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Institutional investors are legally obliged to be faithful stewards of their portfolio companies. Yet, the conventional wisdom among commentators is that institutional investors have failed to perform this obligation because they are not incentivized to make adequate investments in corporate governance. This Article contends that this criticism is based on an incomplete analysis that misses a critical aspect of the operation of institutional investors. The critics focus exclusively on institutional investors’ efforts in actively engaging with the managements of their portfolio companies. They ignore, however, an important passive governance tool that institutional investors routinely use: corporate guidelines. Corporate guidelines are published by institutional investors to articulate their stance on governance issues and justify their voting decisions in annual meetings. Corporate guidelines have become increasingly popular not only among investors, but also among other market actors who interact with investors in shaping corporations’ governance regimes, such as the corporations’ managements and other shareholders, proxy advisory firms, and law firms.

This Article demonstrates how corporate guidelines exert a profound effect on corporate governance. For institutional investors, corporate guidelines constitute an ideal tool for balancing the investors’ governance-related duties and the need for cost minimization. The promulgation and use of guidelines is less costly than active engagements, and unlike outsourcing voting decisions to proxy advisory firms, it is regarded as a valid way to fulfill the investors’ duties as corporate stewards. For the managements, aligning governance policies with corporate guidelines signals their commitment to sound governance practices, helping managements fend off challenges by activist shareholders. Activist shareholders, for their part, routinely cite corporate guidelines to support their proposals. This Article empirically substantiates these claims by analyzing the ways in which the guidelines were used by corporations and activist shareholders in proxy statements published by S&P 500 corporations. Initially, I focused on the years 2019–2021. After my initial findings, I expanded the scope to the years 2005 and 2010. Finally, to get a more comprehensive outlook, I expanded the scope of my research, continuing with a focus

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on the top 100 S&P 500 corporations during the years 2005–2021. This expansion examined the number of explicit references made by corporations and resulted in a significant spike in such references between 2015 and 2021. Furthermore, although the number of explicit references made by activist shareholders was not consistent throughout these years, such references were still made frequently. Importantly, my analysis notes that in certain years under assessment, almost 40% of the corporate proxy statements of the 100 largest companies included explicit references to corporate guidelines. This fact cannot be dismissed when examining institutional investors’ stewardship.

Overall, I collected data from 3313 proxy statements published by S&P 500 corporations in 2005–2021. This Article therefore offers the first comprehensive theoretical and empirical examination of corporate guidelines and their effect on corporate impact.
In recent years, corporate scholars and policy makers have devoted a great deal of attention to large institutional investors. In particular, there exists a heated debate in the corporate world about the capabilities and incentives of institutional investors.
to invest in corporate stewardship decisions (i.e., monitoring, voting, and engaging\(^1\)) in their portfolio companies. The main focus is on mutual funds, which hold most of the assets of institutional investors.\(^2\)

According to common wisdom, which finds support in theoretical and empirical studies, institutional investors refrain from active stewardship for three principal reasons. First, managers of mutual funds have poor incentives to invest in active stewardship since their compensation is not affected by the successes of their portfolio companies. Furthermore, the business model of mutual funds is predicated on offering the lowest possible fees to clients and therefore does not align with active stewardship. The stewardship budgets and personnel of mutual funds, including at the “Big Three”—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—are far too small to allow them to invest in informed voting and engagements in the thousands of corporations that comprise their portfolios.\(^3\) Second, since mutual funds and other types of institutional investors, such as pension funds, have business ties with the corporations in which they invest, active intervention in those corporations may lead to confrontations that jeopardize those ties. Third, and relatedly, managers of corporations wield political power, and confrontations with them may cause a political backlash against institutional investors that may lead to legislative and regulatory responses aiming to reduce the institutional investors’ power.

Over the years, scholars have advanced various proposals to enhance the involvement and activism of institutional investors in their portfolio companies. For example, Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst have argued that policymakers should reassess and reform the regulation of mutual funds’ fees to induce them to be more active.\(^4\) An alternative way to enhance mutual funds’ activism has been proposed by Lawrence A. Cunningham, who proffered a new

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2. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, *The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors*, 31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 94 (2017) (arguing that investment funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and other similar funds, “are the most important category of institutional investors and represent most of the assets held by institutional investors”). Also, Assaf Hamdani et al. explored the structure of fees paid to managements of private pension funds. See Assaf Hamdani, Eugene Kandel, Yevgeny Mugerman & Yishay Yafeh, *Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment*, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 49 (2017). They concluded that to align the incentives of pension fund managers with those of fund clients, and to motivate funds to promote clients’ interests, regulators should consider revising the current regulatory regime and allowing pension funds to charge performance-based fees to promote better investment management. See id. at 80–82.

3. As recently documented by Bebchuk and Hirst, the stewardship personnel of BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street stands at forty-five, twenty-one, and twelve staff members, respectively, in stark contrast with the huge number of companies that they manage in their portfolios (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street invest in 11,246, 13,225, and 12,191 global companies, respectively and 3765, 3672, and 3117 U.S. companies, respectively). Bebchuk & Hirst, *Index Funds*, supra note 1, at 2077.

4. See Bebchuk et al., *supra* note 2.
model, called “quality shareholder voting.”

This proposal aims to “increase the voting power of long-term committed shareholders” by granting an increasing voting power for shares “held for a given number of years.”

A different mechanism has been suggested by Adi Libson and Gideon Parchomovsky, who have called for the use of tax incentives to encourage mutual funds to become more active.

Other scholars have suggested using voting mechanisms to alter the behavior of passive institutional investors. Dorothy Shapiro Lund has suggested that passive index funds should be barred from voting their shares since they lack adequate incentives to inform themselves before voting.

A less extreme proposal was made by Caleb N. Griffin, who advocated for a “pass-through” mechanism that would empower beneficial investors in index funds to decide how the votes associated with the funds’ shares would be cast.

In this Article, I show that the participants in the debate about the role played by institutional investors in improving corporate governance and reducing agency costs have largely overlooked an important, and surprisingly effective, mechanism employed by institutional investors: “corporate guidelines.” This term covers proxy voting guidelines that are drafted and published by mutual funds on an annual basis, as well as letters drafted by them that provide insights into their priorities, views, and philosophies. It also reflects principles, standards, and general statements published by organizations and groups of institutional investors, such as the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) and the Investor Stewardship Group (ISG).

The corporate guidelines contain “model principles” that pertain to all aspects of corporate governance. The guidelines allow institutional investors to communicate their expectations regarding sound corporate governance to their portfolio companies. While there is no de jure sanction for violating the norms promulgated in the guidelines, they exert enormous influence on companies and their managements. Managers and directors who disregard guidelines risk retaliation from institutional investors and may even lose their job. Critically, the guidelines enable a new form of activism that is consistent with the profit model of mutual funds. I term this form “guidelines-based stewardship.”

The growing use of corporate guidelines can be ascribed to three main reasons. First and foremost, the use of guidelines allows institutional investors to strike a balance between their strict fiduciary duties, on the one hand, and their need to be cost-effective, on the other. It is important to understand that institutional investors


6. Id.


10. See infra Section II.A.
are legally obligated to vote in thousands of shareholder meetings. This is a colossal burden. Relatedly, given their enormous power, institutional investors are expected to act as responsible “corporate citizens.” The guidelines provide institutional investors with an effective way to influence their portfolio companies without collapsing under the weight of full-fledged activism.

The second reason for the growing use of corporate guidelines is that guidelines constitute a “softer” and less adversarial device, relative to classic interventions. Corporate guidelines do not mandate specific governance structures. Consequently, they reduce the potential for confrontation between institutional investors and the managements of their portfolio companies. Maintaining solid ties with portfolio companies is not only an independently important goal, but it also helps stave off political pressures to increase the regulation of institutional investors.

Third and finally, the use of corporate guidelines has become a common global phenomenon. Stewardship codes and principles have become popular devices, adopted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), by many leading countries in the field of corporate governance, and by the largest institutional investors worldwide. An example of this trend is the principles developed in 2018 by the ISG, which is composed of the largest institutional investors in the United States and their international counterparts.

This Article is the first to engage in an in-depth examination of corporate guidelines and to demonstrate their efficacy as a corporate governance tool. The Article aims to make two novel contributions to corporate law scholarship: one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, the Article adds a previously unnoticed dimension to the burgeoning literature on the role of institutional investors in financial markets. Specifically, it highlights the use of guidelines as a principal aspect of corporate stewardship and examines their strengths and weaknesses. My analysis also suggests that the use of guidelines will only increase and multiply in the future.

Empirically, I examined the scope and pervasiveness of the use of guidelines in the corporate realm. To this end, I collected and analyzed 3313 proxy statements published by the S&P 500 corporations in advance of their annual shareholder meetings in the years 2005, 2010, and 2019–2021 and by the top 100 S&P 500 corporations in the years 2005–2021. For each corporation in my sample, I collected information on whether the corporation’s proxy statement includes explicit references to investors’ corporate guidelines, broken down by references made by corporations and their shareholders.

12. See infra Section III.A.1.
13. See infra Section II.B.2.
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra text accompanying note 84.
16. Of the S&P 500 corporations examined in 2019–2021, 494 issued proxy statements in 2019, 493 in 2020, and 417 in 2021. The reason why not all 500 corporations published proxy statements is that some of them went private, and in 2021, not all of them have published their statements yet.
Corporations make references to the guidelines to communicate with their shareholders and other constituencies and to express their commitment to sound corporate governance. Just as important, the guidelines are also a centerpiece of the strategy of activist shareholders. Activist shareholders frequently rely on corporate guidelines when submitting proposals for corporate reforms and then use the guidelines to convince managements to agree to reforms and to persuade large institutional investors to support their campaigns.

With respect to explicit references to guidelines made by corporations, my analysis reveals that in the years 2005, 2010, 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively, one, three, thirty-two, twenty-eight, and twenty-four proxy statements included such explicit references to investors’ corporate guidelines, which constitute 0.25%, 0.69%, 6.48%, 5.68%, and 5.76% of the samples, respectively. Importantly, most of the explicit references were made by the largest corporations. Thus, in the years 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively, 13.13%, 12.24%, and 13.10% of the proxy statements of the 100 largest corporations of the S&P 500 contained such a reference. This finding supports the hypothesis that larger corporations, which establish a precedent for the rest of the market, are more responsive to corporate guidelines. To complete the picture, my analysis reveals that from 2005 until 2018, only a very small percentage of the proxy statements of the 100 largest corporations of the S&P 500 contained explicit references to corporate guidelines made by corporations. The growing number of references made by corporations can be explained by the growing burden imposed on institutional investors to act as active stewards and to actively engage with their portfolio companies. In turn, this pressure has pushed institutional investors to highlight their guidelines and expectations from their portfolio companies, by sending letters, making declarations, and forming the ISG. This dynamic forces portfolio companies to take corporate guidelines more seriously.

Moreover, corporate guidelines have a profound effect on corporate best practices. My analysis reveals that in 2019, 226 corporations (45.2% of the sample) declared their commitment to the best practices and acknowledged that their boards review the corporation’s policies, frameworks, and guidelines, striving to ensure compliance with them. By influencing industry best practices, corporate guidelines indirectly shape corporate governance.

It should be emphasized at this point that my statistical data on explicit references to guidelines do not capture their full effect. My empirical analysis focuses on explicit and direct use of the guidelines. But the guidelines are not always used explicitly. The guidelines are routinely invoked in interactions between institutional investors and corporations. Yet, this use of the guidelines evades empirical quantification. As I discuss in the Article, the guidelines also serve as a background for conversations between corporations and institutional investors, but this effect, too, cannot be empirically measured.

Furthermore, my analysis also examines explicit references to guidelines made by activist shareholders, and reveals that in the years 2005, 2010, 2019, 2020, and
2021, respectively, thirty, thirty-three, twenty-eight, seventeen, and fourteen proxy statements included such explicit references to investors’ corporate guidelines, which constitute 7.50%, 7.59%, 5.67%, 3.45%, and 3.36% of the sample, respectively.\(^{20}\) Importantly, most of the explicit references were made by activist shareholders that targeted the largest corporations. Thus, in the years 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively, 14.14%, 10.20%, and 11.90% of the proxy statements of the 100 largest corporations of the S&P 500 contained such a reference made by activist shareholders.\(^{21}\)

Taken together—the explicit references to corporate guidelines made by both corporations and activist shareholders—my analysis reveals that in the years 2005, 2010, 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively, thirty-one, thirty-five, fifty-three, forty-three, and thirty-eight proxy statements included explicit references to investors’ corporate guidelines, which constitute 7.75%, 8.05%, 10.73%, 8.72%, and 9.11% of the samples, respectively.\(^{22}\) Importantly, most of the explicit references were made in the proxy statements of the largest corporations. Thus, in the years 2005, 2010, 2019, 2020, and 2021, respectively, 11.90%, 15.91%, 24.24%, 21.43%, and 25.00% of the proxy statements of the 100 largest corporations of the S&P 500 contained such a reference. Interestingly, in the years 2008, 2009, 2016, and 2017, respectively, 28.24%, 39.08%, 32.63%, and 32.98% of the proxy statements of the 100 largest corporations of the S&P 500 contained such a reference.\(^{23}\) These findings cannot be dismissed when speaking of institutional investors’ stewardship and more specifically of the potential power of corporate guidelines formulated and published by institutional investors.

Finally, not just corporations and activist shareholders refer to investors’ corporate guidelines. Leading law firms that advise corporations refer to institutional investors’ corporate guidelines and urge corporations to review and pay close attention to the guidelines.\(^{24}\) In addition, proxy advisory firms, which have become a major force in the corporate world in the past two decades, rely on institutional investors’ guidelines when advising market actors how to vote.\(^{25}\)

Structurally, the Article is organized as follows. In Part I, I will discuss the scholarship on the role of institutional investors in improving corporate governance. A main theme in the literature concerns the passivity of institutional investors and their reluctance to serve as corporate stewards. I will show that the existing literature has paid scant attention to the potential power of corporate guidelines. In Part II, I will introduce the major characteristics of corporate guidelines and the dynamic that the guidelines create between investors and their portfolio corporations. In Part III, I analyze the reasons behind the rise in the popularity of the guidelines. In Part IV, I provide detailed evidence on the use of corporate guidelines by corporations, shareholders, law firms, and proxy advisors. A short conclusion then follows.

