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Book Review. Law, Intellect, and Education by Francis A. Allen

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legislation as the Uniform Products Liability Act provides an addendum to the development of strict liability. Has reality caught up with aspiration and do the actual costs of administering through litigation an imperfect compensation system outweigh considerations of fair compensation to injured consumers? At the same time, this retreat may (and should) herald renewed interest and inquiry into two closely related problems for the future: (1) the extent to which a more efficient and fair compensation system for product accidents can be developed through the legislative and administrative processes; and (2) the extent to which more effective accident prevention systems—systems concerned with more than simple product failure—can be developed. Surely these questions transcend in importance the current rattle in the courts and the literature over the legal standard for defect in design cases. For if any engine mounting on a DC-10 or nuclear reactor system or chemical storage container fails, the one-shot cost to life, property, psychological well being, and economic relationships obliterates every assumption made about strict liability as a compensation system and makes accident prevention (safety) the most important consideration for private industry and government regulators. Let's face it. The common-law string in products cases barely holds its own weight and is in danger of breaking. The future lies in surrounding and perhaps supplanting this string with more vigorous accident prevention and compensation systems. It surely is a challenge worth tackling head on at an early stage in one's legal studies.24


Reviewed by Gene R. Shreve*

This small book by a former dean of the University of Michigan Law School is the most confident statement of the nature and purpose of American legal education to appear since questioning and serious criticism gathered force in the 1970s. Coming after a period

24. As this review is completed, another "casebook" on products liability by Professor Marshall S. Shapo has been announced for publication in the spring of 1980. The liability book will be accompanied by a separate paperback by Shapo entitled "Public Regulation of Product Hazards."

of relative disillusionment, *Law, Intellect, and Education* is valuable for some of the claims it makes in support of legal education. While I find myself in disagreement with many of the author's points, I think the book generally represents an important contribution to the literature on legal education\(^1\) because it represents the philosophical position of the powerful law school traditionalists, who seldom reduce their views to writing.\(^2\) This forthright book says more about the feelings which justify traditional law school processes than the speculations of twenty critics, thereby providing important new material for the continuing dialogue on law school reform.

Over the past thirty years, Dean Allen has written numerous essays on law and legal education which have been edited, revised, and combined into this volume. The collection is intended to represent the values and observations of an influential figure in American law school circles, and to honor Dean Allen's service to the Association of American Law Schools.\(^3\) The book can most easily be seen as a work on law schools, although the author prefers the broader concept of "the university law school."\(^4\)

The author's insistence on viewing the law school as part of a greater university community serves as a basis for some valuable observations about trends and needs in legal education. Dean Allen addresses the impact of other disciplines on law teaching and scholarship, noting that

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1. For an overview of the considerable body of literature which has been produced on the subject of legal education, see Barry & Connelly, *Research on Law Students: An Annotated Bibliography*, 1978 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 751.


4. *Id. at* 65. The concept would seem to be particularly relevant in light of the current controversy over the place of practical skills training in the law school curriculum. See notes 15 & 16 infra; McGowan, *The University Law School and Practical Education*, 65 A.B.A.J. 374 (1979).
there are few competent and conscientious law teachers or scholars who today
would question the penetrating power of economic analysis in the considera-
tion of some legal questions, the utility of techniques of social research de-
veloped outside the law schools, or the insights gained from viewing contemporary
problems from the broad perspective of historical sequences.5

At the same time, Dean Allen justly criticizes the frequent failure
of legal scholars to borrow and apply techniques of empirical re-
search to their own work.6 The need to develop strategies for collect-
ing and evaluating factual data is great. He writes that “in many
vital areas of legal policy . . . we literally do not know what we are
doing, and we are not sufficiently committed to finding out.”7 Sus-
picion of the methods of empirical research long accepted in other
academic disciplines has been a tradition among legal scholars8 and
will die hard. This book will hasten its demise, particularly in light
of the reinforcement Dean Allen gives to law faculty members seek-
ing to broaden their interdisciplinary horizons.

Advanced degree work in the humanities or social sciences is
rarely a prerequisite for law school faculty appointment. Faculty
members who are drawn directly from law school or practice proba-
bly are often intimidated by both the knowledge and research meth-
odologies of related university fields. Yet Dean Allen writes of “the
remarkable task of self-education that law faculty members, partic-
ularly young ones, have undertaken in the past generation.”9 The
author performs a genuine service in encouraging law professors to
explore material from related university disciplines and integrate it
into their teaching and scholarship, although they may always lack
the certification of a doctoral or master’s degree in other fields.

