play here as well. Although institutional investors have no collective action issue, they may still be reluctant to support a rival team. Banks, for example, are looking for new business from companies, and thus, voting for a challenger may prevent them from obtaining business from the incumbents.

In the current U.S. system, shares are commonly held in “street name,” where the broker with whom the stocks were purchased, or another intermediary entity, is listed as the legal owner on a corporation’s records but the shareholder still receives the financial benefits as the “beneficial owner” of the stock. If a shareholder desires, she can register her shares with the Direct Registration System, which allows a shareholder to move her shares from street name to directly registered in her name and back to street name. Unfortunately, this system, created in 1996, can take up to thirty days to prepare a shareholder’s directly held stock for sale, although two to five days is more common.

c. Administrative Issues

Generally, the basic rules of shareholder voting follow about the same structure, and most shareholders vote by proxy. The election administration is not flawless, however. Weaknesses and inconsistencies include inaccurate shareholder lists, delays and omissions in ballot distribution, and incomplete vote tabulation by the subcontractor firms that run elections on behalf of public companies.

Inaccuracies may lead to doubt among shareholders as to whether the election results are legitimate. It is especially troubling in cases of contested elections—archaic administration may create additional impediments, and a rival team may incur

266. Id. at 692–93.
267. Id.
268. Edelman et al., supra note 217, at 1384.
269. Id.
270. Bebchuk, supra note 194, at 693.
272. Id.
273. Yermack, supra note 219, at 105–06.
274. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 251, at 1253–55.
275. Id. at 1249–53.
276. Id. at 1251–53.
significant expenses if it loses the election. Furthermore, “even if an election’s outcome is not in doubt, managers and shareholders pay attention to not only the identity of the victor, but also to the vote totals on both sides.”277 In addition, “[i]f votes are not counted accurately, then voting totals become noisier signals of shareholders’ preferences, undermining the value of corporate elections as a form of communication.”278

5. Recent Changes Facilitating Shareholder Voice

a. The Decline of Staggered Boards

One of the attributes of corporate governance, commonly criticized by the proponents of shareholder power, is staggered boards. The staggered board has primarily served as an antitakeover mechanism. Typically, in a staggered board, directors are divided into three separate classes serving staggered terms,279 and shareholders elect only a third of the directors (one class) in any given year.280 It therefore takes a rival two years to replace a majority of the board and gain control. The alternative is a unitary board. In a unitary board structure, shareholders vote on all director positions at each annual meeting.281

Professor Bebchuk found two ways in which staggered boards obstruct challenges against incumbent directors. First, it increases costs, because “[r]ivals need to run a slate of directors [at least] twice,” “campaign[ing] for more than a year.”282 Second, shareholders are reluctant to vote for a rival, even with a better agenda, in a company with staggered board structure.283 After a rival wins the first round of elections, the board will be internally divided for at least one year.284 This unstable transition discourages shareholders.

Staggered boards may also lead to “lower value, a greater likelihood of making acquisitions that are value-destroying, and a greater propensity to compensate executives without regard to whether they actually do a good job.”285 These factors and pressure from the public led to a decline of staggered board in American corporate practice: “302 S&P 500 companies had staggered boards in 2002”,286 in 2016, only

277. Yermack, supra note 219, at 106.
278. Id.
282. Bebchuk, supra note 194, at 694.
283. Id.
284. Id.
286. Id.
84 boards held staggered elections.287 “Of 900 other companies outside the S&P 500, staggered board adoption rates have declined by about 25 percent since 2002.”288 Many institutional investors and proxy advisers favor de-staggering boards as well.289

b. Majority Voting

Large companies have been recently adopting majority voting.290 Under this system, uncontested board nominees must receive more of the “for” votes than “against” or “withheld” votes to win elections.291 Plurality voting represents an alternative way—the nominees receiving the most “for” votes are elected or re-elected.292 Thus, “a director would simply need to receive a plurality of the votes cast.”293 The main concern with the plurality voting rule arises in an uncontested election; there, a director may win the election upon receiving just one “for” vote294 (assuming all other votes were “withheld”).295 It follows that if only one candidate is on the ballot, she wins.