\(^{20}\) See infra Section IV.A.3 and Table 4.
\(^{21}\) See infra Section IV.A.2 and Figure 3.
\(^{22}\) See infra Section IV.A.1 and Table 1.
\(^{23}\) See infra Section IV.A.1 and Figure 1.
\(^{24}\) See infra Part IV.
\(^{25}\) See infra Part IV.
I. THE FOCUS ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’ (LACK OF) PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVE STEWARDSHIP

A. Institutional Investors’ (Lack of) Activism

One of the most prominent phenomena of the past three or four decades in corporate law is the emergence of institutional investors. Today, institutional investors own between 70% and 80% of public corporations’ shares traded in the U.S. equity markets, and the largest institutional investors each hold approximately 5% to 10% of a typical large public corporation.26 As a report published by Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in 2019 reveals, “As of December 2018, one of BlackRock, Vanguard or State Street was the largest shareholder in 438 of the S&P 500 companies, roughly 88 percent, and collectively the three firms owned 18.7% of all shares in the S&P 500.”27

Along with ownership and the power it confers come great expectations—investors are supposed to play a prominent role in corporate governance. This role of institutional investors has attracted much attention in the corporate scholarship. However, institutional investors so far have not been able to fulfill such expectations. Two models that analyze investors’ involvement in corporate governance can summarize the vast body of literature that has emerged on this topic during the recent decades. Both models conclude that investors are not active monitors of corporations, but each of them has a slightly different perspective.

According to the first model, institutional investors, especially mutual funds, are passive because of inadequate incentives and conflicts of interest.28 In short, corporate governance activism is very costly. Activism means targeting companies in which investors assume that intervention would potentially improve the company’s share value and taking several actions to press the company to adopt the investors’ strategy. The actions may include proposing precatory or binding shareholder proposals, running “vote no” campaigns against incumbent directors,29 calling special meetings, and more. In certain cases, an activist shareholder may also initiate a lawsuit against the company, in order to obtain information from the company or to change its decisions.30

29. For further reading, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1993), elaborating on the notion of how activists may encourage their fellow shareholders to withhold votes toward directors’ elections to express dissatisfaction with performance of managements, and more generally, firms.
30. The underlying objective of activist campaigns is mainly to obtain seats on the board of the company. Also, as a recent report reveals, in past years, other “common underlying
To get a sense of how costly activism is, Nickolay M. Gantchev found that a single activist campaign, ending in a proxy fight, and usually led by an activist hedge fund, has an average cost of $10.71 million.\textsuperscript{31} Although this estimation refers to a costly campaign that ends with a contested vote,\textsuperscript{32} other forms of activism are costly as well. High cost itself should not be an insurmountable barrier because, theoretically, institutional investors can pass on the cost to their clients by charging higher fees, but the problem here is that given regulatory barriers, mutual funds cannot charge performance-based fees, but only fees based on a fixed percentage of the assets under management of the fund.\textsuperscript{33} Such an incentive structure therefore discourages managers of mutual funds to be active.\textsuperscript{34} I will elaborate this point further in Section III.A below, where I discuss the need of institutional investors to stay cost-efficient.

Moreover, managers of some types of institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, have business ties with public companies, which distort their incentives to monitor these companies. As Bebchuk and Hirst explain, managers of large institutional funds believe that if they defer to the decisions of their portfolio companies’ managements, they will have better chances to obtain business from those companies, such as 401(k) employer-sponsored retirement plans.\textsuperscript{35} Such ties push institutional investors’ managers to favor corporate officers and vote for the officers’ proposals rather than shareholders’ proposals.\textsuperscript{36}

Lastly, managers of institutional investors may fear that activism may result in backlash, and therefore choose to be significantly deferential to corporate officers. This would mean that the investors’ managers are less willing to intervene in corporate officers’ decision-making processes or to confront the officers. The reason is that going against the officers may trigger opposition from the officers and “from objectives of proxy contests related to business strategies, balance-sheet actions (such as returning cash to shareholders through dividends or share repurchases, which are often related to capital allocation strategies) and divestitures or other M&A actions (such as encouraging a sale of the company or opposing a merger).”\textsuperscript{32}

31. Nickolay Gantchev, \textit{The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model}, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 624 (2013); \textit{see also} Kahan & Rock, \textit{Hedge Funds}, supra note 28, at 1050 (“All of this consumes significant resources, both in-house and from hiring outside advisors.”).

32. Activist campaigns may also end with a settlement between activists and the target company. \textit{See} Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, \textit{Dancing with Activists}, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 2 (2020) (indicating that the incidence of such settlements has grown over the years).


34. \textit{See id.}

35. Bebchuk et al., supra note 2, at 101–03. Some of the companies’ employee savings and retirement plans and other affiliates have retained institutional investors (such as BlackRock, State Street, etc.) to provide investment management and trustee, custodial, administrative, and ancillary investment services. \textit{See id.} at 102–03.

parts of the public that are resistant to concentrations of financial power” in the hands of large institutional investors.\textsuperscript{37} Given the fact that corporate officers’ “control [of] the massive resources of Main Street companies . . . [makes them a] formidable foe in the political arena,”\textsuperscript{38} opposition from corporate officers may lead to a political and regulatory backlash and a reduction of institutional investors’ power. Therefore, institutional investors are not likely to choose an intervention strategy, even when it may enhance the value of their portfolio companies.\textsuperscript{39}

According to the second model, developed by Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, although institutional investors are not proactive, they are not passive in the common sense. Rather, they are “rationally reticent,” meaning they are “will[ing] [to] respond to proposals but are unlikely themselves to create them.”\textsuperscript{40} Put differently, institutional investors, such as mutual funds, are inactive in the sense that they are unlikely to intervene, except when other players, such as activist hedge funds, are involved in shareholder activism.

Both models can explain why institutional investors grossly underinvest in corporate stewardship. As Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst document, the Big Three have very small stewardship departments and their stewardship budgets are insignificant.\textsuperscript{41} Specifically, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street have stewardship teams composed of forty-five, twenty-one, and twelve members, respectively.\textsuperscript{42} At the same time, their portfolios (worldwide) include 11,246, 13,225, and 12,191 companies, respectively.\textsuperscript{43} Given this data, the Big Three can only spend “very limited resources on stewardship.”\textsuperscript{44} Although it seems that the Big Three have recently increased their stewardship personnel,\textsuperscript{35} the trend does not seem to be significant enough to change the picture.

Both models have one thing in common: they focus only on the active dimension of stewardship provided by institutional investors in their portfolio companies, neglecting the passive dimension.

\textsuperscript{37} Bebchuk & Hirst, \textit{Index Funds, supra} note 1, at 2070.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Id.} at 2069.
\textsuperscript{39} See \textit{id.} at 2066–70.
\textsuperscript{41} See Bebchuk & Hirst, \textit{Index Funds, supra} note 1, at 2075–80.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Id.} at 2077.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.} at 2079.
B. Investors’ Private Engagements

Before proceeding to analyze the passive dimension of stewardship, we should also pay attention to a special type of active stewardship: large institutional investors’ private engagements with their portfolio companies. These “behind-the-scenes” engagements take a collaborative approach, which differs from the one-sided approach in which institutional investors demand that corporations adopt certain changes. Instead, these engagements reflect an approach in which investors and their portfolio companies cooperate with and understand each other.46 In other words, such engagements are a more communicative and “non-confrontational” means that allow investors to maintain a more “dynamic relationship” with companies’ managements.48 As a recent BlackRock brochure states, “Engagement is a key mechanism for providing feedback or signaling concerns to companies about factors that affect long-term performance.”49

In their recent article, Matthew J. Mallow, then senior director, and Jasmin Sethi, then vice president at BlackRock, describe many interrelated forms of engagement, including “holding direct conversations with companies, regulators, and issue experts; conducting educational outreach with the market; collaborating with other investors, companies, and advocates; convening summits to identify tipping points; soliciting shareholder proposals; and sponsoring academic and other intellectual analysis on the issues to increase market participant awareness.”50

To complete the picture, commentators have also raised doubts regarding the effectiveness of private engagements as a form of corporate stewardship. As Bebchuk and Hirst point out, private, “behind-the-scenes” engagements are not a substitute for classic activism because, first, data provided in the public reports of the largest institutional investors reveal that investors engage privately with only a small number of their portfolio companies.51 Specifically, “From 2017 through 2019, the average proportion of portfolio companies with no engagement were 88.9% for BlackRock, 94.2% for Vanguard, and 94.5% for SSGA [(State Street)].”52 Second, since private engagements are nonconfrontational, it is unlikely that institutional investors will force their portfolio companies to make changes involuntarily, which reduces the effectiveness of private engagements because companies can ignore the investors’ expectations without being punished.53

47. Id. at 392.
48. Id. at 390.
50. Mallow & Sethi, supra note 46, at 393; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 848 (providing examples of other informal engagement interactions).
51. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1, at 2084–88.
52. Id. at 2086.
53. See id. at 2088.
C. Corporate Guidelines Are Overlooked

Oddly, little research, if any, has been devoted to exploring the uses and potential power of corporate guidelines. Some prominent scholars have briefly discussed the potential role played by guidelines. For example, in their article, Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst acknowledge that investors can use general principles to monitor their portfolio companies, but argue that monitoring “cannot be effectively carried out using general principles.” As they emphasize, monitoring requires a company-specific analysis regarding each and every company, and this seems to be the consensus among scholars. Moreover, as John Coates explains, the current analysis of index providers’ incentives regarding stewardship fails to “capture the real implications of indexing for U.S. corporate governance” because the analysis should—but does not—take into account the way index funds form and publish “policies” regarding various governance issues, and how these policies may influence corporate governance systems in their portfolio companies. Lastly, in their recent article, Edward Rock and Marcel Kahan explain how market-wide governance issues can be decided with reference to the voting guidelines.

In a similar vein, scholars have recognized that large institutional investors are likely to enjoy the economies of scale derived from the fact that they invest in hundreds of companies and are therefore incentivized to study corporate governance issues to take advantage of the insights common to all relevant companies. However, beyond general recognition of the potential of corporate guidelines, a deeper study of their nature and cost-effectiveness is needed. This Article aims to fill this void.

54. Id. at 2083.
55. Id. at 2084.
56. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, 100 B.U. L. Rev. 1771, 1778 (2020) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be Shareholders] (explaining how engagements by institutional investors that involve the oversight of individual companies on governance and performance require the investors to have company-specific information); see also Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 772 (2017) (“The firm-specific nature of the tradeoff between principal costs and agent costs is the reason that firms adopt a wide variety of governance structures . . . .”)
58. See Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, supra note 56, at 1778.
II. THE ESSENCE OF CORPORATE GUIDELINES

A. Corporate Guidelines: General Features

Traditionally, guidelines on corporate governance are set by quasi regulators, including stock exchanges such as the NYSE and Nasdaq. These guidelines are a set of principles and practices that aim to support and promote sound corporate governance and, accordingly, enhance corporate value.

Today, corporations also design and adopt their own governance guidelines, which address various matters, including requirements for director qualifications, board elections (including director majority voting policies), director responsibilities, lead independent director’s roles, directors’ conflicts of interest, committees of the board, executives’ compensation, shareholders’ communication with the board (e.g., shareholders’ rights to proxy access and to call special meetings), performance evaluations of the board and its committees, reviews of the composition of the board and its committees, qualifications of audit committee members, board diversity, and commitments to corporate social responsibility.

Corporations’ guidelines establish a framework for governance of the board of directors and the management of the corporation. These guidelines are typically designed by the board, described in detail in the public reports of the corporation, and updated by the board periodically. As will be explained in Section IV.A.2, corporations state their commitment to the guidelines compiled by large institutional investors and strive to align their guidelines with the investors’. Put differently, guidelines adopted by corporations are influenced by proxy voting guidelines published by large institutional investors.

Today, large institutional investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street publish their own governance guidelines on an annual basis. In fact, mutual funds have been subject to a duty to publish their guidelines since 2003, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-6, which requires mutual funds to disclose the policies and procedures they use to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities, and to disclose their voting decisions in order to allow clients to see whether their practices are aligned with the guidelines.

The guidelines are used to instruct the investors how to vote and communicate with their portfolio companies. As BlackRock recently stated, “[V]oting guidelines

61. See infra Section IV.A.2.
62. See infra Section IV.A.2.
63. See Examining the Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advisory Firms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cap. Mkt. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 17 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing Before the House] (statement of Lynn E. Turner, Managing Director, LitiNomics) (“If you look at the Web sites of the largest public pension funds and the 15 largest money managers . . . you will find they all have their own custom designed proxy voting guidelines . . . ”).
64. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2022); see also Hearing Before the House, supra note 63, at 28–29 (providing an explanation of the rule by the former chairman of the SEC).
are the benchmark against which we assess a company’s approach to corporate governance. . . .”65 Relatedly, guidelines constitute a tool whereby investors give their perspective on various corporate governance practices that can promote long-term financial performance, and thus show their vision and preferences to the corporations in which they invest. Institutional investors do not differ significantly in their guidelines. Differences mainly exist in the form of how closely the investors will follow their guidelines. Some investors allow for more flexibility within the guidelines, enabling them to diverge when necessary, while other investors leave less room for discretion.66

When voting on certain issues, institutional investors may diverge from their own guidelines. Such a divergence is not automatically perceived as a breach of good corporate governance. However, at least some of the investors have an “align or explain” mechanism, meaning that when their voting behaviors in certain portfolio companies do not align with their own guidelines, they must explain the reason for the divergence. For example, T. Rowe Price has a Proxy Committee that develops its guidelines and distributes the guidelines to portfolio managers. Ultimately, the portfolio managers decide how to vote on the proxy proposals of companies in their portfolios, but as T. Rowe Price’s guidelines stress, “When portfolio managers cast votes that are counter to the Proxy Committee’s guidelines, they are required to document their reasons in writing to the Proxy Committee.”667

Lastly, guidelines designed by institutional investors typically reserve some degree of flexibility for the portfolio companies by allowing the investors to take into account the portfolio companies’ individual characteristics when complying with the guidelines, as long as they show the holistic attitude stipulated by the guidelines. Put differently, institutional investors’ guidelines do not seek to dictate specific governance structures, but rather defer to the structures chosen by corporations’ boards of directors, as long as the structures align with the investors’ philosophy.


