Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law

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Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law

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I. Introduction

Doctrine that sets the preclusive effects of federal judgments reflects both concern over the appropriate use and conservation of federal judicial resources and the influence of other developments in federal procedure. These factors also are implicated when federal courts are asked to give preclusive effect to state court judgments. But federal courts have considerably less capacity to apply federal doctrines to determine the preclusive effect of state judgments than they do to determine the preclusive results of federal actions because the full faith and credit statute,1 section 1738, requires that state judgments be given as much preclusive effect in federal court as they would be given by the courts that rendered them. In many state-judgment cases, section 1738 has long confined federal courts to applying the preclusion law of the rendering state. In other state-judgment cases, the role of section 1738 has been shrouded in un-

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1. The statute reads as follows:

The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.

The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
certainty and controversy. My purpose in this Article is to suggest how the full faith and credit statute should be used to structure choice-of-law decisions when state judgments are presented in federal court. This Article will address three problems left unresolved in the Supreme Court's recent decision, *Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons.*

First, it is not always easy or, perhaps, even possible for federal courts to determine the content of state preclusion law. What if state law is undeveloped or unclear? What if the nature of the particular preclusion issue is such that no state court will ever rule on it? To what extent are the obligations of section 1738 relaxed when such difficulties appear? This Article suggests that section 1738 should be read to require that federal courts give preclusive effect to state judgments, whether the conclusion of preclusion is supported by apposite state precedents or merely suggested from a reading of state preclusion law. When state law provides no direction, however, federal courts should be permitted to revert to federal preclusion law and policy.

Next, when should another congressional act be read to imply an exception to section 1738? This Article argues that a presumption against implying an exception to section 1738 should exist in order to guard against judicial overreaching, reinforce the finality of state judgments, and promote harmony among state and federal courts. This presumption seems capable of withstanding arguments implying an exception to section 1738 from the creation of concurrent federal jurisdiction. And, in *Marrese* and many other cases, the fact that preclusion will defeat exercise of the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction is also insufficient to overcome this presumption.

Finally, when, if ever, should section 1738 leave federal courts free to give greater preclusive effect to a state judgment than would the rendering state? This Article contends that although the statute should place limits on such authority, use of section 1738 categorically to prohibit greater preclusion is neither inevitable nor desirable. Section 1738 should be read to leave federal courts free to apply federal law to augment the preclusive effects of a state judgment whenever doing so would not frustrate the purpose behind the state's rule of lesser preclusion and would advance the purpose behind the federal rule of greater preclusion.

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II. Preclusion in the Federal Courts

A. Federal Courts as an Intramural System

Federal courts generally regard the preclusive effects of federal judgments to be a question of federal law. Because Congress has provided very little guidance, federal courts have traditionally elaborated preclusion standards for federal judgments as a matter of common law. The federal courts' role in this context is equivalent to that played by state courts in determining the force and effect of their judgments. In either case, the court is administering an intramural law of preclusion for its own court system. Under the direction of the United States Supreme Court, the federal courts have extended the reach of their intramural preclusion law in both claim preclusion and issue preclusion.


The majority view has been developed most fully in Professor Degnan's article and seems to be the preferable approach. The subject, however, lies beyond the scope of this Article, which discusses state judgments. The preclusive effect of federal judgments in state court also lies beyond the scope of this Article. For a valuable discussion of that subject, see Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 759 (1979).

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982), which provides for the registration of federal judgments in other federal districts, states that "[a] judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner." Section 1963 fails, however, to provide any standards for determining the scope of federal preclusion. Furthermore, Professor Hazard identifies "only one federal statute that expressly deals with res judicata, the well-known provision concerning issue preclusion of the Clayton Act." Hazard, Reflections on the Substance of Finality, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 643 (1985).


7. The United States Supreme Court has employed this terminology in several of its recent cases. E.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). The term "claim preclusion" has become the modern synonym for the combined terms "merger" and "bar." "Issue preclusion" has similarly succeeded "collateral estoppel" and "estoppel by judgment."
The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties to final judgments from relitigating claims and may also foreclose the litigation of new claims. A new claim is precluded when it is so closely related to a previously raised claim that together they constitute a "claim" in a larger sense. This expanded concept of a claim is intended to signify all of the alternative legal theories and the full scope of remedies generated by the facts of the original controversy. Whether the entire claim, in this broad sense, was actually put forward in the prior case is immaterial; what matters is whether it could have been put forward.

Like their state counterparts, federal courts have faced problems in determining the limits of the doctrine of claim preclusion. Disappointed parties clearly need to be prevented from relitigating the same claims, but it is more difficult to decide when matters not actually raised in the prior proceeding should also be precluded. The Supreme Court once adhered to a formalistic and relatively narrow conception of a claim for preclusion purposes. In more recent times, however, many lower federal courts have adopted the expansive definition of a claim contained in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, and the Supreme Court has indi-


10. "A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Federated Dept Stores, Inc. v. Molitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); see also Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (holding that parties are also bound as to matters that could have been raised); Crouwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877) (same); cf. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984) ("Claim preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a matter that never has been litigated, because of a determination that it should have been advanced in an earlier suit.").

11. See, e.g., Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927) (describing a cause of action as "the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong")); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4407, at 59 (describing Baltimore as limiting the idea of a claim "to violation of a single right by a single wrong").

12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). Section 24 employs a transactional approach. Subsection (1) states that the former judgment precludes "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the [original] action arose." Subsection (2) provides that the scope of "transaction" and "series" of transactions "are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage."
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cated that it may do the same.\(^{13}\)

The doctrine of issue preclusion supplements claim preclusion by giving a final adjudication preclusive effect in a subsequent case that cannot be said, even in the broadest sense, to share the same claim. The doctrine precludes relitigation of issues of fact or law so long as the issue was actually raised, litigated, and necessary to the judgment in the prior proceeding.\(^{14}\)

One question has dominated modern-day developments in issue preclusion in both the federal and state intramural systems: When, if ever, can nonparties to the prior adjudication employ the doctrine? At one time the federal rule was never. Under the Supreme Court's mutuality doctrine, it was impossible for those who could not have been bound by a prior adjudication to use it to their advantage.\(^{15}\) Later, the Supreme Court attached importance to the difference between binding total strangers\(^{16}\) to the prior litigation and binding those who had previously obtained an adjudication of the issue, albeit against a different party.\(^{17}\)

\& E. Cooper, supra note 5, § 4407, at 62 n.35 (surveying federal cases adopting § 24 and noting other federal decisions that have employed alternatives to the transactional approach of § 24 to broaden the scope of claim preclusion).

13. The Supreme Court briefly discussed § 24 in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), observing that “[d]efinitions of what constitutes the same cause of action have not remained static over time.” Id. at 130. The Court followed this observation by comparing the claim definitions in the first and second Restatement of Judgments. Id. The Court praised § 24 as “a more pragmatic approach.” Id. at 131 n.12. The Court declined to go further and “parse any minute differences which these differing tests might produce” because it concluded that the plaintiffs were, under either test, subject to claim preclusion. Id. at 131.


These prerequisites have no counterpart in claim preclusion. The latter may be based on any judgment on the merits, including (subject to limited possibilities of collateral attack—see infra note 63) default judgments. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 comment a (1982); J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 3, at 655.


16. It remains true that genuine strangers to the prior proceeding cannot be bound by it. “It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979). In a few federal cases, strangers to a prior adjudication in the technical sense that they were not parties have been subjected to issue preclusion because of the extent of their actual involvement. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155 (1979) (holding that even though it was not a named party, the United States “plainly had a sufficient 'laboring-oar' in the conduct of the state-court litigation to actuate principles of [collateral] estoppel”). For arguments that issue preclusion should be used more extensively against nonparties, see Berch, A Proposal to Permit Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking Affirmative Relief, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 511. But see Pilemeyer, Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 383 (1983) (discussing possible violations of due process when the doctrine of collateral estoppel is used against a nonparty in the prior litigation).

17. The Court criticized the mutuality doctrine for “failing to recognize the obvious difference in position between a party who has never litigated an issue and one who has fully litigated and lost.”
Court has now dispensed with the doctrine of mutuality and permits strangers to the prior litigation to employ issue preclusion against those who were parties, whenever it appears from the circumstances that it is fair to do so.

Maximum use of claim and issue preclusion makes particular sense in the federal intramural system for two reasons. First, preclusion doctrines promote conservation of severely-taxed federal judicial resources.


For an excellent discussion of Parklane, see Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 Ind. L.J. 615 (1980).

18. Although the Supreme Court refused to invoke the mutuality requirement in Blonder-Tongue, the implications of the decision beyond its patent-law context were unclear. But, in Parklane, "the Court conclusively ended the mutuality of estoppel requirement in the federal courts and authorized the use of nonmutual estoppel." Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837, 968 (1984). For a survey of lower federal court decisions following Parklane, see Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 55-65 (1985).

19. Strangers to the prior adjudication may employ issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel) defensively or offensively. The Court recently used the terms to connote whether the party seeking the benefit of preclusion does so from the posture of a plaintiff (offensive use) or defendant (defensive use). United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 n.4 (1984); see also 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 5, § 4464, at 576 n.13 (surveying numerous federal decisions permitting defensive nonmutual issue preclusion); id. at 577-78 n.14 (surveying numerous federal decisions permitting offensive nonmutual issue preclusion). It now appears that issue preclusion may be invoked defensively against the United States as a party, United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984), but not offensively, Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162. Stauffer and Mendoza are discussed in Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States Government, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 113 (1984). For further discussion of Mendoza, see Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in the Pursuit of Litigant Equity, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 847 (1986).

20. Parklane can best be understood as completing the process, begun in Blonder-Tongue, of replacing one fairness test with another. The mutuality doctrine was bottomed on the idea that it was unfair to create risk-free opportunities for preclusion and that benefits of the preclusion were spoils of victory earned through the risk of equally adverse consequences. Rejecting this idea, Parklane declared that henceforth it would be necessary to come up with some good reason why nonmutual offensive preclusion should not be permitted. The Court granted federal courts "broad discretion to determine when it should be applied." Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331. Federal courts may use their discretion to refuse offensive preclusion when it is sought by one who deliberately bypassed an opportunity to participate in the original proceeding, when the defendant's stake in the original proceeding was so small that he had no incentive to defend vigorously, when the previous judgment relied on for preclusion was inconsistent with other judgments, or when the subsequent proceeding afforded significantly more advantageous procedural opportunities for the defendant. Id. at 330-31. These considerations, among others, provide a pragmatic and loose-textured fairness test. This new test shifts the focus of attention from the party wishing to use the doctrine to the party against whom it is invoked.

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Although some commentators have questioned the relationship between preclusion and judicial economy, it seems clear that growing aversion to relitigation is a leading reason for the expansion of preclusion doctrines in general and in the federal intramural system in particular. Second, the liberal claim and party joinder available in federal court is intended to dispose of as many controversies as possible in the first instance. By penalizing piecemeal litigation and delay, broadened preclusion pressures litigants to avail themselves of the many opportunities that the initial lawsuit provides.

B. Intersystem Preclusion

When federal courts consider the effect of state judgments, the courts are part of an intersystem judicial process. So long as state and federal preclusion law is identical, intersystem cases pose no special difficulties. This is frequently true, because the expansion of the preclusive effects of federal judgments has its counterpart in the law of most states. The question whether to rely on state or federal law in such

22. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4403, at 14 ("It is difficult to find much independent support for res judicata rules simply as a means to protect overworked courts."); Cleary, supra note 9, at 348-49 (rejecting "the saving in court time" as a "particularly unconvincing" justification for what would now be called claim preclusion).

23. Vestal, supra note 7, at 35; cf. Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 611 (1985) ("Resource conservation is a familiar and persistent motif in the literature of courts. Of late, as courts appear overused and underproductive, interest in economy has increased.").

24. The Supreme Court said in Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981), that it found one of its fifty-year-old res judicata precedents "even more compelling in view of today's crowded dockets." Id. at 401.

25. For example, Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "now makes it clear that any party who has asserted a claim for relief against an opposing party or parties may join with it whatever other claims he may have, regardless of their nature, against any opposing party." C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 526 (4th ed. 1983).

26. For example, the limits of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules are sufficiently broad that all those injured by a single tort may join as plaintiffs .... The rule does not require that all questions presented by each plaintiff be common; it is enough if there is any ... question common to all the claims. Similarly, all distinctions between joint and several rights or obligations on a contract have been abolished.

27. Federal litigants also enjoy liberal discovery and relatively broad opportunities for pleading amendment. It has been noted that, along with liberal claim pleading, "[t]hese opportunities thus enlarge the scope of what 'might have been' litigated by the plaintiff in the first action and should correspondingly enlarge the scope of claim preclusion." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 14, at 617.

28. The term is from Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 511.

29. Propreclusion developments in federal court are part of a larger movement. "[T]he trend in the United States is toward increased finality." R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: COMMENTS—CASES—QUESTIONS 657 (3d ed. 1981). The approaches taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in its broad, transactional definition of a claim (§ 24) and in its rejection of the mutuality doctrine (§ 29) generally reflect the positions of most state intramural systems. The nearness of the emerging federal test to the Restatement's claim definition has already been noted. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court's nonmutual preclusion test in
cases is largely a matter of protocol.\textsuperscript{30} But different court systems have not set the same boundaries for their preclusion doctrines; the federal and various state systems have adopted different approaches.\textsuperscript{31} This is not because of disagreement over what preclusion policies courts should recognize. The same general policies\textsuperscript{32} are accepted everywhere.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, concern for correctness of judicial decision, the prudential counterforce to preclusion,\textsuperscript{34} is also a constant in all systems. Differences result because of other policies in each system that the preclusion law must support (for example, the federal policies of liberal claim and party joinder, pleading amendments, and discovery)\textsuperscript{35} and because of varying local assessments of the scarcity

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979), is quite similar to the criteria appearing in § 29 of the Restatement. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 692 n.36 (suggesting that the American Law Institute adopted the Parklane criteria in § 29).

30. For example, in Brown v. St. Louis Police Dept', 691 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1982), although the Eighth Circuit looked to Missouri law to determine the claim preclusive effect of a Missouri state judgment, the court noted that it would have come to the same conclusion had it instead relied on federal preclusion doctrine. \textit{Id.} at 396 n.2.

31. The clash of viewpoints may be largely a twentieth-century phenomenon. "Courts and judges of the 19th century shared a common understanding of res judicata in terms of what a judgment decided. . . . [T]his common agreement no longer exists . . . ." Degnan, \textit{supra} note 3, at 742 (emphasis in original).

32. Briefly stated, the policies are "to save judicial energy, to prevent harassment of the defendant, to further societal interests in the orderly and expeditious resolution of controversies, and to give repose . . . ." A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, \textit{THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS} 1459 (1965). For further discussion, see A. VESTAL, \textit{supra} note 7, at 7-12; Vestal, \textit{supra} note 7, at 31-43. On the particular significance of giving repose to judicial decisions, see \textit{infra} note 104.

33. \textit{See} F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, \textit{supra} note 14, at 590 (stating that the "social objectives of the rules [of res judicata] have remained much the same").

34. Strangers to the prior proceeding are usually able to resist its preclusive effects on due process grounds. \textit{See supra} note 16. This is less because the judgment might be incorrect than because due process, in this context, guarantees a "day in court." Because those who participated in the prior proceeding have had a day in court, they usually will be unable to use due process as a shield against preclusion. \textit{See infra} notes 266-70 and accompanying text. When participants' resistance to preclusion succeeds, it is because of concern over the correctness of the prior adjudication.

It is often said that the incorrectness of a judgment does not diminish its preclusive effect. \textit{See}, e.g., Federated Dept' Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 (1981) (stating that the "res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong"). This is certainly true when the second suit is a replication of the first, but the more dissimilar the suits become, the more the point loses force. Every system seems to recognize some point at which preclusion (although constitutional) is inappropriate because the judgment does not carry a sufficient assurance of correctness to properly govern the different case. As Learned Hand observed, \textit{res judicata} "must be treated as a compromise between two conflicting interests: the convenience of avoiding a multiplicity of suits and the adequacy of the remedies afforded for conceded wrongs." Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955); \textit{see also} Vestal, \textit{supra} note 7, at 29 (discussing Lyons).

The functions that concerns about correctness play in checking constitutional applications of preclusion may explain why preclusion law—unlike the law of personal jurisdiction—has, for the most part, not become a subcategory of the constitutional law of due process.

35. \textit{See supra} notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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of judicial resources. Within constitutional limits, each intramural approach determines how many opportunities to litigate should be sacrificed for the good of its system.

