Rhetoric, Reality, and the Law of Unfunded Federal Mandates

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Rhetoric, Reality, and the Law of Unfunded Federal Mandates

by

Daniel H. Cole and Carol S. Comer

“Unfunded mandates” were a major issue in the 1994 congressional elections. In rhetoric reminiscent of Ronald Reagan’s New Federalism, candidates around the country lashed out against the federal government’s “undisciplined appetite” for regulating with “other governments’ hard-earned money.” They brandished impressive-looking surveys and studies to support their claim that “unfair” federal regulatory “burdens” were driving states and cities toward “bankruptcy.” State and local leaders declared a National Unfunded Mandates Day, and they staged made-for-media protests to publicize the event. The press seized on the sound-bites, without bothering to explore the facts.

Regardless of the constitutional or political propriety of federal mandates, there is no evidence that those mandates are imposing net costs on state and local governments.

Banner headlines proclaimed, “WASHINGTON BUCK-PASSING COSTING STATES, CITIES, TAXPAYERS DEARLY,” and “MODERN-DAY TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION.” This combustive rhetoric fueled the emergence of the unfunded mandates issue as a national political priority, and it helped usher into Congress a new Republican majority with a “mandate” to curb mandates.

Immediately following the 1994 elections, then-Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole announced that the 104th Senate’s first act would be “to relieve states from unfunded federal mandates.” Indeed, Senate Bill 1 was entitled the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. Meanwhile, the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives severed the unfunded mandates issue from the Contract with America (“the Contract”) in order to act on it even more quickly than the rest of the Contract. The 1995 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) became the second statute enacted by the 104th Congress. President Clinton signed it into law on March 22, 1995.

Given the expedited treatment it received, the UMRA is surprisingly modest. The statute does not require the Congress to repeal, or even review, existing unfunded federal mandates. Nor does it prevent the
federal government from imposing new regulatory burdens on state and local governments. The statute does require Congress to quantify the costs to local and state governments of some new mandates it imposes; for many (but not all) intergovernmental mandates costing more than $50 million, Congress must either identify a federal funding stream or approve the unfunded mandate in a separate, recorded vote. Administrative agencies also must prepare "regulatory impact statements" for proposed regulations that would impose costs of more than $100 million in any one year on local governments or the private sector. These provisions could reduce the number of unfunded federal mandates and enhance congressional oversight of agency decisionmaking. The result could be better, though not necessarily fewer, federal mandates to state and local governments.

If the federal government wants to issue new mandates, it will not have to look hard for funding streams. Ironically, state and city coffers are filled with federal funds that are, as yet, untied to specific federal mandates. But how can that be if, as the rhetoric maintains, federal unfunded mandates are bleeding cities and states dry? Simply put, the reality does not support the rhetoric. According to the best available numbers, total federal subsidies to local governments substantially exceed the total estimated costs of federal regulations.

Recent articles have focused on the constitutionality and policy implications of unfunded federal mandates. This article has a different goal: to expose a central myth behind the push for federal mandate relief. Regardless of the constitutional or political propriety of federal mandates, there is no evidence that those mandates are imposing net costs on state and local governments. On the contrary, federal subsidies to most cities and states, including block grants, categorical grants, and tax subsidies, more than compensate for the total estimated cost of federal mandates, funded as well as unfunded. In other words, the funding issue, which has been at the center of the federal mandates debate, is a red herring, and sweeping arguments about the fiscal unfairness of federal mandates are misguided. Critics of federal mandates must, instead, argue the messier political merits of specific federal requirements.

Section I of this article presents the rhetoric of unfunded mandates and subjects it to a reality check. One central premise of the mandates "problem"—that the federal government is imposing unfair costs on state and local governments—turns out to be a myth. Section I concludes with some implications of this analysis for federal policymakers and judges.

Section II examines the UMRA and its legislative history, and Section III reviews the Act's first year of implementation. Our final assessment of the UMRA is positive, because it should: (1) improve the legislative process by increasing the information available to legislators about the costs of the intergovernmental mandates they enact, (2) enhance political accountability by requiring a separate vote for many new mandates, and (3) improve congressional oversight of administrative agency actions. We doubt, however, that the UMRA will have a significant, long-term affect on the number of new federal intergovernmental mandates. Nonetheless, state and local governments should be satisfied so long as the federal government provides them with a net subsidy.

I. THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY OF UNFUNDED MANDATES

A. ORIGINS OF THE "PROBLEM"

The phrase "federal mandate" refers to a regulation or regulatory burden imposed by the federal government on a state or local government. The federal mandate "problem" actually encompasses several issues, including increasing federal "red tape," declining federal aid to states and municipalities, increasing state responsibility for federal regulatory programs, and the comparative political accountability of officials at various levels of government. Before Congress enacted the UMRA in 1995, the phrase "unfunded mandates" appeared in a number of different contexts, ranging from general issues of intergovernmental relations to the merits of specific federal regulations.

Federal-state relations have always been contentious. Before the 1930s, those relations were based on constitutional delegation, premised on a system of dual federalism. During the New Deal era, federal-state relations became primarily a political (or fiscal), rather than a constitutional, issue. The federal government became more involved in state and local activities, but it was viewed more as a provider than a boss. Federal aid more than paid for the small number of local programs enacted as part of the Roosevelt Administration's New Deal, and local governments could devote surplus federal funds to local programs.

During the 1960s and 1970s, intergovernmental relations grew increasingly strained, as Congress enacted more than 500 new federal regulatory programs affecting state and local governments. Many of these programs promoted noble social goals, ranging from clean drinking water to freedom from racial discrimination, but they came with detailed rules, bureaucracies, and formulas for matching and distributing funds. Even more importantly, they came without direct federal funding; state and local administrative authorities had to pay the bulk of the costs out of their own budgets.

The strain on state and city coffers was offset,
However, by federal “General Revenue Sharing”—all-purpose grants with no conditions attached—22 during the 1970s, federal grants to state and local governments quadrupled.23 By 1978, federal grants to cities equaled 26% of the revenue cities raised themselves and 70% of the revenue they received from their states.24 Federal grants to eleven big cities, including Detroit, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Tulsa, Rochester, Chicago, Boston, St. Louis, Cleveland, Houston, and New York, averaged 43.3% of city tax revenues.25 For some cities, including St. Louis, Newark, Buffalo, Cleveland, and Boston, federal aid averaged 57.3% of own-source revenues.26 Most federal grants-in-aid at that time were in the form of “General Revenue Sharing.” Thus, the federal funds were completely fungible.

The flow of federal dollars to state and local governments slowed when the Reagan Administration took office in 1980. Between 1978 and 1988, the federal contribution to state and city outlays fell to only eighteen percent.27 These aid reductions came as the number of federally-imposed mandates continued to rise. As a result, the net federal subsidy to cities and states declined. But—this point is critical—it remained a net subsidy.

In addition, while the Reagan Administration did not curtail the imposition of new federal mandates, it reduced the burden for state and local governments (if only temporarily). First, it slowed the pace of new mandates, especially environmental mandates. Second, it effectively reduced the costs of existing federal mandates by relaxing federal oversight and enforcement. In the early 1980s, for example, Congress slashed the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s budget by more than thirty percent (from $1.4 billion in 1981 to $975 million in 1983).28 As a result, in 1983 the EPA was forced to reduce its staff of enforcement attorneys from 200 to only 30.29 The Reagan EPA had little choice but to adopt voluntary compliance and the “nonconfrontational approach” as its official enforcement policies.30

In the last years of the Reagan Administration, federal funding to state and local governments increased again, but not nearly to late-1970s levels, and it came with more strings attached. General Revenue Sharing was replaced by Categorical Grants and Block Grants, which provided less discretion to recipient governments. But the lost discretion was only marginal. The strings attached to Block Grants, in particular, tend to be quite loose.31 They are still substantially fungible in that they can offset own-source revenues dedicated to complying with federal mandates. Still, the marginal loss of discretion in the use of federal grant funds may be one factor driving current state and city complaints about federal mandates.

The phrase “unfunded mandates” first appeared in the late 1970s, when the rate of increase in federal intergovernmental mandates began to outpace the rate of increase in federal grants to state and local governments.32 During the Reagan years, state and local governments had to bear more of the costs of the existing programs as well as new federally mandated programs. This exacerbated existing fiscal pressures and generated political tension, giving impetus to the unfunded mandates debate. “Unfunded mandates” became a “shorthand phrase that sums up the tensions and grievances of the federal system characterized by deficits at the national level, and by budget shortfalls, increased taxes, and service cutbacks at the State and local levels.”33

In 1979 the Joint Economic Committee of Congress attempted, for the first time, to define and quantify the federal regulatory burden on state and local governments.34 But like all subsequent studies of the unfunded mandates “problem,” it failed to assess the total costs of federally imposed mandates in light of federal intergovernmental grants and subsidies. As a result, the study provided no grounds for concluding that federal mandates were imposing net costs on state and local governments. The same was true of a 1980 study conducted by the Urban Institute that estimated the gross costs of six federal mandates on seven jurisdictions.35

While the study derived a total per capita cost of $25 (in 1978 dollars), the study’s authors admitted that the costs of federal mandates varied drastically from one jurisdiction to another.36 They also did not offset the costs of federal mandates against fungible grants-in-aid.37 Nevertheless, these early studies elicited prompt, if weak, legislative responses.

