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Values to Be Added to an “Eastphalia Order” by the Emerging China

CHANG-FA LO*

INTRODUCTION

In the eyes of many, the rise of China and India has transformed the former collective dominance of the United States, Europe, and Japan into a multipolar world.¹ Within this multipolar world, relations between the United States and China will constitute an important bilateral contour for the twenty-first century, as illustrated by the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that convened in July 2009. In this context, the ideas promoted and practiced by China will have greater weight in influencing and shaping international relations. It is important for other parts of the world to see and understand what differences Chinese power and ideas could make in the evolving, multipolar world and what values China could bring to the new international society.

This essay focuses on the potential impact of emerging China and discusses ideas practiced and proposed by China concerning international relations. I will compare ideas supported by China with the concepts present in the Westphalian system of international politics and ask whether it is appropriate to see in the rise of China the emergence of an Asian-centric international system. In addition, the essay tries to identify the merits and inadequacies of ideas favored by China. My ultimate purpose is to show that China must integrate other values into its existing ideas if it desires to make a long-lasting impact on world affairs.

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1. See generally ACCENTURE, THE RISE OF THE MULTI-POLAR WORLD (2007), available at <http://www.accenture.com/NR/rdonlyres/BD275F6C-9E28-45F0-A8DB-7C1733D81BC2/0/MultiPolarWorld2007.pdf> (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (discussing trends in economics and business which are resulting in a world with multiple economic power centers).

I. CHINA AS A GREAT POWER

In ancient China, people from the West were called barbarians. When those westerners came to China and visited the Emperor, they had to kneel down and kowtow before him. These attitudes and practices reveal that, in those distant times, China considered itself the center of the world. However, the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries caused great changes in, among other things, manufacturing and transportation technologies. Western nations exploited these changes rapidly to strengthen their economies, technological capabilities, and military power.

While these transformations were taking place in the West, China slept. China still believed that it was the zenith of civilization and the center of the political universe for other countries wishing to establish and maintain relations with the Middle Kingdom. China belatedly discovered the devastating power Western nations developed and wielded, and Chinese leaders realized eventually that their country could not catch up to Western developments without changing the entire Chinese system of politics and economics. For their part, Westerners long considered China a culturally and economically backward country and an uncivilized place with corrupt and incompetent government.

All the attention now being focused on China's rise in global prominence has, to some extent, brought China back full circle, where it is increasingly viewed within and beyond its borders as sitting at the center of this new multipolar world. Enormous policy reform efforts within China over the past thirty years have produced a country that many believe has become one of the biggest political and economic powers in the world. Many factors have combined to give China its current great power status.

First, China has the world's largest population. In 2006, China's population was estimated at 1.3 billion, which accounts for twenty percent of the world's population.² Although population size does not necessarily translate into strength, China's large population of eager-to-succeed people has become an important force in pushing the Chinese economy forward. The increasing capabilities and confidence of the Chinese population has significantly increased consumption, swelling China's domestic market to huge proportions. This large domestic market in turn supports the development of China's domestic industries and makes China an attractive place for transnational companies to

2. POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 2009 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET 2 (2009), available at http://www.prb.org/pdf09/09wpds_eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).

invest and do business, which brings new technologies and skills that help modernize Chinese businesses. China's domestic market also makes China an increasingly important trading partner for many countries.

Second, China's economy has grown impressively for more than thirty consecutive years, with growth in its gross domestic product (GDP) often reaching nine percent annually.³ China's current GDP places it third in total size, behind the United States and Japan, and China could soon surpass Japan in total economic size.⁴ China's economic importance and its response to the recent economic recession "have led some to suggest that global institutions such as the Group of Eight—the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia—are becoming obsolete; that the only dialogue that really matters going forward is the conversation between the 'G2,'"⁵ that is, China and the United States.