Two important issues illustrate conflicting approaches: claim definition and recognition of nonmutual issue preclusion. Most state systems give “claim” a broad definition, similar to that found in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and the federal intramural system. A minority of states, however, adhere to a narrower definition. They permit accident plaintiffs to split what appears to be a single claim into separate suits for property damage and personal injury. Similarly, although most state systems have joined the Restatement (Second) and the federal courts in permitting some degree of nonmutual issue preclusion, a minority still adhere to the mutuality doctrine.

There are other, not yet as significant, points of existing or potential conflict in preclusion law. For example, when should judgment in the original proceeding be considered final, and what effect, if any, should be given punitive dismissals? Claim preclusion is subject to real and potential differences over the scope of privity and over the effect of rule

36. Cf. supra notes 21, 24 and accompanying text (discussing the view that federal judicial resources are overtaxed).

37. See supra notes 12-13, 30 and accompanying text.


39. See supra notes 18-20, 30.

40. See cases cited at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter’s note (1982); Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 510 n.1, 518 n.35; Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1062-64 (1970). Professor Casad writes that “in recent years, nine states have reaffirmed their adherence to the mutuality doctrine.” Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 510 n.1 (citing cases from Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, and North Dakota).

41. “[I]t has become clear in the federal courts that res judicata ordinarily attaches to a final lower court judgment even though an appeal has been taken and remains undecided.” 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4427, at 270. In contrast, some state systems do not give finality to their judgments if there is a possibility that the outcome will be changed through appeal. See, e.g., Chavez v. Morris, 566 F. Supp. 359, 360 (D. Utah 1983) (“A Utah state court judgment is not final while an appeal is pending or until the time to appeal has expired.”).

42. “Penalty dismissals seem exquisitely difficult.” 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467, at 643.

12(b)(6)-type dismissals. Differences in issue preclusion law include the scope of the "necessarily decided" prerequisite, extension of the doctrine to ultimate as well as to evidentiary facts, and the effects, if any, of default judgments.

Choice-of-law issues arise when a state judgment presented for enforcement in federal court comes from a system with a conflicting intramural preclusion rule. To the extent that federal policies are at stake when federal courts are called upon to enforce state judgments, it might be reasonable to expect federal courts to apply their own preclusion doctrine in intersystem cases. The Supreme Court, however, has read the full faith and credit statute8 to greatly restrict the authority of a federal court to vary from the preclusion law of the rendering state.

Section 1738's requirement, that federal courts give "such faith and credit" to state "records and judicial proceedings" as they would have in the courts of that state, dates from the Act's passage in 1790. Although there is scant history concerning the enactment of what is now section

44. Under the federal intramural standard, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are decisions on the merits, and thus are capable of generating claim preclusion. Federated Dept Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). The federal rule appears to be the same as that of many state courts—claim preclusion operates even when dismissal is brought about by curable defects in the pleading. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4439, at 354 (stating that "most federal and state courts hold that the second action [brought on an improved complaint] is precluded"). But some state systems continue to follow what was once the majority rule and refuse to extend claim preclusion this far. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Braniff Int'l Corp., 579 F.2d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that an involuntary dismissal that allowed plaintiffs to file an amended complaint was not preclusive under Illinois state law).

45. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467, at 642.


47. The federal court position appears to be that default judgments are incapable of generating issue preclusion. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (stating that "judgment in the prior suit precludes litigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action") (emphasis added); see also 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4442, at 375-76 n.3 (stating that default judgments do not support issue preclusion when judgments are entered without further inquiry upon failure to answer).

New York's intramural system takes the opposite view—default judgments can support issue preclusion with reference to issues that might have been raised if the lawsuit had proceeded. D. SIEGEL, HANDBOOK ON NEW YORK PRACTICE 597 (1978); Rosenberg, Collateral Estoppel in New York, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 165, 174 (1969) (stating that New York decisions indicate "that defaults . . . foreclose matters that might have been raised and decided").

New York's position may be so unfair that it is unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying notes 267-69. But if the New York rule is valid, the situation presents an example—perhaps the only one—of the federal intramural system opting for the less preclusive of two permissible options.


49. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. For the text of the original statute, see Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 33, 60 (1957). Documents explaining the legislative history of the Act apparently were destroyed when the British burned the Capitol in 1814. See id. at 60 n.124. Amendements to the statute, reviewed in Nadelmann, id. at 81-86 and Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respec-
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1738, it seems clear that Congress intended to impose upon federal courts an obligation to recognize and enforce the judgments of states equivalent to the obligation imposed on sister states by the Constitution's full faith and credit clause to recognize and enforce sister-state judgments. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute accordingly.

Congress has the authority to elaborate a more precise and systematic set of regulations for the intersystem enforcement of judgments. Commentators have raised the idea, but Congress has never really acted upon it; and, except in child custody cases, section 1738 has remained the standard for regulating choice of preclusion law.

Several of the earliest federal cases considered article IV and section 1738 to do no more than repeat the requirement of the full faith and credit clause of the Articles of Confederation: that judgments be taken

tive Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 95 n.2 (1984), have not altered the standard set forth in the text.

50. See Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 66 (1982); Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C.L. REV. 59, 84 (1984). Documents making up the legislative history of the Act have been lost. Nadelmann, supra note 49, at 60 n.124.

51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."

52. Atwood, supra note 50, at 67; Degnan, supra note 3, at 743-44.

53. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1939) ("The Act extended the rule of the Constitution to all courts, federal as well as state.").

Numerous articles have been written covering all or part of the history of judgment recognition from colonial times, through the Articles of Confederation, to the constitutional period. See Nadelmann, supra note 49; Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981); see also Degnan, supra note 3, at 742 n.5 (listing numerous authorities that discuss the evolution of the constitutional concept of full faith and credit); Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1944) (providing a detailed analysis of the historical developments of the full faith and credit clause); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153 n.4 (1949) (listing authorities that discuss the history of the clause); Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 UCLA L. REV. 441 (1955) (analyzing the advocacy of and defenses to a full faith and credit claim in judicial proceedings).

54. In addition to the authority ceded to Congress in art. IV, § 1 of the Constitution, other bases of legislative jurisdiction include the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, and the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Insofar as federal judgments or federal enforcement by courts are involved, Congress' authority under article III is also implicated.


57. The final paragraph of art. IV of the Articles of Confederation stated: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State."
as prima facie evidence in subsequent proceedings. Such an approach would have left federal courts free to apply their own law in determining the preclusive effects of state judgments. It was not long, however, before the Supreme Court rejected this view. In *Mills v. Durpee*, the Court held that for a federal court to give full faith and credit to a New York state judgment it must identify and apply New York preclusion law. Justice Story wrote: "[W]e can perceive no rational interpretation of the act... unless it declares a judgment conclusive when a court of the particular state where it is rendered would pronounce the same decision." In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court reiterated that the statute in judgment-enforcement settings served as a choice-of-preclusion-law directive.

Today, federal courts will apply state preclusion law in most state-judgment cases. But two exceptions to this requirement exist and two more should be seriously entertained.

The first two exceptions are clearly established. Section 1738 does not require federal courts to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment when it would be unconstitutional to do so, or when another congressional enactment operates to suspend section 1738. Two further exceptions should exist. Federal courts should not be confined to state preclusion law when it is so undeveloped or confused that it does not suggest an answer. In addition, federal courts should be free to give greater effect to a state judgment than the rendering court would give, when doing so would not frustrate the purpose behind the state's rule of lesser preclusion and would advance the purpose behind the federal forum's rule of greater preclusion.

The first of these four exceptions acknowledges the obligation of federal courts to consider properly raised due process objections to insufficient notice or the lack of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend-

58. For a review of cases so holding during the Articles of Confederation period, see Sumner, supra note 53, at 442 n.6. For early cases taking the same view under article IV of the Constitution and the full faith and credit statute, see Nadelmann, supra note 49, at 63-64; Sumner, supra note 53, at 443.
59. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
60. "[I]t is beyond all doubt that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York was conclusive upon the parties in that state. It must, therefore, be conclusive here also." Id. at 484.
61. Id. at 485.
62. See, e.g., Union & Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903) (stating that "[a]s the judgment pleaded had no force or effect in the Tennessee state courts other than as a bar to the identical taxes litigated in the suit, the courts of the United States can afford it no greater efficacy"); Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818) (reaffirming the *Mills* doctrine that a state court judgment has the same effect in federal courts as it does in other state courts); see also infra note 103 (citing other cases that apply the *Mills* doctrine); cf. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 135 (1912) ("The general effect of a judgment of a court of one State... is that which it has, by law or usage, in the courts of the State from which it comes.").
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ants in the prior state proceeding. Similarly, federal courts must consider whether the preclusion rule of the judgment-rendering state is so sweeping that it lacks the fundamental fairness that due process requires. Because the state court that rendered the judgment would be required to entertain these same due process issues, a federal court may do so without denying the judgments full faith and credit.


Adequacy of notice and personal jurisdiction questions underlying the judgment may be raised if the judgment was obtained by default. This rule of general application was noted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 (1982), and by the Supreme Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706-07 (1982).

Because a frequent consequence of insufficient notice is that the defendant learns of the original adjudication only after it has been reduced to a final judgment, collateral attack on notice grounds is freely available. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 comment b (1982). In contrast, the defendant is in a position to appreciate the personal jurisdiction issue as soon as he receives the summons and complaint. As a result, the defendant has the option of litigating in the forum selected by plaintiff or taking a default judgment and collaterally attacking it on jurisdictional grounds when it is presented for enforcement elsewhere (typically the defendant's home state).

It is essential that a defendant be permitted the option of taking a default judgment and collaterally attacking it on jurisdictional grounds. Whatever the claim-preclusive effect of a default judgment generally, see supra note 14, due process requires that a defendant's refusal to participate in the forum the plaintiff selected should not preclude him from subsequently attacking the judgment on personal jurisdiction grounds. On the one hand, under these circumstances, the "right to challenge jurisdiction makes [the defendant] an instrument for confining judicial authority to its prescribed limits." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 65 comment b (1982). On the other hand, if the defendant elects initially to challenge personal jurisdiction and is unsuccessful, that decision will preclude reexamination of the question when the judgment is presented for enforcement. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703-05; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938). Theoretically, preclusion law also should prevent collateral attack if the defendant omitted his jurisdictional challenge when participating in the initial proceeding. The tendency in such cases, however, is for courts to reach the same result simply by noting that defendant's participation in the initial proceeding operated as a consent to jurisdiction. E.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 703-05.

64. Due process usually protects strangers to the prior proceeding from preclusion. See supra note 16. Due process may also protect prior participants from unfair surprise. Atwood, supra note 50, at 70; Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 524.

65. See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1945); Reese & Johnson, supra note 53, at 165. The Supreme Court has observed that, in refusing enforcement to a state judgment on due process grounds, "other state and federal courts would still be providing a state court judgment with the 'same' preclusive effect as the courts of the State from which the judgment emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482 (1982).


Sister-state and federal courts are also under no obligation to enforce judgments that, for any other reason, would be denied enforcement by the state courts originally rendering them. See A.
The authority of federal courts to refuse enforcement of state judgments on due process grounds is beyond question. Important questions exist, however, concerning the prerequisites for the second exception and when or whether the third and fourth exceptions should apply. In addressing these questions, this Article begins with a recent case that presented the Supreme Court an opportunity to answer them: Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons.66

III. The Supreme Court at the Crossroads: The Marrese Case

A. The Decisions

The American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons denied membership to Dr. Marrese and a copetitioner. They sued the Academy in Illinois state court, alleging breach of a duty (founded upon the Illinois Constitution and Illinois common law) to consider fairly their applications. The court dismissed their case for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs then filed a federal antitrust suit in Illinois. The Academy moved to dismiss on the ground that the final judgments in the prior Illinois state case precluded the federal antitrust claims. After several district and circuit decisions, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, decided that the claims were precluded.67

Writing for a plurality of the court, Judge Posner acknowledged that plaintiffs’ antitrust claims68 could not have been presented in the prior state proceeding because they were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court.69 But, he noted, plaintiffs could have presented similar Illinois state antitrust claims in the prior suit.70 Judge Posner suggested that if plaintiffs had initially joined state antitrust claims with the claims actually raised in the prior case, and if the state antitrust claims had been finally adjudicated, that would have precluded a subsequent federal adjudication of the federal antitrust claims.71 He contended that

69. 726 F.2d at 1154.
70. Id. at 1153, 1155.
71. Id. at 1153-54.
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the result should not be different just because the state antitrust claims were not raised in the prior case.\textsuperscript{72}

The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, reversed the Seventh Circuit.\textsuperscript{73} The Court stated that section 1738 requires a federal court considering the preclusive effect of a state judgment to begin its inquiry by examining state preclusion law.\textsuperscript{74} The circuit court erred in disregarding Illinois state law.\textsuperscript{75} Noting disagreement in the circuit opinions and between the parties over whether the prior judgment would be given claim preclusive effect under Illinois law, the Court remanded the case so that the district court might initially determine the content of Illinois preclusion law.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{B. The Statutory Exception Question}

The Constitution probably does not compel federal courts to recognize the preclusive effects of state judgments created under state law.\textsuperscript{77} It

\textsuperscript{72} Id. at 1154-56. In his lengthy dissent, Judge Cudahy set forth the opposing view. Id. at 1173-83. He argued that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to accept limitations that state preclusion law places on state judgments. Because he read Illinois decisions to follow the general principle that a court’s judgments do not preclude claims that the court is not competent to adjudicate, and because Illinois state courts were not competent to adjudicate plaintiffs’ federal antitrust claims, Judge Cudahy concluded that the prior adjudication was not preclusive under Illinois law. Id. at 1180. He further argued that, even if federal courts were free to give greater force to a state judgment, \textit{Marrese} did not present the appropriate occasion for doing so for several reasons. Judge Cudahy saw material differences between the state and federal antitrust causes of action. As a more basic matter, he questioned the plurality's comparison of the Illinois and federal antitrust claims when the state antitrust claim had not been presented in the prior proceeding. Judge Cudahy was particularly concerned that the plurality’s approach could lead to trial \textit{in absentia} of federal antitrust claims in state proceedings. This, he felt, would undermine the goal of uniform interpretation and application of federal antitrust law intended by exclusive federal jurisdiction. For an extensive critique of the opinions of Judges Posner and Cudahy, see Comment, \textit{The Claim Preclusive Effect of State Judgments of Federal Antitrust Claims: Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons}, 71 IOWA L. REV. 609 (1986).

Retired Justice Stewart (sitting on the Seventh Circuit by designation) voiced many of these criticisms in his dissent to an earlier \textit{Marrese} decision that was subsequently vacated en banc. See \textit{Marrese} v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1096-1100 (7th Cir. 1982).

For a description of the complex subsequent history and vacation of this case, see 726 F.2d at 1152.

\textsuperscript{73} 470 U.S. 373 (1985). The Justices voted 7-0 in favor of reversal with Justices Blackmun and Stevens not participating in the decision. Chief Justice Burger filed a separate opinion.

\textsuperscript{74} The point is made at least three times in the Court’s opinion, see id. at 375, 380-81, 386, and also in the Chief Justice's concurrence, see id. at 387.

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 375.

\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 387.

\textsuperscript{77} Article IV of the Constitution imposes a full faith and credit obligation only upon sister states. \textit{See supra} note 51. Perhaps it could be argued that, in the absence of the full faith and credit statute, the tenth amendment would place some obligation on federal courts to respect state judgments. Even during the halcyon period of tenth amendment law, however, when National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was in force, the argument would not have been easy to make. And the climate for the argument worsened considerably when the Court, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruled \textit{National League of Cities}. For a discussion of Garcia, see Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: \textit{The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine}, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1985).
follows that Congress did not have to enact the original full faith and credit statute, and that it is free either to repeal it or to lighten its obligations by amending it to create exceptions. As the law now stands, however, section 1738 contains no exceptions.\textsuperscript{78} One must look for exceptions in other federal statutes. For example, Congress has expressly suspended the full faith and credit requirement in the federal habeas corpus statute.\textsuperscript{79} But the question will more often be whether suspension, though not expressly required, is necessary to effectuate the purposes for a statutory grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. In short, should a court imply an exception to the mandate of section 1738?

Because Congress has not expressly suspended the preclusive effect of state judgments in subsequent federal antitrust cases,\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Marrese} provided the Supreme Court with precisely the kind of implied-exception issue that has divided commentators\textsuperscript{81} and generated uncertainty in the lower federal courts.\textsuperscript{82} But the Court declined to resolve the issue, stat-

\textsuperscript{78} For the text of the statute, see supra note 1. It is clear that the “full faith and credit” obligation of the statute requires at the very least that federal courts give as much preclusive effect to state judgments as would the courts that rendered them. See infra note 103.


