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LEGAL SERVICES FOR POOR PEOPLE*

Thomas Ehrlich**

I am honored today to join with you in this tribute to Pope John XXIII. As much as any person in our lifetime, through his words and deeds—in the quiet dignity of his spiritual leadership—Pope John focused our concern on the needs of the poor throughout the world. People of all faiths responded to his message, and in the spirit of that message it seems to me particularly appropriate to discuss with you help for poor people through legal services and their need for those services.

This topic is, to put the matter gently, a timely one because the Legal Services Corporation, which funds civil legal care for poor people throughout the country, is under sharp attack from many in and out of government. The Heritage Foundation, which was established in part to chart proposed actions for a new conservative administration, urged in its recent publication, Mandate for Leadership, that a new administration should start with the assumption that the legal services corporation should ultimately be abolished.1 This year that is precisely what President Reagan proposed; he called for the complete elimination of the Corporation and recommended to Congress that no further funds be provided for it.

This is no idle threat, as the history of the legal services movement shows. Federally funded civil legal services were organized as part of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the agency created by President Johnson to lead the war on poverty. During the years of the Nixon presidency, the office came under increasing attack by the executive branch, an attack led from within particularly by Vice-President Agnew, and from outside Washington by the then Governor of California, Ronald Reagan.

To the great credit of leaders of the organized bar—as well as thousands within the program—those efforts to destroy federal support for legal serv-

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* These remarks were originally delivered as the annual Pope John XXIII Lecture at Catholic University's Columbus School of Law on April 3, 1981.


ices failed. But the experience proved the potential vulnerability of the program to partisan political attack, particularly if it remained within the Executive Branch.

In response, supporters of the program persuaded Congress in 1974 to establish a new entity to support and guide legal services: the Legal Services Corporation was created,\(^2\) governed by its own board of directors and receiving direct funding. When the Corporation began operations in the fall of 1975, funding for the legal needs of poor people had been frozen under President Nixon for the previous five years at $74 million annually. The local programs supported with those monies were concentrated largely in urban areas along the east and west coasts, for those were the areas where bar and other groups were most receptive. As a result, many areas in the midwest, the south, and the southwest were totally without any legal help for poor people except through volunteer efforts of private attorneys.

The Corporation immediately established a plan—the so-called minimum-access plan—to expand services throughout the country. The initial goal was to provide the equivalent of at least two lawyers and supporting staff for every 10,000 poor people. Congress and the Carter administration supported that minimum-access goal and over the course of four years it was fully realized. Today, about 6,200 lawyers and 2,800 paralegals are serving in 323 programs throughout the country. The Corporation's funding was increased to $321 million in the last fiscal year. This is far less than the amount needed for adequate service in every dimension. Two lawyers cannot possibly provide decent legal care for 10,000 people. But the first important step has been taken, and careful planning has been under way for some time for a steady expansion of the quality and quantity of service.

I do not mean to suggest that the Corporation's efforts have been without opponents since it began operations in 1975. But those opponents have largely confined themselves to proposing restrictions on the ability of legal services lawyers to provide help in specific areas of the law. From the outset, these lawyers have been precluded from work in matters involving nontherapeutic abortions, selective service, and educational desegregation. Each year efforts have been beaten back to expand that list, though during the past session Congress did add a restraint on the representation of aliens known to be in the United States illegally.

For the overwhelming majority in Congress, however, the basic concept

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of federally supported legal help for poor people has not been at issue. Assaults, when they came, were on relatively fringe questions. I strongly believe that no restrictions at all should be imposed on the substantive areas in which poor people may receive federally-funded legal help when they need it, but the program can continue to flourish even with those limitations.

A second line of recent attack has been that private lawyers should play a more active role in the provision of services through so-called judicare programs, rather than continuing the dominant reliance on full-time staff attorneys that has marked the legal services program from the outset. As mandated by Congress, the Corporation did an exhaustive study of various types of programs using private lawyers. Thirty-eight demonstration programs were established and compared over time with a representative group of sixty staff attorney programs in terms of costs, quality, client satisfaction, and overall impact on the client community. The study shows clearly that no particular mode of service has a definitive edge in terms of those criteria, but it also shows that more private attorneys can and should be used effectively, particularly as a supplement to ongoing staff attorney programs. The Corporation is now working actively to expand the involvement of private lawyers in local programs throughout the country.

The current attack, however, is of a very different sort. The attack, in essence, is a declaration of war. In fact, the Reagan administration’s transition team did not propose elimination of the Corporation, but rather, it urged a series of steps to restrict aggressive advocacy on behalf of poor people. The administration has publicly announced, however, that it does seek abolition. As an alternative, it suggests that funding for legal services can be provided by the states if they choose.