The majority vote rule challenges incumbent directors, making them more accountable, “because every election, in effect, becomes a contest between the candidate and ‘not the candidate.’”296 It also makes the challenging process cheaper—unsatisfied shareholders do not need to run their own candidates because shareholders may campaign for withholding votes. The opponents of the majority voting rule, on the other hand, are concerned that “shareholders could withhold (or threaten to withhold) votes for reasons unrelated to shareholder value maximization.”297 This is especially relevant for companies with institutional shareholders.

The majority voting movement began in the 2006 proxy season, when some “institutional shareholders submitted more than 140 shareholder proposals calling for this voting rule.”298 It received substantial support—in 2007, for example, the rate of success of these proposals was more than 50%.299 Professor Choi and colleagues found that in 2005, “only nine of the S&P 100 companies used majority voting in director elections”; “as of January 2014, almost 90 percent of S&P

287. Carol Bowie, ISS 2016 Board Practices Study, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/01/iss-2016-board-practices-study [https://perma.cc/2UJ3-9ZU3].
288. Solomon, supra note 280.
291. Id.
292. Id.
294. Majority Voting for Directors, supra note 290.
296. Id. at 11.
298. Mourning, supra note 214, at 1163.
299. Id. at 1164–65.
500 companies have adopted some form of majority voting."300 Studies have shown that the adoption of majority voting led to “positive abnormal returns,” but that this effect diminished over time.301 Another study found that firms that adopted majority voting were more likely to implement shareholder proposals that, in turn, positively impacted stock price.302

Adoption of the majority voting rule may be explained by several factors. One possibility is self-selection—companies with “good” and proactive corporate governance self-select into adopting majority voting.303 Another is that majority voting makes directors more responsive to shareholder interests.304 A third possibility is that companies that have adopted majority voting may engage in more campaigning (“electioneering”) in close elections because the implications of receiving a majority withhold votes are more severe.305 They may do so by lobbying Institutional Shareholder Services not to issue a “withhold” or “against” recommendation or by targeting shareholders directly.306 “Finally, shareholders may be more reluctant to cast a vote against a nominee when a failure to get a majority of ‘for’ votes could result in the ouster of the nominee,”307 Shareholders may perceive that a failed election at a company with a majority voting rule may interfere with the board functioning or impact stock price and therefore be reluctant to cast a “no” vote.

c. SEC Proxy Rules

For many years, the restrictive SEC proxy rules imposed significant costs on potential insurgents and chilled shareholder speech.308 Since 1992, however, the SEC has been gradually relaxing its proxy requirements. In 2007, the SEC promulgated its “eProxy” rules, which were designed to further reduce costs by eliminating the mailing costs of proxy statements to shareholders.309

Under the new Rule 14a-16, public companies mail shareholders only a Notice of Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, at least forty days prior to the shareholder meeting.310 All proxy materials now “must be publicly accessible, free of charge, at the Web site address specified in the notice,” and must remain there through the conclusion of the shareholder meeting.311 A shareholder may solicit proxies pursuant to the new rule as well.312 Online posting of proxy materials reduces at least distribution

301. Id. at 1128.
302. Id. (citing Ertimur et al., supra note 297).
303. Id. at 1129.
304. Id. at 1130.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1132.
309. Id. at 559–60.
311. Id.
312. Id.
costs, as only a single page—the notice—needs to be mailed (the cost of printing and mailing was estimated $5–$6 per set of proxy materials). The SEC Commissioner noted that these savings “help level the playing field between management and dissenting shareholders.” The practice shows, however, that eProxy has not often been employed.

d. Changes in Broker Rules

The majority of shares are held in “street name” by custodians, such as banks and brokerage firms, on behalf of their clients, the “beneficial owners” of the shares. Issuers of proxy materials do not know the identity of the beneficial owner, which in turn impedes communication with shareholders. Brokers are required to forward proxy materials to the beneficial owners for a fee, paid by the issuer. In some circumstances, typically in cases of routine and “uncontested” matters, brokers were permitted to vote shares on behalf of beneficial owners. There is no practical reason for brokers not to support management on these matters because they do not have an economic interest in the corporation.

In 2010, the NYSE rules and the Dodd-Frank Act prohibited brokers from voting shares on behalf of the owners in nonroutine matters, without shareholder instructions in most circumstances. Under amended Rule 452 of the NYSE, director elections, regardless of whether they are contested, are considered nonroutine and brokers may not vote the shares without instructions. Similarly, section 957 of the Dodd-Frank Act bars brokers from voting shares held in their names without shareholder instructions on board elections, “executive compensation, or any other significant matter.”