An illustrative example is the guideline that requires the separation of the chairman of the board and the CEO. BlackRock’s guideline allows its portfolio companies to choose between an independent chairman and a lead director that serves together with the chairman when the roles of the chairman and the CEO are combined. 68 During the roundtable held by the SEC in 2018 on proxy process, Rakhi Kumar, senior managing director and head of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Investment and Asset Stewardship at State Street, explained how some of the corporate governance issues are “gray” and require attention to specific details. 69 As she stressed, “We realize it’s not just as easy as flipping the role of a chair and CEO. We realize it has much more to it, such as the individual in place, the time commitment, the job description.” 70

The above example reflects the typical attitude of institutional investors toward their own guidelines. Thus, although at first glance corporate guidelines designed by institutional investors may be seen as a rigid set of one-size-fits-all rules, they are actually relatively flexible principles that leave discretion for both the investors and managements of corporations. 71

For these reasons, institutional investors’ corporate guidelines are likely to meet little opposition from corporations, and thereby alleviate the concerns raised by Bebchuk and Hirst about the disincentives of investors to confront corporations’ managers. 72 This means that unlike investors’ mentality toward active stewardship, institutional investors are likely to invest in designing corporate guidelines because

68. BLACKROCK, INC., supra note 66, at 6. (“There are two commonly accepted structures for independent leadership to balance the CEO role in the boardroom: 1) an independent Chair; or 2) a Lead Independent director when the roles of Chair and CEO are combined. . . . In the absence of a significant governance concern, we defer to boards to designate the most appropriate leadership structure to ensure adequate balance and independence. . . . In the event that the board chooses to have a combined Chair/CEO or a non-independent Chair, we support the designation of a Lead Independent director, with the ability to: 1) provide formal input into board meeting agendas; 2) call meetings of the independent directors; and 3) preside at meetings of independent directors.”).


70. Id.

71. See, e.g., Vanguard Horizon Funds, Vanguard-Advised Funds Proxy Voting Policy (Form 497) (Oct. 1, 2019) (“In evaluating proxy proposals, we consider information from many sources . . . . We will give substantial weight to the recommendations of the company’s board, absent guidelines or other specific facts that would support a vote against management.”); BLACKROCK, INC., supra note 66, at 3 (“These Guidelines are not intended to limit the analysis of individual issues at specific companies or provide a guide to how BIS will engage and/or vote in every instance. They are to be applied with discretion, taking into consideration the range of issues and facts specific to the company, as well as individual ballot items . . . .”); FID. INVS., PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 1 (2022), https://www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/Full-Proxy-Voting-Guidelines-for-Fidelity-Funds-Advised-by-FMRCO-and-SelectCo.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z8V-NWQE] (“Fidelity maintains the flexibility to vote individual proxies based on our assessment of each situation.”).

72. See supra Section I.A.
the guidelines will neither harm the business ties between the managers of the 
investors and the portfolio companies nor lead to other types of backlash.

B. Corporate Guidelines: The Potential Influence

In this Section, I explain how corporate guidelines have omnipresent power and 
influence. As I have discussed in Section I.A, the research conducted so far by 
scholarship shows that institutional investors have a limited pecuniary interest and 
lack the budgets and personnel needed to influence governance regimes in their 
portfolio companies. It therefore concludes that institutional investors’ influence 
on corporate governance in their portfolio companies is limited. In this Section, I 
will argue that this view underestimates the influence of institutional investors on 
corporate governance because it fails to capture the potential power of corporate 
guidelines.

In Section II.B.1, I will explain how the guidelines of the largest institutional 
investors have the potential to influence corporations before and after formal voting 
periods (in between shareholder meetings) due to their special nature. Relatedly, in 
Section II.B.2, I will explain how this special nature of the guidelines allows both 
the corporations and the investors relying on them to avoid confrontation and 
shaming.

1. The Omnipresent Power of Corporate Guidelines

Skepticism regarding institutional investors’ involvement in stewardship 
typically originates from statistics and numbers. For example, as mentioned before, 
Bebchuk and Hirst argue that the limited personnel and budgets of the Big Three 
cannot allow them to be good stewards of the huge number of corporations they 
invest in. Bebchuk and Hirst support their argument by citing that the number of 
companies with which the Big Three engage, according to their annual stewardship 
reports, constitute only 5.5%–11.1% of their portfolio companies, and only 0.6%– 
3.9% of these companies experienced multiple engagements by the Big Three. 
Bebchuk and Hirst also provide evidence on the frequency of the Big Three’s voting 
against say-on-pay proposals, showing that they rarely vote against the proposals 
initiated by managements. They argue that these findings indicate a near absolute 
defereence of the Big Three to the managements of their portfolio companies. 
Pro-management voting by index funds was also documented by other empirical 
udies. While these findings are convincing, they do not capture the full story.

73. See supra Section I.A.
74. See supra Section I.A.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 41–45.
76. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1, at 2087.
77. See id. at 2091–95.
78. See id.
[https://perma.cc/W42X-U28T]; Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta Ravina & Howard Rosenthal, Investor Ideology
The influence of investors’ corporate guidelines tends to be underestimated because it is hard to identify and quantify, and because providing stewardship through the guidelines is often indistinguishable from the simple pro-management voting practice. Indeed, there are many cases where shareholders submit a proposal to a company asking its board to make a governance change, and the institutional investors’ voting decision is aligned with the board’s recommendation to vote against the shareholder proposal. In such cases, the voting behavior of institutional investors is traditionally counted as pro-management voting, and thus the investors are perceived as if they haven’t fulfilled their fiduciary duty to monitor their portfolio companies in an optimal manner. However, a closer look will reveal a more complex dynamic behind such a voting pattern.

The analysis of the real power of the largest institutional investors will not focus only on the dynamic between the investors and their portfolio companies in the formal voting process because changes in governance are also made by corporations in the period between annual meetings. Corporations may modify their governance

(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 557/2018, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119935 [https://perma.cc/9E3E-L8ZV]. Interestingly, institutional investors themselves admit that they prefer engaging with their portfolio companies to supporting shareholder proposals submitted to these companies. For example, Ray A. Cameron, head of the Investment Stewardship Team for the Americas Region at BlackRock, stated that:

We prefer engagement, as we see shareholder proposals as a tool often of last resort, an avenue for accelerated change when needed. During our direct engagements with companies, we address the issues covered by many shareholder proposals that we believe to be material to the long-term value of the company. Where management demonstrates a willingness to address the material issues raised, and where we believe progress is being made, we will generally support the company and vote against the shareholder proposal.

SEC Roundtable-2018, supra note 69, at 116–17; see also id. at 118 (“BlackRock takes an engagement-first approach. And we find that even when we do not support shareholder proposals or some proposals, the conversations that we have with companies on related topics often lead to positive change without the use of what some might consider to be a blunt instrument.”); Tim McLaughlin & Ross Kerber, Index Funds Invest Trillions but Rarely Challenge Management, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2019, 6:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-funds-index-specialreports/special-report-index-funds-invest-trillions-but-rarely-challenge-management-idUSKBN1WN107 [https://perma.cc/S5NW-K2B6] (“‘A vote against management is a sign of a failed engagement,’ Michelle Edkins, who oversees BlackRock’s proxy voting [as a director of Investment Stewardship], said in an interview.”).

80. Thus, for example, during the 2020–2021 proxy voting year, BlackRock supported 35% of shareholder proposals, and in the previous year, BlackRock supported only 17% of shareholder proposals. See BLACKROCK, INC., PURSUING LONG-TERM VALUE FOR OUR CLIENTS: BLACKROCK INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: A LOOK INTO THE 2020-2021 PROXY VOTING YEAR 16 (2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/2021-voting-spotlight-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK7K-J5X5]. Interestingly, regarding governance aspects, in the 2020-2021 proxy voting year, BlackRock supported only twenty-seven percent of shareholder proposals. Id. at 72.
guidelines during the year based not on shareholder proposals, but on analysis of corporate guidelines.

As some corporations’ proxy statements reveal, corporations’ governance guidelines are designed in advance of the shareholder meeting, based on the board of directors’ review of “governance guidelines published by institutional investors and proxy advisors,”81 “stockholder expectations,”82 “proxy voting guidelines of [the company’s] major stockholders,”83 “Investor Stewardship Group’s (ISG) Corporate Governance,”84 “investor concerns,”85 whether a certain standard has been “recognized by the Council of Institutional Investors as a market standard,”86 “evolving governance best practices,”87 “emerging best practices in corporate governance,”88 and “prevailing practices among other U.S. companies.”89

The above statements mean corporations do not ignore corporate guidelines of the largest institutional investors and proxy advisory firms or the industry’s best practices. As the ISG, an initiative formed by the largest institutional investors, emphasizes on its website, “Listed companies should recognize that some of their largest investors now stand together behind these principles.”90 The ISG’s position reflects a threat that if corporations choose not to follow the principles perceived by investors to be good corporate governance, they should have good reasons; otherwise, they are exposed to sanctions from the investors in the form of, for example, the investors’ decision to oppose reelection of directors or the decision to support shareholder proposals. Such a threat is credible despite the fact that institutional investors tend to vote with management and are perceived as pro-management.91

As Brandon Rees, deputy director of Corporations and Capital Markets for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), stated during the roundtable held by the SEC in 2018: “Large institutional investors—the BlackRocks and State Streets and Vanguards of the world—do not

81. WEC Energy Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 24 (Mar. 21, 2019).
82. Id.
84. See infra notes 205–209 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
87. WEC Energy Grp., Inc., supra note 81; see also Albemarle Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 44 (Mar. 26, 2019).
88. S&P Global Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 17 (Mar. 25, 2019); see also Target Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 67 (June 12, 2019); Activision Blizzard, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 10 (Apr. 23, 2019); Pub. Serv. Enter. Grp. Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 16 (Mar. 4, 2019); Corning Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 11 (Mar. 22, 2019); Allelied Pub. Ltd. Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at i (Apr. 18, 2019); Everest RE Grp., Ltd., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 5 (Apr. 11, 2019); Devon Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 20 (Apr. 24, 2019).
89. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 89 (Apr. 5, 2019).
need the shareholder proposal rule process to get the attention of management or the board of directors. There’s not a corporate secretary or investor relations department in the country that would not return their call within 24 hours.”  

Besides this general statement, Gary Retelny, president and CEO of the largest proxy advisory firm, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), recently emphasized in the SEC’s 2018 roundtable that where institutional investors “have their own custom policies that they have designed and that they want to implement with regard[] to” their portfolio companies, “[w]hat ISS does, essentially, is help them with the work flow . . . based on [investors’] own individual custom policies.”

Relatedly, according to the recent empirical research conducted by Bebchuk and Hirst, the Big Three “have been very active in supporting [shareholder] proposals advocating governance changes favored by their governance principles . . . .”

Lastly, a report recently published by State Street, one of the prominent signatories of ISG, reveals that State Street’s initial screen in March 2018 identified sixty-six S&P 500 companies that did not comply with the ISG’s governance principles. Subsequently, many of these companies improved their practices before their annual shareholder meetings or were able to provide sufficient justification for their practices. State Street eventually voted against those who failed to do so.

In conclusion, institutional investors’ pro-management voting pattern during annual shareholder meetings does not necessarily mean that they blindly defer to managements’ governance practices. Additionally, it can suggest that the investors are able to steer the managements to follow their guidelines before the annual meetings start or secure the managements’ promise that they will follow the guidelines soon after the upcoming meetings, thereby making it unnecessary to effectuate governance changes by voting against the managements.

2. Corporate Guidelines as a “Soft” Intervention that Avoids Confrontation and Shaming

Corporate guidelines, unlike active engagements, may allow corporations to avoid embarrassment and harm to their reputation. Simply put, at the moment that a shareholder proposal is submitted and requires that the board implement a governance change, if the board subsequently recommends to the company’s shareholders to vote “for” the shareholder proposal, it may be interpreted as if the board was unaware of and had failed to make the fit and proper governance arrangement in advance. Such a dynamic may create an element of “shaming” the board. By contrast, if the board chooses to propose a governance change by itself

92. SEC Roundtable-2018, supra note 69, at 150.
93. Id. at 191–92 (“[Eighty-seven] percent of the shares that we execute votes for[]vote as per their own custom policies.”).
94. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1, at 2104.
96. Id.
97. Id.
and supports its proposal by referring to institutional investors’ guidelines, the board is likely to signal that it is its commitment to good corporate governance, not external forces, that is driving the proposed governance change. Such a proposal initiated by the board can even be made soon after the board has refused to accept a shareholder proposal on the same governance issue.

To illustrate this dynamic, take the giant pharmaceutical company Allergan as an example. In its 2018 proxy statement, shareholders requested Allergan’s board to adopt a policy that would require the chair of the board, whenever possible, to be an independent director. To support their proposal, shareholders wrote that

A number of institutional investors said that a strong, objective board leader can best provide the necessary oversight of management. Thus, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System’s Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance recommends that a company’s board should be chaired by an independent director, as does the Council of Institutional Investors. An independent director serving as chairman can help ensure the functioning of an effective board.