For examples of exclusive federal jurisdiction clearly expressed by statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (patent and copyright actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f) (actions to quiet title to real estate to which the United States claims an interest). The American Law Institute recommended that exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction also be expressed by statute. \textit{ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS} 24-25 (1969) [hereinafter cited as \textit{ALI STUDY}].


\textsuperscript{82} Atwood, supra note 50, at 62; see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5,
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ing that such a determination would be necessary only if the inquiry into state law on remand led to the conclusion that the prior judgment was preclusive under Illinois law.83

Marrese did work one change in the law. Federal courts will no longer be able to ignore section 1738 when considering the implications of exclusive federal jurisdiction on the enforceability of state judgments.84 It is unfortunate, however, that the Court's opinion does not shed more light on how federal courts should frame and resolve implied statutory-exception issues.85

The Court did offer the following general observation concerning the approach that should be taken on remand:

[Resolving] whether the concerns underlying a particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction justify a finding of an implied partial repeal of § 1738 . . . will depend on the particular federal statute as well as the nature of the claim or issue involved in the subsequent federal action. Our previous decisions indicate that the primary consideration must be the intent of Congress.86

The opinion, however, provides little specific guidance beyond a review of the sketchy picture that the Court's earlier decisions created. As it had already suggested in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,87 the Court rejected the idea that exclusive federal jurisdiction invariably creates an exception to section 1738.88 At the same time, the Court seemed, through its use of Brown v. Felsen,89 to confirm that implied statutory exceptions to section 1738, at least theoretically, are possible.90


83. 470 U.S. 373, 386.
84. Like the Seventh Circuit in Marrese, the majority of lower federal court cases had made no reference to section 1738. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4470.
85. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger chided the Court for failing to provide more guidance to the district court. 470 U.S. at 387.
86. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
87. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). The Court applied § 1738 although it refused to decide whether plaintiff's Title VII suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court. Id. at 506 n.20.
88. As the Marrese Court noted, "Kremer implies that absent an exception to § 1738, state law determines at least the issue preclusive effect of a prior state judgment in a subsequent action involving a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts." 470 U.S. at 381.
90. The Marrese Court, juxtaposing Brown with Kremer, described Kremer as "finding no congressional intent to depart from § 1738 for purposes of Title VII" and Brown as "finding congressional intent that state judgments would not have claim preclusive effect on dischargeability issue in bankruptcy." 470 U.S. at 386. In Brown, the Supreme Court considered the effect of a prior state adjudication in a federal bankruptcy proceeding under § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976) (repealed 1978). Curiously, though the Brown Court made no reference to the full faith and
C. The Greater Preclusion Question

The Marrese Court refused to entertain the possibility that the federal court could give claim-preclusive effect to the Illinois judgments, even though the state judgments would not be preclusive under Illinois law. Presumably, Congress could divest federal courts of the power to augment the preclusive effect of state judgments. Twice in Marrese the Court seemed to be saying that this was the effect of section 1738.

But Marrese's cursory treatment of the greater preclusion question only perpetuates doctrinal confusion created by several recent Supreme Court cases. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. and Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education suggested that federal credit statute, it did declare: "While Congress did not expressly confront the problem created by prebankruptcy state-court adjudications, it would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970 amendments to adopt a policy of res judicata which takes these § 17 questions away from bankruptcy courts and force them back into state courts."

442 U.S. at 136; see also Atwood, supra note 50, at 73-75 (discussing the significance of Brown to § 1738 litigation).

91. The Court stated that § 1738 directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which judgment was rendered. "It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. Rather, it goes beyond the common law and commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken."

470 U.S. at 380 (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481-82 (1982)). That this rule has "long been established" is a questionable assertion. See infra notes 106-07. Later the Court asserted that, in Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984), it had rejected "the view that § 1738 allows a federal court to give a state court judgment greater preclusive effect than the state courts themselves would give to it." 470 U.S. at 384; see also id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing Migra for the proposition "that a federal court is not free to accord greater preclusive effect to a state court judgment than the state courts themselves would give to it").

92. Congress' authority to do so can be traced from article III of the Constitution. Article III reposes the power to create lower federal courts in Congress, and it has long been clear that federal courts may exercise only as much power as Congress has elaborated in subject matter jurisdiction statutes. E.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850). From Congress' authority to grant jurisdiction to federal courts must be implied authority to diminish the courts' power. Congress may do this by repealing grants of subject matter jurisdiction or by restricting the availability of judicial remedies. See generally Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 507-11 (1928) (providing a history of the statutes that have defined federal jurisdiction over federal question cases). For example, the authority of Congress to withdraw the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions is beyond question. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). The authority of Congress to impose choice-of-law directives on federal courts is equally clear. The most prominent example is the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), which requires federal courts to apply the "laws of the several states . . . as rules of decision in civil actions" unless the federal constitution, statutes, or treaties "otherwise require or provide."

93. See 470 U.S. at 383, 386. 481-82 (1982). Kremer held, "Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged." Id. at 466. One commentator has gone so far as to read Kremer as making "federal doctrine . . . irrelevant." Smith, supra note 50, at 72.

94. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). Kremer held, "Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged." Id. at 466. One commentator has gone so far as to read Kremer as making "federal doctrine . . . irrelevant." Smith, supra note 50, at 72.

95. 465 U.S. 75 (1984). The Migra Court declared, "It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." Id. at 81; see also id. at 88 (White, J.,
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courts may not increase the preclusive effects of state judgments. But an intervening decision, Haring v. Prosise, appears neatly to counterbalance the implications of these two decisions. In Haring, the Court devoted several pages to discussing whether, on grounds of federal policy, it could justify giving preclusive effect to a Virginia judgment when Virginia law would not. The Court decided against preclusion, but this discussion suggests that when section 1738 does not require preclusion because the judgment would not be preclusive under state law, preclusion supported by federal doctrine remains a possibility. If section 1738 stood as a per se bar to greater preclusion, the Court's discussion would have been pointless. In its crude way, Marrese may have tied the hands of federal judges whenever they are called upon to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments. Analytically, however, Marrese preserves the dichotomy between Haring and the Kremer and Migra decisions by citing all three cases with approval.

concurring) (citing authorities for the proposition that a federal court may not increase the preclusive effects of state judgments).

96. It should be noted, however, that the greater preclusion issue was not before the Court in Kremer, because the Court was satisfied that the New York judgment was preclusive under state law. 456 U.S. at 466-67. And, the Court's analysis in Migra suggests that Ohio courts probably would have regard their judgment as preclusive as well. See 465 U.S. at 87. Both decisions focused on the obligation of federal courts under § 1738 to give as much preclusive effect to a state judgment as that judgment would have in the state courts that rendered them.


98. Id. at 317-23. The Court similarly commented on the desirability of giving greater preclusive effect to the Illinois judgment in Marrese. Noting the position of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments against preclusion in cases like Marrese, the Court said: "[W]here state preclusion rules do not indicate that a claim is barred, we do not believe that federal courts should fashion a federal rule to preclude a claim that could not have been raised in the state proceedings." 470 U.S. at 384 n.3. Later the Court observed:

We are unwilling to create a special exception to § 1738 for federal antitrust claims that would give state court judgments greater preclusive effect than would the courts of the State rendering the judgment. Cf. Haring v. Prosise . . . (refusing to create special preclusion rule for § 1983 claim subsequent to plaintiff's guilty plea).

Id. at 384. And, it labeled as "debatable" the contention that the court of appeals' approach in Marrese would advance federal policies of economy and consolidation. Id. at 385.

99. The Haring Court seems to have made a distinction between the function of § 1738 in authorizing or explaining a choice of preclusion law and the function of the statute in limiting choices. The Supreme Court suggested that federal judges must follow § 1738 when they are faced with state judgments that would be preclusive where rendered; in such cases § 1738 explains the selection of state preclusion law. 462 U.S. at 313. However, at least in cases in which state courts would not regard the judgment as preclusive, § 1738 does not require federal courts to apply only state preclusion law. See id. at 314 n.8. That the Court ultimately declined to create a federal preclusion rule is immaterial. Its very willingness to entertain the argument supports the authority of federal courts—at least in some cases—to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments than would the courts of the state rendering the judgment. For a more extensive discussion of the limiting effect of Haring on § 1738 in greater preclusion cases, see infra text accompanying notes 237-44.

100. 470 U.S. at 380, 384-86. Since Marrese, however, the Supreme Court seems to have gone further toward reading § 1738 as a categorical denial of federal court authority to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments. In Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768, 771-72 (1986), the Court reiterated the restrictive view it had taken in Kremer, Migra, and Marrese. Writing in Parsons for a unanimous court, Justice Rehnquist made no reference to Haring.
The problem is one of statutory interpretation. It is clear that, subject to constitutional restraints\(^{101}\) and the possibility of a statutory exception,\(^ {102}\) section 1738 requires federal courts to give state judgments as much preclusive effect as they would have under state law.\(^ {103}\) This interpretation is essential to preserve the authority of the state judgment-rendering courts\(^ {104}\) and to realize the statute’s goal of establishing a parity of obligation between state and federal enforcement courts.\(^ {105}\) These policies fail to explain, however, why the statute’s full faith and credit obligation also should compel federal courts to honor the limitations of state preclusion law.

This is not to say that section 1738 is or should be without application in the latter situation. It is just that a separate rationale for explaining—and perhaps limiting—its application must be found.\(^ {106}\) The Supreme Court renewed its interest in section 1738 as a choice-of-preclusion-law directive only recently.\(^ {107}\) The Court has yet to discuss, how-

1. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
2. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
3. The Supreme Court first asserted that § 1738 requires a federal court to give at least as much preclusive effect to a judgment as it would receive in the court that rendered it in Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) discussed supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. The rule has been restated in numerous cases. E.g., Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 (1983); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); Covington v. First Nat’l Bank, 198 U.S. 101, 109 (1905). The Allen Court put the matter simply, observing of § 1783: “Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so . . . .” 449 U.S. at 96.
4. If other judicial systems could ignore the local authority of a state court’s judgments, the stature of that court would be impaired, and it would be impossible to find repose through the formal resolution of controversies. Authorities are in unanimous agreement that these are central purposes of preclusion. See supra note 32; see also Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 383, 385 (1985) (discussing the importance of giving repose to state judgments); cf. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 5, § 4403, at 15 (“Repose is the most important product of res judicata.”). The Supreme Court has placed a similar premium on repose regarding federal judgments. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1983) (discussing the importance of giving repose to federal judgments).
5. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
6. This assumes that an investigation of state preclusion law either yields an answer to the preclusion question or at least establishes a predicate for concluding how courts of the state would view their own law under the same or substantially similar circumstances. See infra text following note 124. If, instead, state law is unavailing, federal courts probably should be permitted to chart an independent course. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
7. Uncertainty over how much state preclusion law § 1738 ought to require federal courts to apply has been noted elsewhere. See Atwood, supra note 50, at 71-72; Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 521-23; Casad, Introduction to Symposium: Preclusion in a Federal System, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 599, 600 (1985).
8. Before Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Supreme Court had on occasion dealt with prior state adjudications without utilizing state preclusion doctrine or § 1738. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). In Montana, the Supreme Court decided, without referring to § 1738, that a federal res judicata doctrine gave issue-preclusive effect to a Montana judgment against the United States. Although defensible, the holding did represent a departure from the general rule that issue preclusion cannot be used to bind strangers to the prior
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However, the greater preclusion problem thoughtfully or at any length. It is hoped that the Court will acknowledge through its interpretation of section 1738 the need to give different treatment to greater preclusion cases.

D. Looking Ahead

Notwithstanding the criticisms of some commentators, recent cases prior to Marrese probably have been correct in requiring state preclusion law to be followed. Under the circumstances presented in Marrese, the Court also seems correct in ruling out the possibility that greater effect could be given to the Illinois judgment.

But it is regrettable that the Supreme Court has not developed an interpretive approach that explains and harmonizes its various comments on section 1738. Because of the absence of a cohesive analysis, the Court’s decisions shed insufficient light on how different and more diffic-

adjudication. See supra note 16. The only Montana preclusion case cited by the Court did not bear on this issue, and it is unclear whether the Montana courts would have reached the same conclusion.

The Court commented that “considerations of comity as well as repose militate against redetermination of issues in a federal forum at the behest of a plaintiff who has chosen to litigate them in state court.” 440 U.S. at 163. The Court’s general approach in Montana, however, was to treat the preclusion issue as if it had arisen in a federal intramural setting, and the Court cited a number of federal-judgment cases, including Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924); Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294 (1917); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Sallfield, 241 U.S. 22 (1916); and Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897). Numerous lower federal court decisions also have gauged the preclusive effects of state judgments by federal intramural doctrine. See, e.g., Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663, 666 (11th Cir. 1984) (using principles of federalism in deciding not to give preclusive effect to state adjudication of constitutionality of state statute); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1977) (using federal standards to deny preclusive effect to state court adjudication of claim under Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1303-1305 (1970)); Drier v. Tarpon Oil Co., 522 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1975) (using federal standards to preclude relitigation in federal securities law case of issue of fact decided in a prior state judgment).

Some commentators assert that it is improper to view § 1738 as a choice-of-preclusion-law directive. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 3, at 625 (“I believe that the full faith and credit statute does not provide or choose preclusion law.” (footnote omitted)); Comment, The Collateral-Estoppel Effect to Be Given State-Court Judgments in Federal Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1471, 1492 (1980) (“Section 1738 provides a weak statutory basis on which to build a system of preclusion jurisprudence.”).

Professor Burbank, in his interesting article, offers a choice-of-preclusion-law approach derived from an interplay of federal common law and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). Although his arguments are imaginative, he has not yet demonstrated why § 1738 is an unsuitable mechanism for regulating choice of preclusion law. And I agree with Professor Hazard that there are serious questions concerning the plausibility of Professor Burbank’s § 1652 theory. Hazard, supra note 4, at 642-46. For the most recent presentation of Professor Burbank’s views, see Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 733 (1986).

108. See infra notes 183, 191, 197, 198, 206.


110. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.

111. See infra notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
cult federal cases should be decided in the future. In addition, the Supreme Court needs to elaborate more fully a standard to aid federal courts in determining when state preclusion law is so indecisive on the questions before them that it may be disregarded. The balance of this Article explores some of the possibilities for new development in this area.

IV. The Process of Honoring State Preclusion Law Under Section 1738

A. State Law as a Beginning Point

The Court's opinion in *Marrese* should eliminate the last vestiges of resistance to the rule that section 1738 requires federal courts presented with state judgments to consider state preclusion law. As recently as 1979, the Supreme Court's own decisions provided examples of federal judicial independence from section 1738. In the following year, however, the Court signaled the reemergence of section 1738 as a force in such cases. Three subsequent cases stressed the importance of state preclusion law to the application of section 1738. *Marrese* makes it clear that not only must state preclusion law be examined, but, in most if not all cases, the inquiry must begin there.

In *Marrese*, this meant that an investigation of Illinois preclusion law had to precede the determination of whether an exception to section 1738 should be implied from exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction. The Supreme Court sought to justify this sequence by suggesting that if the judgment was not preclusive under Illinois law, there would be no need for answering the implied-exception question. Of course, the converse of this proposition makes just as much sense. If the Court had begun with the implied-exception issue and had

112. *See supra* note 107.
113. *Allen v. MeCurry*, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). The Court left open, however, the question of how the issue preclusive effect of the Missouri judgment was to be evaluated. *Id.* at 105 n.25.
116. *Id.* at 383.
concluded that an exception to section 1738 existed, a subsequent inquiry into the content of Illinois state preclusion law would have been unnecessary. The federal case would be insulated from Illinois preclusion doctrine in order to protect exclusive antitrust jurisdiction.

Perhaps the Supreme Court's emphasis on the state-law inquiry as the correct starting place, even in Marrese, is little more than a point of intersystem etiquette; or it may be a manifestation of more substantial concerns of comity and federalism. The Court's state-law preoccupation may also be a byproduct of a battle of wills between the Supreme Court and its hierarchal inferiors over whether to take section 1738 seriously as a choice-of-law directive. Some federal courts of appeal have seemed particularly slow to respond to the message of earlier decisions concerning the significance that section 1738 gives to state preclusion law.