Dean Allen writes in the preface that all essays in Law, Intel-
lect, and Education express his concern that legal education “is
under attack in the twentieth-century world, and that, if it is to
survive, it must today, as in the past, be contended for.”10 The
author undertakes to defend legal education from what he sees to be
the potentially corrosive effect of developments beyond the bor-
ders of the university community. The external threats cited by
Dean Allen change according to the time each essay was written.
They include “intellectual obscurantism” in the years immediately

5. F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 57.
6. Id. at 88.
7. Id. at 89.
8. For example, Thomas Reed Powell, a professor at Columbia University School of Law,
 used to speak with disdain of some social studies where “counters don’t think, and thinkers
9. F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 56. Dean Allen argues strongly for the need of legal
educators to educate themselves. Id. at 44.
10. Id. at vii.
following the Second World War, Vietnam, rapid technological change, Watergate, and bar association attempts to shape law school curriculums.

It is regrettable that Dean Allen has chosen to cast the purpose of his collection of essays in such epic terms. While the book works well at a musing, epigrammatic level, it is an inadequate vehicle for the author's larger purpose of defending essential values of legal education. Why and how the external forces identified by Dean Allen threaten legal education is never fully explained. More basically, the book devotes little specific attention to what the processes of American legal education are or should be. The reader needs a clearer indication of the purposes and methods of student learning and growth in law school in order to understand and evaluate positions taken by Dean Allen.

Nowhere is this weakness more apparent than in the author's discussion of student based criticism of legal education. Dean Allen sees the dissatisfaction of law students with the quality of their classroom experiences as a "contribution of modern student attitudes to the new anti-intellectualism in American legal education." The substance of student criticism is never really presented, but the author appears to see in it a rejection of his vision of an "intellectually based and humanistically motivated" law school. Dean Allen deplores the reluctance of some, perhaps many, law students to undertake the intellectual exertion and self-discipline for "clear and responsible thought" in their legal studies. The author finds two sources for what he perceives as student anti-intellectualism. The first is Vietnam disillusionment. Dean

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11. Id. at 17 (note).
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 40-41.
14. Id. at 11 (note).
15. Id. at 51-52.
16. For example, Dean Allen, referring to the practical skills controversy, states: If ever the law schools and the practicing profession are in perfect accord, it will be because one or the other has capitulated and abdicated its proper functions. In this sinful world, when the lion and the lamb lie down together the lamb is usually in the interior of the lion. Id. at 57.
17. Id. at 71.
18. Id. at vii. Dean Allen uses variations of this phrase throughout the book. He apparently sees law school learning as a fusion of the reasoning process (intellect) with the critical study of values which have their source in other university disciplines (humanism). E.g., id. at 24-25, 68. Dean Allen's repeated use of the term "humanistic"—"humanistically motivated law training," id. at 62, "humanistic ends of law teaching," id. at 67, "humanistically based legal education," id. at 69—may confuse readers who associate the term with a school of thought more critical of legal education. See note 2 supra.
19. Id. at 68.
Allen argues that students have less faith in, hence less interest in, political and social institutions. The second source is what Dean Allen calls the “hedonism of modern life.” The author suggests that learning in law school is hard work and inevitably painful, yet many students feel that they “possess a kind of natural right not to experience pain.” Dean Allen sees in student criticism a desire for an easy, anti-intellectual classroom alternative. The author urges law teachers to resist student pressures to make the tensions and demands of the classroom less rigorous.

Dean Allen’s reports of the dissatisfaction of many students with their law school experiences would seem accurate. Interest in law school begins to decline during the first year, and the problem worsens during the second and third years. Professors often become discouraged at declines in class attendance or preparation and student preoccupation with practice opportunities, either part time during law school or full time thereafter. While this all may be true, I think the author is wrong in concluding that student dissatisfaction with the law school experience represents an unhealthy trend in legal education. What can be observed during the decade of the 1970s is an increasing willingness of students to react to longstanding issues of relevance and quality in legal education. Students have become far less willing to accept uncritically the character, sequence, and duration of law school programs on the sole authority of law school faculties and administrators.