These amendments are meant to protect shareholders by preventing uninstructed broker voting and voting distortions. This is especially significant in the context of majority voting—“broker votes can no longer be relied on” for this purpose, thus “increasing the insurgent’s chances to unseat an incumbent in a ‘withhold the vote’ campaign.” It also leads, however, to potential unintended negative consequences. For example, the inability of brokers to vote uninstructed shares means that corporations with high supermajority requirements for amending

314. Id.
315. Id. at 15.
316. Kahan & Rock, supra note 251, at 1237.
318. Id.
319. See Becker & Subramanian, supra note 253, at 16.
320. Id.
their charters may be unable to reach these thresholds without uninstructed broker vote, even with strong support from shareholders and directors. This phenomenon is referred to as a “frozen charter.”

e. Proxy Access

The advocates of increasing shareholder power have persistently demanded implementation of the “proxy access” rule. The idea is fairly straightforward—under the rule, “significant long-term shareholders should have the right to place [their] board candidates on the company’s own proxy statement.” Proponents argue that proxy access empowers shareholders to actively monitor managers and the incumbent board “by the threat of replacement.” The Dodd-Frank Act provided the SEC with the express authority to regulate shareholders’ access to the corporate proxy.

In turn, the SEC adopted Rule 14a-11, the proxy access rule, in 2010, but the D.C. Circuit struck it down in 2011, holding that the SEC failed to “adequately . . . assess the economic effects of [the] new rule.” Rule 14a-11 required public companies to include in their proxy materials nominations for director from qualified shareholders who own at least 3% of a company’s outstanding shares for a minimum of three years. Yet, “[i]n 2015, at least 116 companies received a shareholder proposal seeking a proxy access bylaw along the parameters of the vacated SEC rule.” Companies’ responses varied from rejecting the idea on principle, to expressing openness to adopting or agreeing to adopt the rule, sometimes requiring a 5% ownership threshold instead of 3%. As a result, “125 companies had a proxy access bylaw by the end of 2015”; it is likely that a majority of S&P 500 companies will follow the trend in the near future.

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324. Scott Hirst, Frozen Charters, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 94 (2017) (“In the three years after the broker voting change took effect, in 54 of the 63 companies where charter amendments failed despite receiving overwhelming shareholder support, the company would have had their amendments pass had the broker voting change not been implemented.”) (footnotes omitted).
325. Id.
326. Becker & Subramanian, supra note 253, at 20; see also Coffee & Palia, supra note 226, at 570.
332. Id.
333. Id.
that the “3%/3-year ownership thresholds have become the unofficial standards” of proxy access provisions. Proponents’ arguments in favor of proxy access may be summarized as follows: it “promotes greater director accountability to shareholders”; it makes it significantly easier and less costly to nominate board candidates; it fosters competition leading to election of “better qualified and more independent” directors; and it “makes it easier . . . for boards to replace underperforming directors.” There is, however, disagreement among advocates for proxy access regarding the proper way to implement the rule. On one hand, the regime, denoted as “private ordering,” allows shareholders to initiate adoption of proxy access. On the other hand, a “default” regime, imposes the proxy access rule. Professor Bebchuk argues that because of the difference in power between management and shareholders, private ordering will fail to increase shareholder involvement in director nominations. Thus, Bebchuk favors the default rule with the minimum threshold requirements as vacated Rule 14a-11 provided. Professor Grundfest, however, advocates for a private ordering regime because it allows shareholders to choose among different structures of the rule, finding the best fit for a company’s needs.

In response to the financial crisis, Delaware enacted section 112 of the DGCL. It states:

- bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to an election of directors, it may be required . . . to include in its proxy solicitation materials (including any form of proxy it distributes), in addition to individuals nominated by the board of directors, 1 or more individuals nominated by a stockholder.

Thus, section 112 provides for private ordering of proxy access, in line with Grundfest’s proposal. In addition, the SEC did not appeal the D.C. Circuit case, and instead amended Rule 14a-8 on September 14, 2011, to prohibit companies from excluding shareholder proposals that would amend a company’s governing documents regarding director nomination procedures. It resulted in what

335. Id.
338. See id.
Bernard Sharfman referred to as “shareholder-initiated proxy access” in addition to “board-initiated proxy access.”