Third, China has built up its military capabilities considerably. It has 2.3 million military personnel in active service.⁶ The Chinese military's scale is far greater than that of most other countries. Although China is still modernizing its weaponry and weapons systems, Chinese military expenditures are high, and the speed of modernization is impressive. China is already one of five countries that have nuclear submarines, and it has indicated that it wants to build aircraft carriers to enhance its air defense perimeter.

Fourth, in addition to being one of the five permanent members on the U.N. Security Council, China has rapidly increased its political influence around the world. China often downplays its views on various diplomatic matters and is not willing to force other countries to accept its positions, but this strategy seems to be working well because China has increased its presence and influence across the globe, not only in East Asia but also in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and notably Africa.

Of all these factors, China's economic growth has been the most important one in terms of raising China into the realm of recognized great powers. China has long had a large population, a substantial

3. U.N. Statistics Division – National Accounts, China, People's Republic of - GDP - All Series, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/SelectionCountry.asp> (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (select Country: China; select Series: GDP - All Series; select Years: 1970-2007).

4. *China Could Surpass Japan in Nominal GDP Soon*, ASIAN ECON. NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDP/is_2008_April_7/ai_n25343392 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).

5. Bill Powell, *The China Model*, TIME, Aug. 17, 2009, at 36, 38.

6. GlobalFirePower.com, China Military Strength Statistics, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=China (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).

military, and global diplomatic activities, but these attributes did not by themselves cause other powers to look at China as an equal. China's economic growth and capabilities have tipped the balance and changed the situation. China's heightened prominence globally during the current recession, when the United States and many developed countries have struggled, has created more attention and respect for China as a key player in turning the fortunes of the global economy around. Echoing the perception that the world is seeing the emergence of the G2, President Obama asserted in July 2009 that the U.S.-China relationship would "shape the twenty-first century."⁷

II. IDEAS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROMOTED AND PRACTICED BY CHINA

Material power, both economic and military, is important in determining the nature of international relations, and the growth in China's power alone gives it the ability to influence world affairs. Ideas, however, also play a role in how great powers think, act, and engage with enemies, rivals, and potential allies. Thus, the ideas China brings to the table as a great power are important and potentially of significant influence. This is especially true in determining whether China's rise will produce a new type of international system, which this symposium refers to as "Eastphalia."⁸

The most important ideas that shape China's approach to international relations are the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, listed below. China promulgated these ideas with India and Burma in 1954.⁹ These principles remain important to China,¹⁰ as demonstrated by China's 2004 celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of their issuance and its vow to continue to practice and advocate for them.¹¹

7. Powell, *supra* note 5, at 38.

8. On the concept of Eastphalia, see Sun Wong Kim, David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly, *Eastphalia Rising? Asian Influence and the Fate of Human Security*, WORLD POLY J., Summer 2009, at 53 (arguing that the rise of Asian countries might produce an Asian-centric international system with potentially significant consequences for international relations generally and human security specifically).

9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the P.R.C., *China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, Nov. 17, 2000, available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm> (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).

10. Asia's other rising power, India, also considers the Five Principles to be important to how it approaches its foreign policy and diplomatic relations in the 21st century. See David P. Fidler & Sumit Ganguly, *India and Eastphalia*, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147, 150-51 (2010).

11. Wen Jiabao, Premier, State Council P.R.C., Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development, Address

Understanding China’s potential impact on world affairs and the ideas that may determine the nature of Eastphalia requires grasping what the Five Principles mean for international relations, international law, and global governance.

