Recent Developments: The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

David P. Fidler
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dfidler@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub

Part of the European Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Fidler, David P., "Recent Developments: The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment" (1989). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 872.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/872

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Council of Europe broke new ground in the field of human rights on November 26, 1987 when it opened the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention) for signature. The Convention is the first human rights accord that sets up procedures for the prevention of torture and other ill-treatment of individuals. Although it represents a challenging development in the international fight against torture, loopholes in the document and the inherent difficulty of enforcing international human rights norms suggest that the Convention will engender more hope than progress.

The Convention is the latest progeny of the recent international effort to combat torture that dates back to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration). The strong stand against torture taken by the Universal Declaration has been reinforced by several subsequent international agreements. The succession of torture prohibitions in these international accords gave Amnesty International support for its 1973 claim that "[i]t can safely be stated

---


2. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/811, at 2 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. The Universal Declaration built on article 55 of the United Nations Charter, which obligates the member states to "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 55. Although the Universal Declaration is an aspirational document rather than a binding treaty, see Universal Declaration, supra, preamble, its influence in human rights law and the fight against torture has been significant. See N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1987).

that under all circumstances, regardless of the context in which it is used, torture is outlawed under the common law of mankind.\textsuperscript{4} Western European states took a leading role in promoting the values embodied in the Universal Declaration by adopting in 1950 the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention).\textsuperscript{5} Article 3 of the European Convention declares that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."\textsuperscript{6} The prohibition against torture in the European Convention is absolute; it may not be violated even in times of war or national crisis.\textsuperscript{7}

The enforcement procedure for the rights in the European Convention involves three bodies: the European Commission of Human Rights (Commission), the European Court of Human Rights (Court), and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers).\textsuperscript{8} The European Convention empowers the Commission to receive petitions on alleged violations either from other state parties\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{4} AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE 38 (1975). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture views the prohibition against torture as \textit{jus cogens}, or a peremptory norm of general international law. Report by the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 1 (1986); see also A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 314 (1986); N. RODLEY, supra note 2, at 70. In the United States, the Second Circuit has termed the torturer "an enemy of all mankind" and torture a crime against humanity. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).

\textsuperscript{5} Opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. The European Convention has been ratified by all 21 members of the Council of Europe: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 1954 UNTIL 1984 1 (1984) [hereinafter STOCK-TAKING: 1954-1984].

\textsuperscript{6} European Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, at 224. The European Convention does not define torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have, however, developed definitions for the critical concepts in article 3. For extended discussions of these concepts, see Doswald-Beck, \textit{What Does the Prohibition of \"Torture or Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment\" Mean? The Interpretation of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights}, 25 NETH. INT'L. L. REV. 24 (1978), and N. RODLEY, supra note 2, at 71-95.

\textsuperscript{7} European Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, at 224. Article 15 allows signatory states to derogate from the duties imposed by the treaty "[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation." \textit{Id.}, art. 15, at 232. Member states, however, shall not derogate from article 2 (protection of life), except for death caused by lawful acts of war; article 3 (torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment); article 4, para. 1 (slavery or servitude); and article 7 (retroactive punishment). \textit{Id.}, arts. 2, 3, 4 and 7, at 224-32. On the absolute nature of the prohibition, see Duffy, \textit{Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights}, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 316, 321-22 (1983). For a philosophical reflection on torture, see Shue, \textit{Torture}, 7 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 124 (1978).

\textsuperscript{8} Article 19 created both the Commission and the Court. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 19, at 234.

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Id.}, art. 24, at 236. All but one of the state petitions submitted to the Commission have included allegations of violations of article 3. See Greece v. United Kingdom, 2 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 174 (1958); The Greek Case, 13 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 108
or from individuals, groups of individuals, or non-governmental organizations, provided the state party complained against has recognized the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.\(^{10}\n\) The Commission decides whether to admit a petition.\(^{11}\) If the petition is admitted, the Commission investigates the complaint and seeks a friendly settlement.\(^{12}\) If no settlement is reached, the Commission sends the Committee of Ministers a report on the facts with an opinion as to whether the European Convention has been violated.\(^{13}\) If the states involved in the complaint have recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, the Commission or the states may request the Committee of Ministers to refer the case to the Court for decision.\(^{14}\) The rulings of the Court are binding on the states involved,\(^{15}\) and the Committee of Ministers supervises the execution of the judgment.\(^{16}\) If the case is not brought before the Court, the Committee of Ministers decides whether the European Convention has been violated, and its decision is binding.\(^{17}\) Even though the European Convention’s procedures have influenced other human rights efforts,\(^{18}\) two factors combined in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s to stimulate efforts by European human rights ad-