Companies have started using “substantially implemented” or “directly conflicts” exemptions to exclude shareholder proxy access proposals. Yet, consistent with the 2016 season, in 2017, the SEC continued to affirm that shareholder proposals asking for a proxy access rule “are considered to be substantially implemented if companies provide terms permitting shareholders that own 3% or more for at least three years to nominate the greater of two directors, or 20%, of the board.” In addition, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance stated that “the staff won’t view a shareholder proposal to be directly conflicting with a management proposal if a reasonable shareholder could logically vote for both.” It eliminated a major way companies addressed proxy access proposals.

IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This Part presents our hypotheses, data, methodology, and empirical evidence regarding the role of outside shareholders in preventing stock option manipulation. Our evidence shows that the presence of outside directors did not reduce either corporate fraud or malfeasance by the board during our sample period extending from 1996 to 2015.

A. Securities Class Action Lawsuits

We start by examining the number of securities class action lawsuits that were either settled, dismissed, or are ongoing. We obtain this data from the Stanford Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC). A securities class action contains allegations of violations of federal or state securities laws.

346. Id.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases Settled</th>
<th>Number of Cases Settled for $10M or more</th>
<th>Number of Dismissed Cases</th>
<th>Number of Ongoing Cases</th>
<th>Total Number of Cases Filed</th>
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<td>63</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,159</strong></td>
<td><strong>677</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>486</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,063</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Security Class Action Lawsuits from SLCA

SCAC has kept track of about 4000 class action lawsuits since the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was passed. The total number of cases filed, settled, dismissed, or ongoing is shown in Table 1. The total number of lawsuits filed is 1407 for the 1996–2000 time period, while the number of cases settled is 588 or 64.1% of the total. The number of cases settled for $10 million or more equals 212 or 23.1% of the total.
Looking at the post-SOX period between 2002 and 2008,\textsuperscript{347} we see that the total number of lawsuits decided is 1116, and the number of cases settled is 580 or 52.0% of the total cases decided. The number of cases settled for $10 million or more equals 254 or 22.8% of the total cases decided, which is very similar to the pre-SOX period. The dollar volume of settlements shows similar patterns. All settlements average $3.6 billion per year pre-SOX and $3.3 billion post-SOX period. For large settlements (more than $10 million), the corresponding figures are $3.3 billion per year in the pre-SOX period and $3.1 billion in the post-SOX period. Hence, there is no sign of abatement in the number or dollar amount of settled cases during the post-SOX period. Consequently, SOX does not appear to be leading to better corporate governance.

\textbf{B. Malfeasance of the Board}

Next, we investigate whether malfeasance by the board has declined following SOX.\textsuperscript{348} To explore this issue, we revisit the options backdating scandal of 2006 and extend our time period to 2015. We explore whether executives manipulate the timing of option grants or timing of information flows to benefit themselves during the post-SOX period. If executives have positive information around their option grants, they can delay the public announcement of news until after executive options are granted in order to benefit their compensation. This activity is called spring-loading. If executives possess negative information around their option grant time, they can expedite the release of negative information to a date earlier than information release in order to benefit their compensation. The early release of negative information reduces the stock price and thus the exercise price of the options. This activity is called bullet-dodging.

The dating hypothesis is linked to backdating and forward-dating of stock options. Backdating suggests that executives change the date of options grants to an earlier date when stock price was at a minimum. It is straightforward to test this hypothesis, because if there is a change in the grant date, grant date will be reported with delays. There is a positive relationship between the length of delays and the amount of stock price bounce since the grant date. Forward-dating suggests that if the stock price has been falling since the grant date, executives may have incentives to wait to see if the price will fall further. Forward-dating is more difficult to test because there is always a bounce in price between the grant date and the reporting date. Nevertheless, the forward-dating hypothesis also predicts a stock price decline prior to an option grant date.

To test these hypotheses, we obtain option grant data from the Thompson Reuters insider reporting database, which contains all option grants to executives and directors including inside and outside directors for all publicly listed firms in the United States. Other studies have also used the insider trading database to

\textsuperscript{347} We restrict our post-SOX time period to 2003–2008 to abstract from the large number of ongoing cases during the post-SOX period.

analyze corporate governance and internal control mechanisms. The database contains identifying information of firms, identifying information of executives, the number of shares granted, the underlying security of the option, the grant date, and the reporting date. Since the Thompson Reuters database starts at 1996, we limit our analysis period from January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2015. We collect daily returns of the underlying company stocks and the value weighted market index from CRSP.