In 1980, Congress enacted two laws, the Paperwork Reduction Act38 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act,39 which were designed not to prevent or reduce federal mandates, but to decrease compliance costs. A more significant law was enacted in 1981, entitled the State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act.40 Like the 1995 UMRA, this statute required the Congressional Budget Office to prepare cost estimates for all federal mandates on state and local governments in pending legislation.41 However, unlike the 1995 UMRA, the 1981 Act did not erect any procedural hurdles to the enactment of new federal mandates.42 While it undoubtedly increased the information available to federal legislators about the costs of mandates they imposed on state and local governments, the 1981 State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act ultimately had no impact on the number of federal mandates. By the late 1980s, the unfunded mandates issue rose again to the fore of public policy debates, as new studies appeared to prove that proliferating federal mandates were pushing state and local governments toward bankruptcy.
B. Proving a Myth: Surveys and Studies of the Unfunded Mandates “Problem”

In 1988, the City of Columbus, Ohio, issued the third major report on the unfunded mandates “problem.” This report gave new energy to the anti-mandate movement and sparked other local and state government studies. These studies, which received widespread media attention, provided much of the evidentiary basis for the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. At first glance, the state and local government studies look impressive. They appear to show that unfunded federal mandates are unfairly taxing state and local resources. But appearances can be, and in this case are, deceiving. On a careful reading, the state and local government reports prove to be at best uninformative, and at worst misleading. Most significantly, not one of the reports examines whether the total costs of federal mandates exceed total federal subsidies to state and local governments. In the absence of that comparison, the studies and reports cannot possibly “prove” that the federal government is imposing “unfair” burdens on state and local governments and their taxpayers.

This subsection critically examines the largest and most significant of the state and local unfunded mandates studies, each of which suffers from significant flaws. We supplement the information they contain with Commerce Department and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) statistics on federal subsidies to state and local governments. The available numbers do not provide a complete picture of intergovernmental fiscal relations, but they do permit a rough comparison of the federally-provided subsidies and federally-imposed mandates (funded and unfunded). Federal grants-in-aid appear to substantially exceed the estimated costs of federal mandates, providing a net (after mandates) subsidy to state and local governments.

1. The Ohio Studies

The State of Ohio has been at the center of the unfunded mandates controversy since 1988, when its State and Local Government Commission conducted a survey entitled An Overview of the Mandate Problem and Recommendations for Ohio. This report dealt mainly with state mandates to local governments, and it led to the enactment of state legislation regulating state-imposed unfunded mandates in May of 1994. At about the same time, Ohio’s governor issued an Executive Order to further control state mandates to local governments. The Executive Order created a task force to study outdated and inappropriate state mandates and to assess the impact of proposed state agency rules on local governments.

The State and Local Government Commission of Ohio issued a second report in 1994 that addressed both state and federal mandates. The report identified seventy-six laws containing unfunded mandates, eleven of which were federal requirements that state regulators had passed through to local governments. The report also contained a survey of county, township, and municipal officials to determine which federal mandates were the most burdensome to local governments. The survey results listed the federal mandates and the number of times each mandate was identified by surveyed officials. Of twenty-two identified federal mandates, twelve were related to environmental protection. However, the survey did not require or even request local government officials to provide financial information to substantiate their claims about the burdens imposed by these “unfunded mandates.” Consequently, the report provided no gross and net cost estimates for listed federal mandates.

The report did, however, quote from an earlier State of Ohio study that estimated that the total annual cost of unfunded federal mandates to the state exceeded $300 million. Although this figure is almost certainly inflated, it does provide a useful starting point for assessing the true “burden” of unfunded mandates on the State of Ohio. However, cost estimates tell only half the story. In order to accurately assess the burden of federal mandates, we also need to know how much federal funding the state received. There are many ways to fund a mandate. Even without direct funding, a mandate might be funded indirectly, for instance, by discretionary federal grants-in-aid.

According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in 1994 the State of Ohio received approximately $8.4 billion in federal grants, more than $3 billion of which were discretionary. Apparently the State of Ohio received ten times more federal discretionary dollars than it was required to spend on all “unfunded” federal mandates, since the state’s own estimates show federal mandates cost only $300 million. This figure may be misleading, however, because discretionary dollars (since the demise of General Revenue Sharing) always come with strings attached; they cannot offset federal mandate costs dollar-for-dollar. A more accurate computation would require a more complete cost estimate of mandate costs, available funds, and restrictions on fund uses. The net burden or benefit imposed on the State of Ohio by the federal government is the total cost of federal mandates, both funded and unfunded, minus total federal subsidies received, including grants and tax subsidies. But the Ohio studies do not provide the information necessary to compute the net burden (or benefit). The numbers they do provide only permit us to conclude that in 1994 Ohio received from the federal government $8.1 billion more...
than it was forced to spend on unfunded federal mandates.

2. The Chicago Study
In 1992, the City of Chicago and the Roosevelt University Institute for Metropolitan Affairs prepared another report on unfunded mandates. This sheds more light on the issues than the Ohio studies because it includes more detailed financial information that, on close examination, appears to contradict the City's contentions about the "burdens" of unfunded federal mandates. What remains, in the end, is only bald rhetoric about federalism and "the direct connection between the individual citizen and his or her government that the American federal system was created to enhance." The Chicago report claims that federal mandates consume local tax revenues: "[L]ocal governments and taxpayers are now dipping well into local revenue sources to foot the bill for federal programs." But the financial data provided in the report belie this contention. The Chicago report estimates that "unfunded mandates and burdensome regulations cost . . . a conservatively-estimated $160 million." But the report also reveals that the federal government contributes $519 million each year to the City's budget. Accepting both numbers at face value, Chicago apparently receives over three times more money from the federal government than it is forced to spend on "unfunded mandates and burdensome regulations."

3. The Tennessee Study
The State of Tennessee issued a report in 1995 that yielded findings similar to those of the Chicago Study. The study estimated that federal mandates (funded and unfunded) cost the state $244.2 million in budget year 1995-96. But the study also reported that federal aid to Tennessee was expected to total $4.08 billion dollars. Not all of this federal aid is discretionary, of course, but a sizable chunk of it is. In 1994, for example, thirty-nine percent of the $3.9 billion in federal grants Tennessee received—$1.5 billion—was discretionary. That is more than six times the estimated total cost of federal mandates in Tennessee's 1995-96 budget year. Of course, comparing federal discretionary funds to mandate costs is meaningful only if discretionary funds are somehow fungible for mandate purposes. Later in this section, we will see that they are substantially fungible.

4. The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse Study
In 1992 and 1993, the U.S. Conference of Mayors surveyed 314 local governments about unfunded federal mandates and hired the accounting firm of Price Waterhouse to tabulate the results. It was the largest survey to date of unfunded federal mandate costs, and its findings, published in October 1993, appear impressive. According to Price Waterhouse's computations, the ten most expensive federal unfunded mandates cost American cities $6.5 billion in 1993. This total estimate is the sum of estimates provided by the 314 cities that participated in the survey. However, while the data seem striking, they have little utility because of numerous and substantial methodological flaws in the survey.

The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study attempts to derive generally applicable inferences based on survey data obtained from a sample. Inferential statistics rely on mathematical theories of probability to make generalizations about populations based on data from samples. In order to draw the desired inference with a high degree of accuracy, the sample must be representative of the whole population, and the data must be accurate. This process can yield highly accurate inferences if it is done properly. However, the inferences drawn from the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study are not reliable, because the process was flawed.

The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study attempts to infer a total cost estimate of unfunded federal mandates for all U.S. cities from a sizable sample of 314 cities. But the sample is not representative of all U.S. cities. Smaller cities (defined by the survey as those with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants) are under-represented in the data pool because they responded to the survey less frequently than larger cities. In addition, the study fails to reveal whether the sample includes every city that responded to the survey or a select group of respondents. While the survey's size is respectable, its representativeness is questionable.

The survey data are also questionable. The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study claims that survey data were verified (without explaining how), but subsequent independent assessments have turned up numerous significant discrepancies. For example, the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study claims that 234 of the 314 surveyed cities incurred costs under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This figure made the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) suspicious because there are no known endangered species in or around many of those cities. To test the data, EDF solicited copies of survey responses directly from participating cities. Of the eight cities that provided their survey responses to the EDF, only one reported ESA-related costs. But the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study listed all eight as having reported costs under ESA mandates. The staff of the Senate

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Environment and Public Works Committee discovered other discrepancies. They found that the study mistakenly listed at least two cities (Norman, Oklahoma and Jackson, Mississippi) as having incurred costs under legislation including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.

These discrepancies alone refute the claim that the U.S. Conference of Mayors and Price Waterhouse verified the data contained in the study. Moreover, it would have been impossible to verify much of the data in the study because the study did not require respondents to identify information sources or to supply supporting records. When the staff of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee interviewed survey respondents, only twenty-two percent of them “could provide documents to verify the cost estimates they provided to Price Waterhouse.”