20. Id. at 62. In Dean Allen’s view, they are “impatient with any educational activity that does not promise an immediate and discernable payoff in private law practice.” Id.
21. Id. at 73.
22. Id.
23. He attempts to bolster flagging faculty spirits and adds notes both optimistic and dire:
Resistance creates dissonance in their relations with some students, and dissonance is particularly distressing to conscientious teachers who have always relied on a sympathetic bond with their students as an avenue of communication and as a means for mutual learning. Happily, there are indications that the dissonance is lessening. In any event, the only alternative available to the instructor is default and capitulation.
Id. at 74-75.
25. The behavior of many second and third year law students is characterized by “cycles of extended periods of lethargy followed by bouts of cramming. During the second and third years of study, student effort declines and disbelief in the value of the standard techniques of legal education increases.” TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS 17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LAWYER COMPETENCY]. For a thoughtful and detailed examination of the problem of declining student interest in law school, see Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 662-59 (1979).
Traditional law school authority figures are losing their hold on students for many reasons. Vietnam and Watergate have played their part. Students are still aware that their knowledge of institutional and professional models is inferior to that of their professors, but because the models are less sacred, students are less intimidated by their lack of knowledge and less willing to suppress or postpone criticism of their surroundings. The admission of larger numbers of women to law schools is also a factor. Legal education is no longer the male ritual or rite of passage that it used to be.

On one basic and important point I believe I am in agreement with Dean Allen. When students reject the structure and content of law school experiences offered them, their opportunities for learning are greatly diminished. Law students simply lack the capacity to design and implement an alternative program of learning entirely on their own. I am as disturbed as I perceive the author to be that not enough learning is happening in law school. The essence of my disagreement with the author involves two related assumptions which are at the core of the book. First, I am not persuaded that student criticism of legal education is essentially irrelevant or that it has its stimulus in larger and essentially unproductive trends of hedonism or social disillusionment. Second, I cannot accept Dean Allen’s positive and essentially protective assessment of the sufficiency of learning opportunities in law school.

Learning in law school comes as a result of the totality of student experiences in the law school community—what has been called the law school “climate.” It is nonetheless fair to say that most learning comes about as a result of the efforts of law teachers. Unlike academic functions of scholarship and administrative contribution, law teaching exists and can be evaluated almost exclusively in terms of the quantity and quality of student learning.

The essential preoccupation of the book with analytic learning as the purpose of legal education can be faulted. While there is
perhaps unanimous agreement that analytic learning is an essential goal, one may ask whether systematic examination, integration and growth of nonanalytic skills (such as writing, interviewing, and negotiating abilities) should not also be primary goals sought in legal education. Yet even if the purpose of legal education could be confined to analytic learning, the book fails to indicate what good teaching in realization of that goal might be, or whether, or to what extent law teachers are accountable if students fail to progress in analytic learning. A consideration of the nature of and essential preconditions for analytic learning makes it more difficult to accept Dean Allen’s dismissal of student dissatisfaction with their classroom experiences.

It may be helpful at this point to offer some observations on the nature of analytic learning and related strategies of casebook teaching. Common to all roles in the law is the need for analytical competence in legal problem solving. Needed is the capacity both to explain and influence the legal processes by which controversies are resolved, and by which the lives of members of our society are authoritatively arranged. This can be done only through the utilization of three highly integrated functions. First, educated lawyers have knowledge of particular legal rules. Second, these rules are matched against the facts of the particular situation derived from observation. Finally, decisions are made about the possible legal significance of the facts through the process of reasoning.

“Knowledge” can be knowledge about rules reflecting social values (substantive law) or knowledge about the rules which compose the process making social values authoritative (procedural law). The selective packaging and distribution of knowledge is a
central law school function. Students learn some of the knowledge they will need through legal problem solving and they learn research skills sufficient to acquire the remainder. If this were the only learning goal in law school, teaching materials would be black letter texts. Instead, students most frequently use casebooks, which are certainly inefficient vehicles for the transmittal of knowledge. Students must extrapolate and apply knowledge (the rules) from the cases. This forces them to deal with and develop skills of observation and reasoning in order to acquire knowledge and to associate the three in the exercise of critical skills of analysis in legal problem solving.

Analytic learning is most frequently associated with casebooks and case method teaching. The presence of an analytic learning component, however, is probably a sine qua non for the adoption of any course into the law school curriculum. Such analytic learning involves the student in the sacred process of learning to “think like a lawyer.” Venerated are “skills and values . . . of reading, writing, reasoning, a strong repugnance to the abuse of rhetoric, and a dedication to the arts of reasoned articulation.”