Allergan’s board of directors recommended that the shareholders should vote against this shareholder proposal, and at the annual meeting held on May 1, 2019, the proposal was rejected. Specifically, 101,019,176 shares voted “for” and 159,894,901 voted “against.” Interestingly, at the time of the voting, the largest shareholders of Allergan were Wellington Management Group with 24,934,153 (7.49%) of Allergan shares, BlackRock with 21,466,017 (6.45%) of Allergan shares, and Vanguard with 24,179,830 (7.27%) of Allergan shares. Although their voting guidelines supported the separation of the chairman and the CEO, Wellington and BlackRock voted against the proposal, which determined the results of the voting on the proposal.

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98. Allergan plc, 2018 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 95 (Mar. 23, 2018).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 96.
101. Allergan plc, Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 1, 2019).
102. Id.
103. Allergan plc, 2019 Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 98 (Mar. 22, 2019).
104. See WELLENTON MGMT., GLOBAL PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 3 (2022), https://www.wellington.com/content/dam/wellington/pdf/en/new-global-proxy-voting-guidelines-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EAZ-UBU8] (“We will generally support proposals to separate the chair and CEO . . . .”); BLACKROCK, INC., supra note 66, at 6 (“There are two commonly accepted structures for independent leadership to balance the CEO role in the boardroom: 1) an independent Chair; or 2) a Lead Independent director when the roles of Chair and CEO are combined, or when the Chair is otherwise not independent.”).
However, in its 2019 proxy statement, Allergan’s board subsequently adopted the governance change that would require the chair of the board to be an independent director but presented the change as its own initiative. It stated:

The Board has also heard from many of our shareholders that they would value a policy requiring an independent Chair that the Board could phase in with the next CEO transition. Accordingly, the Board has adopted changes to its corporate governance guidelines and the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee charter so that, phased in within a reasonable period of time in connection with the next CEO transition following the March 2019 adoption of the Corporate Governance Guidelines, the Chair of the Board shall be, whenever possible, an independent director.\(^\text{106}\)

Another example relates to Booking Holding Company (the former Priceline Group, Inc.). In its 2015 proxy statement, the board opposed a shareholder proposal concerning enhanced proxy access.\(^\text{107}\) However, after the proposal was eventually approved at the annual meeting in 2015,\(^\text{108}\) the board tried to describe this governance change as a result of its own effort to improve governance.\(^\text{109}\) As the proxy statement of 2019 stated:

Our management and the Board of Directors regularly evaluate ways to improve the Company’s corporate governance. The Board adopted the Proxy Access By-Laws in 2015. The Board’s adoption of Proxy Access By-Laws demonstrates the Company’s commitment to good corporate governance practices and responsiveness to stockholders. We adopted our current Proxy Access By-Laws after significant evaluation and deliberation by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and the full Board of Directors and meaningful stockholder engagement. This thoughtful review included an analysis of best practices among other leading U.S. public companies and a review of the corporate governance policies of some of our largest stockholders.\(^\text{110}\)

Such a dynamic may teach us that managements are not against governance changes per se but would oppose the changes proposed by shareholders in an adversarial manner. Unlike shareholder proposals, guidelines designed by institutional investors may provide both corporations and institutional investors with an elegant way to avoid direct confrontation. At first, investors can support management by voting against a shareholder proposal, even though the proposal is consistent with the investors’ guidelines. Eventually, since managements understand that they have to align with the institutional investors’ philosophy and expectations of governance to reflect their commitment to their largest investors and, more

\(^\text{106}\) Allergan plc, supra note 103, at 7.


\(^\text{108}\) The Priceline Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 4, 2015).

\(^\text{109}\) See Booking Holdings Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 77 (Apr. 23, 2019).

\(^\text{110}\) Id.
generally, their awareness of good corporate governance, the managements are likely to adopt the substance of the shareholder proposal.

III. THE RISE OF CORPORATE GUIDELINES

This Part offers potential explanations for the rise of corporate guidelines from the supply side, for example, why corporate guidelines have become a more popular form of stewardship among institutional investors. Some of the explanations are interrelated, and taken together, they shed light on the trend toward standardization in corporate governance and, more specifically, on the evolution of corporate guidelines.

A. The Need to Strike a Balance Between Complying with Fiduciary Duties and Cost-Effectiveness

In this Section, I will explain how institutional investors’ growing use of corporate guidelines is the result of their need to balance between (1) their fiduciary duties to vote on a huge number of resolutions at shareholder meetings of their portfolio companies and (2) their need to stay cost-effective. In this Section, I focus on three issues.

First, institutional investors are obliged to vote in the best interests of their clients as part of their fiduciary duties. Relatedly, given their enormous power, these investors are expected to act as good stewards. Second, large investors are subject to a burden of voting in thousands of annual meetings every year. This enormous burden has pushed them to increasingly use the services of proxy advisory firms. Such reliance on advisory firms has drawn huge criticism that institutional investors outsource their duties owed to their clients instead of fulfilling them. Meanwhile, lots of mutual funds have moved toward the passive indexing strategy—a move that has portrayed them as passive stewards and attracted much attention and criticism from commentators and policymakers. Mutual funds have been forced to defend themselves, again, by emphasizing their willingness to devote more resources to corporate stewardship. Unable to simply disregard the above criticism, institutional investors must show that they take control of their own duties. Third, institutional investors, mainly mutual funds, must remain cost-effective in order to achieve competitive advantages in a market that substantially limits their incentives to invest in active stewardship. The combination of these elements, discussed below, has led to institutional investors’ increasing reliance on corporate guidelines.

1. Compliance with Fiduciary Duties and Good Citizenship

Institutional investors owe fiduciary duties to their clients. According to the law and relevant regulations, institutional investors are required to vote their proxies in

111. See Eckstein, Great Expectations, supra note 11, at 93–94.
112. See id. at 136.
113. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 8; Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1.
114. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1, at 2034.
the best interests of their clients. At first, after the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) began ordering private pension funds to act solely in the interests of their plan participants and beneficiaries. Subsequently, in 1988, the DOL released a letter, commonly known as the “Avon Letter,” stating that “the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.” In 2003, the SEC adopted a rule and amendments under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 pertaining to mutual funds and investment advisers in order to encourage them to vote their proxies in the best interests of their shareholders.

The SEC and the U.S. Congress have continued to reinforce institutional investors’ duties in the following years. Just recently, in November 2018, in the statement announcing a roundtable on the proxy process, chairman Jay Clayton stated that “[s]hareholder engagement is a hallmark of our public capital markets.” In effect, it seems that pension funds, mutual funds, and policymakers have interpreted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as requiring funds to vote at every shareholder meeting, on every matter. As the SEC Commissioner Elad L. Roisman recently stated, “[I]t appears to be the default position of many advisers that they vote every proxy, for every company, in every fund’s portfolio.”

Beyond legal duties, institutional investors are also subject to reputational concerns. Simply put, due to their enormous power in influencing corporate governance (e.g., they have plenty of resources to invest in corporate stewardship and also enjoy economies of scale on this aspect), large investors are expected to act as good stewards and, more metaphorically, as good corporate citizens.

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115. Eckstein, Great Expectations, supra note 11, at 91.
121. Bubb & Catan, supra note 79.
122. See, e.g., Proxy Advisory Firms Roundtable, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 74 (Dec. 5,
concerns incentivize the investors to act as responsible actors who promote better corporate governance since such a positive image is likely to improve the way they are perceived by policymakers, the media, etc. This is especially important for large investors like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, given the fact that in recent years they have been the subject of widespread criticism due to their market power, which has reduced competition and accordingly harmed consumers. As Edward Rock and Marcel Kahan explain, “The best way to avoid regulation is to be viewed by relevant audiences as a responsible steward.” Moreover, reputation is critical to maintaining clientele, as former Senator Phil Gramm stated during the roundtable held by the SEC in 2018: “You’re going to be relatively unaffected by the profitability of the company where you’re casting those proxies. But you may very well be affected by the public perception of your actions, and therefore the marketability of your index.” Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the leaders of the largest institutional investors consistently emphasize their strong commitment to corporate stewardship.

The upshot here is that under the existing law and expectations from the public, institutional investors cannot renounce corporate stewardship in an absolute way. As I will show in the next sections of the Article, this trend toward being a good corporate steward has increased institutional investors’ reliance on corporate guidelines because they are considered a legitimate governance device and at the same time allow the investors to stay cost-effective.

2. The Growing Burden on Institutional Investors, the Criticism Against Outsourcing Their Fiduciary Duties, and the Need to Take Control of Their Duties

Institutional investors are subject to a very burdensome governance task. During the past two decades, corporate law and regulations have significantly expanded the types of issues that require a shareholder vote. For example, as the 2019 SEC Roundtable-2013, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-advisory-services/proxy-advisory-services-transcript.txt [https://perma.cc/6EPX-5KQ2]. At this roundtable, Mr. Eric Komitee, general counsel at Viking Global Investors, LP, remarked, “I think investment advisers generally speaking have a duty of good corporate citizenship in the United States the same way ordinary citizens have a civic duty to vote in elections, you know, where the outcome is potentially important to corporate America and the companies in which they invest.” Id.

123. See Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, supra note 56, at 1799.
124. See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 724 (2017) (arguing that ownership concentration by the largest passive investors will undermine product market competition and result in calls to limit their power); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026, 2047 (2018) (holding the same position as the previous article); Eckstein, supra note 91, at 510 (describing criticism against the common ownership structure and the concentrated power of the largest institutional investors).
125. Kahan & Rock, Let Shareholders Be Shareholders, supra note 56, at 1798.
127. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1, at 2048.
128. See Eckstein, Great Expectations, supra note 11, at 90.
BlackRock Investment Stewardship report reflects, its investment stewardship team votes “at over 16,000 meetings a year.”\textsuperscript{129} As the 2019 Vanguard Investment Stewardship report reveals, “In the 2019 proxy year, the Vanguard funds voted on 169,746 proposals at 18,961 company meetings across every major financial market.”\textsuperscript{130}

The growing burden has pushed more and more investors to outsource their voting tasks to proxy advisory firms in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties.\textsuperscript{131} This trend has attracted much criticism and calls for legislative and regulatory intervention.\textsuperscript{132} Large institutional investors have been accused of violating their fiduciary duties by blindly following the recommendations of proxy advisory firms, which operate without transparency and with conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{133} Public companies have also urged policymakers to take a stronger position on the proxy advisory industry.\textsuperscript{134} In response, the SEC as well as the U.S. Congress have investigated and debated the merits of proxy advisory regulation.

In 2010, the SEC issued a concept release that focused on the U.S. proxy system in general and on proxy advisors in particular.\textsuperscript{135} The House of Representatives held a hearing on the matter in June 2013,\textsuperscript{136} and the SEC followed up on this hearing with a roundtable discussion in December 2013.\textsuperscript{137} At the same time, Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher expressed “grave concerns” as to “whether investment advisers are indeed truly fulfilling their fiduciary duties when they rely on and follow recommendations from proxy advisory firms.”\textsuperscript{138} No rulemaking initiatives resulted from these discussions until June 30, 2014, when the Investment Management and Corporate Finance Divisions of the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (SLB-20) outlining the responsibilities of proxy advisors and institutional investors when casting proxy votes.\textsuperscript{139} During these hearings and discussions, participants

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{129} BlackRock Investment Stewardship, \textit{supra} note 49, at 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Another reason for the reliance on proxy advisors is the SEC’s interpretation that institutional investors could cleanse any conflict of interest they may have with their portfolio companies by relying on voting policies developed by an independent, third-party agency—such as a proxy advisory firm. See Eckstein, \textit{Great Expectations}, \textit{supra} note 11, at 93.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} \textit{Id.} at 89; see also Asaf Eckstein & Sharon Hannes, A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Advisory Firms, 53 Wake Forest L. Rev. 787, 789–90 (2018).
  \item \textsuperscript{133} See Eckstein & Hannes, \textit{supra} note 132, at 797–800.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} See, e.g., \textit{Ctr. on Exec. Comp., A Call for Change in the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo: The Case for Greater Accountability and Oversight} (2011).
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Hearing Before the House, \textit{supra} note 63, at 1–2.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} SEC Roundtable-2013, \textit{supra} note 122, at 1, 41–42.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Michael J. Segal, Trevor S. Norwitz & Sebastian V. Niles, Wachtell Lipton Discusses Commissioner Gallagher’s Critiques of Proxy Advisory Firms, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 17, 2013), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/07/17/wachtell-lipton-discusses-commissioner-gallaghers-critiques-of-proxy-advisory-firms/ [https://perma.cc/87R6-DAMZ].
  \item \textsuperscript{139} See \textit{Proxy Voting: Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers and
complained that institutional investors “sidestep their fiduciary obligations instead of actually fulfilling them themselves,”\textsuperscript{140} that the SEC “effectively decoupled the voting decision from the fiduciary duty” by allowing institutional investors to exclusively rely on proxy advisors,\textsuperscript{141} and that today, “investment managers vote automatically in line with a proxy advisory firm’s recommendation, so-called robo-voting.”\textsuperscript{142} This debate shows no sign of fading. Just in 2018, the SEC initiated, again, a series of discussions on how to curb the power of proxy advisory firms.\textsuperscript{143} In November 2019, the SEC voted to propose amendments to its rules governing proxy advice.\textsuperscript{144}

The outrage is directed not only at proxy advisory firms but also at large institutional investors, and the way they fulfill their fiduciary duties has been under close scrutiny.\textsuperscript{145} In response to the criticism, investors emphasize their commitment to enhancing good governance in their portfolio companies. For example, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink declared that BlackRock reaches its voting decisions independently.\textsuperscript{146} This declaration was accepted with satisfaction. For example, following this declaration, Martin Lipton and David Karp of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz wrote to the firm’s clients that “it is a helpful sign that a major institutional investor is willing to take a direct and pragmatic role in governance issues rather than outsourcing this responsibility to a proxy advisory firm or agitating for short-term results.”\textsuperscript{147}

So far, I have described how the largest institutional investors have attracted much attention for the way they fulfill their duties. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the attention has skyrocketed with the growing use of index fund services.