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual nonaggression
3. Mutual noninterference in internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence

In essence, the Five Principles are elaborations on the basic idea of sovereignty. Territorial integrity is simply part and parcel of sovereignty—the state is sovereign over its territory. The principle of nonaggression constitutes another way of expressing respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. The principle of noninterference emphasizes that sovereignty covers not only physical territory but also all the people and activities taking place within such territory. The people and their activities are the concern of the sovereign state, not the business of other countries or entities. The principles of equality and mutual benefit place sovereign states on an equal footing, meaning they acquire the same rights and assume the same obligations. Cooperation among states, as equals, should aim to produce mutual benefits rather than more powerful states imposing their wishes on weaker ones. Such a process demeans the sovereignty of less powerful countries. Finally, the principle of peaceful coexistence embodies the notion that sovereign states with different political and economic systems can and should coexist in peace, and this reinforces the principles of sovereignty, nonaggression, and noninterference.

The substantive content of the sovereignty-centric Five Principles connects to traditional notions of sovereignty found in international law. The traditional understanding of sovereignty involves recognition of a state’s right to monopolize the exercise of political power within a defined territory and over the population therein. Sovereignty is, and has long been, a foundational structuring norm in international politics, and it has been a central principle in modern international law. The concept of sovereignty makes it possible to talk about the legal and political equality of nations. Sovereignty is also the basis for

international legal rules that accord obligations and rights to states and their officials, such as the concepts of sovereign immunity and the diplomatic immunity of official representatives of a sovereign state. It is sovereignty that also generates a state's right not to be subject to interference or intervention by any foreign or intergovernmental power.¹²

Sovereignty and its associated international legal principles are so central to modern international law that they are enshrined in numerous international agreements and resolutions, including the Charter of the United Nations (U.N. Charter). Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter states, for example, that "[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."¹³ Article 2(4) of the Charter requires all U.N. members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.¹⁴ Article 2(7) of the Charter provides:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.¹⁵

Other international instruments also express the principles of nonaggression, noninterference, and peaceful coexistence found in the Five Principles. For example, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States condemns armed intervention, forms of political and economic coercion that undermine the exercise of sovereign rights, and any effort to organize or assist terrorist or armed activities that seek the overthrow of a state's government.¹⁶

Countless other examples could be provided to demonstrate that the norms in the Five Principles are widely found in international law and

12. John H. Jackson, *Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept*, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782 (2003).

13. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.

14. *Id.* at para. 4.

15. *Id.* at para. 7.

16. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981).

governance instruments. In substantive terms, the Five Principles really contain nothing new because each of its principles has been around for a long time. The key to understanding China's embrace of the Five Principles and their potential importance in the shift of power and influence toward China and Asia is comprehending how China's insistence on these principles may affect how states, especially the Western powers, change their international behavior.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S ADVOCACY OF THE FIVE PRINCIPLES

Although the Five Principles do not differ from the traditional concept of sovereignty in international law, China's promotion of them and insistence on their application in international relations could have far-reaching implications for the new multipolar order that is emerging. A Chinese and Asian demand for implementation of the Five Principles would challenge the largely Western-led push for policy actions and international legal principles that discount sovereignty and justify military and political intervention into the domestic affairs of states perceived as engaging in illegitimate behavior.

The penchant for Western powers to engage in military and political interventions in other, mainly non-Western countries stretches from the imperial period through the post-Cold War era. Justifications for such interventions have included the infamous "standard of civilization" that permitted "civilized" states to intervene against "uncivilized" nations (which had no rights under international law), the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, principles of human rights, promotion of democracy, and the more recent principle of the responsibility to protect. China's main rival in the emerging multipolar world—the United States—has been a leading practitioner of all these kinds of interventions and justifications. From the time when the United States exercised its rights as a "civilized nation" to intervene against "chronic wrongdoing" in the Western Hemisphere¹⁷ to post-Cold War U.S. efforts to spread democracy, free markets, and respect for civil and political rights, U.S. power has been wielded in ways very much at odds with the norms found in the Five Principles. Chinese reemphasis on the Five Principles, now backed by greater Chinese material power and political influence, will challenge Western-led interventionist practices and principles in international relations and international law. Heightened importance for the Five Principles could help other countries establish stronger reasoned foundations to resist American and European proclivities to intervene politically and/or militarily in the domestic

17. Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 6, 1904).

affairs of other states. The Five Principles could also become the platform for broader, collective resistance to the West's dilution of other countries' sovereignty and desire to impose their ideas and political and economic systems on other peoples. With China, India, and other important Asian states embracing the Five Principles, the shift of power and influence toward Asia recognized everywhere could make the Five Principles much more than rhetoric, and thereby force Western powers to change their ways and compete for influence on different terms, which could potentially reduce conflict and enhance international cooperation.