We analyze three subperiods that represent different eras in executive compensation literature. The first subperiod is the pre-SOX period, between January 1, 1996, and August 31, 2002. There is no regulation about stock option backdating in this period. The second period, scandal-period, is between September 1, 2002, and December 31, 2006. The feature of this period is the high number of backdating scandals. The last period is January 1, 2007, to December 31, 2015, which is named as the post-scandal period.

Table 2 shows the number of grants, the number of firms, and the number of options granted for top executives as well as inside and outside directors. We report these numbers separately for promptly reporting and delayed reporting for each group. Total number of options granted for inside directors and top executives is 40,914.5 million, and for outside directors is 8460.4 million for the whole sample period. Of these totals, 21,697.3 million options were granted in the pre-SOX period; 9713.5 million options were granted in the backdating scandals period; and 17,964.10 million options were granted in the post-scandal period. Also, 29,885.8 million options were reported promptly, while 19,489.10 million options were reported late during the whole sample period.

### Table 2: Sample Characteristics of Insider Trading by Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Top Executives and Directors</th>
<th>Outside Directors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Grants</td>
<td>Number of Firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-SOX Period 01/96-08/02</td>
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<td>Promptly Reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delayed Reporting</td>
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<td>7,857</td>
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<tr>
<td>Backdating Scandal 09/02-12/06</td>
<td>460,543</td>
<td>4,812</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promptly Reporting</td>
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<td>Delayed Reporting</td>
<td>52,556</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Scandal Period 01/07-12/15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delayed Reporting</td>
<td>26,902</td>
<td>1,576</td>
</tr>
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In the pre-SOX period, the delayed reporting number of grants, number of firms, and number of options are much higher than those for promptly reporting option grants. Only one-fifth of top executives and inside directors report their options promptly, while this ratio is one-third for outside directors. This relationship reverses after SOX. The number of promptly reported grants, firms, and options inflates while number of delayed grants, firms, and options mitigates in post-SOX period. Prompt reporting increased up to 90% of all option grants for both insiders and outsiders. This trend continues in the post-scamd period. Nevertheless, even in the post-scamd period, about 3% of all option grants are late reported.

We use event methodology to measure the abnormal returns around event dates. Event dates are option grant dates. We measure ninety days of cumulative market-adjusted abnormal daily stock returns (CAR) before the event date and ninety days of CAR after the event date. For all summary statistics, the unit of observation is the individual grant.

We define abnormal returns as the difference between the daily returns for firms with the option awards to executives and the value weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq, and ARCA. This approach controls for market movements and implicitly assumes the average beta or risk-exposure is one. Our sample contains more than 6000 firms; therefore, we can safely claim that this assumption is satisfied. Abnormal return $AR_i$ for stock $i$ and day $t$ is computed by a market adjusted model as:

$$AR_i = (R_{it} - R_{mt})$$

For each firm $i$ and day $t$, where $R_{it}$ is the simple daily return on the stock option-granting firm $i$ on day $t$. $R_{mt}$ is the daily return on the value weighted index of the stock market. For each event date $t$, these returns are first averaged across all option granting firms $i$ to compute average abnormal returns:

$$AAR_t = \frac{1}{n_t} \sum_{i=1}^{n_t} AR_{it}$$

The average abnormal returns are cumulated across the event dates as follows:
These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the behavior of abnormal returns around option granting dates. In Figures 1 through 6, abnormal returns are computed using a market adjusted model. Day 0 refers to the grant day. Day 90 refers to the ninetieth trading day after the grant date, while day -90 refers to the ninetieth trading day before the grant date.

We group insiders into two groups: Executives and inside directors; and outside directors. Inside directors are those who combine the title of director with the title of officer. An example is OD (officer-director). The title of outside directors is simply given as D. To highlight the emphasis by SOX, on outside directors, we combine executives and inside-directors in one group called executives and contrast this group with nonexecutive outside directors.

Figure 1 shows the mean CARs from ninety trading days prior to the grant date (date 0) to ninety days after the grant date for executives and inside directors (insiders) versus outside directors during the pre-SOX period (January 1996–August 2002). As can be seen from Figure 1, stock prices form a V-pattern for all insiders’ option grants, either reported promptly or late. The presence of the V-pattern indicates that option timing games were prevalent during the pre-SOX period.