There are at least three important reasons, however, why a national organization is essential if legal services lawyers are to do their job efficiently and effectively for poor people. First, legal services are already locally run. Each of the 323 programs throughout the country has its own local board and management. A shift to state governments would mean an increase in red tape, bureaucracy, and overhead expenses—precisely the opposite of the objectives generally sought by shifting responsibility to the states. This shift would also impair the Corporation’s ability to make certain that the special legal needs and difficulties of particular groups, such as the elderly, are taken appropriately into account in ways that promote efficient and high quality services.

Second, the Corporation provides training, coordination, technical assistance, and information exchange on a national basis. It supports the
nation's only journal of poverty law. These and many more vital services would be lost without the national Corporation, which spends only 1.8% of its entire budget on management and administration.

Third, and most important, a shift of responsibility from the Corporation to state governments would undercut the independence of legal services and would subject the program to renewed and intense partisan political pressure. One of the responsibilities of legal services attorneys is to challenge state and local officials when poor people believe they have been hurt because those officials are not carrying out their legal responsibilities. This type of client representation is, of course, a normal part of a private attorney's practice. When supported with government funds, however, it is unfortunately true that some officials would prefer elimination of that representation, particularly in the states where it is most needed.

A national organization controlled by an independent board of directors, allocating funds to local programs that are similarly controlled by their own individual boards, ensures that quality legal service to poor people—not partisan politics—is the basis for decisionmaking.

In response to the administration's attack, scores of groups of poor people, lawyers, and others are working to defend the program—urging, indeed, that it must be strengthened. And I have no doubt that these efforts will succeed, as they must.

One part of the defense effort must be to ensure that a carefully developed case is made to explain why federal funds should be spent to serve poor people. Why are legal services different—if they are different—from other forms of public assistance?

The question I raise is not whether poor people are in fact helped by legal services programs. On that issue, the evidence is clear and compelling. Many of you who are students, and no doubt others as well, are already working on a volunteer basis in one of the offices of a local legal services program here in Washington, D.C. To those who have not done so, I urge you to spend some time in a legal service office talking with those who are receiving legal help and with those who are providing it. The legal problems poor people face in this city and elsewhere are terrifying in the extreme: loss of the tenement flats where they live, or the social security and other benefits that feed their families are all too common examples. Last year, programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation were involved in over one million matters. Some were settled in a few minutes; others required years. Most, of course, never reached a courtroom. But the difference that legal services make in the lives of poor people is enor-
mous, and no experience in my professional life has made me prouder than my opportunity to make some contribution to that enterprise.

The issue I raise, however, is not whether the program benefits are real—they are. Rather, the question is: why legal services in relation to other public programs designed to help poor people?

Strange as it may seem, virtually no attention was focused on this issue at the time the Legal Services Corporation was created. The hearings and debates in Congress on the Act that was finally adopted consumed several thousand pages. The structure of the Corporation, the way in which the board members would be chosen, and scores of procedural issues were endlessly debated. But the underlying question—"why legal services?"—was not asked in any searching way. It was assumed that the federal government should fund those services, and the debate concentrated mainly on the mechanics.

At this time, with the program's future so much at issue, it seems to me particularly important that we turn to this basic question. It is not enough, in other words, to be concerned solely with issues of tactics. We must maintain and strengthen the program. But we will succeed in that effort only if we are clear in explaining not only what we are defending but why we are defending it.

The terms of the Legal Services Corporation Act say little that gives much help on the question: why legal services for poor people? Indeed, the original terms of the Act do not even refer to poor people or to poverty at all. Rather, the Act declares that it is designed "to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel."3 Taken literally, that category includes a majority of all Americans.

It was the Legal Services Corporation Board that concluded—with the full approval of those working in local programs—that priority should be given to poor people, and the Board chose to use the federal government's annually-adjusted poverty level as the base line for determining how local programs should define income eligibility. The Act requires the Board to adopt some eligibility standards but does not specify which ones. The Board decided to focus on poor people not only because of their relative economic status, but also—though this was not often articulated—because it was generally thought that legal problems impact on the lives of poor people more seriously than on any other group. Inability to use the legal system can be and often is disastrous for poor people in ways that are

inapplicable to others. The thin margins on which poor people live make law a crucial instrument for their survival.

The Board, however, did not adopt a position on the more basic issue: assuming that the legal services provided are to be primarily for poor people, why should the federal government support them?