B. Determining the Content of State Preclusion Law—The Insignificance of the Marrese Paradox and the Emergence of a Useful Rule

Perhaps the most serious objection to Marrese's insistence on the examination of Illinois state preclusion law is that, because of a paradox created by the exclusive character of federal antitrust jurisdiction, it is impossible for the same preclusion question ever to come up in the Illinois state courts. If plaintiffs had filed their federal antitrust complaints in state rather than federal court, the Illinois courts would not have had subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the claim preclusive effect of the prior Illinois judgments. Judge Posner used this point to justify using federal rather than state preclusion law. The Supreme Court insisted that this paradox made no difference:

To be sure, a state court will not have occasion to address the

117. The Marrese Court noted that the full faith and credit statute "embodies concerns of comity and federalism." Id. at 380. The Court made a similar observation in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).


118. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.


120. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1154 (7th Cir. 1984) (plurality opinion). Professor Burbank takes the same position. See Burbank, supra note 81, at 664 & n.3.
specific question whether a state judgment has issue or claim preclusive effect in a later action that can be brought only in federal court. Nevertheless, a federal court may rely in the first instance on state preclusion principles to determine the extent to which an earlier state judgment bars subsequent litigation.121

Judge Posner's abortive attempt to finesse the state law question draws attention to a frailty in the Court's emerging section 1738 analysis. Marrese and other recent cases make clear that the Court has imposed a bifurcated regime of preclusion law on federal courts. In the intramural sphere, the preclusive effect of federal judgments usually will be determined by consulting federal doctrine.122 In the intersystem sphere, the preclusive effect of state judgments usually will be determined by consulting state doctrine.123 But surely this cannot mean that federal courts are confined to state law when state preclusion law is so undeveloped or so hopelessly confused that it cannot provide an answer.

Because of the featured role that its recent section 1738 decisions give to state preclusion law, the Court will have to deal with this problem. The Court's response in Marrese was less definitive than the Chief Justice wished,124 but the Court did offer at least the beginnings of a sensible choice-of-preclusion-law approach. By acknowledging that state preclusion law could provide answers in cases not subject to state court adjudication, the Court evinced a willingness to honor the spirit as well as the letter of state law in section 1738 cases. With further judicial refinement, this approach could lead to a rule that, absent a statutory exception, section 1738 requires that state judgments be preclusive in federal court whenever the conclusion of preclusion is suggested from an examination of state preclusion law. This rule will facilitate the application of state preclusion law when federal courts are exercising jurisdiction concurrent with that of state courts, and it will also extend to situations in which, because of a disability created either by federal or local law, courts of the state could not exercise jurisdiction over the same case. What matters is whether, by examining the whole of state preclusion law, the federal court can derive an answer for the case at hand.

Judge Posner's approach seems superficial in contrast. It was a mistake for him to rely on the paradox created by exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction as an a priori demonstration of the inability of Illinois state preclusion law to provide guidance in Marrese. Taken to its logical conclusion, Judge Posner's position extends well beyond exclusive-jurisdic-

121. 470 U.S. at 381-82.
122. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
123. See supra subpart II(B).
124. See supra note 85.
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tion settings. It suggests that, in determining the preclusive effect of state judgments, federal courts must give weight to state decisions only when they are entirely on point. This reading of section 1738 as a choice-of-law directive is too technical and narrow. Respect for the state origin of the judgment requires federal courts to examine all of the state's preclusion law.\textsuperscript{125} Granted, the paradox created by exclusive federal jurisdiction might make an examination of state preclusion law more difficult,\textsuperscript{126} but, if \textit{Marrese} serves as a guide, these difficulties may not be insurmountable.

One question that Illinois law might help answer is whether a state court may preclude by its judgment matters that it would have been incompetent to adjudicate.\textsuperscript{127} Inasmuch as the authority of a particular state court to adjudicate can be limited by state as well as federal law, this is a question that Illinois can answer through its intramural preclusion doctrine.\textsuperscript{128} Illinois law also might indicate whether the relationship between plaintiff's federal antitrust claims and the Illinois constitutional and common-law claims adjudicated in the prior proceeding is sufficient

\textsuperscript{125} When no case on point can be found, it is always appropriate for a federal court to search elsewhere in state preclusion law for guidance. Consider the example provided by Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), a case brought within the federal court's concurrent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court was faced with a specific preclusion issue that the Virginia courts could have (but had not) addressed. The Court adopted the same approach it later took in \textit{Marrese}, stating: "Because there is no Virginia decision precisely on point, we must look for guidance to Virginia decisions concerning collateral estoppel generally." \textit{Id.} at 314.

The problem is really no different from that posed by the \textit{Marrese} paradox in reverse: when should a state court should use federal law to determine the preclusive effect of a federal judgment in a case a federal court would never hear? Such cases would seem to pose no insurmountable obstacle in reaching the conclusion that federal preclusion law controls. For example, see the discussion of the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment on a subsequent state court adjudication of state antitrust claims that could have been (but were not) offered in the federal suit under a theory of pendent jurisdiction. \textit{Infra} notes 282-84 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{126} The number of federal preclusion cases purporting to follow state law suggests that frequently it will not be difficult to ascertain and apply state preclusion law. \textit{See generally} 18 C. \textit{Wright}, A. \textit{Miller} & E. \textit{Cooper}, \textit{supra} note 5, § 4469 (providing an annotation of such cases). For a discussion of the general process of ascertaining state law, see Note, \textit{Federal Interpretation of State Law—An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry}, 53 \textit{Minn. L. Rev.} 806 (1976).

\textsuperscript{127} The \textit{Marrese} Court suggested that "[t]o the extent that state preclusion law indicates that a judgment normally does not have claim preclusive effect as to matters that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain, . . . a state court judgment does not bar a subsequent federal antitrust claim." 470 U.S. at 383.

\textsuperscript{128} In determining Illinois law on this point on remand, the courts are likely to give attention to Spiller v. Continental Tube Co., 95 Ill. 2d 432, 447 N.E.2d 834 (1983), in which the Illinois Supreme Court stated that preclusion extended "not only to questions which were actually litigated but also to all questions which could have been raised or determined." \textit{Id.} at 432, 447 N.E.2d at 838. Petitioners urged in argument before the United States Supreme Court that \textit{Spiller} carried the negative implication that the original adjudication could preclude only questions that could have been raised in that adjudication. Joint Reply to the Brief of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons in Opposition to the Joint Petition for a \textit{Writ of Certiorari} at 2, \textit{Marrese} v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). Respondent argued that \textit{Spiller} did not invite such a reading. Brief for Respondent at 11.
to support preclusion. Although the paradox will prevent Illinois courts from comparing a successive federal antitrust claim with prior state claims, Illinois courts can compare the prior state claims with a subsequent claim under Illinois' similar state antitrust statute.

Whether a search actually leads to disclosure of Illinois precedents shedding light on these two questions is beside the point. Federal courts directed by section 1738 to examine state preclusion law always face the possibility that state doctrinal developments may not reach questions raised in the case at hand. Analytic difficulties resulting when this happens are reminiscent of those that federal courts encounter under the Rules of Decision Act. But, because of the difference in the force of the two choice-of-law directives, it should be much easier for federal courts to revert to federal law in truly problematic cases under section 1738 than it would be in cases under section 1652.

There is a significant difference between the power of Congress to choose between choice-of-law approaches for the recognition of state rules of decision and for the recognition of state preclusion law. Concerning state rules of decision, the Supreme Court has held, beginning with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, that federal judges could not displace state substantive law merely because their diversity jurisdiction had been invoked. One can argue that a reading of the Rules of Decision Act less deferential to state law than the one given in Erie would be unconstitutional. In contrast, Congress enjoys much greater latitude in deter-

129. For an explanation of how claims are compared under the doctrine of claim preclusion, see supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
131. The more alike the state and federal statutes are, the more useful will be the analogy. See Marrrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1176 n.8 (7th Cir. 1984) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (listing several Illinois cases that plaintiff cited for the proposition that Illinois courts would not bar a subsequent suit under the state antitrust statute), rev'd, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
133. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
134. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). Swift had read the Rules of Decision Act to permit federal diversity courts to devise and apply their own general common law instead of applying the decisional law of the forum state. Writing for the Court in Erie, Justice Brandeis addressed Swift in the following manner: "If only a question of statutory construction were in-
mining how much recognition federal courts must give to state judgments. The Constitution might even allow Congress to repeal section 1738 and permit federal courts to ignore state judgments altogether.\textsuperscript{135}

Because Congress has a wider scope of permissible options under section 1738 and because the statute's interpretation is still unsettled,\textsuperscript{136} the Supreme Court presently has flexibility in developing a choice-of-law approach for section 1738. If state preclusion law is undeveloped or hopelessly unclear, it should not be difficult for the Court to approve application of federal preclusion law.

In his \textit{Marrese} concurrence, Chief Justice Burger appeared to endorse a measure of federal-court autonomy when state preclusion law was not helpful.\textsuperscript{137} He stressed the importance of certainty to the goal of

volved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so.” 304 U.S. at 77-78. Although subsequently noting that \textit{Erie} “indicated that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to make law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases,” Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956), the Supreme Court has not chosen to clarify or refine the point.

A number of commentators have endorsed the suggestion in \textit{Erie} that the decision was necessary to preserve a constitutional principle. \textit{See}, e.g., Friendly, \textit{In Praise of \textit{Erie}—And of the New Federal Common Law}, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 392-98 (1964) (stating that the constitutional ground taken in \textit{Erie} was not only right, but also the only tenable ground that could be taken); Mishkin, \textit{Some Further Last Words on \textit{Erie}—The Thread}, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1688 (1974) (observing that the constitutional underpinnings of \textit{Erie} constitute the essential unity of the decision); Wechsler, \textit{Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code}, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 239 n.121 (1948) (stating that the constitutional language of \textit{Erie} was necessary to correct an act of usurpation); Note, \textit{The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision}, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1086 (1964) (arguing that the constitutional decision in \textit{Erie} was “consonant with the basic premises of American federalism”). Others have questioned the premise. \textit{See}, e.g., Clark, \textsuperscript{supra} note 132, at 278-79 (observing that “it seems clear that Congress may determine the manner and form of adjudication of rights which under the Constitution may be committed to the federal courts”); Kurland, \textit{Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the \textit{Erie} Doctrine in Diversity Cases}, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 197 (1957) (stating that “the Court's decisions offer little guidance as to the position it will adopt if called upon to determine whether \textit{Erie} announces a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress and the federal courts”); cf. ALI STUDY, \textsuperscript{supra} note 80, at 442 (noting that “it does not necessarily follow that the \textit{Erie} holding was constitutionally compelled in the technical sense of being legally imposed by the fundamental instrument”); Ely, \textit{The Irrepressible Myth of \textit{Erie}}, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) (suggesting a less restrictive role for the Constitution and a commensurately greater range of choice-of-law options for Congress). For an excellent overview of the subject, see C. WRIGHt, \textsuperscript{supra} note 25, at 359-64.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{See supra} note 77 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{See generally Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons}, 470 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (asserting that when state law is ambiguous, comity and federalism do not come into play and a clear federal rule should be applied). If, instead, the Court's prior \textsection 1738 decisions clearly barred recourse to federal preclusion law in cases in which state preclusion law was unavailing, constraints of statutory stare decisis might make it difficult for the court to adopt a more flexible view. \textit{See infra} note 180.

\textsuperscript{137} The Chief Justice felt that “it is likely that the principles of Illinois claim preclusion law do not speak to the preclusive effect that petitioners’ state court judgments should have on the present action.” 470 U.S. at 390. He suggested that “in this situation, it may be consistent with \textsection 1738 for a federal court to formulate a federal rule to resolve the matter.” \textit{Id}. 1235
repose in preclusion law, but this may not be the strongest argument for his conclusion. It is true that certainty facilitates repose and that repose is a major goal of preclusion law.\textsuperscript{138} Yet, it is probably also true that the certainty a clear federal governing rule promotes is offset by uncertainty that the following question generates: At what point is state law sufficiently undeveloped or unclear that reversion to federal doctrine is tolerable under section 1738? The dividing line between those cases in which state law may be said to point the way and those in which it does not will be, at best, indistinct.\textsuperscript{139}

The best justification for ultimately disregarding indeterminate state preclusion law may be that federal courts are not authoritative expositors of the meaning of state law. If state courts face a problem of uncertainty in the meaning of state law, it is cured through adjudication of the case. State courts will, in other words, add to their law whatever new meaning is necessary to explain and support their resolution of the controversy. Uncertain state law presents federal judges with far greater difficulty. They usually can neither enlist the assistance of state judges\textsuperscript{140} nor decline jurisdiction because of the difficulty of state-law questions.\textsuperscript{141} Instead, they must "vicariously"\textsuperscript{142} create enough state law to decide the case at hand by attempting to "forecast" the state's law "as it would be expressed by its highest court."\textsuperscript{143} The process transforms federal courts into analytically-handicapped state court surrogates, forced to speculate on the nature of governing law and unable to work significant changes on

\textsuperscript{138} See supra notes 32, 104.

\textsuperscript{139} Marrese may be close to the line. My position is that Illinois law is significant if it suggests preclusion; in his Marrese concurrence, Chief Justice Burger questioned the usefulness of Illinois jurisdictional competence cases in determining the preclusive effect of state court judgments on federal antitrust claims. 470 U.S. at 390.

\textsuperscript{140} "Except in those few jurisdictions permitting a federal court to certify an unsettled question of state law to the state's highest court, a federal court's decision on state law cannot be corrected, for the benefit of the litigants in the particular case, by the state's authoritative tribunal." Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). For a case in which certification was used, see Strange v. Krebs, 658 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1981).

\textsuperscript{141} Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). With a few exceptions, federal diversity courts have been required to decide cases even when state law is unsettled. See J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL & J. WICKER, supra note 5, § 4507, at 100.

\textsuperscript{142} The term is from 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4507, at 100.

\textsuperscript{143} McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980). This test for determining the content of state law in federal court is based on the realization that, just as the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the meaning of federal law, the ultimate authority on the meaning of state law is the state's highest court. The principle is well established. E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 182 n.3 (1983); Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
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its content. Of course, the reach of state law similarly confines federal judges in cases decided under section 1652, but only section 1738 presents federal courts with the means to elaborate what is, in the fullest sense, a choice-of-law approach. For, although it is appropriate under either statute for a federal court to build on the implications of state law in order to honor that law, the explicit choice of federal law and policy when state law is unclear is constitutionally legitimate only under section 1738. So long as federal courts give proper respect to the clear suggestions of state law, section 1738 is capable of supporting a flexible and pragmatic approach in selecting the proper preclusion rule.

Whether Illinois law is too undeveloped to be helpful in Marrese is a

144. At times, when a federal decision on the meaning of state law has not been eclipsed by an intervening state decision, it has been followed by a subsequent federal court. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining why the Second Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Tennessee law), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982). But it is clear that the courts of a state are free to disregard all federal court pronouncements—even those of the United States Supreme Court—concerning the meaning of state law. Cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941) (stating that the state courts, rather than the United States Supreme Court, had "the last word on . . . [the] statutory authority" of a state agency). And the Supreme Court has acknowledged the need to look to state courts for "an authoritative construction" of state law. See Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 308 (1979).

145. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 710; supra note 132.

146. For example, federal courts must examine the decisions of lower state courts when there are no state high court decisions on point. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). If state law does not answer the preclusion question explicitly, it should usually at least provide a basis for predicting how state courts would answer the question. See supra note 125. The process of prediction can be interesting as well as controversial. Compare Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 909 (1st Cir. 1957) (holding that federal court was not obligated to apply Mississippi law in view of the Mississippi Supreme Court's indication that the law would be revised soon) with Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976) (because state law was silent on issue, federal judge applied law that he believed state court would apply if they had the opportunity to do so). In Mason, a federal diversity court took notice of a national trend in tort law and some inapposite Mississippi case law to predict that the Mississippi Supreme Court would repudiate its privity limitation on recovery. The prophecy was fulfilled in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). In Crutsinger, a federal court gave issue-preclusive effect to a Kansas judgment, concluding from its survey of Kansas law and national developments that, if given the opportunity, the Kansas Supreme Court would abandon its mutuality requirement. It is at least arguable that the Crutsinger court took excessive liberties with Kansas law. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 688 n.14 (discussing Crutsinger).