Furthermore, Figure 1 indicates that the late reported options have higher post-grant returns than promptly reported options. This pattern holds for both executives and outside directors. This finding indicates that backdating was also prevalent prior to SOX.

Finally, Figure 1 shows that the post-grant returns are much smaller for outside directors than for insiders. This pattern holds true to both prompt and late reported option grants. This finding indicates that outside directors are involved with manipulative compensation games to a lesser extent than the executives during the pre-SOX period.

The specific numbers are as follows: Executives enjoy a post-grant bounce of 7.8% and 9.2% abnormal returns following the grant date for promptly-reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, or 1.4%, can be attributed to option-timing games, while 7.8% can be attributed to information-timing games.

The comparable figures for the outside directors are as follows: Outside directors enjoy a post-grant bounce of 3.7% and 7.0% abnormal returns following the grant date for promptly reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, or 3.3% can be attributed to option-timing games.
while 3.7% can be attributed to information-timing games. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors were involved in compensation manipulation games albeit to a slightly lesser degree than executives. Furthermore, more of the compensation games involved manipulating information flows rather than blatant backdating of option grant dates.

Figure 1: Abnormal returns around option grant days, pre-SOX, by title and reporting delays

Figure 2 shows the abnormal profits of insiders and outside directors during the post-SOX, option-dating scandal period of September 2002 to December 2006. We notice that the post-grant stock price bounce is much higher here for all groups: Executives enjoy a post-grant bounce of 4.6% and 14.9% abnormal returns following the grant date for promptly-reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, or 10.3%, can be attributed to option-timing games, while 4.6% can be attributed to information-timing games. Thus, option-timing games appear to be much more prevalent during this time period.

The comparable figures for outside directors are as follows: Outside directors enjoy a post-grant bounce of 4.6% and 10.3% abnormal returns following the grant date for promptly-reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, or 5.7%, can be attributed to option-timing games, while 4.6% can be attributed to information-timing games. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors were involved albeit to a slightly lesser degree than executives in compensation manipulation games.
This evidence flies in the face of the intended purpose of SOX, which relied on outside directors to serve as a check on top management. Outside directors clearly do not appear to fulfill this purpose. Instead of acting as a check on the top management, outside directors appear to benefit from both information flow as well as option grant timing games almost as much as the top executives.

We now turn to the post-scarnd period of 2007 to 2015. Figure 3 shows the abnormal profits of insiders and outside directors during the post-scarnd period. Figure 3 shows that compensation games continue during the most recent, post-scarnd period. Executives still enjoy a post-grant bounce of 3.8% and 4.1% abnormal returns following the grant date for promptly reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, or 0.3%, can be attributed to option-timing games, while 3.8% can be attributed to information-timing games. Thus, once again, information-timing games appear to be much more prevalent during this time period.

The comparable figures for the outside directors are as follows: Outside directors enjoy a post-grant bounce of 3.8% and 7.5% abnormal returns following the grant date for promptly-reported and late-reported option grants, respectively. The difference between these two groups, or 3.7%, can be attributed to option-timing games, while 3.8% can be attributed to information-timing games. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors were involved as much, if not more, than the executives in compensation manipulation games.

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352. We call this period the post-scarnd period because the scandals were revealed in 2006.
Once again, the significant post-grant returns that are captured by the outside directors indicate that SOX has not worked as intended. Outside directors are not providing sufficient checks and balances on top management to prevent option timing games even in the post-scare period. To investigate the extent of these games, we now restrict our attention to very large option grants involving more than 100,000 shares. The evidence for large grants is shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6.
Our evidence for the large grants shows similar but higher abnormal returns. The fact that the post-grant date abnormal returns increase even more for larger grants further corroborates the conclusion that these stock return patterns are not random, but rather they are deliberate and planned. Overall, our evidence does not support relying on outside directors to provide an effective check on top management either before or after SOX.
Our evidence shows that SOX has not been effective in improving corporate governance. It has not reduced the overall fraudulent activity. The number of class action lawsuits has not decreased significantly since SOX was passed. Furthermore, the large volume of large settlements has not declined. Our evidence also shows that SOX has not reduced manipulative activity by the board. Overall, our evidence indicates that the responsibilities placed by SOX on outside directors do not appear to work as intended.