As a step in the process of analyzing and answering that question, let me suggest to you six lines of approach that seem to me, in varying degrees, persuasive. These approaches are by no means mutually exclusive; they are closely interrelated. Each has, however, significant implications for the kinds of legal services that should be viewed as most important within a program restrained by limited resources, as is the case with every local legal services program in the country. The Corporation Board—properly, I think—determined that each local program should establish its own priorities through a participatory process directly involving the poor people in its community. That approach is still sensible.

At the same time, it seems to me essential that those concerned with supplying and supporting legal services for the poor think through together the reasons why those services are deserving of federal support and, if they are entitled to particular priority, why that is so. As befits a sometime law professor, I will leave you the task of evaluating each of the six lines of approach.

A. Legal Services are an Effective Means to Ameliorate Poverty

Do legal services really help poor people become less poor and ease the burdens of being poor? Those who began the legal services program as part of the Office of Economic Opportunity were convinced that the answer is "yes." As Sergeant Shriver so often said, legal services are one weapon in the war against poverty, one way to help poor people improve their economic conditions. In 1967, the Director of the Legal Services Offices with the OEO, Earl Johnson, stated that law reform was the primary goal of the program: "to bring about changes in the structure of the world in which poor people live in order to provide on the largest scale possible consistent with our limited resources a legal system in which the poor enjoy the same treatment as the rich."4

4. E. Johnson, Justice and Reform 133 (1974) (quoting Proceedings of the Harvard Conference on Law and Poverty, at 1, 3 (Mar. 17-19, 1967)). This approach may have been given congressional sanction by a new provision added in 1977 to the "Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose" of the Legal Services Corporation Act: "(3) providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal counsel will serve best the ends of justice and assist in improving opportunities for low-income persons consistent with the purpose of this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (Supp. II 1978).
From the outset of the OEO program, this rationale had its skeptics. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, for example, argued that “enforcement of their rights can . . . result in the poor getting what they pay for, but it may also result in their having to pay more for what they get.”5 A number of people responded that Professor Hazard had missed the point, particularly because he failed to take into account the significant role of public benefits in the lives of poor people. Earl Johnson stated, for example, that “the dollar income gap apparently has been reduced by several hundred million dollars through actions of poverty attorneys.”6 Mr. Johnson also questioned whether prices paid by poor people are adjusted as easily as Professor Hazard suggested.

Others have concluded that Professor Hazard substantially overstated his case, but there is something to that case. The point here, however, is not to review the debate on the matter. Assuming the validity of the argument that legal services can help ameliorate poverty—that law reform should be one, if not the primary goal, of those services—this approach obviously has considerable implications for legal services priorities.

If legal assistance is viewed primarily as a means to fight poverty, then priority should be given to those matters that most directly improve the economic lot of poor people in matters that particularly affect them as a group. To state this approach does not resolve difficult questions of definition and implementation. At root, it assumes that we can determine what it means to be poor and what causes poverty. Much of the tactical debates at the outset and through the early days of the OEO Office of Legal Services concerned those issues and how to deal with them. Legal services were then seen as a means to fight poverty, though that was not necessarily the only purpose.

At the least, one can say that if this approach is followed then substantive issues with direct economic impact on the poor, such as eviction and employment cases, should generally have priority over matters without that impact, such as uncontested divorces and child custody disputes. Another priority might be to combat exploitation of poor people in order to ease the sense of powerlessness that is characteristic of the condition of poverty.

B. The Hurdles Imposed by a Legal System Should not be Insurmountable Due to Poverty

In some situations, a legal solution is essentially the only solution, short

of no action at all. When one is sued, for example, the response must be a legal response. Divorce is another illustration. Access to welfare benefits provided by statute is often another.

In these situations, government has mandated that everybody use the legal system. This mandate, one may argue, should carry with it the financing to ensure that the poor are not precluded from that use. These situations, the argument goes, are different from those in which a legal solution is only one of several possible solutions.

Although the argument has merit, I think line-drawing in this area is difficult and the differences may be more of degree than of kind. Perhaps more important, many who are poor often cannot know whether a particular problem they face has a legal solution, let alone whether it is the only solution. Advice from a legal services lawyer may be needed to provide that knowledge. Finally, this line of analysis does not necessarily answer the question: “why legal services for poor people as opposed to all persons financially unable to afford legal assistance?”

Turning to the issue of priorities, this approach leads to giving priority to those matters that have only a legal solution, and to further ordering based on the degree of dominance of a legal solution over other solutions. It might mean, for example, that some housing matters should not be accepted by local programs unless it is clear that all other reasonable options have been exhausted.