\(^{(1970)}\) (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands submitted charges against Greece); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 15 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM RTS. 76 (1972); Cyprus v. Turkey, 18 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 82 (1975); The Turkish Case, 26 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. part II, ch. I., at 1 (1983) (Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden in 1982 submitting charges against Turkey). For an overview of the above cases, see STOCK-TAKING: 1954–1984, supra note 5, at 7–19 (1984).

10. European Convention, supra note 5, art. 25, at 238. As of Dec. 31, 1986, 18 states had recognized the competence of the Commission to receive individual petitions: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: SUPPLEMENT 1986 v (1988) [hereinafter STOCK-TAKING: SUPPLEMENT]. The Commission has received many individual complaints alleging violations of article 3, most of which were declared inadmissible. The extensive Commission and Court case law on article 3 is summarized in Doswald-Beck, supra note 6, passim, and Duffy, supra note 7, passim.

11. European Convention, supra note 5, arts. 26–27, at 238.

12. Id., art. 28, at 238–40.

13. Id., art. 31, at 240.

14. Id., art. 48, at 246. The Court achieved its competence to hear cases on Sept. 3, 1958. Id., art. 56, at 248. As of Dec. 31, 1986, 19 states had recognized the competence of the Court to hear cases: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. STOCK-TAKING: SUPPLEMENT, supra note 10, at v.

15. European Convention, supra note 5, arts. 52–53, at 248.

16. Id., art. 54, at 248.

17. Id., art. 32, at 240–44.

vocates to improve the European Convention's machinery to fight torture and other ill-treatment. First, Europeans became disillusioned with the European Convention's ability to deal effectively with torture. For example, although Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands filed petitions against Greece alleging torture, the European Convention's procedures were ineffective in stopping or preventing torture in Greece.\(^{19}\) Amnesty International commented that the Greek torturers' "appreciation of the international system and the effectiveness of the international protection of human rights was certainly more accurate than the hopes of the intellectuals and professors they were torturing."\(^{20}\) Even where the European Convention's machinery had an opportunity to function, the process took years. In the *Ireland v. United Kingdom* case,\(^{21}\) six years passed from the lodging of the complaint to the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights—a pace grossly inadequate for the immediate needs of fighting torture and other ill-treatment.\(^{22}\)

Second, the efforts of Amnesty International in the early 1970's jolted the complacent international attitude toward torture. In its 1975 *Report on Torture*, Amnesty International reported that over sixty countries practiced torture.\(^{23}\) European states began to push within the United Nations and the Council of Europe for new measures to protect individuals from torture.\(^{24}\) In the mid-1970's, Jean-Jacques Gautier, a Swiss human rights

---

20. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, *supra* note 4, at 100.
22. As one commentator has stated: "Although it takes an average of about six years for a case to be decided in Strasbourg, in some instances nine or ten years have elapsed before a case is resolved." Drzenczewski, *The European Human Rights Convention: Time for a Radical Overhaul?*, 10 B.C. INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 9, 13 (1987).
23. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, *supra* note 4, at 31. Amnesty International summed up the painful paradox: "Never has there been a stronger or more universal consensus on the total inadmissibility [sic] of the practice of torture . . . [but] at the same time the practice of torture has reached epidemic proportions." *Id*.
lawyer, began promoting the idea of a new European convention for the prevention of torture. Gautier wanted to incorporate the system of periodic visits and confidential recommendations to government authorities developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross in its work with prisoners of war under the four Geneva Conventions. A draft prevention treaty followed. Through a confidential visitation system to detention facilities by an independent European body, Gautier and other European human rights activists hoped to prevent acts of torture and ill-treatment instead of merely reacting to them through the petition procedures of the European Convention.

In deference to the United Nations' efforts to prepare a United Nations Convention against Torture, the International Commission of Jurists and the Swiss Committee against Torture turned Gautier's draft prevention treaty into a draft Optional Protocol to the proposed United Nations Convention against Torture. In 1980, Costa Rica submitted this draft Optional Protocol to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights for consideration. Although the Council of Europe threw its support behind the draft Optional Protocol, the


27. Similarly, Amnesty International in 1973 included as one of its recommendations for strengthening the implementation and protection of individuals against torture the idea that the press, lawyers, families, and national and international inspectors have access to all prisons and detention facilities. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CONFERENCE FOR THE ABOLITION OF TORTURE: FINAL REPORT 14 (1973).