147. For example, Chief Justice Burger suggested that the absence of guiding Illinois state law might leave the federal court in Marrese free to pursue preclusion policies, "ensuring that their resources are used efficiently and not as a means of harassing defendants with repetitive lawsuits . . . ." Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring). In contrast, under § 1652 federal courts do not seem authorized to apply federal law. Despite eloquent arguments to the contrary, see Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 Yale L.J. 762, 775-77 & 777 n.17 (1941), reversion to purely federal law has not become a common default policy. Even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rule of Evidence 444 do not authorize federal courts to look to federal law for a purpose other than the fair administration of justice. See generally the discussion of state law in 9 J. MOORE & J. MAILMAN, supra note 126.
matter of controversy. 148 Even if the federal courts conclude on remand that it is too undeveloped, it would be unfortunate if the Seventh Circuit uses as the federal standard the exaggerated preclusion rule advanced in Judge Posner’s opinion. The obstacle to claim preclusion in Marrese arises from the relatively weak nexus between the state common law and constitutional claims presented by the petitioners in the original state proceeding and the petitioners’ subsequent federal antitrust claims. Judge Posner avoided this hurdle by stressing the nexus between the federal antitrust claims and the claims under the Illinois state antitrust statute, which petitioners could have raised in their Illinois case. 149 This notion—that all the claims, however dissimilar, that plaintiff could have brought in the original case should be used to determine the scope of preclusion—is not new. 150 The reasons for rejecting it continue to have force. 151

V. The Proper Scope of Implied Statutory Exceptions to Section 1738

A. A Suggested Test

If we assume that Illinois doctrine would give claim preclusive effect to Marrese’s prior adjudication, 152 is it plausible that the grant of exclusive jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims functions as an implied exception to section 1738?

There is a certain symmetry to the implied-exception argument. It is hard to see much difference between depriving federal courts of the opportunity to adjudicate federal antitrust claims because they have al-

148. See supra text accompanying note 76, and notes 127, 137 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., F. James, supra note 38, at 555 n.13 (citing authorities).
151. "Where . . . claims are factually quite distinct so that there will be no overlap in presenting evidence to support them, much less is to be saved by trying them together, or including them in a single lawsuit to be tried separately. Indeed, trying them together may cause confusion and prejudice." Id. at 555. Professor James also suggests that fear of claim waiver generated by the rule might force parties to introduce claims that would not otherwise have been litigated. Id. And, he notes that consequences from the omission of insufficiently related claims would be too severe: "Hardship from oversight would be greatly multiplied if the parties were bound to think of all the aspects of all possible claims against their adversaries." Id. at 556. For further criticisms of this approach, see 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 5, § 4412, at 93-106; Cleary, supra note 9, at 347. But cf. Berch, supra note 16, at 533 (arguing that absentee similarly situated to claimants should be precluded by adjudications in which they had an opportunity to participate by intervention); Note, Preclusion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1551, 1565 (1979) (same).
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ready been adjudicated in state court, and depriving federal courts of the same opportunity because the federal antitrust claim—although not raised in the prior state proceeding—is sufficiently related to a state claim that was, or could have been, raised in the earlier state action such that it now should be precluded. Exclusive federal jurisdiction addresses the first situation by confining federal antitrust claims to federal court. A consistent approach would prevent state judgments from precluding claims that exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction would not permit them to adjudicate.

Perhaps the chief difficulty with this argument is that Congress could have required consistent results but has failed to do so. Both section 1738 and federal antitrust statutes are silent concerning the possible claim preclusive effects of state judgments on subsequent federal antitrust cases. The Supreme Court has noted that its power to suspend section 1738's requirement that state judgments be enforced must derive from statutory interpretation. The Court has evinced an understandable reluctance to partially repeal section 1738 under the guise of statutory interpretation; therefore the test to be met for implying an exception to section 1738 must be exacting.

In light of the Court's attitude, more than a demonstration that suspension of section 1738 would complement the purposes of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction should be required to establish an implied exception to section 1738. The Supreme Court should expressly declare what it has intimated: An implied exception should be found in cases like Marrese only if preclusion by state judgment would so frustrate the purposes served by exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction as to make the suspension of section 1738 implicit in the creation of exclusive federal jurisdiction. The appropriate measure for such a test is the difference between the effective operation of exclusive antitrust jurisdiction with and without suspension of section 1738.

B. Resolving the Implied-Exception Issue in Marrese

From the vantage provided in Marrese, it does not appear that a


154. In Kremer, the Court noted: "It is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored." 456 U.S. at 468 (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)). The Supreme Court reiterated the point in its post-Marrese decision, Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768, 772 (1986), when it refused to use the "relitigation" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), to imply an exception to § 1738.

155. See supra notes 90, 153-54.
refusal to suspend section 1738 would so harm the effective operation of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction as to justify implying an exception to the statute. This is so because the benefits of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction have so diminished that in most cases it scarcely matters whether exclusive federal jurisdiction is insulated from the preclusive effects of state judgments. 156

Much of the discrete significance that federal antitrust law had when the Supreme Court determined federal jurisdiction to be exclusive over sixty years ago 157 is now gone. Intervening years have seen the proliferation of state antitrust statutes. 158 Some state statutes are so similar to federal law that federal antitrust decisions are used to interpret them. 159 In other instances, state courts have read their statutes to provide opportunities for antitrust recovery unavailable under federal law. 160 A recent study suggests that antitrust claimants are exhibiting a growing preference for state courts. 161

The object of exclusive antitrust jurisdiction was, as with any grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction, to enhance enforcement of federal law. This purpose is accomplished by providing for uniform interpretation and application of federal laws, preventing state court bias and misapplication of those laws, assuring that federal judges can utilize their expertise in adjudicating federal claims, and allowing for jury trial and the use of extensive federal discovery and evidence rules. 162

To the extent that federal antitrust law continues to stand apart from state law, however, the protections offered by exclusive federal jurisdiction are to a large extent both ineffectual and unnecessary.

To begin with, exclusive federal jurisdiction does not direct all federal antitrust questions to federal courts. State courts can and do adjudicate federal antitrust defenses raised in response to state claims. 163

156. See infra note 182 (noting special circumstances, not suggested in Marrese, when an exception to § 1738 might be implied).
157. See supra note 80.
160. Hovenkamp, supra note 159, at 377 n.10.
161. Id. at 378.
163. See Comment, State Judgments—Federal Antitrust, supra note 81, at 955; Note, Estoppel—Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 81, at 1285-86; Comment, Exclusive Jurisdiction: The Effects of State Court Findings, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 439, 447 (1956).
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factors explain this. First, limitations on federal subject matter jurisdiction prohibit filing a case in federal court or removing a state case to federal court solely because of the existence of an affirmative defense based on federal law. Second, not only may a state court entertain federal question affirmative defenses, but, under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, the state court must do so before deciding against the party raising the defense. This means that only federal antitrust claims can be thought of as within the exclusive preserve of the federal courts.

Even if parties litigated all federal antitrust questions in federal court, it is unlikely that anything approaching genuine uniformity of interpretation could be achieved. Although one cannot doubt the function of the Supreme Court in elaborating uniform federal law, the Court “is no longer capable of providing the supervision of federal judicial lawmaking that it once provided.” The lack of effective Supreme Court

164. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). Mottley held that a federal question issue that is not necessary to a well pleaded complaint but only appears in the answer as an affirmative defense is outside the scope of the general federal question statute—now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). The same limitation has been imposed on the alternative federal question basis for antitrust suits—28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). See Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 316 U.S. 350, 353 (1942) (citing, inter alia, Mottley). The Planter's Bank case held that a case filed in state court is not removable to federal court if the only federal issue appears in the answer to the complaint. See 152 U.S. at 460. The result of these rulings, ironically, is to confer a kind of exclusive jurisdiction on state courts in cases raising a federal question only as an affirmative defense. An American Law Institute recommendation would provide a general remedy to this situation by broadening federal statutory removal of controversies exceeding $10,000 to reach cases involving a federal issue even if raised only in an affirmative defense. See ALI STUDY, supra note 80, at 195 (proposed § 1312(a)(2)). Broadened statutory removal also has been associated with particular reference to state-court affirmative defenses addressing the subject matter of federal exclusive jurisdiction. See Note, Estoppel—Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 81, at 1305-06; cf. Dickinson, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Role of the States in Securities Regulation, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1245-47 (1980) (advocating a similar proposal for state-court defenses based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1982), which provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction).

165. M. REDISH, supra note 162, at 124; Note, Estoppel—Exclusive Jurisdiction, supra note 81, at 1303.


168. Carrington, supra note 21, at 553. The Supreme Court has traditionally kept abreast of its workload. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 43 (5th ed. 1978). Increasingly, however, this is possible only by truncating the process of decision in some cases and evading deci-
superintendence\textsuperscript{169} has placed federal courts of appeal in a position "to create and to balkanize national law."\textsuperscript{170} Appellate courts have created considerable confusion and some conflict over the meaning of federal law at both intracircuit and intercircuit levels.\textsuperscript{171}

Moreover, in the antitrust setting, the need for the other "advantages" of exclusive federal jurisdiction is questionable. The possibility that judges might be biased against or misunderstand federal law—always difficult to establish\textsuperscript{172}—seems particularly unlikely because antitrust causes of action have become a familiar part of state law.\textsuperscript{173} The significance of the federal courts’ antitrust expertise has diminished for the same reason. Jury trials (a mixed blessing in antitrust cases\textsuperscript{174}) may be more available in federal court,\textsuperscript{175} but plaintiffs’ increasing partiality

\textsuperscript{169} According to a prominent study:
Supreme Court review has become an exceedingly unlikely event in most federal litigation. Of about 8,000 cases decided after hearing and submission in the courts of appeals, only about one in a 100 will be given full consideration by the Supreme Court. Of the cases tried in the district courts, about one in 300 reaches the Supreme Court.

P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 209.

\textsuperscript{170} Betten, supra note 167, at 68.

\textsuperscript{171} The primary means of resolving intracircuit conflict has been en banc rehearing before the entire circuit. It has been suggested that "the en banc device is foundering." P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 201. The tortured Seventh Circuit history of Marresse offers some confirmation. See supra text preceding note 67.

Differing approaches at the intercircuit level undoubtedly lead to some conflicts and may be at least problematic in causing extended confusion before conflicts coalesce. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 167, at 212-13.

Finally, consider Professor Bator’s assessment of the argument that federal court adjudications enhance uniformity of federal constitutional law:
There is no reason to think that the federal district courts will achieve more uniform results with respect to questions of federal constitutional law than the supreme courts of the fifty states. Review by the courts of appeals does, of course, create some centripetal force. But it is notorious that, with twelve [now 13] circuits and increasing numbers of judges on them, the prospects of inter- and intracircuit conflicts are substantial and increasing.


\textsuperscript{172} Even commentators who argue that federal courts provide better federal law adjudications than state courts concede that their position is difficult to document. M. REDISH, supra note 162, at 3; Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 726 (1981).

\textsuperscript{173} See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{174} Antitrust suits can provide the kind of complex litigation capable of overwhelming juries. Current problems have generated an interesting debate over the right to trial by jury. Compare Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment, 80 Mich. L. REV. 68 (1981) (discussing the difficulties in limiting jury trials) with Luneberg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887 (1981) (discussing alternatives to jury trials in complex litigation).

\textsuperscript{175} "State law may deny a jury trial in a case where the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial" in federal court. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 606-07 (4th ed. 1983).
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for state antitrust forums\textsuperscript{176} suggests that the lack of a state jury trial is not important, at least to them. Finally, whatever special advantages litigants in federal court derive from the federal rules of civil procedure and evidence have diminished as an increasing number of states have adopted those rules for use in their courts.\textsuperscript{177}

Developments since the Supreme Court ruled federal antitrust jurisdiction to be exclusive\textsuperscript{178} have, in short, greatly lessened both the need for and the advantages of exclusive jurisdiction in the enforcement of federal antitrust law.\textsuperscript{179} It is unlikely that the Court will overrule its decisions requiring exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal antitrust claims.\textsuperscript{180} Nonetheless, because the purposes served by exclusive anti-

\textsuperscript{176} See supra note 161 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{179} As early as 1957, an observer wrote:

Several considerations relating to the antitrust law and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 indicate instances in which exclusive jurisdiction may be inappropriate. That uniformity is not a significant factor in these fields is indicated by the coexistence of parallel state and federal statutes. Similarly, the disparity of experience between the two systems is diminished, since state and federal courts are adjudicating closely related claims.

\textsuperscript{Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction—Private Actions, supra note 81, at 515. But see Comment, State Judgments—Federal Antitrust, supra note 81, at 965 (stressing "the particularly complex character of antitrust litigation and the greater expertise of federal judges in this area").}

\textsuperscript{180} It often seems that the Court will give greater stare decisis effect to its settled interpretations of statutes than it will either to its constitutional decisions or its diminishing number of common law precedents. This hierarchical view of stare decisis is not universally accepted, see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 148 (1921), but it is defensible. Congress is presumed to acquiesce in the judicial interpretations of its statutes when it does not overrule them by statutory amendment. This can be seen as a kind of retrospective legislative intent. Moreover, if the Court were more willing to reinterpret statutes, this might sap Congress' initiative to review and periodically revise statutory law. Therefore, "once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has been made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed within the gap of ambiguity, the court should take that direction as given." E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 23 (1943). For examples of the force of stare decisis given to the Court's interpretation of federal jurisdictional statutes, see Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (adhering to precedents barring the aggregation of separate claims to satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement for diversity jurisdiction, notwithstanding the suggestion that provision for broadened federal class actions under revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 should be read to permit aggregation); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) (adhering to precedents requiring a federal issue to arise within plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, notwithstanding the suggestion that the Declaratory Judgment Act 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982), authorized plaintiff to anticipate federal issues defendant might raise in a suit for coercive relief). But see Boys Mktgs., Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In that case, the Court overruled a prior interpretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and concluded that a lower federal court had jurisdiction to enjoin a violation of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining contract. Dissenting, Justice Black wrote: "When the law has been settled by an earlier case then any subsequent 'reinterpretation' of the statute is gratuitous and neither more nor less than an amendment: it is no different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that Congress itself placed in the statute." 398 U.S. at 257-58.
trust jurisdiction are on the wane, it would be particularly inappropriate for the Court now to imply an exception to section 1738 based on federal antitrust jurisdiction. In any event, the Court could not substantially recreate the benefits of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction by suspending the full faith and credit statute.

C. Implied-Exception Issues in Other Cases

It is tempting to go further and suggest that rarely should exclusive federal jurisdiction justify an implied exception to section 1738, but admonitions to proceed carefully probably are warranted. The strength of the implied-exception argument will vary from one type of exclusive jurisdiction to another. And, although the foregoing analysis suggests that exclusive antitrust jurisdiction generally does not justify an implied exception to section 1738, an exception probably should be found to prevent state court determinations of fact from precluding a defense against

181. This is at least true in cases, like Marrese, in which the question is not whether state-court determinations of fact preclude the federal defendant from resisting a subsequent federal-court claim for treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). When a federal treble damages claim is at issue, it is arguable that to give preclusive effect to the state proceeding might exaggerate its importance and that, because two-thirds of such an award is bottomed on penal policies of federal law (making plaintiffs, in essence, private federal prosecutors), a stronger case can be made for full adjudication in federal court. At the same time, it seems unwarranted for federal courts to go further and imply an exception to § 1738 to permit federal claimants to relitigate facts underlying their treble-damage claims.

182. Assuming it would be desirable for federal antitrust law to pose uniform standards and for determination of those standards to be entrusted only to federal judges, congressional initiatives will be necessary to make it possible. State-court adjudication of federal antitrust defenses, see supra note 164 and accompanying text, would be unaffected by implying an exception to § 1738. Congress would have to amend the Judicial Code so that cases in which federal antitrust questions arise only as affirmative defenses can be filed in or removed to federal court. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.

And it would take further congressional action to achieve substantive uniformity by changing the present nonpreemptive posture of federal antitrust law. “Most real cases are adequately covered by the general rule that state antitrust law may be enforced even though it prohibits less, the same, or more than federal antitrust law.” 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law—An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 208, at 5 (1978). Inasmuch as federal antitrust law has been interpreted to leave state antitrust law free to provide broader remedies or causes of action, see Hovenkamp, supra note 159, at 377 n.10, 389-90, states remain free to devise rival approaches in determining the measure of accountability for anticompetitive practices.

183. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 5, § 4470, at 689 (noting “intimate knowledge of each grant of exclusive jurisdiction and the related substantive law” to be a prerequisite to determining whether an implied exception should be found); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 86 comment d (1982) (“Whether a scheme of federal remedies implies an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 . . . is a matter of statutory interpretation. However, the intention of Congress to make such an exception should not be readily inferred.”); supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing Marrese, Brown, and Kremer and their explanations of when courts have found exceptions to § 1738 acceptable).