Even if all the survey data had been both verifiable and actually verified, the figures extrapolated from that data still would not provide a true picture of the costs of federal mandates. The chosen extrapolation method does not “adjust for significant confounding factors,” such as cost differentials resulting from, among other causes, variations in local pollution levels. Compliance costs under the Clean Air Act, for example, are determined largely by local pollution levels. According to the Staff Report of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, the City of New York, which was included in the survey, led the nation in 1992 with 304 moderate air pollution days. Meanwhile, Honolulu, which was not included in the survey, had only three moderate air pollution days. Yet, “using Price Waterhouse’s method of extrapolation, costs attributable to cities with heavily-polluted air, such as New York and Los Angeles, would influence the extrapolation of costs to an overall population including Honolulu, which has virtually no air pollution.” Similarly, the costs of complying with water supply mandates in Philadelphia, “which has the nation’s worst record for violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the highest annual number of people exposed to dangerous contaminants,” would be used to project compliance costs for other cities not included in the survey, such as Minneapolis, which has “no drinking water violations.”

The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study also fails to offset mandate cost estimates against federal and state aid received, representing yet another methodological flaw. In addition, the study fails to consider that some of the costs cities incurred in complying with federal mandates would have been incurred even in the absence of those mandates. Thus, the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study fails to present an accurate portrayal of the unfunded federal mandates “problem.” According to Senators John Chafee (R-R.I.) and Max Baucus (D-Mont.), respectively the majority and minority leaders on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, the study is “more accurately seen as a review of total compliance costs for federal, state, and local requirements.”

C. ACCURATELY ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL MANDATES AND GRANTS

The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study sheds no real light on the unfunded mandates “problem.” Merely reporting the estimated costs of admittedly expensive federal programs is inflammatory—expenses appear magnified when isolated from overall state and city budgets. Indeed, the state and local studies of unfunded federal mandates reviewed here all misportray the costs of federal mandates in precisely the same ways: They estimate the gross costs of federal mandates, but not the net costs after offsetting for: (1) state and local fiscal benefits resulting from federal mandates, (2) federal grants and other subsidies, or (3) the regulatory costs that would be incurred even in the absence of federal mandates.

A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report illustrates how federal mandate cost estimates are inflated. The report examines state and local government cost estimates of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act and finds that the estimates are exaggerated primarily because they fail to take into account the costs that state and local governments would incur even in the absence of the federal mandates. The CBO rationally assumes that local governments would take some steps to protect drinking water supplies in the absence of federal regulations. The true cost, then, of federal mandates under the Safe Drinking Water Act is the incremental cost of federally-required water protection activities, that is, the costs of federal requirements above those costs local governments would incur even in the absence of federal mandates. The CBO did not even hazard a guess at that number, which must, after all, be very difficult to measure. That does not mean, however, it should be ignored. It is important to recognize, at least, that cost estimates of federal mandates are inflated unless they are offset by the costs that state and local governments would incur even in the absence of federal mandates.

In addition to inflating the costs of federal mandates, the various state and local government studies all fail to offset costs against the federal grant revenues and subsidies they receive. As we saw in our review of various state and local government studies, the total level of federal spending appears to exceed the total costs of federally-imposed mandates. National figures confirm...
this. The Chicago report quotes a Heritage Foundation analyst who estimates the total annual cost to all states of all federal mandates at $75 billion a year.88 Not all of those mandates are unfunded, of course.89 But even if they were, the states still would be receiving a substantial net subsidy from the federal government. According to the Commerce Department, the federal government in 1994 provided a total of $210 billion in annual state aid, $90 billion of which was discretionary.90 That leaves states with a potential net (after federal mandate expenses) surplus of $15 billion or more in discretionary federal grants.

As previously noted, federal block grants and other discretionary funds are not wholly fungible—they come with certain strings attached and, therefore, do not provide a dollar-for-dollar offset for federal mandates—but they are substantially fungible. As David Hyman has written:

The distinction between restricted and unrestricted grants is somewhat artificial because of the fungibility of money, which means the money can be used for more than one purpose. A grant, with or without restrictions on the use of funds, frees local tax monies that otherwise would be spent on government-provided services. The receipt of the grant could allow tax reductions that benefit citizens of recipient communities. If taxes are reduced as a result of the grant, citizens can increase their consumption of private goods and services beyond the amounts that would be possible if they had to finance all government-supplied goods and services through locally raised tax revenue. In other words, the funds may end up being used for any purpose, even though they were intended for a specific use.91

This is especially true where federal grants, even with conditions attached, pay for state and local priorities, such as law enforcement or community development. And, to the extent that all federal grant monies are fungible, they should be factored into federal mandate cost assessments. This may be difficult, as fungibility varies substantially from one federal program to the next, depending on the conditions imposed on grant funds. It might be useful to compare total federal subsidies with total federal regulatory requirements as percentages of city budgets. But first we would need clear definitions of "federally induced costs" and federally-provided benefits, and someone would have to actually collect the data.

Without vouching for their accuracy, we can use currently available estimates of costs and benefits to concoct a rough comparison of federally-induced costs and federally-provided benefits. Starting with federally-imposed costs, the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study estimated that federal mandates consumed on average 11.7% of city budgets in fiscal year 1993.93 How does that compare with federally-provided benefits? Despite the 28% decline in federal funding between 1981 and 1990, federal dollars still comprised an estimated 14.3% of local government revenues in 1991.94 This leaves a 2.6% net subsidy. In fact, the net subsidy is probably higher than that because, between 1991 and 1993, federal grants to state and local governments increased by 26%, from $152 to $206.4 billion.95

The net federal subsidy grows even larger if we incorporate other federal intergovernmental subsidies besides direct grants-in-aid. For example, section 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts state and local bond issues from federal taxation, effectively permitting state and local governments to borrow at below-market interest rates.96 In fiscal year 1995, the section 103(a) exemption cost the federal government an estimated $12.35 billion in lost revenue.97 This is not a federal grant-in-aid, but it boils down to much the same thing; it is a $12.35 billion federal transfer to states and cities with no strings attached. This single tax subsidy covers one-sixth of the total estimated costs of federal mandates imposed on state and local governments ($75 billion).98 State and local governments also benefit indirectly from section 164(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,99 which allows taxpayers to deduct state and local tax payments from income subject to federal taxation. While this benefit accrues directly to taxpayers, it indirectly subsidizes higher marginal state and local tax rates. According to James St. George of the Brookings Institution, "Washington in effect pays 40 percent of state and local income and property taxes for the highest-income taxpayers and lower shares for other taxpayers."100 Deductions of state and local tax payments, together with exemptions for interest earnings on state and local debts, cost the federal government an estimated $66 billion in fiscal year 1994.101 And they are only two of many indirect federal subsidies to state and local governments.

None of this proves, of course, that the federal government provides net subsidies to each state and city. As already noted, the available numbers are incomplete and questionable, and even the concepts of "federally-induced costs" and "federally-provided benefits" are ambiguous. In addition, we have been dealing only with average costs and benefits using numbers for big cities; the fiscal circumstances of individual cities, especially
smaller towns, vary greatly. Nevertheless, the available numbers lean strongly in the direction of an average net federal subsidy; the total amount of federal monies flowing to states and cities appears to substantially exceed the total amount of monies state and cities are forced to spend on federal priorities. At the very least, the numbers do not support the contention that the federal government is imposing net costs on state and (most) local governments. What is the basis, then, for concluding that unfunded federal mandates are imposing “unfair” burdens on state and local governments?

Finally, all of the surveys and studies discussed in this section are premised on the debatable notion that the federal government should pay for each and every regulatory requirement it imposes on state and local governments. As noted earlier, normative issues in the unfunded mandates debate are beyond the scope of this article. But it is worth noting that there are legitimate economic, political, and legal grounds for arguing that local governments (and, through them, local taxpayers) should bear at least some of the costs of complying with certain federal environmental, civil rights, and health and safety regulations.

D. SUMMATION AND IMPLICATIONS

State and local government officials have complained continuously and vociferously that they are the victims of an elaborate scam by the federal government. By imposing unfunded mandates on cities and states, they claim, the feds are receiving credit for admittedly worthwhile programs, while evading the political fallout for the tax hikes those programs demand. In this section, we have subjected the rhetoric about the unfunded mandates “problem” to a reality check which belies the central claim that unfunded federal mandates are unfairly burdening state and local governments. The available numbers simply do not support the claim that federal mandates are bankrupting city budgets and causing local taxpayers to bear the fiscal burden of federal programs.

The various local and state government studies and surveys of the unfunded mandates “problem” reviewed in this section fail to show anything more than that the escalating costs of federal mandates are leaving state and local governments with smaller net federal subsidies. The costs of federal programs have escalated in recent years, while federal grants-in-aid (until about 1988) declined. But the available numbers suggest that the federal government has continued to provide a substantial net subsidy to state and local governments. The proliferation of unfunded federal mandates has reduced, but not reversed that subsidy.