28. For a more detailed look at the proposals of these two bodies, see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS AND SWISS COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, TORTURE: HOW TO MAKE THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION EFFECTIVE (2d ed. 1980).


The United Nations Commission decided to delay consideration of the draft Optional Protocol until after the United Nations Convention against Torture was established.31

In 1983, when it was clear that the proposed United Nations Convention against Torture would not include the prevention system envisioned in the draft Optional Protocol, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers adopt the prevention system in a new European convention on torture.32 On June 26, 1987, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and opened it for signature on November 26, 1987.33 The Convention entered into force on February 1, 1989, three months after the Council of Europe received the seventh ratification.34

The first chapter of the Convention establishes a European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Committee) and authorizes it to make visits to examine “the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty” by the state in order to strengthen the protection of such individuals from torture or other ill-treatment.35 The Convention empowers the Committee to visit any place within the jurisdiction of the parties in which the state allegedly deprives individual liberty.36 State authorities must cooperate with the Committee during such visits.37

The size of the Committee equals the number of parties to the Convention.38 The persons selected to the Committee must be of high
moral character and either competent in the human rights field or have professional experience in penal detention.\textsuperscript{39} Only one national from each state may serve on the Committee, and the Committee members shall act independently of any state.\textsuperscript{40} The national delegations of the parties in the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly will nominate three individuals for Committee membership.\textsuperscript{41} The Council's Committee of Ministers will then elect the members of the Committee from the nominated individuals.\textsuperscript{42} Subject to a provision to stagger membership terms, elected members will serve four years on the Committee.\textsuperscript{43} Except where a party refuses to cooperate or act on Committee recommendations,\textsuperscript{44} Committee decisions will be made by a majority of members present.\textsuperscript{45}

The Committee may organize visits periodically or when circumstances require.\textsuperscript{46} At least two members of the Committee shall make a visit, assisted by experts and interpreters when the Committee thinks it necessary.\textsuperscript{47} When the Committee decides to make a visit, it must notify the government of the party of its intention.\textsuperscript{48} The text is ambiguous as to whether the Committee must notify the party of the specific facilities it intends to visit. Article 8 mentions only the Committee's general duty to notify the state of an intended visit, but article 9, paragraph 1 allows the party to "make representations to the Committee against a visit" to a particular place.\textsuperscript{49} The state visited

\textsuperscript{39} Id., art. 4, para. 2, at 1154.

\textsuperscript{40} Id., art. 4, paras. 3–4, at 1154.

\textsuperscript{41} Id., art. 5, para. 1, at 1155.

\textsuperscript{42} Id.

\textsuperscript{43} Id., art. 5, para. 3, at 1155.

\textsuperscript{44} See infra note 62 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{45} Id., art. 6, para. 1, at 1155. A quorum consists of a majority of the members. Id.

\textsuperscript{46} Id., art. 7, para. 1, at 1155.

\textsuperscript{47} Id., art. 7, para. 2, at 1155. Article 13 obligates Committee members and the experts, interpreters, and others selected to assist the Committee to maintain the confidentiality of all facts and information gathered while carrying out their responsibilities, both during and after their terms of office. Id., art. 13, at 1156. Experts chosen by the Committee must be knowledgeable and experienced in the fields addressed by the Convention, and such experts are bound to the same obligations of independence, impartiality, and availability as Committee members. The Committee must specify the names of the individuals assisting it when serving notice of a visit governed by article 8. A party may declare that a person chosen to assist the Committee will not be allowed to be a part of the visit in its jurisdiction. Id., art. 14, at 1156–57. Committee members and selected assisting individuals enjoy certain diplomatic privileges and immunities in exercising their duties, as elaborated in article 16 and the attached Annex. Id., arts. 16, annex, at 1157, 1158–59.

\textsuperscript{48} Id., art. 8, para. 1, at 1155.