This approach might also lead to some odd results unless it were modified. The only solution to the problem, “how do I change my name from Mzyk to Miller?” is a legal solution. Yet most legal services programs will not handle name changes on the ground that they are not sufficiently important compared with the other problems facing poor people.

C. Many of the Substantive Rules of Law and the Institutions that Apply Them Affect the Poor Unfairly

This line of analysis has three interrelated parts. First, poor people face more legal problems than do citizens generally. Second, the poor face different legal problems than do citizens generally. Third, the poor are at a special disadvantage in dealing with the law.

There is little empirical evidence on the first point. An American Bar Association survey7 done some years ago indicates that the number of legal problems actually increases as income rises. I am extremely dubious about that conclusion. Studies by the legal services programs in Boston8

8. BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION, ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES (Jan. 1977).
and North Carolina, and a critique of the ABA report by the head of the National Social Science and Law Project, confirm my doubts. Certainly the quantity of real estate issues and probate matters is far less for poor people than for others. But I believe that those matters are more than offset by the enormous range of questions involving administrative benefits—social security, aid to dependent children, and so forth—matters that particularly concern poor people. Most obviously, the poor must depend on government more than others, and government generally acts through law.

The point relates to the second aspect of this approach—the distinctiveness of the legal problems of the poor. Though poor people obviously face fewer legal problems in the areas where economic resources are involved, that reduction, I suspect, is more than offset by the increase in other problems, particularly those relating to administrative benefits. This judgment has obvious bite in terms of priorities. It suggests concentration, most obviously, in the area of administrative benefits for the poor. But many areas of housing law and consumer credit law are also, as a practical matter, part of "poverty law."

The third part says more than that the poor are poor—and are shortchanged accordingly. Substantial evidence exists on this point. Substantive rules of landlord and tenant law, for example, often do not take account of the parties' unequal bargaining power. Other areas of the law are similarly biased in their impact on the poor. A brilliant book by Professor Morton Horwitz of Harvard on the development of our legal system during this country's first 100 years underscores the point in significant detail. Listen, for a moment, to his conclusions:

By the middle of the nineteenth century the legal system had been reshaped to the advantage of men of commerce and industry at the expense of farmers, workers, consumers, and other less powerful groups within the society. Not only had the law come to establish legal doctrines that maintained the new distribution of economic and political power, but, wherever it could, it actively promoted a legal redistribution of wealth against the weakest groups in the society.

In the second half of the century, these same commercial interests shifted completely to protect what they had gained. Again, in the words of

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12. Id. at 253-54.
Professor Horwitz, these interests were able to: "elaborate a legal ideology of formalism... that could not only disguise gross disparities of bargaining power under a facade of neutral and formal rules of contract law but could also enforce commercial customs under the comforting technical rubric of 'contract interpretation.'"\(^{13}\) Given the incredible array of judicial social engineering during the nineteenth century on behalf of commercial interests, it is hardly surprising that poor people had and still have some catching up to do if "equal justice under law" is to be a reality.

In short, the question "why legal services?" can be answered: "because the legal system places distinctive, heavier, and unfair burdens on the poor." Those burdens are accentuated, of course, by lack of education and the thin economic margins that make what would be inconveniences to others crises to the poor.

This approach also suggests that priority should be given to those matters that affect the poor \textit{qua} poor. Again, by way of example, this would mean that administrative programs designed to benefit the poor would be a higher priority matter than most areas of family law.

\textbf{D. There is a Need to Help Avoid Disputes and to Settle Disputes Peacefully when they Arise}

All of us—rich and poor alike—have a strong interest in ensuring that disputes—both among our citizenry and between citizens and the various public and private institutions of our society—are avoided whenever possible, and are settled peacefully when they cannot be avoided. Legal services are one key instrument for serving both those aims.

For most people, however, law is only one among many avenues for redress, and usually the one of last resort. Wealthy and middle-class persons generally have access to a number of mechanisms when they face a problem. If a car is defective, they use the Better Business Bureau or one of the government consumer-complaint offices available in many localities. If they fail to receive a social security benefit, they know how to weave their way through the bureaucratic maze, and—if need be—to tap the necessary political help. In these and other problems, most of us have various levers to pull or push before we turn to the law.

As Professor Laura Nader has documented in an important new study,\(^ {14}\) however, poor people rarely know where those levers are or how to use them, and, if they do know, they often lack sufficient muscle to make the levers work. For poor people generally, therefore, legal services, if avail-

\(^{13}\) \textit{Id.} at 201.

able, are the first as well as the last resort: they are the only avenue of redress.