Two things are required of law teachers in order to facilitate growth in analytic learning among their students. First, the professor must possess requisite knowledge of the field covered by the course. Second, the professor must be able to engage and involve his or her class in the process of learning. Knowledge of the field is, of course, essential. The teacher must be capable of arranging, presenting, and, as appropriate, clarifying casebook or other course material. The teacher must be sufficiently well informed and thoughtful about the material that he or she can, when appropriate, serve as a model for the kind of critical thinking desired in the course. But however thoughtful and authoritative the teacher’s grasp of the material may be, mere presentation of that expertise to students will not greatly advance analytic learning. Students cannot develop skills of observation and reasoning and relate them to the acquisition of knowledge if they are passive in class. The need of the teacher to provide opportunities for student participation and to develop strategies for drawing students from a passive to an active learning state is the central issue in law school teaching. A student cannot learn without strong individual involvement. In the ideal classroom, the student has read the assigned material and come to certain tentative critical judgements about it when the class starts. He or she then listens carefully to the critical judgments of class-

33. F. Allen, supra note 3, at 25.
mates and the professor; speaks out to probe, criticize, or defend issues which emerge; and, by the end of the class, revises or expands his or her judgment if the experience of the class has persuaded him or her to do so. The process of testing and revision of critical commitments continues until the end of the course.

Dean Allen is correct in concluding that the process of analytic learning is painful. Learning involves discovering and growing from one's mistakes; that is emotionally uncomfortable and at times degrading, even under the best of circumstances. But to suggest that students have no choice but to bear uncritically the pain of learning ignores sound learning theory. The suggestion also ignores the facts of modern student life. Students can no longer be forced to accept approaches to teaching of which they disapprove. Since most Fs are now given out through the admissions process, grades are no longer the threat they probably once were. Moreover, few law school professors presently try to bring about student participation in class through force or intimidation. Sadly, most law school classes are taught primarily in a mode which involves and engages students not at all—lecture. It is small wonder that students are often bored and dissatisfied with law school teaching.

34. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
35. Naturally, the impact of law school experiences will vary with individual students. Hedegard, supra note 24, at 838. Most, however, find it a trying experience. See, e.g., Note, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 1201.
36. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. Dean Allen comes close to romanticising painful elements in the process of learning. He quotes Samuel Johnson on learning Latin: "My master whipped me very well. Without that, Sir, I should have done nothing." F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 74 (quoting J. WAIR, SAMUEL JOHNSON 24 (1974)). Quoting Ivan Illich, he writes "Man's consciously lived fragility, individuality, and relatedness make the experience of pain, sickness, and even death an integral part of his life." Id. at 78 n.27 (quoting I. ILICH, TOWARD A HISTORY OF NEEDS 109 (1978)). Dean Allen disavows the more sado-masochistic implications of this line of thought. Id. at 68. He argues, however, that profound learning requires a pressure-charged environment. Id. at 73-74. Finally, he suggests that professors must steel themselves against inevitable indications of student distress if they are "to serve their important function" in legal education. Id. at 74; see note 23 supra.
37. Contrary to Dean Allen's conception of the intrepid student who makes his or her own educational experience, see note 32 supra, his attitudes on pain and learning (which came as close to anything in the book to learning theory) create a kind of approach to teaching where student feeling and involvement in the learning processes is most likely to be excluded. For reasons I shall state, this approach seems to me to be incomplete and unsound.
39. "[S]ixty to ninety percent of a typical large law class (and most are large) is lecture." Id. Primary utilization of lecture in law school teaching is widely, if not universally, deplored. See, e.g., Strong, The Pedagogic Training of Law Faculty, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 226 (1973). Professors who feel guilt about the amount of lecturing time do try to mask their work with "questions and answers as mileposts in what is essentially a lecture." T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at 176.
40. It is encouraging that a recent, broadly based study on American legal education has addressed improvement in the quality of teaching. LAWYER COMPETENCY, supra note 25, at 4.
Learning and growth are painful processes for law teachers too, and I am afraid that Dean Allen's book will encourage professors to rationalize important issues of their own individual growth and to blame students for the pain they feel when aspects of their teaching appear to fail. Erection or reinforcement of attitude barriers between teacher and student will deprive most law teachers of any real opportunity to advance learning.