\textit{Availability of Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Advisory Firms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter SLB 20], https://www.sec.gov/interp/legal/cfslb2.htm [https://perma.cc/S69F-FKH2] (providing a set of questions and answers summarizing investment advisers’ responsibilities in voting client proxies and retaining proxy advisory firms, as well as the availability and requirements of two exemptions to the federal proxy rules that are often relied upon by proxy advisory firms).}

\textsuperscript{140} Hearing Before the House, supra note 63, at 19.
\textsuperscript{141} Id. at 29.
\textsuperscript{142} SEC Roundtable-2018, supra note 69, at 191.
\textsuperscript{143} See Clayton, supra note 119.
\textsuperscript{146} Martin Lipton, Disintermediating the Proxy Advisory Firms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 21, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/01/21/disintermediating-the-proxy-advisory-firms/ [https://perma.cc/5GZ3-VFWK].
provided by the Big Three, which have become a major force in the investing arena. More and more scholars have started to explore these funds’ incentives to be good stewards, and many of them criticize the funds for not having sufficient incentives.\footnote{148} Some scholars have taken a step forward and called on lawmakers to consider restricting the rights of index funds to vote at annual meetings of companies in which they invest.\footnote{149} The media has also warned against “[t]he [h]idden [d]angers of the [g]reat [i]ndex [f]und [t]akeover.”\footnote{150} In response, leaders of index funds have emphasized that they are not passive regarding engagements with their portfolio corporations.\footnote{151} Relatedly, they have stressed that they are committed to expanding their stewardship teams’ capabilities,\footnote{152} and intensifying their stewardship efforts.\footnote{153} As an example of their increasing commitment, mutual funds in recent years have expressed their dissatisfaction with the short-term vision of activist hedge funds,\footnote{154} and mutual fund leaders, in letters they sent to the CEOs of their portfolio companies, have criticized the process of quick and private settlements between companies and activists, which has deprived the funds of their voice.\footnote{155}


\footnote{149. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 8.}


\footnote{151. See, e.g., Jennifer Thompson, \textit{Index Tracking ETFs Deny Any ‘Abdication’ of Stewardship Role}, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9e9743e0-e40c-11e7-a685-5634466a6915 [https://perma.cc/ER4M-PQUS]; NOVICK ET AL., supra note 65, at 12.}


\footnote{154. For a discussion of long-term activism versus hedge fund activism, see Sharon Hannes, \textit{Super Hedge Fund}, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 189–99 (2015).}

The upshot here is that in the past two decades, institutional investors have been subjected to an increasing burden because of their growing governance tasks, and they cannot relieve the burden by simply outsourcing these tasks or abandoning their duties. Therefore, subject to the huge costs tied to the governance tasks, institutional investors are seeking a legitimate and cost-effective way to show their commitment to stewardship.

3. Cost-Effectiveness and Limited Incentives to Invest in Active Stewardship

Corporate stewardship, defined as monitoring, voting, and engagement, is very costly and is likely to raise investors’ expenses without bringing much benefit, and thus harm their profitability. However, because institutional investors must stay cost-effective in comparison to their peers, it is hard for them to cut the costs incurred by corporate stewardship because, as I explained above, they cannot ignore their fiduciary duties and cannot outsource fulfillment of the duties to proxy advisory companies without repercussions. Thus, institutional investors must find a mode of stewardship that has minimal costs but at the same time is perceived as legitimate by the public and regulators. Corporate guidelines emerge as a solution to this dilemma.

Institutional investors, both active and passive, are profit-maximizing players operating in competitive markets, and so retaining existing clients (assets) and attracting new clients are two of their primary goals.

For active investors, especially mutual funds, their clients seek to get the highest profit possible. The profit equals the annual return achieved by the fund minus the expenses incurred by the fund. Expenses include administrative costs and investment management fees paid to portfolio managers who perform research analysis to determine which securities the fund will pick. The investment management fees are often the biggest part of the fund’s expenses. The total cost of the fund divided by the fund’s total assets is the total expense ratio (TER). Investors, when considering whether to invest in a fund, give special attention to the TER. This is because expenses are deducted from the total assets of the mutual funds before the clients get their share. The lower the expense ratio is, the higher the return to the clients is. To illustrate, if the fund has an expense ratio of 1%, and the gross annual return is 15%, then the net return to the clients is 14%.

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156. Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1, at 2045.
158. In that regard, it is very obvious how Vanguard highlights the fact that its expense ratio is the lowest in the industry. See Vanguard Mutual Fund Fees and Minimums, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/investment-products/mutual-funds/fees [https://perma.cc/NQ7Y-FUT5] (“Vanguard average mutual fund expense ratio: 0.10%. Industry average mutual fund expense ratio: 0.55%. All averages are asset-weighted. Industry average excludes Vanguard.”).
must be cost-effective to be able to compete with their peers. Given that active corporate stewardship is very costly, managers of mutual funds are likely to prefer using low-cost alternatives, such as corporate guidelines.

The preceding analysis is not merely theoretical. During hearings and discussions held over the years, investors have stressed that they are likely to allocate their time and resources to choosing investments rather than to active engagement. In some sense, allocating resources to corporate stewardship is perceived by investors as an obstacle to fulfilling their other responsibilities, as illustrated by some institutional investors’ statements.160

As Eric Komitee, general counsel at Viking Global Investors, LP, stressed during the roundtable held by the SEC in 2013,

> There are only so many hours in the year, and every hour spent evaluating proxies is potentially an hour spent not evaluating alternative investments that could go into the portfolio. It’s an hour not spent evaluating counterparty risks and custodial issues and all the other aspects of an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty that compete for, you know, the most scarce resource that everybody has, which is time.161

Similarly, at the roundtable held by the SEC in November 2018, Scot Draeger, president and general counsel of R.M. Davis Private Wealth Management, stated, “Over time, [voting] grew to be a huge responsibility. And the analysts really found that they were spending so much time focused on proxies that it left them with resources lacking to do their day-to-day, typical investment work in the portfolio investments themselves.”162

Regarding passive investors, cost-effectiveness is even more crucial. The emergence of passively managed funds—index mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs)—is one of the most heated topics in corporate scholarship today. Unlike active funds that pick stocks, passive funds replicate the return of a selected index.163 The rationale behind a passive fund is, as the late Jack Bogle, the index fund pioneer who founded Vanguard, put it, instead of looking for the needle in the haystack, just “buy the haystack.”164 As such, passive funds provide a return to investors with lower costs of intermediation. Passive funds, dominated by the Big Three,165 compete with active funds. Generally speaking, passive mutual funds charge ultra-low fees, and cost clients about one-fourth to one-eighth as much as comparable active mutual funds.166 This explains the “mass migration” from active

160. See infra text accompanying notes 161–162. Although those statements were not made by the largest investors—probably because they did not want to be perceived as not fully committed to stewardship—it seems that those statements tell the real story.
163. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 1, at 2047.
166. According to the 2018 Morningstar Report, index funds have an average expense
to passive funds.\textsuperscript{167} Passive funds also compete amongst themselves for the lowest tracking error performance and for the lowest cost. In a definite way, Vanguard won “fee war” with the lowest average fees and the largest market share.\textsuperscript{168} The fee war has been so fierce that it continues to push the fee charged by both active and passive funds downward. As the Morningstar’s Annual Fee Study reveals, the asset-weighted average fee has declined significantly over the years, with a drop of 6\% in 2018 alone.\textsuperscript{169} The bottom line here is that passive investors must be more effective when it comes to costs than their active peers, which increases their disincentives to invest in active engagements.

At this point, one might argue that expenses related to investment in stewardship, incurred by active and passive investors alike, can be justified because stewardship may improve the fund’s performance. Specifically, the investment in stewardship may increase the value of the asset under management (AUM) of a fund’s portfolio, and given that investment advisers charge fees equal to a percentage of the AUM, they may have the incentive to invest in stewardship. As I will explain shortly, such an argument suffers from limitations because the incentive structure of managers in most institutional investors discourages them from engaging in active stewardship. Moreover, it is unclear how sensitive mutual funds’ clients are to the funds’ performance.

For both active and passive funds, an incentive problem discourages investment managers from investing in active engagement. Even if investment managers have improved the value of their portfolio by investing in stewardship, they typically would capture only a tiny fraction of the increase in value. Specifically, active investors capture around 0.79\% of the improvement in the value of the position whereas passive investors capture only 0.12\%.\textsuperscript{170} Such a fraction “would generally be insufficient to induce the level of stewardship investment that would best serve the interests of beneficial investors.”\textsuperscript{171}

Moreover, under the current regulatory regime, investment managers are not allowed to include the expenses of stewardship as part of the fees paid by their investors, so the managers bear the full costs of stewardship.\textsuperscript{172} One may further argue that investment managers may have indirect incentives to invest in stewardship in order to enhance the fund’s performance and thereby attract flows of new assets.
to the fund, which will increase their fees. However, as empirical studies have shown, the effect of funds’ performance on flows is complex and not linear,\textsuperscript{173} which means performance may not be perceived as being of much instrumental value in boosting flows.

To complete the picture, in contrast to Bebchuk, Edward Rock and Marcel Kahan stress that the most important incentive for index funds’ advisers to invest in stewardship is the size of their holdings. According to Rock and Kahan, although the rate charged by equity index funds is very low (the average in 2017 was 0.09%), given that passive index funds have the largest positions in companies, the incentive of passive funds’ managers to invest in stewardship is likely to be high.\textsuperscript{174}

Lastly, Bebchuk and Hirst also point out a free-rider problem that discourages index fund managers from investing in stewardship. The investment of a certain fund in stewardship would not improve the fund’s performance relative to other funds. This is because if a fund succeeded in enhancing the value of a portfolio company through investment in stewardship, the increase in value would be captured by all other investors of that company and rival index funds that track the same index.\textsuperscript{175} Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst thereby conclude that active involvement in their portfolio companies “would not result in a superior performance that could enable the manager to attract funds currently invested with rival investment managers.”\textsuperscript{176} Therefore, index funds may have even less of an incentive to invest in stewardship than active funds, and this is supported by empirical evidence.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{173} Compare Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, \textit{Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows}, 53 J. FIN. 1589, 1598 (1998) (providing empirical evidence showing that asset flows respond strongly to prior superior performance but are much less sensitive to past poor performance), and Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, \textit{Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives}, 105 J. POL. ECON. 1167, 1169 (1997) (“We find significant nonlinearities in the relationship, with the overall sensitivity of the relationship and its shape being dependent on the age of the fund in question.”), and Fisch, \textit{supra} note 157, at 1994 (“Investors fail to respond to chronic poor performance by withdrawing their funds, allowing some of the worst performing mutual funds to survive.”), with Jonathan Lewellen & Katharina Lewellen, \textit{Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged}, 77 J. FIN. 213 (2022) (providing empirical evidence of how institutional investors gain an extra sum of money from future flows of assets and finding that the flow of assets is typically sensitive to performance when speaking about the largest institutional investors, thereby concluding that the investors do have incentives to invest in stewardship).

\textsuperscript{174} See Kahan & Rock, \textit{Let Shareholders Be Shareholders}, \textit{supra} note 56, at 1777–93.

\textsuperscript{175} Bebchuk & Hirst, \textit{Index Funds}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 2047; see also Bebchuk et al., \textit{supra} note 2, at 96–97. Note that even if a rival index fund does not invest in this particular portfolio company, it can still benefit from the increase in the company’s value as long as it tracks the same index, because such an increase would raise the value of the index. Bebchuk et al., \textit{supra} note 2, at 98.

\textsuperscript{176} Bebchuk et al., \textit{supra} note 2, at 98.

\textsuperscript{177} See Heath et al., \textit{supra} note 148 (supporting Bebchuk and Hirst’s thesis and finding that index funds vote with management more frequently than active funds and are more likely to defer to management).
To sum up, maintaining cost-effectiveness is critical to institutional investors, especially passive index investors, which translates to their need to take a more modest approach toward stewardship by relying upon corporate guidelines.\footnote{178}{Interestingly, mutual funds may also maintain cost-effectiveness by other methods. For example, their ownership of corporations operating within similar geographies and industries enables them to monitor common threats faced by those companies at lower costs, by applying more formulaic models. \textit{See} Eckstein, \textit{supra} note 91, at 542.}

\textbf{B. Soft Device that Reduces Risk of Confrontation}

The second explanation of why institutional investors are likely to heavily rely on corporate guidelines is that these investors have additional considerations beyond those of good stewardship. Recall that institutional investors prefer not to directly confront managements of corporations, both because managements have strong political power and thus any confrontation may trigger a regulatory backlash, and because institutional investors have business ties with the corporations they invest in.\footnote{179}{\textit{See supra} Section I.A.}

As I explained in Section II.B.2 above, unlike active engagement, corporate guidelines are considered a “soft” device that allows institutional investors to enforce their governance principles in a nonconfrontational and flexible way. Since guidelines do not aim to force corporations to accept a specific arrangement, they are less likely to create a clash between institutional investors and managements. Relatedly, corporate guidelines designed by institutional investors may give managements an elegant way to adopt governance changes without embarrassment. By referring to the guidelines when proposing their own initiatives to improve governance, corporations’ boards can signal that they have kept their shareholders’ interests in mind and are actively seeking governance changes that are fit and appropriate. This would allow corporations to align with best practices demanded by institutional investors through the back door and prevent a direct confrontation between the corporations and the investors in the front door.

\textbf{C. Standardization in Corporate Law: A Global Phenomenon}

In this Section, I suggest another explanation for the rise of corporate guidelines. In his recent article, John Coates analyzes how three megatrends have reshaped corporate governance. One of these trends is globalization.\footnote{180}{\textit{Coates, supra} note 57, at 5–6.} The growing power of institutional investors’ guidelines should be seen as an integral part of a global push for standardization. This Section, while not offering an exhaustive discussion, points to some of the major phases of this trend.