184. Presumably, the more important it is for a type of adjudication to be in federal court, the stronger becomes the basis for arguing an exception to § 1738. Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have read federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to create an exception. See supra note 90 and its discussion of Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
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a subsequent treble-damage claim in federal court.\[^{185}\] Perhaps the most that can be said is that there should be a presumption against implying an exception to section 1738 from exclusive federal jurisdiction\[^{186}\] in order to guard against judicial overreaching,\[^{187}\] reinforce the finality of state judgments,\[^{188}\] and promote harmony between state and federal courts.\[^{189}\]

The answer to the question whether the exercise of the federal court’s concurrent jurisdiction justifies exceptions to section 1738 is more simple. Such exceptions will seldom, if ever, be warranted.

The justification for giving state adjudications preclusive effect under section 1738 is most clear when a plaintiff’s federal claim would have been within the concurrent jurisdiction of a state court, but plaintiff failed to present it when suing there. There is little doubt that if the nexus between the adjudicated state claim and the omitted federal claim is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of claim preclusion, a subsequent federal court should preclude the federal claim.\[^{190}\]

The analysis is more difficult when the party to be precluded did not choose the state forum.\[^{191}\] In *Allen v. McCurry*,\[^{192}\] a section 1983\[^{193}\] case, however, the Supreme Court refused to attach significance to this difference. The Court gave issue-preclusive effect to a prior state criminal

\[^{185}\] See supra note 181.

\[^{186}\] Thus I would attach far less importance to the subsequent exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction than did the ALI in its *Restatement (Second) of Judgments*. See supra note 81 (federal antitrust claims would not be barred by judgment in state court under state antitrust laws).

\[^{187}\] See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.

\[^{188}\] See supra note 104 and accompanying text.

\[^{189}\] “[W]henever a state court judgment is refused an effect with which it would otherwise be endowed, some stress is imposed on the relations of mutual respect that properly characterize the federal legal system.” *Restatement (Second) of Judgments* § 86 comment d (1982). The Supreme Court has recognized that notions of comity and federalism support federal court recognition of state judgments. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

\[^{190}\] Noting the possibility of sufficiently related state and federal claims, the *Restatement (Second) of Judgments* states:

When the plaintiff brings an action on the claim in a court, either state or federal, in which there is no jurisdictional obstacle to his advancing both theories or grounds, but he presents only one of them, and judgment is entered with respect to it, he may not maintain a second action in which he tenders the other theory or ground.

*Restatement (Second) of Judgments* § 25 comment e (1982); see also id. § 86 comment f ("Failure to assert an alternative federal basis for a claim that could rest on both federal and state law generally results in claim preclusion."). For a general discussion of requirements of claim preclusion, see supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.


\[^{192}\] 449 U.S. 90 (1980).

court determination that the rights of the federal court plaintiff had not been violated.

Despite numerous suggestions to the contrary,\textsuperscript{194} the Supreme Court was correct in refusing to imply an exception to section 1738 based upon section 1983.\textsuperscript{195} Federal courts should be as free under section 1738 to give preclusive effect to issues decided in state criminal proceedings as they would be to give preclusive effect to issues decided in federal criminal adjudications.\textsuperscript{196} Section 1983 does not suggest that Congress intended to assure a federal-court setting for section 1983 litigation\textsuperscript{197} or that Congress intended to guarantee civil rights litigants the opportunity to litigate all their issues from an affirmative posture.\textsuperscript{198} Furthermore,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[194.] See, e.g., Smith, supra note 50, at 63 n.22 (citing extensive list of commentaries).
\item[195.] The Court stated in \textit{Allen}:
\begin{quotation}
[N]othing in the language or legislative history of § 1983 proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state-court judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights.
\end{quotation}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
because federal court jurisdiction in section 1983 cases is only concurrent, it is impossible to argue—as one might attempt to argue if the jurisdiction were exclusive—that suspension of section 1738 must be implied in order to realize the purposes of federal jurisdiction. Although the legislative history of section 1983 includes evidence of concern over civil rights enforcement in state courts, this provides an inadequate basis for implying the suspension of section 1738. As Professor Currie noted, “All grants of federal jurisdiction are based upon some perceived inadequacy of state courts.”

The Court’s position in Allen seems defensible for another reason. In a line of cases beginning with Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court sharply reduced the availability of federal injunctive or declaratory relief under section 1983 against state law-enforcement officials. The purpose of the Younger doctrine is to remit federal civil rights claimants to pending state judicial proceedings. Whatever misgivings one might have...
over the wisdom or necessity of the Younger doctrine, the deference to state proceedings that it requires would be illusory if resulting state judgments were denied preclusive effect in federal court. This is why arguments to imply an exception to section 1738 based on section 1983 frequently seem to be an attempt to refight the battle against the Younger doctrine. If the Younger doctrine is wrong, it should be addressed on its own terms. Unless or until it is, Allen must be followed.

Recently, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Allen to reach claim as well as issue preclusion. In Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, plaintiff school administrator sued her employers in Ohio state court for wrongful discharge. She later brought a section 1983 suit against the same defendants in federal court. Noting that she had failed to present her section 1983 claim in the prior state adjudication, the Supreme Court held that she was subject to any claim preclusion existing under Ohio state law. In so doing, the Court again rejected the argument that section 1983 operated as an exception to section 1738. The Court noted that plaintiff’s argument for an exception was the same as had been put forth in Allen: "[T]hat state-court judgments should have ‘less preclusive effect in § 1983 suits than in other federal suits” because of “Congress’ expressed concern over the adequacy and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” 401 U.S. at 43-44. The Court also noted concerns of comity and federalism. Id. at 44. In a series of cases beginning with Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), the Court has used the Younger doctrine to bar § 1983 injunctions against pending state civil proceedings. And, the Court has invoked Younger to bar the issuance of federal declaratory judgments in cases in which issuance of injunctions would not be permitted. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).

206. Compare Smith, supra note 50, at 61-62 (arguing that policy and precedent support flexible application of full faith and credit principles in § 1983 litigation) and Theis, supra note 198, at 873 (arguing that the history and purpose of § 1983 require an exception to § 1738) with Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 342-47 (1977) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (claiming that to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access to federal courts because of pending state civil proceedings is contrary to the purposes of the § 1983 remedy) and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 616-18 (1975) (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that in Younger doctrine cases the history and purpose of § 1983 require initial access to federal courts).

207. It is my view, and that of many other commentators, that the Younger doctrine is wrong. Perhaps the most basic problem with Younger is that it usurps Congress’ prerogative to allocate judicial business between the state and federal courts. See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 88 (1984); Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 382, 413-19 (1983). For a thorough critique of other frailties of the Younger doctrine, see Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C.D. L. REv. 31 (1985).


209. Id. at 83. On the availability of § 1983 adjudications in state court, see supra note 199.

210. 465 U.S. at 85. Using the technique it was to repeat in Marrese, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a more searching examination of state preclusion law. It appeared, however, that Migra’s claim could be precluded under Ohio law. See Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221, 147 N.E.2d 599 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958).

211. 465 U.S. at 84.
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of state courts as protectors of federal rights.”212 Reiterating the view it had expressed in Allen concerning the relationship between sections 1983 and 1738, the Court stated: “It is difficult to see how the policy concerns underlying § 1983 would justify a distinction between the issue preclusive and claim preclusive effects of state-court judgments.”213

The Court seems to have reached the correct decision in Migra. Plaintiff Migra weakened her position when she opted to begin by litigating in state court. Her failure to present a sufficiently related federal claim, also within the state court’s jurisdiction, would be lethal under conventional wisdom.214 Under such circumstances, it would be impossible to deny preclusive effect to the Ohio judgment without questioning the underlying authority of Allen.215

When the Supreme Court correctly concluded in Allen that an exception to section 1738 could not be implied from section 1983,216 it greatly undercut its earlier decision in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.217 The Court had held in England that a federal-court claimant, required by the Pullman abstention doctrine218 to present his state-law issues in state court, could thereafter reintroduce his federal

212. Id. at 83-84.
213. Id. at 83; cf. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1984) (equating claim and issue preclusion and refusing to give preclusive effect under § 1738 to a state arbitration award). On the tendency of the Supreme Court not to distinguish between claim and issue preclusion in § 1738 cases, see supra note 115.
214. This is the view taken in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. See supra note 190. The American Law Institute hedged with reference to § 1983 cases, however, describing them as “[p]articularly difficult and controversial.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment d (1982).
216. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
218. The doctrine takes its name from Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). It applies when, first, the need to invalidate a state statute or regulation as unconstitutional can be avoided if state law is given a certain meaning and, second, that meaning is not evident enough for a federal court to feel comfortable in declaring it, but is within the greater interpretive power of a state court. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & TEMP. PROBS. 216, 232 (1948) (noting the difficulties “inhering in the fact that federal courts are not the authorized expositors of state law”); see also supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties facing federal judges in resolving questions of unsettled state law).

Under the Pullman doctrine, a variety of different consequences from state adjudications may serve to avoid the necessity of federal constitutional adjudication. The state-law issue might be whether the challenged state statute can be interpreted so as to avoid constitutional problems, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), whether the challenged statute might not also violate the state constitution, Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), or whether the case might otherwise be disposed of on state-law grounds. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496.

Rules governing abstention are more difficult to determine when a federal constitutional question is not raised. Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1950) (requiring abstention) with Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (refusing abstention).
issues in federal court.\textsuperscript{219} Although not in so many words,\textsuperscript{220} \textit{England} operated to suspend section 1738 by insulating any subsequent federal-law adjudication in federal court from the claim- or issue-preclusive effects of the state judgment.

The \textit{England} decision is simply wrong. It is probably true that the dispensation \textit{England} grants from section 1738 is necessary for the \textit{Pullman} doctrine to work as intended.\textsuperscript{221} But, even if preservation of the \textit{Pullman} doctrine is desirable,\textsuperscript{222} it cannot be accomplished through illicit suspension of section 1738.\textsuperscript{223} Absent an exception to section 1738, the statute clearly requires state judgments to be given as much preclusive effect in federal court as they would have received where rendered. Because no statutory exception exists for \textit{England}-type cases, the Supreme Court is in the indefensible position of creating an exception as a matter of judicial doctrine.\textsuperscript{224}

\textsuperscript{219} He could do so if the adjudication of the state issues did not moot the case and if he informed "the state courts that he [was] exposing his federal claims" there to assist the state courts in evaluating the state issues and "that he intends, should the state courts hold against him on the question of state law, to return to the district court for disposition of his federal contentions." \textit{England}, 375 U.S. at 421.

\textsuperscript{220} Curiously, the Court makes no reference to § 1738 in \textit{England}.

\textsuperscript{221} Although the \textit{Younger} doctrine requires dismissal of the federal case, see supra note 205, invocation of the \textit{Pullman} doctrine is more appropriately accompanied by a stay of the proceedings. The Supreme Court has encouraged federal courts to retain jurisdiction. E.g., Harris County Comm'r's Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 n.14 (1975); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967). If the purpose for adjudicating the federal case does not disappear during the interim, see supra note 218, the federal court is expected to conclude the litigation. \textit{Pullman} abstention "does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise . . . ." Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).

It has never been suggested that the reasons supporting the \textit{Pullman} doctrine are sufficient to justify forfeiture of plaintiff's opportunity to seek a federal court determination of federal law. Yet this is the effect \textit{Pullman} abstention could have without the protections of \textit{England}. If the state case came to final judgment first and was permitted full effect, it could prevent by claim or issue preclusion the subsequent federal court adjudication of plaintiff's federal issues. Without \textit{England}, \textit{Pullman} abstention could function as an "abdication of federal jurisdiction." Harrison, 360 U.S. at 177.

Putting the matter somewhat differently, Professor Currie observed, "To reduce the violence abstention does to section 1331 [general federal question jurisdiction], \textit{England} ignores section 1738." Currie, supra note 79, at 331.

\textsuperscript{222} The \textit{Pullman} doctrine has received a generally unfavorable critical reception. Commentators have pointed to the egregious delays that federal court claimants have been subjected to under \textit{Pullman}. E.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 80, at 283-84. Another problem is the obscurity of the \textit{Pullman} criteria. See Field, \textit{The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction}, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 697-98 (1981) (advocating the abolition of the \textit{Pullman} doctrine); see also Currie, \textit{The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute Part II}, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) (advocating the abolition of the \textit{Pullman} doctrine); Note, \textit{Judicial Abstention}, supra note 162, at 223 n.17 (citing numerous authorities critical of the \textit{Pullman} doctrine). It has been suggested that the doctrine may actually be counterproductive to interests of federalism. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 21, at 102.

\textsuperscript{223} It should be possible for the Court to overrule \textit{England} without disturbing the few opportunities that now exist for federal courts to certify state-law questions to state high courts. See supra note 140. It is doubtful whether state high courts would have the jurisdiction or the inclination to use certification proceedings to reach and decide federal issues. It is also unlikely that state doctrine would view such proceedings as precluding matters beyond the scope of the state-law inquiry.

\textsuperscript{224} It is axiomatic that the Supreme Court cannot amend a congressional enactment. While
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VI. Section 1738 and Authority to Give Greater Preclusive Effect to Judgments: A Reconciliation

A. The Basis for Limited Federal Court Autonomy

Concurring in *Migra*, Justice White expressed doubt whether realization of section 1738's purpose required federal courts to give no greater preclusive effect to state judgments than state courts would give them.\(^2\) Although he noted that important federal preclusion policies might be served by permitting federal courts to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments,\(^2\) he concluded: "The contrary construction of § 1738 is nevertheless one of long standing, and Congress has not seen fit to disturb it, however justified such an action might have been."\(^2\)

Justice White is correct in questioning the wisdom of a blanket application of section 1738 to divest federal courts of all authority to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments. He is also correct in suggesting that a well-settled interpretation of section 1738 would be especially difficult for the court to revise.\(^2\) But Justice White was wrong in one respect: the law was not settled at the time he wrote his concurrence.\(^2\) It is not clear whether the Supreme Court hedged sufficiently in *Marrese* to preserve its options;\(^2\) in other words, whether the way still is open for the Supreme Court to hold that federal courts may give federal courts enjoy considerable common-law authority to determine the preclusive effect of federal judgments, see *supra* notes 3-5 and accompanying text, they lost comparable authority concerning state judgments with the passage of the full faith and credit statute in 1790. See *supra* notes 77-78 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court spoke of the preemptive effect of congressional initiative on the authority of federal courts to make common law in *City of Milwaukee v. Illinois*, 451 U.S. 304 (1981):

> We have always recognized that federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Congress." . . . Federal common law is a "necessary expedient," and when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.

*Id.* at 313-14 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has acknowledged the limitations imposed under this principle by § 1738. See *supra* notes 153-54 and accompanying text.


226. *Id.*

227. *Id.* Because of his view of precedent, Justice White felt that the Supreme Court would have been warranted in concluding that "preclusion in this case must be determined under state law, even if there would be preclusion under federal standards." *Id.*

228. See *id.* On the particular weight of stare decisis given to the Court's settled interpretations of statutes, see *supra* note 180.

229. Justice White supported his conclusion that § 1738 has divested federal courts of the power to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments with four Supreme Court cases, the most recent of which was *Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co.*, 309 U.S. 4 (1940). *Migra*, 465 U.S. at 88. He did not mention the Court's more recent neglect of state preclusion law in determining the effect of state judgments. See *supra* note 107. Nor did he note the Supreme Court's apparent acknowledgment of federal court authority to give greater preclusive effect to state judgments in *Haring v. Prosise*, 462 U.S. 306 (1983). See *infra* notes 237-44 and accompanying text.

230. See *supra* note 98.
greater preclusive effect to a state judgment without having to overrule any of its recent decisions. A post-Marrese decision suggests time for the development of a rationale permitting more discriminating application of section 1738 is running out. If the Supreme Court has not reached the conclusion already, it seems to be moving toward the view that section 1738 categorically forbids greater preclusion.

This constrictive view of section 1738 proceeds from the erroneous assumption that if the statute does not require preclusion it invariably forbids it. Granted, if state law does not make the state judgment preclusive, a federal court cannot use section 1738 as authority to make it preclusive. But, although section 1738 protects important state interests by requiring federal courts to give as much preclusive effect to the state judgment as would state courts, it is less clear how or when important state interests also would be sacrificed should the federal court decide to give greater preclusive effect to the judgment. Section 1738 functions well as a rule of efficiency to ban without further inquiry all attempts to give less preclusive effect to state judgments, but it should not be applied as uncritically in greater preclusion cases.