However, the potential positive implications of China's promotion and practice of the Five Principles should not be exaggerated. Ultimately, the Five Principles are very protective of sovereignty and unreceptive to ideas, such as human rights, that have become part of modern international law and global governance. In other words, the Five Principles are not filled with innovative substantive ideas about addressing global problems that require collective action from the international community.

IV. WHY THE FIVE PRINCIPLES ARE NOT "WESTPHALIAN"

As explained below, the ideas in the Five Principles are not Asian in origin because their lineage is connected with traditional concepts from the Westphalian system of states. Under the Eurocentric conception of political ideas, the modern state system emerged from the treaties adopted at Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years' War.¹⁸ Through these treaties, European countries completed their "long transition from the Middle Ages to a world of sovereign states."¹⁹ After adoption of these treaties, "the state has been the primary component of the international community and state security—preserving the nation from external and internal threats—has been the chief concern of most governments."²⁰ Thus, the original operating concepts of the Westphalian international system maintained that the state holds sovereignty over its territory, and interference in other states' sovereign affairs is inappropriate. The ideas and principles, such as human rights, used to justify less emphasis on sovereignty and to create more room for interventionist policies are distinctly post-Westphalian in orientation.

18. Marcílio Toscano Franca Filho, *Westphalia: A Paradigm? A Dialogue Between Law, Art and Philosophy of Science*, 8 GERMAN L.J. 955, 955 (2007).

19. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *Sovereignty*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/> (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).

20. Fred L. Borch, *The Historical Role of Military Lawyers in National Security Trials*, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 717, 717 (2009).

As proposed and practiced by China, the Five Principles resemble the basic tenets of the Westphalian system. They emphasize state sovereignty and contend that interference in the domestic affairs of other states is not permitted. But, there are important differences between the Westphalian system and the Five Principles. The treaties that launched the Westphalian principles marked a historical turning point in the development of sovereign states and the modern interstate system. These principles shaped the development of the structure and dynamics of international relations, particularly international law and modes of international governance. Even with the rise of Chinese power and influence, the Five Principles do not create a new international system or order for states to follow. The Five Principles merely reiterate existing fundamental rules and react to contemporary forms of political and military aggression and interventionism. If the Five Principles are identified as a defining feature of the emergence of an Eastphalian order, some might be misled into believing that a new era of concepts and values for international relations has begun, which would simply not be true.

This observation does not mean that China does not have the opportunity to create a durable Eastphalian system. China has the potential, in fact, to achieve such a result. The challenge for emerging China is to demonstrate what it can offer, beyond the Five Principles, to the international community. This challenge specifically manifests itself in terms of what should be done to make an Eastphalian system desirable, how to do it, and why Chinese ideas and leadership would help make the system appealing.

V. POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS FOR CHINA LEADING THE WAY TO EASTPHALIA

A. The Globalized and Rapidly Changing World Offers China Opportunities

There is no question that China has benefitted greatly from the processes of globalization and the rapid economic and technological changes that have occurred around the world in the past thirty years. Unlike many developing countries, China has managed to connect its process of internal reform with transformations in the global economy, technologies, and communications to produce world-influencing economic development. China's new prominence in the world is dependent, therefore, on its interconnectedness and interdependence with much of the rest of the world.