\textsuperscript{49} Id., arts. 8 and 9, para. 1, at 1155–56. According to the International Commission of Jurists, the intention of the original draft was that "[o]nce having notified a state of their intention to make a periodic visit, delegates may visit any place of detention without prior notice, in order to avoid preparatory 'cleaning-up' of particular institutions." The European Draft Convention Against Torture, ICJ REV., Dec. 1983, at 51–52. The only explicit limitation on the Committee's visitation rights is article 17, paragraph 3, which states that the Committee will
must provide Committee delegates unrestricted access to its territory and to the facilities the Committee wishes to examine, as well as complete information on such facilities. The Convention secures the right of the Committee to interview privately persons deprived of liberty and to communicate freely with "any person [the Committee] believes can supply relevant information."

Once a visit is completed, the Committee has the option of immediately providing the state visited with its findings. The Committee will complete a report after each visit. The report is not a legal judgment or interpretation evaluating whether torture or other ill-treatment actually took place at the facilities visited. Rather, it sets forth the facts the Committee found during its visit. The Committee will send the report to the state visited with recommendations if needed. Further, the Committee may consult with the party on how best to improve protection of persons deprived of liberty. All dealings between the party visited and the Committee are confidential. Subject to this confidentiality requirement, the Committee will provide the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe with a general report of its activities that will be sent to the Consultative Assembly and made public.

Article 9, however, contains a 'general escape clause' that allows parties to forestall a visit by making exceptional "representations" to the Committee that the proposed time and place of the visit conflicts with national defense, public safety, ongoing prison disorder, the medical condition of detainees, or urgent interrogations of a serious crime. If a party makes such representations, the Convention obliges not visit places where representatives of protecting powers or the International Committee of the Red Cross visit on a periodic basis under the terms of the four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 and the two Protocols thereto of June 8, 1977. Convention, supra note 1, art. 17, para. 3, at 1157. The text of the Geneva Conventions can be found at 75 U.N.T.S. 1, 31, 89, 135 and 287 (1950); the text of the two Protocols is reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1442 (1977).

50. Convention, supra note 1, art. 8, para. 2, at 1155.
51. Id., art. 8, para. 4, at 1155.
52. Id., art. 8, para. 5, at 1155.
53. Id., art. 10, para. 1, at 1156.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id., art. 11, para. 1, at 1156. The Committee cannot publish reports of visits or personal information gathered therein without permission of the state visited or individual interviewed. Also, the Committee must publish its report when asked by the party to do so. Id., art. 11, paras. 2-3, at 1156.
57. Id., art. 12, at 1156.
58. Id., art. 9, para. 1, at 1156. The relevant text states:

In exceptional circumstances, the competent authorities of the Party concerned may make representations to the Committee against a visit at the time or to the particular place proposed by the Committee. Such representations may only be made on grounds of national defence, public safety, serious disorder in places where persons are deprived of their liberty, the medical condition of a person or that an urgent interrogation relating to a serious crime is in progress.
it to consult with the Committee to clarify its position and to seek arrangements that would allow the Committee to undertake the visit nonetheless. If the Committee wanted to visit a particular individual, the party must provide the Committee information about that person until the visit takes place.

Should a party refuse either to cooperate with the Committee or to improve a situation subsequent to Committee recommendations, the Committee will allow it the opportunity to explain its actions. After such explanation, the Committee by a two-thirds majority may decide to make a public statement concerning the situation.

For most of the member states of the Council of Europe, the impact of the new Convention will be marginal. Most Western European states enjoy good records in the treatment of prisoners and detainees. The new Convention may help Europeans clarify and monitor minimum standards for the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, but most European states maintain such standards without the need for a supranational watchdog body. The Convention could have greater impact in the one Council of Europe member state where torture is still a major problem: Turkey. According to Amnesty International, nearly all of the 250,000 political prisoners interrogated by Turkish police since 1980 were tortured. Although Turkey has joined the new Convention, the Convention's impact on torture in Turkey remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Turkey's record will likely improve—but for reasons

59. Id., art. 9, para. 2, at 1156. The relevant text states:

Following such representations, the Committee and the Party shall immediately enter into consultations in order to clarify the situation and seek agreement on arrangements to enable the Committee to exercise its functions expeditiously. Such arrangements may include the transfer to another place of any person whom the Committee proposed to visit. Until the visit takes place, the Party shall provide information to the Committee about any person concerned.

60. Id.

61. Id., art. 10, para. 2, at 1156.

62. Id. It is not clear if the Committee's obligation not to publish confidential information under article 11 is relaxed when a state refuses to cooperate with the Committee and the Committee votes to make a public statement on the matter under article 10, para. 2.


unconnected with the Convention. Turkey wants to join the European
Community (EC), and until it makes progress on human rights, its
application for EC membership is unlikely to gain approval. Any
improvement in Turkey's torture record, therefore, should not be
credited automatically to the Convention.