Except in the classes of an occasional Professor Kingsfield, a working respect between teacher and students is essential for student participation. The teacher's function of dispersing information, or knowledge, seems to carry with it the highest degree of acceptance and approval. Particularly after the first year, it often becomes more difficult to get students to accept a teaching strategy based on student discussion. Students seem to feel that their powers of observation and reasoning have been fully developed and that they simply need knowledge which will be useful in passing the bar and practicing law. Under these circumstances the teacher may surrender and lecture (more common is the lecture punctuated by a few questions). For the professor to overcome this problem of student attitude it is necessary for the professor to achieve acceptance for demands made to take students out of their passivity. This acceptance is most likely to come if students feel they can take the psychological risks of classroom interaction. If the teacher, by example and direction, establishes an atmosphere where the more intimate aspects of the students' personalities—their feelings, values, and commitments about the learning materials—will be respected, then free discussion important to the development of analytic learning will occur. The problems are how to maintain this atmosphere while also maintaining a level of correctness or analytic probity about the material which the teacher feels is warranted, and how to maintain this atmosphere while also covering the particular

There is still too great a tendency, however, to associate improvements in the quality of teaching with alternatives to the case method. Id. at 26. Because alternatives (variously termed problem method, simulation or clinical education) carry financial and other limitations, it is unlikely that case method teaching will ever be replaced on a wide scale. See Shreve, Classroom Litigation in the First Semester of Law School—An Approach to Teaching Legal Method at Harvard, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 95, 104-05 (1977); LAWYER COMPETENCY, supra note 25, at 22. As a basic matter, effective learning is more a matter of teaching attitude than pedagogical engineering.

42. Kingsfield was a tyrannical law professor in John Osborn's The Paper Chase, a fictionalized narrative of student life at Harvard Law School. Kingsfields, however, are a dying breed. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. Shreve, supra note 2, at 267.
agenda of topics and ideas which the teacher feels is important. Failure in the realization of these latter objectives will dissatisfy the teacher and many of the students as well.

Solutions to these problems come with difficulty and only through trial and error.\(^\text{45}\) Student criticisms are inevitable and will often be insensitive and unduly harsh, for few students seem to realize their teachers are also undergoing a painful learning process. Yet, if one wishes to view legal education in Dean Allen's epic terms, these issues may actually represent "the greatest challenge facing American law schools."\(^\text{46}\) We cannot afford to wait, perhaps forever, for the occurrence of favorable events outside the law school which will somehow increase student enthusiasm for learning. Dean Allen is right to urge renewed commitment to legal education, but it is the enthusiasm, involvement, and learning of law students that must "be contended for"\(^\text{47}\) by law teachers.

How will improvements come about? Dean Allen has provided the answer in another context. The admirable capacity of many law professors to assimilate knowledge from other disciplines related to their fields of interest, what Dean Allen describes as "self-education,"\(^\text{48}\) has significance for educational reform. Most law professors begin their teaching careers at least as ignorant of learning theory as they do of history, sociology, or economics. They can use the same capacity for self-education truly to become teachers.

Part of this self-education can come from consulting the wealth of findings and theories on learning in general\(^\text{49}\) and learning as a law school phenomenon.\(^\text{50}\) But for self-education to be a sufficiently congruent experience to provide real growth, each law teacher must address the particular strengths and needs of his or her own person-

\(^{45}\) Naturally, solutions will differ. Law teachers cannot be required to teach the same way or toward the same specific goals. What should be required is an informed and thoughtful agenda for growth in teaching. Self-examination is particularly warranted for those using the case method. Each teacher should think through the inevitable balances which must be struck in casebook teaching—for example, structure and control versus spontaneity; covering a great deal of ground versus covering a smaller amount in greater depth. Each teacher's standards must exceed his teaching product. Functions of course material selection, the planning and conducting of classes, and the preparation of examinations should be performed subject to a series of goals worked out by the teacher with sufficient thought and self-awareness that they can be articulated to others. These goals should themselves be subject to periodic revision by the teacher.

\(^{46}\) F. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 75.

\(^{47}\) Id. at vii.

\(^{48}\) Id. at 56.

\(^{49}\) For a review of the contributions of several important learning theorists which relates their work to law school processes, see T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 2, at 28-33.

\(^{50}\) See note 1 supra.
ality and working environment. Law student reactions provide important information for teacher self-evaluation. If, as Dean Allen suggests, the present era of unparalleled student candor about effects felt from the law school experience may be passing, we must utilize this considerable source of data while we can.