State and local governments complain that they have had to raise taxes to meet the increased federal mandate compliance costs, but their studies have failed to provide evidence linking local tax increases to federal mandates. Furthermore, given the evidence of a continuing net federal subsidy to state and local governments, it is doubtful that any such links exist. State and local governments may have had to raise taxes to make up for reductions in their net federal subsidies (resulting from increasing federal mandates and declining federal grants), but to the extent they still receive a net federal subsidy, state and local governments cannot genuinely blame local tax increases on federal mandates. On the contrary, national taxpayers have been bearing the excess costs of city programs via direct federal grants or indirect federal subsidies. State and local government officials might in fact be doing exactly what they accused federal legislators of doing: unfairly passing off responsibility for raising taxes. Political commentaries note that this would not be the first time that state and local governments have attempted to “blame their financial troubles on the aggressiveness of higher governmental authority. . . . Scapegoats are essential in politics, and the national government is always a choice target.”

From this perspective, state and local complaints about unfunded federal mandates may be seen simply as part and parcel of “the politics of getting.” All this, admittedly, has little bearing on normative arguments about the propriety of unfunded federal mandates, but it does present the mandates issue in a very different light. At the very least it suggests that the funding issue should not be at the heart of any debate about federal mandates.

Our analysis in this section also has implications for the courts, where the unfunded mandates issue has emerged in recent cases concerning intergovernmental relations. In Printz v. United States, for example, a federal district court in Montana struck down a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required local law enforcement officers to perform background checks to determine individuals’ eligibility to purchase handguns. In an opinion authored by Judge Charles Lovell, the court held that the “ascertainment/background check provision of the Act exceeds the powers delegated to Congress and violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution because it substantially commandeers state executive officers and indirectly commandeers the legislative processes of the state to administer a federal program.” The court’s rationale focused heavily on the fact that Brady Act mandates were unfunded:

More important, both CLEOs (chief law enforcement officers) and state and local
elected bodies are indirectly required to allocate their resources to implement the Act instead of using those resources to address problems important to their constituents.

In addition, state and local governments are also held accountable for the Act by being conscripted into bearing the financial burden for administering the Act, lessening their ability to provide other services to their citizens and leading to the appearance of inefficiency. 111

The court did not support these assertions with any evidence of the costs to local law enforcement agencies of Brady Act compliance. Neither did the court mention offsetting federal grants-in-aid for state and local law enforcement. 112 The district court in Printz swallowed whole the rhetoric of the unfunded mandates “problem” without bothering to examine its factual basis. The court’s carelessness was especially regrettable because its comments about federal funding for the Brady Act mandate were not necessary to its decision on the constitutional issues at bar, which concerned the limits of federal authority over state and local administrators. Indeed, in Mack v. United States, 113 another federal district court managed to hold the same provisions of the Brady Act unconstitutional without resorting to unsubstantiated rhetoric about unfunded federal mandates.

The unfunded mandate rhetoric accompanied the Mack and Printz rulings on their consolidated appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 114 Although Judge Canby’s majority opinion for the appellate panel did not mention cost issues in Brady Act compliance, Judge Fernandez’s dissenting opinion did, noting that state officials were being “ordered to become part of a federal gun control program at the state’s own expense.” 115 Finally, Printz v. United States brought the unfunded mandates issue all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. During oral arguments on December 3, 1996, Justice Scalia stated, “[i]t’s easy to impose an obligation on the states and then let them take the heat for raising taxes.” 116 This comment from a member of the country’s highest court indicates just how pervasive and influential the unsubstantiated rhetoric of unfunded mandates has become.

II. FROM CAMPAIGN RHETORIC TO LAW: THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT OF 1995

The preceding section illustrated that the unfunded mandates “problem” is based, in large part, on a mythical picture of the federal government as a voracious and uncontrollable monster consuming state and local budget revenues. When it comes to legislation, however, persuasive myths can be every bit as important as facts.

In the UMRA, Congress responded to the rhetoric but never lost sight of the reality that state and local governments receive a net federal subsidy. This is clear from the Senate “findings” codified in section 106 of the Act. Section 106(a)(1) provides that “the Congress should be concerned about shifting costs from Federal to State and local authorities and should be equally concerned about the growing tendency of States to shift costs to local governments.” 117 While this acknowledges an unfunded mandates “problem,” it reflects the reality of a declining net federal subsidy to state and local governments. More revealing is the Senate’s second finding in section 106(a)(2) of the Act: “cost shifting from States to local governments has, in many instances, forced local governments to raise property taxes or curtail sometimes essential services.” 118 Notice that this finding expressly blames unfunded state mandates, but not unfunded federal mandates, for local tax increases. The lack of parallel construction in sections 106(a)(1) and 106(a)(2) implies that the Senate was aware that federal mandates have not been responsible for driving up state and local taxes. If this implication is correct, 119 the Senate must have found its legislative task tricky. It had to respond (or, at least, appear to respond) to the perceived “problem” of unfunded federal mandates without denying the reality of a net federal subsidy to state and local governments. Whether or not this was a conscious effort, the structure of the UMRA seems to reflect Congress’s effort to walk a tightrope between perception and reality.

The UMRA’s express purpose is “to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration by Congress, of Federal mandates on State, local, and tribal governments without adequate Federal funding, in a manner that may displace other essential State, local, and tribal governmental priorities.” 120 A Report of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight explained that the goal was to “ensur[e] that Congress and the Executive Branch know and consider the impact of legislative and regulatory proposals before acting on these proposals.” 121 These statements of purpose are fully consistent with the UMRA’s substantive and procedural contents.

The UMRA is divided into four titles. Title I addresses legislative proposals that would impose mandates on state and local governments. Title II imposes procedural requirements on federal agency rulemaking. Title III permits Congress to review existing federal statutes and regulations that impose regulatory
burdens on state and local governments. And Title IV limits judicial review of congressional and federal agency actions, so that litigation does not delay important federal actions.

A. POINTS OF ORDER AND OTHER PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNFUNDED MANDATES IN PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Title I of the UMRA requires that congressional committee reports on legislative proposals include information concerning whether those proposals would impose new federal mandates on state and local governments or on the private sector. The reports must include all direct costs stemming from the federal mandate, as well as any adverse impacts the mandate might have on the competitive balance between the private and public sectors. For legislative proposals that impose mandates on state or local governments, committee reports must provide additional funding information. If the intergovernmental mandate will be federally funded, the report must include information concerning appropriations and how funding will be allocated. If the mandate will not be fully funded, the committee must fully explain why not and to what extent.

In order to assist congressional committees in fulfilling these responsibilities, the UMRA requires the Congressional Budget Office to estimate the direct costs of intergovernmental mandates. If a legislative proposal would impose direct costs exceeding $50 million, the CBO Director must submit, to the responsible committee, an estimate of the costs of complying with the mandate and the amount of new budget authority necessary to cover those costs. The Director also must prepare cost estimates for some private sector mandates. If a legislative proposal would impose mandates on the private sector in excess of $100 million, the Director must estimate the costs of private sector compliance as well as increases in federal financial assistance needed to fund private sector compliance.

If a bill comes to the floor containing an intergovernmental mandate estimated to cost more than $50 million, it is considered not "in order," which means that any legislator can object to it by raising a point-of-order with the Chair. When a point-of-order is raised, the mandate is automatically stricken from the bill unless a majority votes to waive the point-of-order. A vote to waive the point-of-order operates as an express approval of the unfunded mandate. It is important to note, however, that the UMRA does not require any member to raise a point-of-order against an unfunded mandate. If no point-of-order is raised, the unfunded mandate can be enacted into law without a separate vote. It is doubtful, however, that any substantial unfunded mandate would make it through Congress without at least one senator or representative raising a point-of-order. If that did happen, the likely implication would not be that UMRA procedures had broken down, but that there was unanimous support in Congress for the new mandate. In short, the UMRA does not prohibit Congress from enacting new unfunded mandates; it merely provides procedural mechanisms to ensure informed decisionmaking and enhance political accountability.

It is also important to remember that not every unfunded mandate is subject to the UMRA's special procedural rules. In addition to mandates costing under $50 million, Congress expressly excluded seven categories of mandates from the UMRA. These include mandates that: (1) enforce constitutional rights; (2) establish or enforce rights against discrimination; (3) require compliance with accounting and auditing procedures for federal grants; (4) provide emergency assistance to state, local, or tribal governments; (5) pertain to social security programs; (6) relate to national security; or (7) are required to fulfill international treaty obligations. The President also may designate "emergency legislation" to avoid the UMRA's procedural rules.

B. NEW AGENCY RULEMAKING PROCEDURES

Title II of the UMRA amends agency rulemaking procedures to require administrators to assess the impacts of proposed regulations on state, local, and tribal governments. Federal agencies must prepare regulatory impact statements for all proposed rules that might cost local governments or the private sector $100 million or more (in the aggregate) in any one year. The statement must identify the federal law under which the rule is being promulgated, and it must be included in the general notice of the proposed or final rulemaking. The statement must include a cost-benefit analysis and an estimate of compliance costs. The cost-benefit analysis quantifies the costs and benefits of the federal mandate to the private sector or to state, local or tribal governments, as well as the effects of the mandate on public health, safety and the environment. The cost estimates are to include future compliance costs, disproportionate budgetary effects, and the effects of the mandate on the national economy. Cost-benefit analyses also are to assess the extent to which federal resources are available to carry out mandates.