Our recommendation is placing more emphasis and power on the shareholders. Instead of placing almost exclusive emphasis on the board of directors as a check on top management, we need to strengthen corporate governance by strengthening the monitoring role of the shareholders. While not all shareholders will be interested in providing a monitoring role, all shareholders will certainly benefit from enhanced shareholder rights.

We suggest a number of reforms that can enhance shareholder rights. First, the recent trend towards multiclass control structures with unequal voting rights should be checked. Some recent IPOs have involved giving zero shares to outside shareholders. Firms that have recently adopted multiclass shareholder structure with unequal voting rights include Berkshire Hathaway, Google, LinkedIn, Zynga, Groupon, and Facebook. There is also evidence that shareholder returns suffer in controlled firms.353

Second, shareholder voting rights can be strengthened by making shareholder by-law resolutions binding on the board of directors. Currently, the SEC requires that public companies include shareholder proposals on their proxy statements.354 However, these proposals are nonbinding recommendations to the board of directors. Furthermore, corporations typically exclude these proposals under any one of twelve common reasons, such as “improper under state law.”355 Even if passed by the shareholders, these resolutions may not be adopted by the board of directors for any number of reasons. Binding bylaw resolutions would give direct control to the shareholders to assert their interests over the board of directors and top management.

Another important recommendation is a majority-vote requirement for the election of the board, instead of the current plurality rule. The current rule does not permit shareholders to vote against a nominee. They can only withhold their vote if they are unhappy with the candidate. Theoretically, if there is no competing nominee, a person can be elected to the board with a single vote. Majority voting can be further strengthened by requiring that if any director does not receive a majority of the votes, the director must resign immediately and a new vote must be held to determine the replacement director. Having an effective majority requirement would increase shareholder power over the election of the board.

Finally, we suggest a revamping of the Direct Registration System to decrease costs and barriers to shareholders exercising their voting right. Specifically, the system should not only allow for shareholders to automatically register and unregister their shares to the corporation’s books through a secure online portal, but also educate themselves on corporate issues and vote their shares through this portal instead of using the archaic means currently employed.

CONCLUSION

In this study we examine the monitoring role of outside directors. SOX has placed special emphasis on independent board members to control and monitor top management. Our evidence presented in this Article shows that outside directors are not fulfilling this requirement as SOX intended.

First, we investigate the number of class action lawsuits and the dollar value of settlements from 1996 to 2015. We find no sign of abatement in either the number of settled cases or the dollar amount of settlements during the post-SOX period as compared to the pre-SOX period. Consequently, the provisions of SOX do not appear to be leading to better corporate governance—by reducing lawsuits against corporations.

Second, we examine direct malfeasance by the board. In this regard, we investigate the timing and backdating of executive compensation options between 1996 and 2015. In this study, we find that outside directors manipulated their option grants like top executives do. Similar to options given to top management, outside directors use dating and timing techniques to manipulate stock options granted. Our evidence shows that they employ backdating, spring-loading and bullet-dodging games to increase the value of their options. Backdating, among other techniques, provides remarkable profits to outside directors. Application of these techniques for late-reported grants increase outside directors’ compensation by substantial amounts. Specifically, management received extra compensation amounts of 9.2%, 14.9%, and 4.1% for the 1996–2002 period, the 2003–2006 period, and the 2007–2014 period, respectively. For outside directors, the comparable numbers are 7.0%, 10.3%, and 7.5%, respectively. For large late-reported option grants, abnormal returns increase even further.

Our evidence strongly suggests that outside directors are not fulfilling the monitoring responsibility placed on them by SOX. We recommend that the solution lies not in strengthening the board of directors, but in strengthening the power of the shareholders. We make four specific recommendations: First, we recommend that multiclass voting structures should be eliminated. Multiclass voting structures exacerbate the conflict between shareholders and management and lead to inferior outcomes. Our second recommendation is to make shareholder resolutions binding on the board of directors. Currently, management typically ignores nonbinding shareholder resolutions. We also recommend that plurality voting be eliminated and replaced by majority voting for the board of directors. Majority voting shifts the relative power to elect directors away from management to the shareholders. Finally, we propose the Direct Registration System currently employed be replaced with a more modern system, allowing for both registration and voting.