The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for a more flexible ap-

231. The refusal of the Supreme Court to give greater preclusive effect to the Illinois judgment, see supra note 91 and accompanying text, can be reconciled with an interpretation of § 1738 that would permit greater preclusive effect in different and more deserving cases. See infra notes 277-81 and accompanying text.

232. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 106 S. Ct. 768 (1986). This case is discussed supra note 100.

233. See supra text accompanying note 91 and note 100.

234. See supra notes 103, 104, 189 and accompanying text.

235. Commentators have questioned whether the federal requirement of full faith and credit should be understood to extend to the whole body of a state's preclusion law. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467; Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 522-23; cf. Atwood, supra note 50, at 70 n.54 (stating that, although the language of § 1738 reaches both situations, "Congress . . . was clearly concerned with the problem of non-recognition of sister-state judgments rather than the possibility of 'over-recognition'"). Others have maintained that forums should be entitled to apply their local rules of nonmutual issue preclusion to enforce judgments originating from states that adhere to the preclusion limitations of the mutuality doctrine. E.g., A. VESTAL, supra note 7, at 54-55; Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and Foreign Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 381, 383 (1963); Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior Litigation, 74 NW. U.L. REV. 742, 753 (1979). But see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 695 (taking the position that the law of the place rendering the judgment should be used to settle all preclusion questions); Degnan, supra note 3, at 773 (same); Overton, The Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel, and Conflicts of Laws, 44 TENN. L. REV. 927, 948 (1977) (same). The Restatement (Second) frames the greater preclusion issue, but the discussion is inconclusive. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment g (1982).

236. "The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 require that a state judgment be given no lesser effect than it has under the law of the state whose court rendered the judgment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 comment g (1982). In addition, see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Of course, this is true in federal court only if another act of Congress does not function as a statutory exception to § 1738. See supra Part V.
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approach in *Haring v. Prosise*. The Court in *Haring* seemed to distinguish between the function of section 1738 in authorizing or explaining the choice of state preclusion law and the possible function of the statute in limiting choices. The Court suggested that federal judges must follow section 1738 for state judgments that would be preclusive where rendered, but that—at least in cases in which state courts would not regard the judgment as preclusive—section 1738 may not confine the choice to state preclusion law.

The *Haring* Court considered whether a state criminal proceeding, concluded by respondent's guilty plea, had an issue-preclusive effect on respondent's subsequent federal civil rights action against local police authorities. The Court concluded that Virginia preclusion law would not give effect to the state judgment. Under a restrictive reading of section 1738, the Court would have stopped there. Instead, the Court went on to consider whether the state judgment should preclude respondent as a matter of federal law.

Significantly, the Supreme Court did not find section 1738 to be as dominating in *Haring*’s greater preclusion setting. Section 1738 would have settled the matter only if state law rendered the judgment issue-preclusive. The failure of Virginia courts to regard the Virginia judgment as preclusive simply meant that petitioners would have to search beyond section 1738 for justification for their preclusion argument.

The problem with *Haring* is that it is as undiscriminating in its support of federal-court autonomy as other recent decisions have been in

238. See id. at 314-16.
239. See id. at 314 & n.8.
240. See id. at 316-20. This entire discussion would have been unnecessary if the Court had held that § 1738 was a per se rule against greater preclusion.
241. Id. at 316-17.
242. See id. at 316-20. With extended discussion, the Court found respondent's case for a federal rule of preclusion without merit. Id. For an illuminating view of the problem in *Haring* and of the general difficulties of granting issue-preclusive effects to guilty pleas, see Shapiro, *Should a Guilty Plea Have Preclusive Effect?*, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27 (1984).
243. Quoting Union & Planter's Bank v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 (1903), the Court said: "If the state courts would not give preclusive effect to the prior judgment, the courts of the United States can accord it no greater efficacy under § 1738." 462 U.S. at 313 n.6. It is interesting to note that Justice White quotes the same passage from the *Union & Planters' Bank* case to support his conclusion that "preclusion must be determined under state law, even if there would be preclusion under federal standards." Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (1984) (White, J., concurring).
244. The Court stated: "We therefore conclude that Virginia law would not bar Prosise from litigating the validity of the search . . . . Accordingly, the issue is not foreclosed under . . . § 1738." 462 U.S. at 317.
doubting the same. There are two reasons for reading section 1738 to restrict the authority of federal judges to augment the preclusive effects of state judgments. First, the preclusion goals of repose and judicial efficiency may be most easily advanced when the law of the rendering state can be depended upon to determine the preclusive scope of the judgment. Second, courts should respect attempts made by state judgments to advance local substantive policies. Although it may be easier to read a state’s propreclusion position as an attempt to advance local substantive policies, the judgment-rendering court may also use a restrained theory of preclusion to advance substantive policies.

Admittedly, the second reason for honoring the preclusion limitations of the rendering state is more elusive than the first. In many cases, the first reason seems adequate to support judicial application of the rendering state’s rule of lesser preclusion, making unnecessary an examination of the policies underlying state law. The choice of the preclusion law of the rendering state, however, does not completely secure the advantage of certainty. By themselves, the state’s interests in repose and judicial efficiency should not provide sufficient justification for forcing federal courts to abandon objectives of federal procedural policy that would be realized by giving greater preclusive effect to the state judgment. Therefore, federal law and policy should not yield unless choos-

245. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
246. Uncertainty is counterproductive to the purposes of preclusion. “Uncertainty intrinsically works to defeat the opportunities for repose and reliance sought by the rules of preclusion, and confounds the desire for efficiency by inviting repetitious litigation to test the preclusive effects of the first effort.” 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4407, at 49; cf. Burbank, supra note 3, at 627 (noting that “simplicity and predictability . . . are important where legal rules shape litigation conduct, as do preclusion rules”).
247. Subject to occasional choice-of-law considerations, the original adjudication provides the state forum with an instrument for applying local substantive rules to shape and limit the legal consequences of the controversy. State propreclusion law can be seen as a means of protecting the judicial product. Cf. Averill, supra note 65, at 691 (advocating an assessment of the substantive dimensions of judgments presented elsewhere for enforcement).
248. See infra note 271 (offering examples).
249. Professor Carrington has written that the benefits of certainty likely to flow from a rule requiring application of the rendering state’s preclusion law are limited. “This single additional anchor of certainty adds little to what the attentive plaintiff may anticipate without it and surely there is no special need for uniformity, no special hazard of forum-shopping, which can be attributed to the law of judgments.” Carrington, supra note 235, at 385. He also noted the uncertainty associated with attempts to determine the content of foreign preclusion law. “The application of foreign law, like the application of the Erie doctrine, requires the court to try to think with the minds of others—a process so difficult that it seems often to frustrate all thought.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
The degree of inevitable uncertainty may not be quite this great. But Professor Carrington does demonstrate the imperfections of reliance on the preclusion law of the rendering state as a means of promoting clarity. For a discussion of the process of determining foreign preclusion law, its attendant difficulties, and Erie doctrine analogues, see supra subpart IV(B).
250. Here I disagree with Professor Degnan. He concluded his superb article with the following proposed rule:
ing the rendering state's rule of lesser preclusion is necessary to secure the state's substantive interests. 251

The choice-of-preclusion-law approach suggested in this Article brings a form of interest analysis to the problem. Interest of the fed-

A valid judgment rendered in any judicial system within the United States must be recognized by all other judicial systems within the United States, and the claims and issues precluded by that judgment, and the parties bound thereby, are determined by the law of the system which rendered the judgment.

Degnan, supra note 3, at 773. In many, if not most, cases, I would come out the same way. But Professor Degnan's invariable choice of the preclusion law of the judgment-rendering state does not always produce desirable results. See infra subpart VI(B). It is for the best that "[c]ourts have not yet accepted any such clear rule." 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4466, at 618.

251. The approach taken by some federal diversity courts suggests that they would interpose state preclusion law even in such cases in which it is not necessary to secure the state's substantive interests. See, e.g., Mackris v. Murry, 397 F.2d 74, 81 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying Michigan state law of collateral estoppel, and requiring mutuality); McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335, 338-39 (S.D. Miss. 1980) (holding that Mississippi law controlled the application of collateral estoppel, and deciding that estoppel could not be applied under either state or federal law). They would do so, not upon the conclusion that § 1738 requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to all state judgments, but because of a misguided conception that the Erie doctrine applies. The interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), required by the Erie doctrine is explained and compared to the approach under § 1738 in supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text. There is no question that the preclusion law taken by federal courts is bottomed on concerns of judicial administration that are procedural in character. See infra notes 253, 263-65 and accompanying text. And the Erie doctrine has never been used by the Supreme Court to displace federal law when to do so would sacrifice clear federal procedural interests. When such interests have been at stake, federal law has prevailed over contrary state law. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). It is in keeping with the modern and, I think, correct view to suggest that the Erie doctrine is a red herring in the judgment-enforcement context and that § 1738 provides a proper and sufficient standard for such cases. See Degnan, supra note 3, at 750, 769-70 (commenting that when state judgments are presented in federal court, "Erie has no voice on the issue").

Erie works some mischief if applied to state-judgment cases. Granted, in many cases in which federal courts are asked to give greater effect to state judgments, § 1738 too should require the application of state preclusion law. See supra text following note 248. The application of Erie would do no great harm in such cases because it merely substitutes § 1652 for § 1738 as the basis for the result. However, because federal courts should be free to follow their own law of nonmutual issue preclusion in the proper circumstances, see infra subpart VI(B), cases that follow Erie to choose a state rule of mutuality are wrong in both approach and result. See Mackris, 397 F.2d at 81 (continuing state court's requirement of mutuality for the offensive use of collateral estoppel); McCarty, 502 F. Supp. at 338-39 (following state's prohibition of collateral estoppel when mutuality is lacking).

252. Interest analysis is a cornerstone of contemporary choice-of-law analysis. It is used to resolve apparent conflicts between the rules of two or more different jurisdictions. Interest analysis is the technique of determining the true extent of conflict by examining the policies behind the rules vying for acceptance. Professor Brainerd Currie deserves considerable credit for developing the approach through his writings. E.g., B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171. See generally Shreve, Currie's Government Interest Analysis—Has It Become a Paper Tiger?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 541 (1985) (discussing the contributions of Professor Currie at greater length). Other influential works include Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933), and Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1959). Interest analysis has figured prominently in the work of the most influential modern commentators. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d ed. 1977); A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 32, at 77; R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 7-8 (3d ed. 1986).

With one exception, Lewis, Mutuality in Conflict—Flexibility and Full Faith and Credit, 23
eral enforcement forum in having a rule of greater preclusion applied exists to the extent that federal procedural policies are implicated. Interest of the state court in having its rule of lesser preclusion applied exists to the extent that its substantive policies are implicated. When a state's position derives from a procedural concern, for example, that its courts not treat litigants unfairly, that policy does not support the state's rule of lesser preclusion when its judgment is offered for enforcement elsewhere. When the state rule of lesser preclusion is intended to facilitate a substantive policy—to help make real that state's vision of the behavioral expectations and demands of its substantive law—the picture changes. The established reading of section 1738 to guarantee as much preclusive effect to a state judgment in federal court proceeds, at least in part, from the need to give intersystem effect to a state court's attempt to bind the parties in the case to its conception of rights and duties. The rendering state's attempt to address the same matters by refusing to bind the parties is a difference only in technique. It should be treated with no less respect.

Federal courts should not be permitted simply to characterize the question as procedural and apply their own preclusion law.

DRAKE L. REV. 364 (1974), interest analysis does not seem to have played much of a role in choice of preclusion law. In his interesting article, Professor Lewis takes the somewhat radical position that state courts should be free to augment the preclusive effects of sister-state judgments simply upon a showing that the enforcement state has an interest in having its rule of greater preclusion applied. See id. at 385.

Some may object to using interest analysis in choice of preclusion law, because they think of preclusion law as securing party prerogatives rather than advancing the interests of systems in having their preclusion law applied. Party interests and governmental interests supporting preclusion greatly overlap. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4403, at 12-15. Preclusion arguments protect litigants and provide a mechanism for advancing the system's policy ends. But the benefits of preclusion should be available even in the absence of party initiatives. Cf. Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that district court is authorized to raise res judicata issue sua sponte).

False conflicts occur either when the rules produce the same result or (as here) the outcome of the case is capable of frustrating policy supporting only one of two ostensibly conflicting rules. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 17 (1982). The reach of state procedural policies does not extend to the federal case. Therefore no legitimate state policies will be sacrificed if the federal court applies its rule of nonmutual preclusion instead of the mutuality rule of the judgment-rendering state.

The substance-versus-procedure distinction can be misused, a fact made clear by Justice Frankfurter in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But the distinction does seem useful as a means of expressing the difference between "the body of rules which define legal rights, that is, the claims which people make on one another and recognize as valid," and rules "structuring and regulating the judicial process." Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678, 696 (1976) (footnotes omitted). As Justice Frankfurter seemed to suggest, the distinction is serviceable so long as an effort is made to remember that "[e]ach implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used." 326 U.S. at 108.

256. Under the traditional choice-of-law approach, courts have frequently used the procedural
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procedural concerns often justify favoring local law in a traditional choice-of-law setting. But section 1738 must be read to confine federal court access to their own preclusion rules, even when the policies supporting those rules are implicated. Only when the judgment-rendering state is uninterested in the choice-of-law outcome should the way be free for federal courts to give expression to federal propreclusion policies.

This analysis provides a framework for the development of a more discriminating theory of interpretation for section 1738 in greater preclusion cases. Under section 1738, federal courts should respect the preclusive limitations of many state judgments, including, as shall be seen, the Illinois judgment in Marrese. In other cases, the statute should be read to permit federal courts freedom to give more preclusive effect to state judgments. Perhaps the most evident category of cases for which freedom of greater preclusion should exist is that involving nonmutual issue preclusion.

B. Authority to Disregard State Mutuality Limitations—A Suggested Enclave of Federal Court Autonomy

Federal courts have dispensed with the mutuality requirement when determining the issue-preclusive effects of federal judgments. Most states have also dispensed with the requirement; however a minority have not. Should a federal court honor the preclusive limitations of the mutuality doctrine when presented with state judgments from mutuality jurisdictions?

The mutuality doctrine was purged from intramural federal preclusion law in order to conserve federal judicial resources that would otherwise be expended in relitigation of issues. It is difficult to see how the

characterization as an a priori justification for selection of their own law. See E. SCOTES & P. HAY, supra note 253, at 58-59; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 252, at 53.

257. In Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), the Supreme Court used the due process clause to strike down the Texas courts' attempts to favor local law through implausible characterization of an issue as procedural. So long, however, as forum law does address what can reasonably be described as procedural concerns, it need not give way to conflicting law.


259. For an explanation of the mutuality doctrine, see supra text accompanying note 15. The Supreme Court's rejection of the doctrine is discussed supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.

260. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

261. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

262. Concern for the conservation of judicial resources is particularly strong within the federal court system. See supra notes 21, 24-27 and accompanying text.
interest of federal courts in advancing these federal procedural concerns diminishes when they encounter state judgments.\textsuperscript{263} If the mutuality doctrine was an instrument for advancing substantive policies, federal courts should be bound under section 1738 to honor the mutuality doctrine. Because this is not so, however, federal courts should be free to give effect to the judgments of mutuality states according to the federal law of nonmutual issue preclusion.

A state's election to restrain the enforcement of its own judgments through the mutuality doctrine has nothing to do with the process of defining and limiting substantive rights. The interests that the mutuality doctrine advances are procedural, not substantive, in character. The doctrine prohibits use of an adjudication to bind one who could not have profited from the judgment had the case turned out differently. It represents a value judgment bottomed on concerns of procedural fairness—the adjudications of a system should not be available for use on a one-way basis.\textsuperscript{264} States have a right to supplement federal due process in promoting particular ideas of procedural fairness. They have a right to employ the mutuality doctrine to shield litigants from what they perceive to be unfair use of their own courts. But this concern is not implicated when their judgments are presented for enforcement in a federal court. The legitimate interest of state mutuality jurisdictions in protecting litigants does not extend to protecting federal litigants from the intended effects of federal issue preclusion doctrine.