In addition, when an agency proposes a new mandate that would require a regulatory impact statement, it must identify and consider alternatives to the proposed regulation. The agency then must select "the least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that
achieves the objectives of the rule,” unless that alternative is inconsistent with the law or the administrator publishes (with the rule) an explanation of why that alternative is inappropriate.\textsuperscript{135}

C. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF EXISTING FEDERAL MANDATES

Title III of the UMRA requires the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) to study “issues involved in calculating the total costs and benefits to State, local and tribal governments of compliance with Federal law.”\textsuperscript{136} The ACIR is to investigate and recommend to Congress means for: (1) providing governments with more flexibility in complying with mandates, (2) reconciling conflicting or inconsistent mandates, (3) terminating duplicative or obsolete mandates, (4) temporarily suspending non-vital mandates in order to relieve local governments’ fiscal straits, and (5) establishing common definitions and compliance standards.\textsuperscript{137} The ACIR should recommend mandates for legislative review and identify ways to mitigate any negative impacts that relief from intergovernmental mandates might have on the private sector.\textsuperscript{138} The UMRA also charges the ACIR to monitor federal court decisions imposing responsibilities on state, local, or tribal governments beyond those imposed by federal laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{139}

D. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE UMRA

In the final title of the Act, Congress strictly limits judicial review. Plaintiffs can sue under the UMRA only when agencies fail to prepare a regulatory-impact statement as required by section 202.\textsuperscript{140} Even failure to prepare a statement does not give cause to stay, enjoin or invalidate the agency rule.\textsuperscript{141} Judicial review is not available to enforce compliance with any other substantive or procedural provision of the UMRA.\textsuperscript{142}

E. INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE UMRA

Responses to the UMRA have been mixed. Some consider the law a well-balanced solution to the unfunded mandates problem.\textsuperscript{143} Others argue, to the contrary, that it is completely unresponsive to the problem; they view the UMRA as a mere “placebo” which, at best, should do no harm.\textsuperscript{144} More hostile critics have referred to the UMRA as a “toothless” “hoax” that does not even deserve to be called a “law.”\textsuperscript{145} Most interestingly of all, many state and local officials who pushed the hardest for unfunded mandates reform have been virtually silent on the UMRA. To the extent they have discussed it at all, they have referred to the statute as a “first step,” suggesting that they believe it does not completely resolve the unfunded mandates “problem.”\textsuperscript{146} The UMRA’s first year of implementation has, to varying extents, borne out each of these disparate viewpoints.

III. IMPLEMENTING THE UMRA: YEAR ONE

A. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE GEARS UP TO ASSESS NEW FEDERAL MANDATES

The UMRA generated a great deal of activity in the Washington Beltway even before it took effect on January 1, 1996. In particular, the CBO and the ACIR were busy complying or preparing to comply with their statutory obligations under the Act. The CBO’s charge is to identify and calculate the costs of new mandates in proposed legislation and regulations. This task is pivotal, as CBO estimates alone determine whether a given proposal is subject to the UMRA’s point-of-order vote. It is also a job that taxes CBO resources. In an appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee in May 1996, CBO Director June E. O’Neill estimated that the Agency’s added burdens under the UMRA would amount to $2,178 million and twenty-four staff-years in 1996 alone, based on an expected workload of 550 bills to assess for mandate costs.\textsuperscript{147} These figures confirm that while increasing the financial information for congressional policymaking is a laudable goal, it is certainly not cheap.

In order to handle the expected influx of legislative and administrative proposals for mandate cost estimates, the CBO established a new State and Local Government Cost Estimates Unit (SLGCEU) within its Budget Analysis Division. The SLGCEU provides cost estimates and conducts “special studies relating to intergovernmental mandates and their budgetary impacts”\textsuperscript{148} in order to improve the accuracy of mandate cost accounting. In July 1995, representatives of the CBO asked members of the National Conference of State Legislatures for assistance in collecting “more and better information on the costs of its mandates.”\textsuperscript{149} This may have reflected, in part, the CBO’s dissatisfaction with existing state and local studies of federal unfunded mandates, but it primarily demonstrated the CBO’s desire to improve its own cost estimations. Specifically, the CBO wanted assistance in defining and isolating state and local governments’ incremental mandate compliance costs (a problem identified in the CBO’s study of federal mandates under the Safe Drinking Water Act).\textsuperscript{150} The CBO also wanted help to overcome the difficulties of extrapolating and generalizing cost estimates across states.\textsuperscript{151} Five full-time CBO staff members assigned to the SLGCEU perform mandate cost estimates and special studies.\textsuperscript{152} In the first half of 1996 alone, the unit examined nearly 400 bills for intergovernmental and private sector mandates.\textsuperscript{153}
B. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENT RELATIONS REVIEWS EXISTING MANDATES

While the CBO geared up to perform its vital function under the URMA, the ACIR was already completing its initial review of existing federal mandates, as required under Title III of the Act. The twenty-two member Commission,154 comprised of state governors, federal, state, and local legislators, and administration officials, released its preliminary report and recommendations on January 24, 1996.155 The report estimated that state and local governments are subject to approximately 200 mandates under 170 federal laws. Of those 200 mandates, the ACIR selected the fourteen “most troublesome” for review. Based on that review, the ACIR recommended permanently repealing intergovernmental mandates contained in seven federal laws: the Fair Labor Standards Act,156 the Family and Medical Leave Act,157 the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),158 drug and alcohol testing of commercial drivers,159 metric conversion for plans and specifications,160 the Boren Amendment to Medicaid,161 and required use of recycled crumb rubber in asphalt paving.162 None of these federal mandates, according to the ACIR, have “sufficient national interest to justify intruding on state and local government abilities to control their own affairs.”163

By contrast, the ACIR found sufficient national interest to justify federal mandates under the Clean Water Act,164 the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,165 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.166 Nevertheless, the ACIR recommended that the federal government either pick up more of the tab for state and local implementation of these statutes or relax stringent requirements and deadlines for state and local compliance with their mandates.167 The remaining group of mandates, under the Safe Drinking Water Act,168 the Endangered Species Act,169 the Clean Air Act,170 and Acts that condition federal grants-in-aid on compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act,171 were sufficiently justified by the national interest, according to the ACIR, but the ACIR recommended revising them to provide state and local governments with “greater flexibility and increased consultation.”172 In addition to these general recommendations, the ACIR provided more specific and detailed recommendations concerning each of the federal laws reviewed. For example, the Commission recommended that the federal government return to state and local governments “full responsibility for safe drinking water standards.”173

C. CRITICISM OF THE ACIR REVIEW

At a news conference announcing the report and recommendations, ACIR members invoked familiar refrains about the federal government’s propensity for enacting noble goals while sticking state and local taxpayers with the costs. As Representative Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.) put it, “Congress passed the bill, then passed the buck to state and local governments.”174 Such inflammatory rhetoric created an impression that the ACIR (despite its bipartisan composition) and its review process were ideologically and politically biased.175

A report by Citizens for Sensible Safeguards (CSS), a coalition of 150 labor, civil rights, community, and environmental groups,176 alleged that the ACIR’s report and recommendations were based on exaggerated costs, understated benefits, and extensive methodological flaws.177 For example, in reviewing OSHA, the ACIR neglected to consider the extensive fiscal benefits of extending OSHA coverage to all public and private employees. According to the CSS, state and local governments would save an estimated $600 million annually in reduced medical and workers’ compensation costs by complying with OSHA mandates.178 Similarly, in its review of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the ACIR failed to consider existing empirical research that derived lower net cost estimates.179 Part of the ACIR’s problem, according to the CSS, was logistical: “How [could] a staff of three [researchers] explore 200 proposed mandates, select 14, and publish a set of well-researched and coherent suggestions in less than one year?”180 In addition, the CSS noted that the ACIR’s review process was closed—the group held no public meetings—and its voting procedures were suspect.181 ACIR meetings were plagued by absenteeism, and only seven ACIR members, less than a quorum, were present at the December 19th meeting to vote on the report and recommendations. Other members of the ACIR were later balloted, but the exact purpose of the vote was not clear. At the December 19th meeting, ACIR Executive Director William Davis announced that, “the decisions [the Commission] make[s] today are really on what it is that [the Commission] want[s] to expose for public comment over the next three months.”182 According to the CSS, “[c]ommissioners never voted on the substance of the report. Rather, they merely assented to have it published in the Federal Register for comment.”183 This view was confirmed by at least one member of the ACIR, Congressman Donald Payne (D-N.J.), who complained that Commission members were “not clear on exactly what they were voting on.”184

Even after the ACIR released its preliminary report and recommendations, it tried to subvert legally-required administrative procedures. The UMRA directed the Commission to hold “public hearings.”185 The ACIR initially scheduled a single for-profit “conference” for
which it planned to charge participants $400 each. This effort was scuttled after public interest groups complained. The ACIR then tentatively scheduled a free public hearing, but provided only twelve days advance notice in the Federal Register. That hearing was later postponed indefinitely.