This helps explain why China's emphasis on the Five Principles is at odds with the recent and significant growth of Chinese power and influence. Chinese domestic reform and globalization have become so tightly intertwined that the assertion that what occurs within China's territory is not of concern to other countries is no longer valid. Rather than simply repeating the Five Principles, China has a unique opportunity. Because of its newly developed strength and influence, China can shape how countries think and act as sovereigns in a globalized, rapidly changing world. The global economic crisis illustrates China's special position because the world is looking more and more to China for material help to deal with the immediate problems, as well as for leadership in how such a crisis can be avoided in the future. The Five Principles are not an adequate response to this opportunity and, for Eastphalia to be distinct from the old Westphalian order, China and other Asian countries will have to think and act beyond them.

B. Possible Ideas for Chinese Development of an Eastphalian Approach

Whether China can take advantage of this newfound opportunity depends on its development of new ideas and approaches, which, to date, have not been forthcoming from Chinese leadership. The Five Principles tap into ideas, such as noninterference, mutual nonaggression, mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, that have widespread acceptance as values across the contemporary international system, particularly among smaller, weaker countries. The ability to manage politics and economics in the age of twenty-first century globalization, however, is also a worldwide need, and the Five Principles do not produce much in the way of ideas, values, and practices to address it.

Consider three examples of possible ways China could help enhance the Five Principles in the era of globalization. The first example concerns global governance in the context of health. As dangerous outbreaks of infectious diseases have illustrated, controlling such outbreaks often requires intervention of the World Health Organization (WHO). The new International Health Regulations, adopted in 2005, provide WHO with more power and authority than it has ever had. Regardless, many countries, including China and the United States, opposed giving WHO the authority to conduct on-the-spot investigations of outbreaks and response measures unless it first obtained permission from the particular sovereign state. This rather dated notion of sovereignty leads to lost opportunities to control infectious global diseases, and improving global health governance would benefit the entire international community. In the aftermath of China's

mishandling of its SARS outbreak in 2003, China improved its understanding and ability to work with WHO on global health issues, and it could take the lead in trying to strengthen global health capabilities, norms, and strategies moving forward. Such leadership would include accommodating the need for better global health governance with concepts of sovereignty with the objective of improving collective action on health threats. The presence of a Margaret Chan—a Chinese citizen—as Director-General of WHO would give China even more of an opportunity to become *the* leader in global health governance. Achieving this objective would add something of value to the emergence of an Eastphalian system.²¹

The second example involves human rights. The Five Principles were initially promulgated before the human rights revolution had matured as a factor in international law, and, thus, the Five Principles tend to be used to defend the idea of sovereignty as an unlimited power to do all that is not expressly forbidden by international law.²² In light of the history of human rights in international law, the more appropriate idea of sovereignty today is that it refers to the state that “possesses the totality of international rights and duties *recognized by international law*’ as long as it has not limited them in particular terms by concluding a treaty.”²³ Although the exact balance between sovereign power and human rights remains unsettled and contentious, it is increasingly implausible for countries, such as China and India, to continue to claim that human rights matters are strictly within the realm of domestic affairs totally protected by the Five Principles.

How China helps recalibrate this sovereignty-human rights balance will be a key feature of any Eastphalian system. China has a tremendous opportunity, therefore, to find ways to work on human rights issues more productively with international organizations and nongovernmental entities. By trying to find a more productive *modus operandi* in this context, China could take steps that would benefit people in many countries, not to mention China’s influence and reputation in the arena of “soft power.” China’s growing confidence in and skill at engaging more actively with the international law and

21. For more analysis of the impact of infectious disease challenges on Chinese policy, see Yanzhong Huang, *Pursuing Health as Foreign Policy: The Case of China*, 17 *IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.* 105 (2010).

22. See Alain Pellet, *State Sovereignty and the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights: An International Law Perspective* n. 2 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished occasional paper, on file with The Pugwash Study Group on Intervention, Sovereignty and International Security), available at <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/pellet.htm> (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).