Further, if Turkey or any other European state wished to frustrate
the Committee's activities, the text of the Convention provides ample
loopholes. The biggest loophole is the 'general escape clause' contained
in article 9. The celebrated cases of torture in Europe during the life
of the European Convention arose under emergency situations or in
relation to terrorist or violent political offenses. The loophole in
article 9 seems designed to give states freedom of action for dealing
with such incidents and emergencies and will blunt the Convention's
impact on state responses to such situations. Through this provision,
state parties wield considerable discretion over the Committee's right
to make visits, undercutting much of the seemingly mandatory lan-
guage in the Convention.

Since torture and other ill-treatment rarely occur in most European
states and since the Convention provides states with a generous escape
clause, the Convention does not represent the brave step that its
proponents' rhetoric would indicate. Gautier, responding to criticism
of the Convention, revealed that the major motive for the Convention
was that the European example would encourage the prevention
scheme to be extended to other regions and international bodies. This
motive suggests that the Convention was intended primarily not to
prevent torture in Europe but rather as an "act of faith" for the fight
against torture in the international system.

The hope that the Convention will serve as a model and a catalyst
for other regional and international action against torture ignores
several harsh facts. First, the visitation scheme was available for many
years to the United Nations and the Organization of American States
(OAS) when both organizations were drafting new conventions against
torture. Yet both the United Nations and the OAS adopted conven-
tions that do not include a prevention scheme in any form at all.

66. See Turkey Applies to Join The European Community, MIDDLE EAST EXEC. REP., June 1987,
at 20.
67. See Turks Enjoy More Freedom but Torture Continues, supra note 65.
68. Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, para. 1, at 1156.
69. See supra note 6 and the cases contained therein.
70. Cassese, supra note 34, at 133.
71. As one commentator states, "this provision could still be misused with a view to
preventing or at least delaying certain visits." Nowak, supra note 25, at 29.
72. See Vargas, supra note 25, at 2.
73. See the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 29, and the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent
Further, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly delayed consideration of the prevention scheme contained in the Optional Protocol to the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture.\textsuperscript{74}

Second, the United Nations and other regional international organizations are not renowned for implementing effective enforcement remedies for human rights violations.\textsuperscript{75} In the unlikely event that a visitation scheme is adopted on a global level, it will most likely be watered down considerably from what appears in the new Convention for Europe.

Third, the high degree of cooperation and interdependence between European states make it possible for them to adopt a prevention scheme like the one embodied in the Convention. Such cooperation and interdependence are present in the international community to a much lesser extent, if at all. To create and implement a prevention system, community solidarity must be at a threshold level that the international and various regional communities currently do not approach.

Fourth, Europe's ability to maintain a solid record on torture and to adopt a novel human rights convention has less to do with the power of international human rights law than with the firm convictions shared by the European democracies of the inviolability of individual civil and political rights and of the vigorous rule of law. Such conviction, reflecting the influence of Western values, is unfortunately lacking in many other nations, frustrating and eroding the basis for successful human rights instruments.\textsuperscript{76}

In the Convention, European states have challenged the international system to close the gap between rhetoric and action in the fight against torture. The Convention's strategy of preventing torture by creating an independent supranational body to visit detention and penal facilities goes to the heart of the problem with human rights: effective supervision and implementation of human rights standards. The Europeans' forthrightness, however, should not be confused with measureable progress against torture in Europe or the international

\textsuperscript{74} See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{75} In the words of one scholar:

Despite the vast proliferation of instruments setting standards on human rights, imposing obligations as regards the observance of those standards and establishing procedures to deal with breaches of those obligations, violations of human rights continue, their perpetrators apparently undeterred.

Cassese, supra note 34, at 128.

\textsuperscript{76} "Until national legal systems improve their performance it is naive to put faith in 'progress by international legislation.'" Brownlie, The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations, in The Expansion of International Society 357, 368 (H. Bull & A. Watson eds. 1984).
system. For the foreseeable future, the Convention will stand for the obvious proposition that prohibiting torture requires better enforcement of human rights norms. It becomes, ironically, another admirable human rights objective against which stand all the harsh realities of domestic and international politics. For Europe and the international system, then, the new Convention is more symbol than substance.

David Fidler