To begin with, in May 1999, members of the OECD voted unanimously to endorse the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.\footnote{181}{\textit{G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD} https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/FT9R-BL6A].} Since their endorsement, the Principles have been recognized as the basic governance standards for companies
and investors around the world. Some EU jurisdictions, such as the UK and Germany, have also adopted corporate governance codes, in the form of “comply or explain,” which means that the codes are not legally binding, but once a corporation decides not to comply with them, it should explain the reasons for noncompliance.\textsuperscript{182} Similar codes were adopted by other countries, such as Japan (which adopted a stewardship code in 2014) and Hong Kong (which adopted principles of responsible ownership in 2016).\textsuperscript{183}

In 2003, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), led by investors that are today responsible for assets under management in excess of $34 trillion, published its first set of governance principles to “advance[] the highest standards of corporate governance and investor stewardship.”\textsuperscript{184} ICGN’s governance principles were updated in 2013 and in 2017, and they deal with various aspects of corporate governance, such as the board’s leadership and independence (including the need for an independent chair and the role of the lead independent director) and the board’s composition (including diversity and director tenure).\textsuperscript{185}

In 2006, the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) was first launched. Sixty-three investment companies with $6.5 trillion in AUM signed a commitment to incorporate ESG principles into their investment decisions.\textsuperscript{186} By April 2018, the number of signatories had increased to 1715 and represented $81.7 trillion in AUM.\textsuperscript{187} PRI’s principles put special emphasis on ESG issues, seeking to promote ESG considerations in companies in which the signatories invest and to encourage appropriate disclosure on ESG issues in those companies.\textsuperscript{188}

The push for standardized corporate governance on the global level received another boost after the 2008 financial crisis occurred, leading to a growing number of stewardship codes, principles, and guidelines being adopted by many countries around the world.\textsuperscript{189}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}


\bibitem{ICGN} \textit{About ICGN, INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK}, https://www.icgn.org/about [https://perma.cc/7PQW-B4GM].

\bibitem{PRI} \textit{See INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE GRP., ICGN BYLAWS} (2021), https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/2_ICGN%20Bylaws%20%28Approved%20June%202021%29_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y572-RQA5].


\bibitem{ICGN2} \textit{Id.}

\bibitem{PRI2} \textit{See About the PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV.}, https://www.unpri.org/about-us/about-the-pri [https://perma.cc/2DBM-CEWG].

\end{thebibliography}
Recently, seventy of the largest institutional investors in the United States and their international counterparts gathered and formed the ISG.190 Together, these investors have combined assets in excess of $31 trillion in the U.S. equity markets.191 The ISG developed six principles that went into effect on January 1, 2018.192 These principles are perceived by the ISG as “fundamental to good corporate governance at U.S. listed companies,”193 and as “minimum standards in the market” (i.e., their “minimum” expectations of corporate governance from corporations they invest in).194 Although these principles are not mandatory, companies have difficulty ignoring them because they are usually backed by the investors’ credible threat to detect and punish noncompliance.195 For example, recall that after State Street (one of the most prominent signatories of the ISG) reported that it had identified sixty-six S&P 500 companies that failed to comply with the ISG’s governance principles, many of these companies eventually modified their practices based on the ISG’s principles before their annual shareholder meetings, or provided sufficient explanations for their noncompliance.196 Those who did neither suffered the opposition of State Street in the voting process.197

To summarize, all of the global developments described in this Section can be seen as an accelerating force that has been pushing institutional investors toward standardization and, more specifically, toward relying upon proxy voting guidelines.198

IV. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’ GUIDELINES: EVIDENCE

In the previous Part, I analyzed the importance of corporate guidelines. While doing so, I focused on the nature of corporate guidelines and the potential supply-
side explanations of the rise of guidelines (i.e., the explanations of why corporate
guidelines have become a preferred instrument) created by investors and groups of
investors to participate in corporate governance. In this Part, I provide evidence of
the potential power (i.e., the demand-side influence) of corporate guidelines. To do
so, I analyze the ways major players in the corporate governance arena—
corporations, shareholders, legal advisors, and proxy advisors—use corporate
guidelines.

Specifically, I show how corporations use corporate guidelines to reflect their
commitment to their largest investors and to oppose shareholder proposals, how
shareholders base their proposals on corporate guidelines to support their positions,
and how legal advisors refer to the guidelines to warn their corporate clients. Next, I
demonstrate how corporations and shareholders make frequent use of what they term
“best practices,” which may be created and maintained by corporate guidelines.
Finally, I discuss proxy advisors’ use of corporate guidelines and how investors are
involved in the formulation of proxy advisors’ own guidelines. Before turning to
discuss how the different players interact with corporate guidelines, I first explain
the methodology for the empirical study of the uses of corporate guidelines and
summarize the findings.

A. Empirical Research: Sample and Methodology

In order to analyze how corporate guidelines are used by major players in
corporate governance, I analyzed the proxy statements published by corporations in
the form of DEF 14A (Schedule 14A). Initially, my dataset contained proxy
statements published in 2019–2021 by the 500 corporations that constituted the S&P
500 list as of December 10, 2019. In order to expand the scope of this research, I
further inspected data in five-year intervals, for the years 2010 and 2005. Ultimately,
to obtain a broader perspective, the dataset’s timeframe was expanded for the S&P
500 top 100 corporations to the years 2005–2021, which included a total of 3313
proxy statements, to this end. For each corporation in my sample, I collected
information about whether the corporation’s proxy statement includes explicit
references—made by both the corporation and its shareholders—to guidelines of
institutional investors and organizations representing these investors, such as the CII
or the ISG.

1. The Big Picture

In this Section, data is presented on the total number of proxy statements of S&P
500 corporations that included an explicit reference to the guidelines in the years
2005, 2010, and 2019–2021, in order to provide a fuller scope of assessment. The
references are then parceled into two subgroups: references made by corporations
and references made by shareholders. The analysis reveals that in 2005, proxy
statements of thirty-one corporations, comprising 7.75% of the sample, contained
references to corporate guidelines. Of the top 100 corporations, the proxy statements
of ten corporations, representing 11.90% of the category, included an explicit
reference by the corporation, its shareholders, or both.

Thereafter, in 2010, the analysis reveals that proxy statements of thirty-five
corporations, comprising 8.05% of the sample, contained references to corporate
guidelines. Of the top 100 corporations, the proxy statements of fourteen corporations, representing 15.91% of the category, included an explicit reference by the corporation, its shareholders, or both.

In 2019, the proxy statements of fifty-three corporations, comprising 10.73% of the sample, incorporated references to corporate guidelines. Of the top 100 corporations, meaning corporations included in the first tier of the S&P 500 and having the largest market capitalization, the proxy statements of twenty-four corporations (i.e., 24.24%) included an explicit reference by the corporation, its shareholders, or both.

As for 2020, my analysis shows that the proxy statements of forty-three corporations, comprising 8.72% of the sample, included references to corporate guidelines. Of the top 100 corporations, the proxy statements of twenty-one corporations (i.e., 24.24%) included an explicit reference by the corporation, its shareholders, or both.

Finally, in 2021, the analysis shows that the proxy statements of thirty-eight corporations, comprising 9.11% of the sample, contained references to corporate guidelines. Of the top 100 corporations, the proxy statements of twenty-one corporations, representing 25.00% of the category, included an explicit reference by the corporation, its shareholders, or both. Table 1 presents summary statistics on the information in the above categories.

Table 1: Proxy Statements of S&P 500 Corporations that Included Explicit References to Guidelines in 2005, 2010, 2019–2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>7.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>15.91%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>8.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>24.24%</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>10.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>21.43%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>8.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>9.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>90.60</td>
<td>19.70%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>447.8</td>
<td>8.88%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When focusing on the largest 100 corporations in the S&P 500, the analysis reveals that in 2005–2021 a significant percentage of proxy statements contain explicit references to corporate guidelines made by corporations or activist shareholders, as Figure 1 reflects.
Finally, explicit references by corporations and shareholders to the guidelines cover a wide range of corporate governance topics. Some of the proxy statements include references—made by corporations or shareholders—to more than a single topic. Table 2 summarizes the references by topic.
Table 2: Number of Explicit References to Guidelines (Made by Corporations and Shareholders) in 2005, 2010, 2019–2021, by Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>Sh.</td>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>Sh.</td>
<td>Corp.</td>
</tr>
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<td>General Statement</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Enhance Proxy Access</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right To Act by Written Consent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of Supremacy Voting Requirement for By-Law Amendment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative / Majority Voting for Director Elections</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce Involvement in Corporate Governance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Shareholder Voting (Multi-Class Voting Structure)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of CEO/Chairman Roles (Independent Chairman)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of Shareholders to Call a Special Meeting</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeal of Classified Board</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Rights Plan (Poison Pill)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disclosure of Political Spending</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent Directors</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tax Aspects</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Compensation</td>
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<td>ESG</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
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</table>

2. Corporations’ References to Guidelines

Thus far, my analysis has focused on the aggregate number of explicit references to the guidelines made by both corporations and shareholders. Next, I break down the aggregate data into two categories: references made by corporations and references made by shareholders. This breakdown gives us a better perspective of the use of the guidelines by each group. The main finding is that both corporations and shareholders use the guidelines. This indicates that the guidelines have become
a critical benchmark for both groups. In this Section, I present data on references made by corporations. In the next Section, I provide data on references made by shareholders.

The empirical analysis reveals that in the years 2019 through 2021, thirty-two, twenty-eight, and twenty-four corporations, representing 6.48%, 5.68%, and 5.76% of the sample, issued explicit references to corporate guidelines. Most of the references were issued by the top 100 corporations, of which 13.13%, 12.24%, and 13.10% made such references.

In order to obtain a more accurate sense of corporate guidelines, proxy statements by the S&P 500 corporations in 2005 and 2010 were also examined. This examination reveals that one and three corporations, constituting 0.25% and 0.69% of the corporations in the sample, issued an explicit reference to corporate guidelines.

It should be emphasized at this stage that the statistics do not capture the full effect of corporate guidelines because they only include references made in an explicit manner to the guidelines and independently of other interactions between corporations and their investors. For example, the statistics do not include frequently made declarations in proxy statements, according to which, during engagements between corporations and their largest investors, the corporations received feedback from investors on their priorities and expectations and then considered the feedback in formulating corporate governance policies.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>13.13%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>6.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>12.24%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>5.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13.10%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>5.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>90.60</td>
<td>7.92%</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>447.80</td>
<td>3.77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Widening the time frame and examining the S&P 500 top 100 corporations, from 2005 through 2021, reveals a rise in explicit references made by corporations starting in 2015. In the years 2019–2021, the data shows a material spike in explicit references. Figure 2 presents a statistical summary of the percent of explicit references made by corporations.

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199. For consistency’s sake, I examined only corporations that are also included in the 2019–2021 analysis, meaning corporations included in the S&P 500 list as of December 10, 2019.
Figure 2: Percentage of Explicit References to Guidelines Made by the S&P 500 Top 100 Corporations in 2005–2021

Note that references made by corporations to corporate guidelines on executive compensation issues are excluded from the dataset because every proxy statement contains such references. Also, the statistics do not include the statements that corporations have revised their policies in response to their investors’ views or sentiments. This is because it is not clear from the proxy statements whether the corporations learned about the investors’ views or sentiments through active dialogue, by studying corporate guidelines, or both.

Explicit reference statistics, however, do not reflect the full effect of corporate guidelines. There is an important connection between the guidelines and industry best practices. The content of the guidelines may inspire, inform, or augment an industry best practice. Thus, when corporations make references to best practices, they indirectly make references to the guidelines. To capture this effect, I analyzed the data from 2019 to identify references to best practices. My empirical analysis shows that in addition to explicit references to corporate guidelines made in 2019, 226 corporations, comprising 45.2% of the sample, declared that their boards reviewed the corporation’s policies, frameworks, and guidelines according to current and evolving best practices, or emphasized that their governance guidelines were aligned with best practices or that they were committed to best practices.

The guidelines’ influence on best practices may create a derivative effect. Corporations and shareholders referred to statistics on certain governance arrangements adopted by corporations included in S&P 500, S&P 1500, or Fortune 100. Shareholders referred to statistics on best practices to support their proposals in forty-two proxy statements, representing 8.4% of the sample, seventeen of which were statements of the 100 largest companies. Corporations referred to statistics on best practices in thirty proxy statements, twenty-eight of which were made in response to a shareholder proposal.
3. Shareholders’ References to Guidelines

More than just corporations make explicit references to corporate guidelines. Shareholders that submit proposals to their corporations also refer to corporate guidelines in order to support their proposals and convince corporations to make changes and adopt certain governance arrangements. As the analysis highlights, in 2005, thirty corporations (7.50% of the sample) received shareholder proposals that referred to corporate guidelines.

With respect to 2010, thirty-three corporations (7.59% of the sample) received shareholder proposals that referred to corporate guidelines. Thereafter, in 2019, twenty-eight corporations (5.67% of the sample) received shareholder proposals that referred to corporate guidelines. Most of the references were included in the proposals submitted to the largest corporations, including 14.14% of the top 100 corporations.

In 2020, seventeen corporations (3.45% of the sample) received shareholder proposals that referred to corporate guidelines. Most of the references were included in the proposals submitted to the largest corporations, including 10.20% of the top 100 corporations. Finally, in 2021, fourteen corporations (3.36% of the sample) received shareholder proposals that referred to the corporate guidelines. Most of the references were included in the proposals submitted to the largest corporations, including 11.90% of the top 100 corporations.

The fact that explicit references to corporate guidelines—by both corporations and shareholders that targeted these corporations—appear in the proxy statements of the largest corporations comports with my hypothesis about the centrality of the guidelines to corporate governance. The largest corporations attract much more attention from the media, practitioners, academia, policymakers, shareholders, and other corporations, than smaller ones.