23. *Id.* at ¶ 3 (quoting in part *Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations*, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 180 (April 11) (emphasis added)).

governance mechanisms of economic relations could also be developed in the human rights area by acknowledging that China needs to work more constructively with intergovernmental and nongovernmental human rights bodies.

The third example concerns the need for a concept of the international responsibilities of big states. Although international law and the Five Principles both stress the principle of the sovereign equality of states, this principle provides little help for disadvantaged countries. It is peculiar that there has been so much attention paid to requiring transnational companies to assume corporate social responsibilities beyond what the law requires of them, but a similar concept for big, powerful countries is much less developed. Moving toward the idea of international responsibilities for the great powers would require leadership from such powers in tackling more forthrightly matters of international concern. Such responsibilities must not solely arise as a matter of international legal obligation, either. Indeed, some sense of these responsibilities can be seen in the initiatives launched by the Group of Eight (G-8). But, with China joining the ranks of the great economic and political powers, it has the opportunity to reshape these responsibilities, and more importantly, further their fulfillment. Here, again, China could craft a sustainable and much appreciated contribution to international relations in an Eastphalian system.

C. Problems Facing Chinese Leadership in the Formation of Eastphalia

As with India's potential contributions to Eastphalia,²⁴ the ability of China to move beyond the Five Principles and help construct a truly innovative Eastphalian world order may be severely limited by significant and sometimes worsening domestic problems. To begin, China's internal problems in human rights remain sufficiently troubling that these problems might reduce the persuasiveness of Chinese ideas. The lack of effective freedoms and rights for people in China has to be more productively addressed for Chinese world leadership to get beyond China's material power and influence. Improvement of the Chinese legal system is important in this context, and at the crux of this improvement must be the independence of the judiciary from political interference.

Serious domestic constraints on China's international ambitions may also appear in the economic realm, despite the growth of the Chinese economy over the last three decades. China has not yet escaped its high unemployment numbers or the asymmetrical and imbalanced

24. See Fidler & Ganguly, *supra* note 10, at 159-61 (discussing domestic problems that may limit what contributions India could make to an Eastphalian system).

economic prospects in its different regions. Economic discontent in China may force the leadership to focus more intently on internal problems, thus draining political capital and economic resources away from potential Chinese innovations and initiatives at the global level.

Similarly, China faces massive environmental problems that are, and will continue to be, a drag on its economic development and its global reputation as a great power and leader of the new century of international relations. Environmental challenges—especially climate change—will loom larger in the next phase of world affairs than they ever have in the past. Failure at home on environmental issues will limit significantly what type of global environmental leadership China might provide as part of the emergence of an Eastphalian system. Therefore, China has an opportunity to retool its economy for environmental purposes and, in the process, be in the vanguard of making an Asian-centric, multipolar world more environmentally friendly.

CONCLUSION

In this essay, I argued that the rise of Chinese power and its application of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence do not automatically produce an Eastphalian international system. Without more, these developments simply signal the emergence of another great power wielding the principles developed in the Western-dominated Westphalian era. In other words, Eastphalia should be about more than the growth of Chinese material power and its global presence. For Eastphalia to be something distinct, China must propose and practice ideas beyond the Five Principles that appeal to a wide spectrum of states and generate benefits for all people in a globalized world. Such ideas could flow from Chinese leadership by creating a more productive relationship between sovereign power and human rights; showing willingness to cooperate in strategies of global governance that attempt to address common threats, such as infectious disease outbreaks; and developing a more robust concept of heightened responsibilities for the great powers with respect to global problems.

To create a truly distinctive Eastphalian system, China does not have to change its system of government and economics entirely, as it did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to catch up to the more powerful Western world. As part of the G-2 and the main focus of attention in the shift of power and influence toward Asia, China is in a leading position. In fact, China is poised to make its new global significance something that can redefine the Five Principles for a globalized world and leaven international law and global governance with Chinese contributions for decades to come.