The ACIR’s recommendations also can be criticized for exceeding the UMRA’s mandate. As described in section II of this article, Congress specified that the ACIR was to base its review of existing mandates on five factors: (1) providing state and local governments with more flexibility in complying with federal mandates; (2) reconciling conflicting or inconsistent mandates; (3) terminating duplicative or obsolete mandates; (4) temporarily suspending non-vital mandates in order to relieve local governments’ fiscal straits; and (5) establishing common definitions and compliance standards. Arguably, the ACIR went well beyond these directives in recommending the repeal of seven existing federal mandates because they “do not have sufficient national interest to justify intruding on state and local government abilities to control their own affairs.” Nothing in the statutory directives instructed the ACIR to make general policy recommendations about federal mandates because they “do not have sufficient national interest to justify intruding on state and local government abilities to control their own affairs.”

Specifically, the ACIR identified what it considered to be “major problems common to most federal mandates” and recommended the following fixes:

- **Costs.** The federal government should assume some share of mandate costs, both to restrain the extent of the mandate and to help in identifying less-costly compliance alternatives.

- **Public accountability.** Federal laws should recognize that state and local governments are led by elected officials who are accountable to voters, just as the President and members of Congress are.

- **Citizen lawsuits.** Only the federal agency responsible for enforcement of a law should be permitted to sue state and local governments.

- **Small communities.** Deadlines should be extended and mandate requirements modified for very small local governments.

- **Lack of federal coordination.** A single federal agency should be designated to coordinate each mandate’s implementation and to make binding decisions about that mandate.

With these policy prescriptions, the ACIR appears to have changed from a government agency with a statutory mission into an interest group advocating further legislative action. The ACIR’s policy prescriptions go well beyond compliance with the UMRA; in fact, the UMRA would have to be amended to implement them.

In addition to exceeding the UMRA’s statutory mandate, the ACIR’s recommendations went beyond its own staff’s findings. For example, as already noted, the ACIR recommended that the federal government turn over to the states “full responsibility for safe drinking water standards.” This goes well beyond the ACIR staff’s recommendations which called for “national public health standards for drinking water,” but state “imposition and implementation.” The Commission also went beyond its own staff’s recommendations in urging that exemptions under the Endangered Species Act “be applied more extensively to minimize social and economic impact on state, local, and tribal governments.”

It is important to remember that the ACIR itself conducted no reviews of federal mandates above and beyond its staff’s working papers. By exceeding both its statutory mandate and its own staff’s recommendations, the ACIR raises a serious question about its review process for existing federal mandates; to what extent are ACIR recommendations the products of thoughtful and honest review, rather than mere political advocacy?

In view of the intense criticism that met its draft recommendations, on July 9, 1996, the ACIR released a revised draft that reversed course on many of its original recommendations. For example, where the initial draft recommendations had called on Congress to repeal intergovernmental mandates in the Family and Medical Leave Act, the revised draft recommended that Congress “[r]etain state and local government coverage under the Family and Medical Leave Act.” Where the initial draft recommended repeal of intergovernmental mandates found in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the revised draft recommended “no change.” Despite these and other substantial revisions, on July 23, 1996, ACIR members voted thirteen to seven to reject the revised report and recommendations. At that point, ACIR executive director Bill Davis announced that the ACIR would “very likely not go back to the drawing board,” but instead would seek direction from Congress on whether to proceed. Congress responded by shutting down the ACIR on September 30, 1996.

D. THE UMRA BEGINS TO AFFECT THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

The UMRA took effect on January 1, 1996. Between January 1 and March 25, 1996, the CBO issued
twenty-six state and local government impact estimates and found five bills that contained public sector mandates, though none of them exceeded the $50 million threshold to raise an UMRA point-of-order. According to Representative Rob Portman (R-Ohio), this indicates that the Act is working as intended, because mandate provisions are being excised before bills reach the floor precisely to avoid point-of-order votes. As an example, he pointed to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which initially included language to restrict the ability of state and local governments to control public rights-of-way held by cable companies. This restriction would have constituted an unfunded mandate potentially requiring a point-of-order vote because it would have imposed unfunded regulatory burdens on local governments in excess of $50 million. But the mandate was removed from the bill before it ever reached the House floor. Opponents of the mandate persuaded the Commerce Committee to remove it from the bill, using the UMRA point-of-order vote as leverage, and the Telecommunications Act was enacted without it. This episode suggests that the UMRA is not only informing legislators about unfunded mandates in legislative proposals, but is actually deterring them from enacting new unfunded mandates.

Although Congress did not consider any legislation during the first half of 1996 that met the UMRA’s $50 million threshold for a point-of-order vote, UMRA procedures still figured prominently in committee and floor debates on legislative proposals. For example, on March 15, 1996, the House of Representatives debated and voted on House Resolution 375 to waive all points-of-order, including those under the UMRA, while it considered the Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Some House members objected to waiving the UMRA point-of-order, despite the fact that the CBO had concluded that the Act under consideration would impose no new intergovernmental mandates as defined by the UMRA. The House ultimately voted to waive the UMRA point-of-order, along with all other points-of-order. This episode suggests that Congress is quite sensitive about unfunded mandates, playing close attention to UMRA procedures even in cases where they clearly do not apply.

Despite the fact that no legislative proposals in the first half of 1996 met the UMRA’s threshold $50 million cost estimate, an UMRA point-of-order was raised on March 28, 1996, to force a vote on a motion to recommit the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996. Representative David Bonior (D-Mich.) moved to recommit the bill to the House Ways and Means Committee with instructions to report the bill back to the House floor with an amendment making a provision of the proposed legislation contingent on raising the minimum wage by a certain date. Bill Archer (R-Tex.) immediately raised a point-of-order under the UMRA, claiming that Bonior’s motion to recommit included an unfunded mandate, and that the CBO had determined that raising the minimum wage would constitute an intergovernmental mandate costing more than $50 million. However, the ranking minority member on the House Rules Committee, John Moakley (D-Mass.), quickly obtained a letter from the CBO certifying that neither the motion to recommit nor the proposed amendment would impose an intergovernmental mandate as defined in the UMRA because neither action would actually raise the minimum wage. To do that would require additional legislation. Unfortunately, the CBO letter arrived twenty minutes after debate on the measure had ended and the parties had voted, mostly along party lines, to support Representative Archer’s point-of-order.

That did not stop Representative Moakley from excoriating the House leadership’s use of UMRA procedures—the very first time they were applied on the House floor—“to stifle debate.” Moakley raised some ominous implications from the episode:

There is no parliamentary or budgetary ruling and there is no burden of proof on the member raising the point-of-order. It does not matter if the point-of-order is baseless, simply by raising the point-of-order, the House is required to vote on whether to consider the text that is challenged. A simple majority of the House, for any reason, regardless of whether there is any legitimate financial imposition or not, can deny the opportunity of a member to proceed with an otherwise germane and viable legislative measure. I raised the concern at that time that this could be used both to stop legislation not containing unfunded mandates from being considered on the floor and as a dilatory tactic to disrupt the legislative process. I was always assured that this would not be used for this purpose. Even then, however, I did not anticipate that the very first use of this tactic would be to deny the minority the right to offer an entirely legitimate and germane motion to recommit.

I am deeply troubled that if this practice continues, it could simply become a backdoor approach used to gag legitimate debate. The unfunded mandates law should be used as
a tool to fix legislation that imposes unfair financial burdens on state and local governments and the private sector. It should not be used as a weapon to prevent the consideration of viable and responsible legislation initiatives.  

Representative Moakley’s concerns were given credence when the House Parliamentarian, Charles W. Johnson, ruled that Representative Archer had “met the ‘threshold burden to identify the specific language of the motion’ that would be an ‘unfunded mandate.’”  

This ruling seems to confirm that all a legislator needs to do to stifle debate on proposed amendments and motions is to identify some specific language in legislation that could constitute an unfunded mandate.

Representative Moakley reiterated his concerns in a March 29th letter to Representative Gerald Solomon (R-N.Y.), Chair of the House Rules Committee. In response, Representative Solomon suggested that it seemed clear from the minority debate at the time that Representative Bonior’s motion to recommit included an unfunded mandate. And, had the motion itself not included an unfunded mandate, it surely would have required the enactment of an unfunded mandate to further the purposes of the Act under consideration. This, from Representative Solomon’s point of view, justified raising an UMRA point of order against Representative Bonior’s motion to recommit the Contract With America Advancement Act. Representative Moakley disagreed. In a second letter, he reiterated that Representative Bonior’s motion to recommit contained no unfunded mandate, so that the UMRA point of order technically was inappropriate. Chairman Solomon responded, this time more constructively, by suggesting certain steps to avoid the future misuse of UMRA points of order to delay legislation or to block votes on legitimate amendments:

- “Members offering amendments with potential mandate implications” should “be prepared in advance to defend against mandate points-of-order.”