Federal courts should draw upon two sources in determining the fair limits of issue preclusion to be given to state judgments: the Constitution and federal preclusion law and policy. Developments in the latter area led to rejection of the mutuality doctrine. This was accomplished through a new conception of procedural fairness, one in which fairness to the courts and the public was also taken into account. Strangers could bind those who had previously obtained an adjudication of the issue whenever it would not be unfair to do so.\textsuperscript{265}

Two due process questions should be noted at the constitutional

\textsuperscript{263} As Chief Justice Burger observed in Marrese, "federal courts have direct interests in ensuring that their resources are used efficiently and not as a means of harassing defendants with repetitive lawsuits, as well as in ensuring that parties asserting federal rights have an adequate opportunity to litigate those rights." Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring); cf Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 88 (1984) (White, J., concurring) ("If the federal courts have developed rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel that prevent relitigation in circumstances that would not be preclusive in state courts, the federal courts should be free to apply them, the parties then being free to relitigate in the state courts.").

\textsuperscript{264} For further discussion, see supra note 20.

\textsuperscript{265} The focus of the succeeding test shifted from the person wishing to use the doctrine to the one against whom it was invoked. Id.
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level. The first and easiest is whether nonmutual issue preclusion is itself constitutional. The Supreme Court has made clear that it is.266 The second question initially seems more troublesome. Is a party to a prior adjudication denied due process if she is precluded under circumstances that would not have led to preclusion under the law of the state rendering the judgment?267 The due process concern is over the possibility of unfair surprise.268 To prove unfair surprise, the litigant would have to argue two points. First, that a reading of the mutuality law of the forum at the time the case was tried did not give her notice of the possibility that the judgment could generate the greater preclusive effects of nonmutuality. Second, that the litigant reasonably relied on the mutuality doctrine to measure her stake in the outcome of the suit and therefore failed to devote resources to the trial or appeal of the case commensurate with the higher stakes possible under nonmutuality.269

On closer examination, a due process objection to application of the federal rule of nonmutual issue preclusion in such cases would be of doubtful weight. Because many jurisdictions have overruled their promutuality precedents,270 it may be unreasonable for any attorney litigating in a mutuality jurisdiction to rely on the fact that the law will not be changed when or before the judgment is presented for enforcement there. Moreover, a litigant who investigated the matter would discover that the law concerning the obligation of other courts271 to enforce the state mutuality limitations is unclear. This hardly presents a suitable climate for the argument of unfair surprise.

C. The Appropriate Use of Section 1738 to Honor State Law in Greater Preclusion Cases: Marrese and Other Examples

Federal courts have developed a broad definition of a claim in their intramural law of claim preclusion.272 The majority of states have done

266. See authorities cited supra note 17.
267. See Atwood, supra note 50, at 70 n.54 (suggesting that giving greater preclusive effect to a judgment could lead to due process complications); Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 517 (same).
268. Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion, supra note 6, at 526-27.
269. It is easy to base a refusal to employ nonmutual issue preclusion on the failure to satisfy the prerequisites of the doctrine itself rather than on constitutional grounds. For examples of sensitivity of the doctrine to possibilities of unfair surprise, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (discussed supra note 20), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
270. See supra note 29.
272. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
This permits use of claim preclusion to discourage claim splitting and resulting piecemeal litigation. A minority of states, however, adhere to a narrower claim definition, which permits claim splitting. Section 1738 should not leave federal courts free to use the broader claim definition of federal law to give claim-preclusive effect to judgments from states permitting claim splitting. As in the area of mutuality, strong federal procedural interests are at stake, but, unlike the doctrine of mutuality, policies that underlie state law permitting claim splitting appear substantive in character.

The policies supporting the federal rule against claim splitting seem to be as fully implicated when federal courts are presented with state judgments as when they are presented with judgments of their own. The policies are procedural and twofold. The first concerns judicial administration. Broad claim definition averts the wasteful expenditure of federal judicial resources on repetitive litigation by coercing, through threat of claim forfeiture, the consolidation of claims in the original proceeding. In this sense, a rule against claim splitting is akin to the forum’s procedural law concerning compulsory counterclaims. The second procedural policy derives from the court’s concern that parties before it be treated fairly. Claim splitting is unfair to the party opposing the claim in the succeeding case, because it is likely to prolong conflict and increase the expense of litigation.

Although the policies behind some states’ tolerance of claim splitting are more difficult to ascertain, they have been treated as substantive and that characterization seems warranted. Perhaps the easiest way to understand the substantive nature of a rule permitting claim splitting is to reason, a step at a time, from the basic premise underlying why courts hear cases at all. Courts entertain claims because they are duty bound to make real the behavioral demands and expectations of substantive law. Most, probably all, jurisdictions have means of demonstrating that the duty to adjudicate controls even in the face of repetitious litigation, so long as there are extenuating circumstances. Claim-splitting

273. See supra note 29.
274. This is most notable in accident cases. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
276. See R. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay, supra note 29, at 658. For an illuminating comparison of counterclaim and preclusion rules, see Scales, supra note 235, at 753-54.
277. See Developments in the Law—Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 829-30 (1952) (suggesting how interests underlying the law of commercial transactions and of domestic relations might be advanced when courts permit successive lawsuits).
278. Relief in such cases may be built into claim-preclusion doctrine, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 comment j (1982) (misrepresentation through fraud or innocent misrep-
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states simply take concern for the vindication of substantive principles one step further by permitting successive suits in the absence of extenuating circumstances. Therefore, in this context, section 1738 should be read to prohibit a federal court from using a state judgment to preclude a claim that would not be precluded under the law of the judgment-rendering state.\(^\text{279}\)

For the moment, let us assume that Illinois law permits the kind of claim splitting necessary for the plaintiffs to bring successive suits in courts of limited and general jurisdiction.\(^\text{280}\) In that case, the Marrese Court was correct to reject the possibility that section 1738 could permit the lower federal courts to give claim-preclusive effect to the judgments.\(^\text{281}\) Giving greater claim-preclusive effect to the Illinois judgments could undercut Illinois’ substantive policy favoring use of a second suit.

The complication of exclusive federal jurisdiction in Marrese poses an added threat to Illinois’ substantive interests. If federal courts gave claim-preclusive effect to Illinois judgments like the one in Marrese, Illinois state courts would have fewer opportunities to interpret their state antitrust statutes. This would happen if plaintiffs initially file in federal court in order to preserve their federal antitrust claims and also plead their state antitrust claims upon a theory of pendent jurisdiction.\(^\text{282}\)

representation of the defendant), or it may have an extrinsic source, e.g., FED. R. CRV. P. 60(b)(1) (relief from the judgment on grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect”). A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) must be made within a year of the entry of judgment, but, by itself, the motion does not affect the preclusive authority of the judgment. Federal courts take a similar view regarding the effect of appeals. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4427, at 270-71 (“Should the judgment be vacated by the trial court or reversed on appeal, however, res judicata falls with the judgment.”).

279. A federal court would do violence to state substantive interests by using its own rule of preclusion to adjudicate adversely the merits of plaintiff’s claim. If the successive claim was within the jurisdiction of the state court that rendered the original judgment, the frustrated plaintiff might try bringing a third suit there. But the defendant could plead the judgment from the intervening federal case to deny plaintiff access to the claim-splitting advantages of state forum law.

Commentators have suggested that, instead of reaching the merits of these claims, propreclusion forums can promote their policies of efficiency and resource conservation in a manner less disruptive to the interests of claim-splitting states by dismissing the claims without prejudice. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 5, § 4467, at 645-48; Carrington, supra note 235, at 386-87. The suggestion merits careful consideration. It furthers procedural policies against free expenditure of federal court resources, see supra text following note 276, and is preferable to allowing a federal court to give preclusive effect to the first judgment from a claim-splitting state. However, the troublesome question remains whether, in light of § 1738, federal courts have authority to decline to give life to the substantive policies that may accompany a state judgment by dismissing suits without prejudice. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.

280. The question is discussed supra note 128. The Supreme Court directed an examination of Illinois preclusion law on remand. See supra text accompanying note 76.

281. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

282. So long as “a common nucleus of operative fact” can be demonstrated between the jurisdictionally self-sufficient federal antitrust claim and the state antitrust claim, a federal court may adjudicate the state claim upon a theory of pendent jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Plaintiffs probably would seek pendent jurisdiction over their state antitrust claims to avert possible loss of the latter from the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment.\textsuperscript{283} Granted, in the absence of diversity, another federal court would not have the opportunity to measure the preclusive effect of the federal judgment because the pendent state claim would not provide a basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This is a reverse image of the paradox encountered in \textit{Marrese}.\textsuperscript{284} And, just as the lack of an opportunity for state courts to pass on precisely the same preclusion issue does not itself demonstrate in \textit{Marrese} that state preclusion law is inapplicable,\textsuperscript{285} a similar inability of federal courts to make the particular preclusion determination should not rule out the possibility that federal preclusion law controls.\textsuperscript{286}

The attorneys general of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin argued as amici that claim preclusion in \textit{Marrese} would have an eviscerating effect on the development of state antitrust law.\textsuperscript{287} The purposes of exclusive federal jurisdiction are to promote the coherent and uniform development of federal law.\textsuperscript{288} States presumably have the same interest in the authoritative development of their law. Although it is questionable whether state legislatures can endow their courts with exclusive jurisdiction,\textsuperscript{289} state courts at least seem entitled to the full opportunity to elaborate and refine the meaning of state law through the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over state antitrust claims.

\textsuperscript{283} There is considerable support for the argument of preclusion in this context. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller \& E. Cooper, \textit{supra} note 5, § 4412, at 97 n.14; Note, \textit{The Res Judicata Implications of Pendent Jurisdiction}, 66 \textit{Cornell L. Rev.} 608, 609 (1981); \textit{cf.} \textit{Restatement (Second) of Judgments} § 25 comment e, illustration 10 (1982) (stating that "unless it is clear that the federal court would have declined as a matter of discretion to exercise [pendent] jurisdiction . . . the state action is barred"). The \textit{Restatement (Second)} position was endorsed by concurring Justices Blackmun and Marshall and by dissenting Justice Brennan in \textit{Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie}, 452 U.S. 394, 404 (1981) (Blackmun \& Marshall, JJ., concurring), 411 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{284} \textit{See supra} text preceding note 120.

\textsuperscript{285} \textit{See supra} note 125 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{286} This view is supported by the fact that Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun appear to have taken their propreclusion position in \textit{Moiite} as a matter of intramural federal law. See \textit{supra} note 283; \textit{cf.} 18 C. Wright, A. Miller \& E. Cooper, \textit{supra} note 5, § 4412, at 97 n.14 (suggesting it is appropriate for a federal court to enjoin as precluded a state adjudication of a claim that should have been presented under a theory of pendent jurisdiction in a prior federal adjudication).

\textsuperscript{287} In their amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court, they argued that such a result might "strip the states of their right to formulate their own state antitrust policies because plaintiffs will be filing directly in federal court to insure full relief." Brief of the States of the Seventh Circuit, Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, on Behalf of the Petitioners, at 12; \textit{Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons}, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). They argued that this would lead to "federal judges, rather than state courts, molding the Illinois Antitrust laws." \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{288} \textit{See supra} note 162 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{289} \textit{Cf.} \textit{Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.}, 448 U.S. 261, 270 (1980) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a state's attempt "directly to determine the extraterritorial effect" of its worker's compensation awards); Donovan \textit{v. City of Dallas}, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964) (refusing to permit a state court to protect its jurisdiction by enjoining a suit filed in federal court).
Preclusion and Choice of Law

Of course, it is possible to overstate the adverse effect claim preclusion in *Marrese* might have on the development of state antitrust law; federal courts have considerable discretion to refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claims. A plaintiff's unsuccessful attempt to invoke pendent jurisdiction should insulate her from the preclusive effects of the resulting federal judgment, leaving the way clear for a subsequent state court adjudication of the state antitrust claim. Furthermore, there is some indication that state forums would continue to attract state antitrust litigation, even if plaintiffs forfeited their federal claims by filing there. Still, the prospect of an impairment of Illinois' interest in developing its substantive law seems real enough to give added weight to the conclusion that section 1738 should not leave the federal court free in *Marrese* to apply a federal rule of greater preclusion.

VII. Conclusion

This Article began by noting two realms of preclusion law in federal court: (1) the intramural realm, in which federal courts have considerable autonomy to fashion doctrine governing the preclusive effects of federal judgments; and (2) the intersystem realm, in which section 1738 imposes an obligation on federal courts to honor state judgments comparable to the obligation imposed on the courts of sister states by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.

Issues of federal intramural preclusion law may be taxing, but they usually are free of the complications of choice of law. Federal cases involving state judgments could be equally free of choice-of-law complications if federal courts always settled preclusion questions by referring to the state preclusion law of the court rendering the judgment. Section

290. The power to take pendent jurisdiction over a state claim "need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also C. Wright, supra note 25, at 105-07 (discussing criteria influencing the Court's decision in *Gibbs*).

291. See 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 5, § 4412.

292. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61. Professor Hovenkamp wrote: [T]he notion that federal antitrust law is aggressive while state law is passive is largely a thing of the past. Since the early 1970's the United States Supreme Court has gradually restricted the scope of federal antitrust liability and narrowed the range of private persons who may sue for antitrust violations. On the other hand, many states have broadened the scope of their antitrust laws and have granted standing to a broader class of plaintiffs than have a cause of action under the federal laws. As a result, activities that are not illegal under federal law are condemned by the antitrust law of some states. Furthermore, some persons who have suffered injury because of antitrust violations have a damages action under various state antitrust laws while they have no such action under the federal statutes. Hovenkamp, supra note 159, at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
1738 will require this in most cases; however two exceptions currently exist and two more should be adopted.

Federal courts are not required by section 1738 to accept the conclusion of state law that a judgment of that state is preclusive when: (1) state preclusion law would produce an unconstitutional result, or (2) another congressional enactment creates an exception to section 1738. Although the law currently is unsettled, the Supreme Court should make clear that federal courts are not confined to state preclusion law in two additional situations: (1) when state preclusion law is so undeveloped or confused that it does not suggest an answer to the preclusion problem that the state judgment poses, or (2) when the federal court can advance the objectives of its intramural rule of greater preclusion without interfering with any policies that underlie the state's rule of lesser preclusion.

It is difficult to formulate general principles to aid in determining when exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction should function as an implied exception to section 1738. But, the Supreme Court should provide more guidance than it has when it suggested that the creation of exclusive federal jurisdiction cannot, in and of itself, be read to imply an exception to section 1738. An implied exception should be found only if preclusion by state law would so frustrate the purposes served by the particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction as to make suspension of section 1738 essential to the grant. From the vantage provided in Marrese, it does not appear that the difference in the effective operation of exclusive federal antitrust jurisdiction, with or without the suspension of section 1738, usually would be great enough to justify an implied exception.

The interests served in giving state judgments their intended effect are equally strong when federal concurrent jurisdiction is at stake. Because it is impossible to argue—as one can attempt to do concerning exclusive federal jurisdiction—that suspension of section 1738 is essential to a grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the implied-exception argument is far less likely to be convincing. Therefore, the Supreme Court was correct in its much-criticized refusals to imply an exception to section 1738 based on Title 42, section 1983.

Absent a statutory exception, the Court has consistently and correctly read section 1738 to require federal courts to give state judgments at least the preclusive effect they have under state law. In light of this rule, the Court's requirement that inquiries begin with an examination of state law makes sense. But the Court needs to provide far more guidance for situations in which no state law appears to be on point. The Supreme Court has greater freedom under section 1738 than it does under section 1652 to develop a flexible and pragmatic approach for coping with un-
clear state law. Section 1738 should be read to require federal courts to give preclusive effect to state judgments, not only when preclusion is supported by apposite state precedents, but even when a reading of state preclusion law only suggests preclusion. When state law provides no answer, however, federal courts should be permitted to revert to federal preclusion law and policy.

Recent Supreme Court decisions reveal a disturbing drift toward the conclusion that section 1738 categorically prohibits federal courts from giving preclusive effects to state judgments when the courts rendering them would not do so. At the same time, the Court has yet to discuss the greater preclusion problem thoughtfully or at any length. The subject needs more extensive examination than the Court has given it so far. To use the state law of the rendering forum to establish the preclusive effect of a judgment gives the judgment an element of certainty, which complements the underlying policies of preclusion. But, alone, the advantages of certainty are not great enough to justify the selection of a state rule of lesser preclusion when federal interests secured by a rule of greater preclusion would be sacrificed.

Section 1738 should be read to leave federal courts free to augment the preclusive effects of a state judgment whenever doing so would not frustrate the purpose behind the state’s rule of lesser preclusion and would advance the purpose behind the federal rule of greater preclusion. This approach brings to the choice-of-preclusion-law question a form of interest analysis more commonly associated with traditional choice of law. The approach does not support greater preclusion in Marrese, but does suggest that federal courts may, at least, apply their own law of nonmutual issue preclusion to overcome the mutuality limitations of state law.