Table 4 presents summary statistics on references made by shareholders who targeted S&P 500 corporations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>7.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>14.77%</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>7.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>14.14%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>10.20%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>3.45%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>11.40</td>
<td>90.60</td>
<td>12.59%</td>
<td>24.40</td>
<td>447.80</td>
<td>5.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The collected data of the S&P 500 top 100 corporations in the years 2005–2021 show changes in shareholders’ activity during this period. A spike in shareholders’ activity is noted in years 2008 and 2009 and can be linked to the financial crisis. The
two primary foci of shareholders’ proposals in these years are executive compensation and shareholders’ right to call for a special meeting. These topics align with shareholders’ interests regarding the influences of the financial crisis. Figure 3 presents the summary statistics of guideline references by shareholders in the proxy statements of S&P 500 top 100 corporations from 2005 through 2021.

Figure 3: Percentage of Explicit References Made by Activist Shareholders that Targeted S&P 500 Top 100 Corporations in 2005–2021

B. Guidelines as a Device Used by Corporations: A Descriptive Analysis

Corporations declare their commitment to their shareholders and communicate actively with institutional investors, both to express that their governance practices conform with the investors’ expectations and to defend their practices against adverse shareholder proposals. Some corporations provide exact figures regarding their engagement with institutional investors. Some describe how extensive outreach to shareholders led their boards to fully evaluate and consider certain governance issues and implement changes regarding those issues.

The purpose of these communications is clear: to satisfy investors, especially large institutional investors, by signaling corporations’ commitment to existing and potential investors. Some corporations invest special efforts to impress investors. For example, Delta Air Lines stated in its 2019 Annual Meeting Proxy Statement that “[i]n 2018, Delta was named as a ‘Most Honored Company’ by the financial journal Institutional Investor, which ranked Delta’s investor relations effort number 1 in the airline category.”\(^{200}\) Similarly, Honeywell International, Inc., described in detail all of the recent awards it received from institutional investors (most honored

company, leadership award, best investor relations, etc.). Similar statements appear in proxy statements of other leading companies.

Another means to express corporations’ commitment to large institutional investors is to explain how corporations’ guidelines and the guidelines established by institutional investors are aligned. Among the leading corporations to declare how they conform to the guidelines and standards of institutional investors are Bank of America and Salesforce.com. Corporations also refer to the governance guidelines designed by the ISG and the CII, including the largest players such as BlackRock, State Street, T. Rowe Price, Vanguard, etc. For example, UnitedHealth Group made such references when responding to a shareholder proposal to amend its proxy access bylaw provisions. My research also reveals that corporations are making growing use of the ISG’s guidelines as a reference

201. See Honeywell Int’l Inc., supra note 85.
203. See Bank of Am. Corp., supra note 83, at 4 (“Through our Corporate Governance Committee, the Board regularly reviews and closely monitors stockholders’ views on the appropriate number of public company boards on which directors may serve. The Committee considers: the proxy voting guidelines of our major stockholders . . . .”).
204. See Salesforce.com, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 53 (Apr. 25, 2019) (“[T]he Board of Directors also recognizes that many investors and others now view supermajority voting provisions as unduly limiting the Board of Directors’ accountability to stockholders or stockholder participation in the corporate governance of the Company.”).
205. See Associate Members, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., https://www.cii.org/associate_members [https://perma.cc/47GG-REVK].
206. See UnitedHealth Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 74 (Apr. 19, 2019) (“The 20 shareholder aggregation limit we adopted has been adopted by almost all U.S. listed companies implementing proxy access (approximately 93% as of December 31, 2018), and has been recognized by the Council of Institutional Investors as a market standard.”).
point. Among the leading corporations to do so are Procter & Gamble, Intel, IBM, Target and Gilead Sciences.

It may come as no surprise that today corporations disclose the level of their commitment to institutional investors’ guidelines. In fact, institutional investors encourage companies to proactively disclose their compliance with their principles. As State Street revealed in 2019, “In instances of non-compliance when companies cannot explain the nuances of their governance structure effectively, either publicly or through engagement, we may vote against the independent board leader.” In this regard, it is worth noting that State Street has a structured, built-in process to monitor departures from its guidelines based on their portfolio companies’ disclosures. As State Street reveals, its stewardship activities are directly monitored by the State Street Global Advisors Investment Committee, which is composed of several subcommittees. One of the subcommittees, the Proxy Review Committee, “provides day-to-day oversight of the Stewardship Team, including

207. See The Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 16 (Aug. 23, 2019) (“We have evaluated the Company’s governance practices against the Corporate Governance Principles published by the Investor Stewardship Group (‘ISG’), a collective of some of the largest U.S.-based institutional investors and global asset managers, and found they were highly consistent. P&G’s strong corporate governance policies and practices are disclosed throughout this proxy statement, but the following table highlights some of the key ways that P&G’s governance practices are consistent with ISG’s Corporate Governance Principles.”). The Proxy Statement also lists “Policies consistent with the Investor Stewardship Group’s Corporate Governance Principles” and “Signatory to Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles 2.0” as “Corporate Governance Principles.” Id. at iii.

208. See Intel Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 31 (Apr. 3, 2019) (“These guidelines, which investors may find on our website at www.intel.com/governance, along with our other corporate governance practices, compare favorably under the Investor Stewardship Group’s (ISG) Corporate Governance Framework for U.S. Listed Companies, as shown in the table below.”).

209. See Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 11, 2019) (“And this year, IBM became a signatory of the Commonsense Principles 2.0 and endorsed the Investor Stewardship Group’s corporate governance principles.”). The Proxy Statement further states, “Most recently, the Company has been on the forefront of strong governance practices as a signatory to the Commonsense Principles 2.0, bringing the company and investor viewpoints on critical governance matters together. The Company also endorses the Investor Stewardship Group’s principles on corporate governance to promote strong governance practices.” Id. at 80.

210. See Target Corp., supra note 88, at 8 (Apr. 29, 2019) (“[O]ur corporate governance practices compare favorably with the corporate governance principles developed by the Investor Stewardship Group (ISG), which includes some of the largest institutional investors and global asset managers and advocates for best practices in corporate governance.”).

211. See Gilead Scis., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 8 (Mar. 25, 2019) (“We believe our strong corporate governance structures align with these ISG principles.”).

212. See Lacaille & Kumar, supra note 195.

213. Id.

214. SSGA 2018-19, supra note 95, at 22.

215. Id.
approving departures from proxy voting guidelines.” Like State Street, other large institutional investors may also diverge from their guidelines and best practices.

So far, I have explained how references to corporate guidelines allow corporations to deliver to the investors and other constituencies (such as policymakers and media) a strong message of commitment to strong corporate governance. But other than achieving the signaling effect, corporations may also make such references to support their initiatives of making certain governance changes.

Furthermore, corporations sometimes refer to investors’ guidelines in response to shareholder proposals. In doing so, corporations are aware that since the large institutional investors hold shares in the corporation, quite often ranging between 5% and 10%, shareholders are likely to support their proposal with a statement regarding large investors’ guidelines in order to force the corporation to agree to adjust its policy.

When facing a shareholder proposal that uses institutional investors’ guidelines to convince the corporation to adopt certain policies, the board of this corporation has two options: to recommend the shareholders to vote either “for” or “against” the proposal. When choosing to recommend against the proposal, as in fact happens most of the time, the board cannot just provide its bottom line but rather has to support its recommendation. This dynamic frequently forces corporations to open a dialogue with those institutional investors who choose to diverge from their own guidelines.

As I explain in Section IV.E below, in many cases, corporations refer to industry best practices, especially when responding to a shareholder proposal. In this regard, it is important to understand that when corporations refer to best practices, they are indirectly referring to corporate guidelines because the best practices are strongly influenced by the guidelines.

C. Guidelines as a Device Used to Support Shareholder Proposals: A Descriptive Analysis

Some shareholders increasingly use institutional investors’ guidelines as part of their proposals submitted to the corporation to be voted on at shareholder meetings.


217. See Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive Remuneration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 334, 354 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds., 2015) (“In anticipation of the 2014 proxy season, Vanguard sent letters to approximately US 350 companies to proactively engage with them on governance issues. The letters are tailored to the individual companies and identify governance practices at the companies that Vanguard believes are not in line with what the asset manager views as best practices.”).

218. See, e.g., Booking Holdings, Inc., supra note 109, at 77 (“We adopted our current Proxy Access By-Laws after significant evaluation and deliberation by the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and the full Board of Directors and meaningful stockholder engagement. This thoughtful review included . . . a review of the corporate governance policies of some of our largest stockholders.”).

219. Hamdani & Hannes, supra note 26, at 973.
These shareholders are often activist hedge funds, which have significant incentives to invest in activism (in comparison to mutual funds),

or “corporate gadflies,” which have become dominant players in recent years. Guidelines are being used by these players as a tool to convince corporations to follow certain practices. Usually, shareholders also include information regarding the way large institutional investors voted on the matter in their proposals.

My dataset provides many examples of direct and specific references made by shareholder proposals to large institutional investors’ guidelines. For example, shareholders referred to the guidelines when they called on Apple to improve proxy access;

when they asked Amazon to reduce the ownership threshold for calling special shareholder meetings;

when they asked Alphabet (Google) to elect directors by a majority vote; and when they required ExxonMobil to separate the roles of the chairman and the CEO. Frequently, it is the same group of

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220. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 263, 283–85 (2019) (describing the role played by hedge funds during the past years); see also Hamdani & Hannes, supra note 26; Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds, supra note 28.


222. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 59 (Apr. 12, 2019) (including shareholder proposal to use majority voting for director elections, which states that “[a]mong our Company’s largest shareholders: T. Rowe Price Associates and BlackRock both voted FOR 88.9% of shareholder proposals on this topic[] [and] SSgA Funds Management voted FOR 100% of such proposals”).

223. See Apple Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 52 (Jan. 8, 2019) (“BlackRock’s 2018 Proxy Voting Guidelines included the following: ‘In general, we support market-standardized proxy access proposals, which allow a shareholder (or group of up to 20 shareholders) holding three percent of a company’s outstanding shares for at least three years the right to nominate the greater of up to two directors or 20% of the board.’”).

224. See Amazon.com, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 17 (Apr. 11, 2019) (“Large funds such as Vanguard, TIAA-CREF, BlackRock and SSgA Funds Management, Inc. (State Street) support the right of shareholders to call special meetings.”).

225. See Alphabet Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 70 (Apr. 30, 2019) (“BlackRock’s proxy voting guidelines include the following: ‘Majority voting standards assist in ensuring that directors who are not broadly supported by shareholders are not elected to serve as their representatives.’ Among our Company’s largest shareholders: T. Rowe Price Associates and BlackRock both voted FOR 88.9% of shareholder proposals on this topic. SSgA Funds Management voted FOR 100% of such proposals.”).

226. See Exxon Mobil Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 58 (Apr. 11, 2019) (“Numerous institutional investors recommend separation of these two roles. For example, California’s Public Employee Retirement System’s Principles & Guidelines encourage separation, even with a lead director in place.”).
shareholders—known as corporate gadflies—who include references to institutional investors’ guidelines in their proposals.227

These findings may shed light on a recent study conducted by Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley, and Donald B. Klein, in which they found that passive investors affect the corporate governance of the companies in which they invest.228 They discuss possible mechanisms by which passive investors may influence governance, such as “facilitating activism by other, non-passive investors.”229 They assume that a “threat” of activism by others may be enough to enhance governance, and that such a threat is likely to increase when the “concentration of passive institutions’ ownership stakes” increases.230

Furthermore, as my research reveals, shareholders also refer to the guidelines issued by the CII. Such references were made, for example, by shareholders who submitted proposals to the Board of Amazon to modify the vote-counting practice;231 by shareholders who submitted proposals to the board of Facebook to give each share an equal vote232 and to separate the roles of the chairman and the CEO;233 by a shareholder who asked the board of JPMorgan to adopt cumulative voting;234 and by shareholders who submitted proposals to the board of AT&T to modify proxy access requirements.235

Lastly, shareholders may also rely on governance guidelines provided by institutional investors through other channels. For example, shareholders have

227. This group includes Mr. John Chevedden, Mr. James McRitchie, and Mr. Kenneth Steiner.
228. See Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Klein, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2016) (finding that increased ownership by passive funds in companies is associated with an increased percentage of independent directors, a removal of takeover defenses, and a lower percentage of dual-class share structures).
229. Id. at 128.
230. Id.
231. See Amazon.com, Inc., supra note 224, at 39 (“Policy 3.7 of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII, ‘The Voice of Corporate Governance’) declares that ‘abstentions should be counted only for purposes of a quorum.’”).
232. See Facebook, Inc., supra note 222, at 55 (“The Council for Institutional Investors (CII) recommends a seven year phase-out of dual class share offerings. The International Corporate Governance Network supports CII’s recommendation ‘to require to a time-based sunset clause for dual class shares to revert to a traditional one-share/one-vote structure no more than seven years after a company’s IPO date.’”).
233. See id. at 57 (“The Council of Institutional Investors argues: ‘Having an independent chair helps the board carry out its primary duty—to monitor the management of the company on behalf of its shareowners. A CEO who also serves as chair can exert excessive influence on the board and its agenda, weakening the board’s oversight of management. Separating the chair and CEO positions reduces this conflict, and an independent chair provides the clearest separation of power between the CEO and the rest of the board.’”).
234. See JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 89, at 90.
235. See AT&T Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 27 (Mar. 12, 2018) (“Proxy Access: Best Practices 2017 . . . by the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), notes that ‘while proxy access has gained broad acceptance, some adopting companies have included, or are considering including, provisions that could significantly impair shareholders’ ability to use it.’ The report ‘highlights the best practices CII recommends for implementing proxy access.’”).
referred to the annual letter sent by BlackRock chairman and CEO Larry Fink to corporations in which BlackRock invests and their senior managements. Boeing’s shareholders did so when they urged the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors to adjust financial performance metrics to exclude the impact of share repurchases when determining the amount or vesting of any senior executive incentive compensation grant or award.\textsuperscript{236} Similarly, Gilead Sciences’s shareholders requested that the board issue a report describing how Gilead plans to allocate tax savings as a result of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.\textsuperscript{237} Institutional investors other than BlackRock use annual letters to communicate with the managements of their portfolio companies as well. In fact, “It has become customary, over the last few years, for companies and other stakeholders to await annual letters from large institutional investors that provide insight into investor views . . . .”\textsuperscript{238}

Before moving forward, and just to complete the picture, it is worth noting that shareholders, besides referring to corporate guidelines, may also support their

\textsuperscript{236} See The Boeing Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 56 (Mar. 15, 2019) (‘Large stock buybacks send ‘a discouraging message about a company’s ability to use its resources wisely and develop a coherent plan to create value over the long term,’ Laurence Fink, chairman and CEO of BlackRock, wrote in an April 14, 2015[,] letter to S&P 500 Index companies.”).