- Before offering such amendments or motions, Members should present written copies, along with evidence they do not include unfunded mandates, to “avoid triggering unnecessary points of order that otherwise must be raised defensively for lack of adequate time or information to make an informed judgment.”

- “When an unfunded mandate point of order is raised, Members on both sides” should “use the 20 minutes of debate allotted ... (to determine) whether an unfunded mandate does exist;” and

- “[T]he Leadership on both sides (should) impress on their respective members, especially on ... bill managers, that the point of order should not be raised for dilatory or frivolous purposes.”

While Representative Solomon’s recommendations, on one hand, may help to avert future controversies over the legitimate use of mandate points-of-order, they do not ensure that points-of-order cannot be used by the majority to stifle debate on proposed amendments and motions. On the other hand, the episode illustrates Congress’s extreme sensitivity, at present, to the issue of unfunded mandates. This may or may not suggest that the UMRA is having the intended effect; it could just reflect the current anti-federal mood of the country.

It is true that Congress did not enact a single new unfunded intergovernmental mandate exceeding the $50 million threshold during the 104th Congress. However, it is quite unlikely that the 104th Congress would intentionally have enacted substantial new unfunded mandates even if the UMRA did not exist. In short, it is difficult (if not impossible) to separate out the legal effects of the UMRA from the background political pressures which led to its enactment and continue to influence the legislative process. The UMRA does, nevertheless, provide some security against unintentional enactments of new unfunded mandates. That alone may justify the statute’s existence.

IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES

As a case study of the legislative process, the story of unfunded mandates reform is both troubling and reassuring. It is troubling in that it confirms suspicions that the legislative process is driven more by rhetoric and (mis)perception than by fact and evidence. It is reassuring in that it shows how even a faulty process can lead to good, or at least benign, legislative ends.

Federal mandate reform was based on unsubstantiated claims of “unfair” federal regulatory burdens that supposedly were driving state and local governments into “bankruptcy.” As we saw in Section I, the various state and local government surveys and studies of the federal mandates “problem” all failed to demonstrate that the federal government imposes net costs on state and local governments. On the contrary, the best available evidence indicates that state and local governments receive a net (after mandates) federal subsidy. Without other convincing reasons to either reduce federal mandates or increase federal funding, legislative reform was unjustified or, at least,
unnecessary. This does not mean, however, that the UMRA is a bad law.

The UMRA increases the information available for legislative and administrative decisionmaking by requiring cost estimates for new mandates, and it enhances congressional accountability by requiring a separate recorded vote to approve new legislative mandates. These procedural requirements are useful, though not cheap. All other things being equal, they should improve the quality of legislative decisionmaking. Perhaps even more importantly, the UMRA changes the way administrative agencies do business. From now on, when agencies propose rules containing mandates with aggregate costs estimated at $100 million or more in any one year, they must select the “least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative,” unless that alternative is either contrary to law or demonstrably inappropriate.

Some critics complain that the UMRA does not go far enough, however, in preventing Congress from imposing new unfunded intergovernmental mandates. But that begs the question that we have tried to raise in this article: Why should the federal government prevent itself from imposing mandate costs on state and local governments, so long as it continues to provide them with a net subsidy? If there are sound arguments, beyond the unsubstantiated claims of fiscal unfairness, the advocates of federal mandate reform have not yet articulated them.

Finally, the fight over federal mandates reflects fundamental questions about government policy and intergovernmental relations. One side alleges that the federal government has intruded too much on state sovereignty. The other side counters that the attack on unfunded federal mandates is really aimed at rolling back environmental and social programs. Both sides agree, however, that all levels of government today confront real and mounting fiscal pressures. The public continues to demand a wide range of expensive government services, but rejects tax increases for them, and expects the government to balance its budget. The American economy, meanwhile, cannot grow fast enough to permit all three of these conditions to co-exist. Under the circumstances, and especially in view of the increasing pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit, the net federal subsidy to state and local governments is likely to decline, regardless of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.

NOTES
1 Federal Mandates; Passing the Buck, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnews file. The various surveys and studies are discussed and critiqued infra Section I.


9 The UMRA does, however, oblige the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to review existing federal mandates and to report recommendations to Congress. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1551-1552 (1996). For a more extensive discussion of the Commission’s responsibilities and the UMRA in general, see infra Section II.


11 Id. §§ 1531 & 1532 (1996). However, these cost estimates for private sector mandates are for information purposes only; Congress does not have to vote separately to approve substantial new private sector mandates.

12 See infra Section I.


15 ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, MANDATES: CASES IN STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS 1 (1990) [hereinafter ACIR 1990].


18 Fix & Kenyon, supra note 14, at 24.

19 Id.

20 Contrary to conventional wisdom, the situation has changed little to this day. Despite the proliferation of federal regulatory mandates since the 1960s and reductions in federal grant programs, state and local governments still appear to receive a sizable net subsidy from the federal government. Whether or not state and local governments should be subsidized at all by the federal government is a question somewhat outside the scope of this article. However, we touch on normative issues at various points infra.

21 CITY OF CHICAGO & ROOSEVELT UNIV., INSTITUTE FOR METROPOLITAN AFFAIRS, PUTTING FEDERALISM TO WORK FOR AMERICA: TACKLING THE PROBLEMS OF UNFUNDED MANDATES AND BURDENSOME FEDERAL REGULATIONS 8 (1992) [hereinafter CHICAGO STUDY].

22 See TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, FEDERALLY INDUCED COSTS AFFECTING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1994) (“General Revenue Sharing (GRS) provided essentially no strings formula grants to virtually all state and local governments between 1972 and 1980, and to local governments until 1986. Although not designed originally to be a program of mandate reimbursement, and not distributed according to variations in mandated burdens, GRS distributed up to $6 billion annually. GRS funds could be applied to mandated activities at the discretion of the recipient government. One study of federal mandates affecting local governments in the late 1970s found that the average costs of such requirements were roughly comparable to the amount of General Revenue Sharing the jurisdiction received.”).


25 Id. at 121.


27 CHICAGO STUDY, supra note 21, at 9.


29 Feller, supra note 28, at 554; Naynerski & Tietenberg, supra note 28, at 114.


31 See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID PROGRAMS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: GRANTS FUNDED FY 1993, at 1-2 (1994); see also Craig A. Rimmerman, Reagan’s New Federalism and the Implementation of Community Development Block Grants in a Midwestern City, in THE MIDWEST RESPONSE TO THE NEW FEDERALISM 97, 99 (P.K. Eisinger & W. Gormley eds., 1988) (quoting a HUD official from Columbus, Ohio: “I liked the block grant until Reagan. The Reagan reforms have opened up the program to uncontrolled abuse by local governments. The eligibility requirements are so wide open now that you can use the funds for anything. This office no longer exercises control over the program. The monitoring of the program now takes place after the fact. It is a big city pork barrel program now under Reagan.”).

32 Osbourn, supra note 16, at 1.

33 Id. at 8.

34 Id. at 5.


37 See Muller & Fix, supra note 35; see also Falconer & Berry, supra note 36, at 21.

41 See id.
42 Id.
44 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 A similar survey was conducted in Oklahoma in 1992. Like the Columbus, Ohio survey, the Oklahoma survey merely listed federal mandates identified as the “most burdensome” to local officials, without providing any financial information to substantiate the claims. OKLAHOMA STATE AGENCIES, COUNTIES AND CITIES AND TOWNS, STATE AND FEDERAL MANDATES AS PRESENTED TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (1992).
51 1994 OHIO STUDY, supra note 46, at 22.
52 Id. at 17.
53 See infra, Section I.C.
54 The federal government provides many “discretionary funds” for state and local governments. In some cases, discretionary grants may have few or no strings attached. Typically, however, they are funds which state or local governments are free to use within certain parameters specified by federal law. For example, if the federal government provided discretionary funds for any purpose related to the implementation and enforcement of federal environmental laws, those funds obviously could not be used for non-environmental protection purposes; but they might be used to cover (indirectly) the costs of (directly) unfunded environmental mandates. In addition, as we point out infra note 77 and accompanying text, discretionary federal funds devoted to state or local projects are fungible; state and local governments are not out-of-pocket if they are forced to devote saved state and local funds on federal projects. However, depending on the circumstances, one may question why the federal government should fund local programs while forcing local governments to devote local funds to federal programs.
56 1994 OHIO STUDY, supra note 46, at 17.
57 CHICAGO STUDY, supra note 21.
58 Id. at 11.
59 Id. at 24.
60 Id. at iii.
61 Id. at 76.
63 This is clear from the report’s definition of the phrase “federal mandates,” which includes “provisions of federal law or regulation which require state government implementation, without option to the state.” Id. at A-26. Neither this definition, nor any other reference in the report, distinguishes between funded and unfunded federal mandates.
64 Id. at A-25.
65 1995 COMMERCE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 55, at 1 tbl.1.
67 Id. at 2.
68 See DAVID KNOKE & GEORGE W. BOHRSTEDT, STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 22 (1994).
69 Id. at 16.
70 U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS/PRICE WATERHOUSE SURVEY, supra note 66, at 1.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, ANALYSIS OF THE UNFUNDED MANDATES SURVEYS CONDUCTED BY THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS AND THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES (1994).