\textsuperscript{237} See Gilead Scis., Inc., supra note 211, at 80 (“Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock recently stated: ‘Companies have not been explicit enough about their long-term strategies. . . . What will you do with increased after-tax cash flow, and how will you use it to create long-term value? This is a particularly critical moment for companies to explain their long-term plans to investors.’”).

proposals by citing guidelines drafted by other individuals and entities such as index providers, professional and academic opinion leaders, and policymakers.

D. Guidelines Are Being Used by Legal Advisors and Other Professionals

To better understand the push for corporate guidelines, and to have a more complete picture of the dynamic they create, it is worth examining the way law firms treat them when they advise their corporate clients. Today, the best U.S. law firms study institutional investors’ philosophy, expectations, and vision through the analysis of their proxy voting guidelines, letters, and public statements.

Law firms are well aware of the fact that it is necessary for their corporate clients to have the support of large institutional investors when asking shareholders to vote for proposals initiated by the management, and when asking them to vote against shareholder proposals adverse to management recommendations. As explained earlier, each large institutional investor typically holds between 5% and 10% of the shares of a public corporation. Together, they frequently constitute a solid block of shares that can tip the scale in any voting process. As I explained in Section IV.B, complying with institutional investors’ guidelines is a necessary condition to win the investors’ support. Therefore, law firms frequently advise their clients to pay attention to and follow the guidelines.

239. For example, when John Chevedden submitted to UPS a proposal for equal voting rights for each shareholder, he emphasized that “[l]ast year, S&P Dow Jones Indices said that companies with multiple classes of shares would be barred from entering its flagship S&P 500 index.” United Parcel Serv., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 62 (Mar. 15, 2019). More generally, in this context it is useful to refer to Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1229 (2019) (describing how index providers constitute another source of corporate governance rules).

240. For example, activist shareholder John Chevedden submitted to the board of Netflix, Inc. a proposal that recommended removing the requirement of supermajority vote, referring to Professor Lucian Bebchuk and his colleagues’ position against supermajority vote. See Netflix, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 90 (Apr. 23, 2019). Also, references to this article were made by Chevedden when he targeted Norfolk Southern Corp.; FirstEnergy Corp.; Twitter, Inc.; Skyworks Solutions, Inc.; and Leidos Holdings, Inc. Similar references were made by James McRitchie when he targeted BlackRock, Inc., and by other shareholders when they targeted Discovery, Inc.

241. For example, Chevedden submitted a proposal to Anthem, Inc. to eliminate the classified board structure, emphasizing that “Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission said, ‘In my view it’s best for the investor if the entire board is elected once a year. Without annual election of each director shareholders have far less control over who represents them.’” Anthem, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 68 (Mar. 29, 2019). Similarly, a shareholder proposal submitted to the board of The Walt Disney Company requested that the company report on cyber security and data privacy, emphasizing that “[i]n September 2017, the Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division announced creation of a ‘Cyber Unit’ stating, ‘Cyber-related threats and misconduct are among the greatest risks facing investors and the securities industry.’” The Walt Disney Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 68 (Jan. 11, 2019). It also added that “[p]rior to becoming Chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton wrote, ‘cyber-threats are among the most urgent risk to America’s economic and national security and the personal safety of its citizens.’” Id.
One illustrative example is a memorandum sent by Davis Polk to a client, stressing that “[o]ne thing to note—as influential as these proxy advisory firms’ voting guidelines are, it is just as, if not more, important to review the voting guidelines of the company’s actual institutional shareholders.”

Another example is the following statement made by Martin Lipton, the founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz:

Major institutional investors . . . have established significant proxy departments that make decisions independent of ISS. It is important for a company to know the voting policies and guidelines of its major investors, who the key decision-makers and point-persons are and how best to reach them. It is possible to defeat an activist attack supported by ISS by gaining the support of the major institutional shareholders.

Other leading law firms also closely follow large institutional investors’ evolving perspectives and views.

Other professionals in the corporate field use institutional investors’ corporate guidelines as a reference point. For example, in October 2014, the Business Roundtable, an association of the CEOs of leading U.S. corporations, released a proposed voting policy on “Independent Chair Shareholder Proposals (U.S.).”


This policy referred to the perspectives of BlackRock and State Street on the matter. 246 Similarly, in its annual corporate directors survey published in 2019, PwC described new developments in the policies of State Street and BlackRock regarding gender diversity. 247

This Section described a special dynamic by which guidelines of institutional investors may influence corporate managements’ decision-making through attracting the attention of corporate professionals.

E. Best Practices

As I explained in Section IV.A above, in addition to explicit references to corporate guidelines, corporations may cite industry best practices to support their adoption of certain governance arrangements. Since corporate guidelines may initiate, accelerate, and maintain industry best practices, corporate guidelines may exert influence on corporations’ governance regimes through the corporations’ reliance on best practices.

The empirical analysis shows that almost half of the S&P 500 corporations declared that their boards reviewed the corporation’s policies, frameworks, and guidelines according to current and evolving best practices, or emphasized that they are committed to best practices or that their corporation’s governance guidelines are aligned with best practices. Relatedly, both corporations and shareholders referred to statistics regarding best practices, and corporations made the references mainly in response to shareholder proposals.

Such references are used as a tool to convince corporations to adopt certain governance arrangements. For example, a shareholder of Facebook who submitted a proposal that called the board to elect directors by a majority vote supported his proposal by stating that “[m]ore than 89% of the companies in the S&P 500 have adopted majority voting for uncontested elections, as have 67% of the S&P 1500.” 248 A shareholder of Alphabet supported his proposal with exactly the same statement. 249 Similar use of best practices was made by shareholders with regard to other governance issues as well. For example, a shareholder of Pfizer supported his proposal to separate the role of the chairman and the CEO, by stating that “[as of March 2017] 58% of S&P 1,500 firms separate these two positions and the number of companies separating these roles is growing.” 250 Similar proposals and statements have been made by shareholders of other companies as well. 251


246. See id. at 2–3.
248. Facebook, Inc., supra note 222, at 59.
249. See Alphabet, Inc., supra note 225, at 70.
251. See, e.g., AbbVie Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 73 (Mar. 22, 2019) (“As of October 2018, 50% of the S&P 500 have separated the role of Chair and CEO. Furthermore,
In response to shareholder proposals that make such references, corporations also make similar references. For example, the board of JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s response to a shareholder proposal on enhancing shareholder proxy access emphasized that “[t]he Firm’s proxy access By-law is aligned with current best practices and with prevailing practices among other U.S. companies.”252 The board added that “[b]ased on a review of the Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey 2018 by Shearman & Sterling, the terms of our proxy access By-law, including the re-nomination threshold, are consistent with the 67% of S&P 500 companies that have adopted proxy access.”253

F. Extension: Proxy Advisors’ Reliance on Corporate Guidelines and Investors’ Involvement in Designing Proxy Advisors’ Guidelines

Proxy advisors are considered central players in corporate governance. During the past two decades, institutional investors have increasingly relied on proxy advisory firms, and many observers believe that institutional investors have outsourced their proxy voting and corporate governance decisions to proxy advisory firms. The leading proxy advisory firms—ISS and Glass, Lewis & Co. (“Glass Lewis”), which together account for 97% of the industry—254—have been called “de facto corporate governance regulators”255 and “de facto arbiters of U.S. corporate governance.”256 In some cases, proxy advisors effectively controlled the vote of 50% of a corporation’s total shares outstanding.257

Similar to mutual funds, proxy advisory firms also lack capabilities and resources needed to research each company for which they provide voting advice or execute voting on behalf of their clients (i.e., institutional investors). For example, in June 2017, the ISS reported that its “Global Research team [located in the ISS’s offices in Europe, North America, Asia, and Australia] consisted of approximately 460 analysts, including approximately 270 research analysts and 190 data analysts.”258 As Glass Lewis reports, it has around “380 employees worldwide, more than half of whom are dedicated to research.”259 These numbers are overshadowed by the enormous coverage that proxy advisors are supposed to provide. As ISS currently

31% of S&P 500 firms have an independent chair.”). Although the above example includes accurate statistics, in some cases shareholder proposals mention the names only of leading corporations in which a requested governance arrangement was adopted.

252. JPMorgan Chase & Co., supra note 89.
253. Id.
255. Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 6 (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-129.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7G3-24TL].
256. Hearing Before the House, supra note 63, at 6. For an overview of the evolution of the proxy advisory industry, see Eckstein & Hannes, supra note 132.
257. See Eckstein & Hannes, supra note 132, at 796 n.46.
reports, it “covers approximately 48,000 meetings in 115 markets, delivering proxy research and vote recommendations while working closely with clients to execute more than 12.8 million ballots representing 5.4 trillion shares.”  

Similarly, Glass Lewis reports that it covers “more than 30,000 meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets.”

In light of proxy advisors’ lack of optimal capabilities to make an informed voting decision on each resolution submitted to a vote at every shareholder meeting, it is interesting to see that proxy advisors themselves rely on corporate guidelines to cope with their limited capacities. In the roundtable on proxy process held by the SEC in November 2018, Gary Retelny, the president and the CEO of ISS, explained that “[w]hat ISS does, essentially, is help [institutional investors] with the work flow . . . in actually executing those votes, based on [investors’] own individual custom policies.”

Katherine Rabin, who served as the CEO of Glass Lewis, made a similar statement. Relatedly, proxy advisors’ lack of capabilities may shed light on their reliance on their own guidelines, which has attracted much criticism. Critics have attacked proxy advisors for their “one-size-fits-all” approach.

Interestingly, institutional investors not only design their own guidelines, but are also involved in the process in which proxy advisory firms develop their voting guidelines. A look at the development process of ISS guidelines can illustrate such involvement. The process includes four major phases: (1) survey—ISS invites institutional investors, corporate issuers, and corporate governance organizations to respond to a survey regarding selected policy positions; (2) roundtable—ISS holds a roundtable to discuss with investors and issuers means to promote corporate guidelines; (3) comments—ISS publishes draft guidelines and gets feedback from investors and issuers; and (4) final guidelines—ISS publishes the final version of its guidelines for the subsequent proxy season.

As reported by the ISS, it received inputs from 121 institutional investors and 382 corporate issuers for its 2017 Governance Principles Survey; 107 responses from institutional investors and 469 responses from corporations for its 2018 Survey.

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261. GLASS LEWIS, supra note 259.


263. See id. at 193 (“[A]t the end of the day, what we’re doing is executing votes in accordance with the specific instructions of our clients. Whatever policy it is, it’s their policy.”).

264. See Eckstein & Hannes, supra note 132, at 820.


and 128 responses from investors and 227 responses from corporate executives for its 2019 Survey, which covered issues such as board gender diversity, director over boarding, combined CEO and chair, capital structure (including multi-class shares), etc. These data indicate that both institutional investors and corporations have a strong interest in proxy advisors’ guidelines. Similarly, although Glass Lewis, the other leading proxy advisory firm, does not disclose the exact process for designing its guidelines, its process also includes inputs from institutional investors and corporations.

CONCLUSION

Institutional investors, while often the largest shareholders in their portfolio companies, have little incentive to actively shape the companies’ corporate governance regimes. There are two common explanations for this phenomenon: (1) active engagements are too costly because initiating an activist campaign is expensive and may disrupt the complex business relationships between investors and their portfolio companies, and (2) institutional investors are “rationally reticent” and thus only respond to others’ shareholder proposals instead of submitting their own. Institutional investors draw criticism for underinvesting in corporate governance. However, the critics ignore the power of a passive corporate governance instrument used by the investors: corporate guidelines. In this Article, I have explained the growing importance of corporate guidelines through the lenses of investors, corporations, shareholders, and other stakeholders.

Corporate guidelines, a set of sound principles and practices in corporate governance, are published by institutional investors to instruct their portfolio managers on voting decisions. Given institutional investors’ holdings in their portfolio companies, their voting decisions have a significant impact on the governance policies in those companies. In short, studying corporate guidelines is meaningful and it requires a broader scope than just focusing on the most observable voting patterns.

Investors have three main motivations to use corporate guidelines. First, the guidelines make it possible for institutional investors to fulfill their fiduciary duties, on the one hand, and stay cost-effective, on the other. Second, the guidelines allow institutional investors to avoid direct confrontations with the managements of their


269. See David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Brian Tayan, The Influence of Proxy Advisory Firm Voting Recommendations on Say-on-Pay Votes and Executive Compensation Decisions, THE CONF. BD., Mar. 12, 2012, at 4 (“During the 2011 proxy season, 72.0 percent of companies reviewed the policies of a proxy advisory firm or engaged with a proxy advisory firm to receive feedback and guidance on their proposed executive compensation plan.”).

portfolio companies. Third, the development of corporate guidelines is part of the global push for the standardization of corporate law.

Corporations are not only passive targets that corporate guidelines are directed to influence but also active users of those guidelines. The empirical part of this Article has shown that in the years 2005 through 2021, the top 100 S&P 500 corporations increasingly made explicit references to corporate guidelines in their proxy statements in order to signal their commitment to sound corporate governance principles and to support their governance policies or their responses to shareholder proposals. The Article further demonstrates that other market actors and institutions routinely rely on corporate guidelines. Activist shareholders cite the guidelines to make their proposals more convincing. Proxy advisory firms, which bear a heavy burden to vote, also rely on pooling corporate guidelines and inputs from various investors to conceive and conclude on their voting decisions. Therefore, the corporate guidelines have become a principal mechanism that institutional investors use to shape corporate governance.