74 Id. at 15-16.
75 Id. at 8-9.
76 Id. at 9.
77 Id. at Executive Summary.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 12.
81 Id. at 12-13.


85 Id. at 2, 10, 42.

86 Obviously this same analysis applies to other federal mandates designed to protect public health and safety. Even in the absence of federal mandates, local governments would likely incur some significant expenses to protect local populations from the harmful effects of air pollution, hazardous wastes, and other environmental hazards.

87 See infra Section I.B.

88 CHICAGO STUDY, supra note 21, at 10 (quoting Andrew J. Corwin, How Federal Mandates Manhandle States, Chi. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnews file.) Neither the Chicago Report nor the Corwin article supply information on how the $75 billion a year figure was derived. We are, however, willing to assume it is accurate for purposes of comparison against federal intergovernmental transfers.

89 In fact, unfunded federal mandates comprise only a small percentage of all federal mandates. For example, the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse survey estimated that the total cost of unfunded federal mandates on cities in 1993 amounted to $6.5 billion. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS/PRICE WATERHOUSE SURVEY, supra note 66, at 2.

90 1995 COMMERCE DEP’T REPORT, supra note 55, at 1 tbl.1; Letter from Lawrence W. Hush, supra note 55.

91 DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO POLICY 649 (1990); see also JOHN E. DAWSON & PETER J.E. STAN, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1952-1993, at 62, 72 (1995) (“It is frequently assumed that a federal grant causes additional state and local expenditures and that these expenditures occur in the program, or for the purpose, the grant specifies. Neither part of this assumption need hold in a specific instance, however, since grants are fungible against state and local funds in the jurisdictions’ regular budgets ... This fungibility of federal grants allows state and local governments to substitute across categories of expenditures and thus casts doubt on any accounting of the final ends of federal grants.”); Linda Feldman, Federal Block Grants: Boondoggle or Boon for Local Government?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News library, Cumws file (“The term block grant, in fact, can be so wide as to be almost meaningless.”).

92 See CONLAN, supra note 22.


95 ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: GRANTS FUNDED FY 1993, at 7 tbl.2 (1994).

96 Recent Legislation, supra note 94, at 1469 n. 2 (1996).


98 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.


101 Id.

102 Supra note 13 and accompanying text.

103 Many of these arguments are made persuasively by Dana, supra note 13. For an explanation of the economic efficiency gains that can result from unfunded mandates, see HYMAN, supra note 91, at 659-60 (showing that federal mandates for local pollution abatement, which impose 80% of the compliance costs on local communities, can “get local residents to choose the efficient level of abatement”).
Federal mandates have literally grown out of control, and today counties are spending more of their locally raised revenues to comply with these mandates than they receive in Federal aid.”

141 Cong. Rec. H3303, H3309. Representative Davis’s statement appears to contradict our findings in Section I, but he neither provided nor referred to any data in support of his conclusion.


123 Id. § 658b(d).
124 Id. § 658c. It is important to bear in mind, however, that private sector mandates, unlike intergovernmental mandates, are not subject to point-of-order votes under the UMRA.

125 Id. § 658d.
126 Id. §§ 658d(c)(2) & 658e.
127 Id. § 658a.
128 Id. § 658a(6).
129 Id. § 1532.
130 Id.
131 Id. § 1532(a)(1).
132 Id. § 1532(b).
133 Id. § 1532(a)(3) & (4).
134 Id. § 1532(a)(2).
135 Id. § 1535.
136 Id. § 1551.
137 Id. § 1552.
138 Id. § 1552(a)(3).
139 Id. § 1554.
140 Id. § 1571. The ACIR’s initial report and recommendations on existing unfunded mandates is discussed infra Sec. III.B.

142 Id. § 1571(b).
143 See Recent Legislation, supra note 94, at 1469.
The Act requires the extension of medical insurance benefits during the leave period. Medication is a key component in caring for a newly-adopted child, or newly-placed foster child, or to care for a seriously ill child, parent, or spouse. The Act requires the extension of medical insurance benefits during the leave period.


148 Id; see also Report from the Congressional Budget Office on Unfunded Mandates, 142 CONG. REC. H1278, H1279 (Feb. 27, 1996).


150 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.

151 Id.

152 Statement of June E. O'Neill, supra note 147.

153 Id. A few of CBO's mandate cost estimates are discussed infra this section.

154 The ACIR is supposed to have 26 members, but at the time it released its report, there were four vacancies. See CITIZENS FOR SENSIBLE SAFEGUARDS, SHIRKING RESPONSIBILITY: ACIR'S CALL TO REPEAL FEDERAL PROTECTIONS 25 (1996) [hereinafter CSS REPORT].

155 ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MANDATES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (1996) [hereinafter ACIR REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS].


157 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (1996). This law requires employers, including state and local governments, to provide employees with up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave each year to care for a newborn child, newly-adopted child, or newly-placed foster child, or to care for a seriously ill child, parent, or spouse. The Act requires the extension of medical insurance benefits during the leave period.

158 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1996). OSHA authorizes the Department of Labor to set standards for workplace health and safety for private employers. It only applies to state governments that volunteer to administer the federal OSHA program within their jurisdictions.

159 Under Title V of the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-143, 105 Stat. 952, the U.S. Dept. of Transportation administers drug and alcohol testing regulations that apply to holders of commercial drivers licenses, including state and local government employees.


163 ACIR REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 5.

164 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1996). The Clean Water Act requires states to designate water uses, develop water quality criteria, monitor water quality, and report on water quality every two years. Local governments are required to develop programs for controlling pollution from nonpoint sources, to control discharges from storm sewers, and to comply with federal standards in treating sewage flowing into publicly-owned treatment works.

165 Pub. L. 101-476. This law reauthorizes discretionary programs that provide support and research to aid in the education of disabled individuals.

166 Pub. L. 101-336. This law prohibits discrimination against the disabled in employment, public services, and public accommodations. State and local governments are required to adjust their policies to comply with the Act, and to make structural changes to public buildings and streets to provide access to the disabled.

167 ACIR REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 6.

168 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1996). This law sets national drinking water standards for the 58,530 waterworks around the
country that serve 25 or more persons.

169 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1996). This law prevents economic development in areas where endangered species are known to be present. In addition, state, local, and tribal governments cannot obtain federal permits, licenses, or grants if the project does not comply with national requirements for protecting endangered species.

170 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1996). This law requires states to obtain federal approval of state plans for achieving federally established air quality standards. Emissions standards in the Act in some cases apply to facilities owned by local governments. In addition, local development is conditioned on compliance with federal air pollution rules.


172 ACIR REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 6.

173 Id. at 13.

174 Quoted in id.


176 CSS’s members include (among others) the AFL-CIO, the American Association of University Professors, the American Jewish Committee, the American Lung Association, the Children’s Defense Fund, the Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, the International Association of Firefighters, the NAACP, the National Audubon Society, the National Consumers League, the National Education Association, the National Urban League, the Natural Resources Defense Council, OMB Watch, the Sierra Club, the United Cerebral Palsy Associations, and the United Methodist Church General Board of Church and Society.

177 CSS REPORT, supra note 154.

178 Id. at 3, 11.


181 Quoted in CSS REPORT, supra note 154, at 6.

182 Id.

183 Id.


185 2 U.S.C. § 1552(c)(2).

186 ACIR Recommendations ‘Dire’ Threat, supra note 179, at *4.

187 Id.; see also 67 Fed. Reg. 7271.


189 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.

190 See supra notes 156-164 and accompanying text.


192 ACIR REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 13.

193 Id. at A-30

194 Id. at 14.

195 ACIR REVISED REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 188.

196 Id. at 10.

197 Id. at 12.


199 It is unclear, however, whether Congress has terminated or just temporarily inactivated the Commission. See Dennis Camire, Go Figure: Congress Keeps Alive Commission It Killed, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Nov. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws file.
However, this deterrent effect is not complete. The very same Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, includes a significant unfunded mandate that was not subject to a point-of-order vote because it came in below the $50 million threshold. Specifically, section 602 of the Act exempts direct broadcast service providers "from the collection or remittance, or both of any tax or fee imposed by any local taxing jurisdiction on direct-to-home satellite service." See Barrie Tabin & Nicholas P. Miller, The Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996: What It Means for Cities, NATION'S CITIES WKLY., Feb. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file.

However, section 602 of the Act did not meet the UMRA's threshold for a point-of-order vote, it could cost local governments millions of dollars in lost revenues. See Damon Chappie, Parliamentary Tussle Over 'Unfunded Mandate,' ROLL CALL, Apr. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file.

In support of this contention, Rep. Solomon later sought and received from CBO Director June E. O'Neill confirmation that raising the minimum wage in order to effectuate regulatory reform, as would have been required by Representative Bonior's motion to recommit, would have constituted an unfunded mandate under UMRA. See Gerald Solomon, Act of 1938, CONG. PRESS RELEASES, Apr. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnws file; Gerald Solomon, Letter to Rep. Moakley Re: Minimum Wage Legislation, CONG. PRESS RELEASES, May 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library.