This line of analysis leads to giving priority to dispute avoidance and dispute settlement by legal services programs. It also helps to underscore that all segments of our society—not just poor people—have a vital stake in those programs. One does not have to raise the specter of blood in the streets to appreciate the importance to all of us that the legal system be used as widely as possible when self-help is the only other option.

The point is emphasized by the reality in our society that many of the traditional institutions for settling (or at least containing) disputes—family and church being primary among them—are far less able to cope than in earlier years. We can—and I do—bemoan the loss of strength in these institutions, but the loss is no less real.

E. Legal Services Lawyers are Civil-Law Enforcement Agents

The next line of analysis is closely related to several of the preceding approaches, but it offers, nonetheless, a distinct perspective. The job of those in legal services programs around the country is to ensure that civil laws—local, state, and federal—are enforced on behalf of poor people, just as they are on behalf of those who are able to afford an attorney. The point is fundamental, but often forgotten. It leads to giving priority to those types of problems in which the legal rights of a poor person have been violated by a public official or another private citizen.

This approach also highlights the disingenuousness of the Reagan administration’s suggestion that the states can, if they choose, pick up the funding for legal services that would be eliminated by the federal government.

It is hardly surprising that some officials—whether state governors or petty bureaucrats—prefer to act regarding poor people without exposing themselves to potential legal action. Many landlords, retailers, and employers feel the same way. They would prefer to deal with their tenants, customers, and employees without regard to the civil laws in matters involving poor people. When faced with reduced budgets and necessary choice among programs, therefore, it is not hard to predict the fate of legal services under the Reagan administration’s proposal—particularly in those states where legal services are most needed.

F. Access to the Legal System is an Inherent Right of Citizenship

It is not by happenstance that “to establish justice” is the first purpose expressed in the federal Constitution by the framers who sought “a more perfect union.” That aim is stated in the preamble before to “insure do-
Without justice, there can be no domestic peace or general welfare: in short, there can be nothing worth defending.

Unlike the right to legal counsel in criminal matters, the Supreme Court has not recognized a general right to counsel in civil cases. I believe that a sound case can be made for the right extending beyond the limited circumstances in which it has been previously recognized. My expectation is that, over time, this constitutional right will be accorded in a series of specific special circumstances. Indeed, this process is already underway. The rights of minors and other handicapped persons in civil incarceration proceedings are one example. Incremental steps were taken to establish the constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases, over a substantial period of time, until the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright\textsuperscript{15} and Argersinger v. Hamlin,\textsuperscript{16} and I suspect a similar pattern will occur in civil matters as well, though not without setbacks.

I am not alone in the view, however, that counsel ought to be provided in civil proceedings to those who cannot afford it—not because it is constitutionally required, but because it is right. The legal system—including all its institutions (courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures) and the rules they apply—is a chief mechanism for ordering and reordering individual and social affairs. It is by no means the only instrument. But it is probably the most significant, and it is certainly the only one that is governmental. As part of government, that mechanism belongs to all citizens.

This last approach is the most normative of the six suggested. It argues that if the political liberty of a citizen means anything, it must mean the opportunity to use the legal system. One of the responsibilities of citizenship is living within that system: one of the rights of citizenship is to make use of and influence the system.

The approach also includes the more general argument that the society as a whole has a substantial stake in making the legal system available to poor persons. That judgment does not, of course, resolve the issue “available for what?” But when combined with other parts of this approach, the result is a system of priorities based on the wishes of poor people themselves. If access to the legal system is an inherent right of citizenship, then those who are poor should decide how to allocate limited resources among the various substantive areas in which there is demand for services.

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The six lines of approach that I have suggested are obviously not the

\textsuperscript{15} 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
\textsuperscript{16} 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
only possible ones. Some people may, for example, support legal services on the ground that society as a whole ought to have the benefit of participation by every part of society, including poor people, in the processes of the legal system. This argument suggests that a major role of legal services ought to be to ensure that the voices of poor people are heard in community decisionmaking—decisions, for example, on urban renewal or where a new highway should be placed.

In the main, however, my judgment is that these six approaches include the primary lines of analysis for the question, "why legal services?" Those of us who support federally funded legal services need not choose only one of them, though—as I suggested—each has significant implications in terms of priority setting. But it is essential, I believe, that we talk through together, far more than in the past, these fundamental questions. That is a difficult undertaking when the very survival of the program is at stake. But that survival depends in significant part on the power and persuasion of the case we make in dealing with the fundamental question.

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Finally, I make a special plea to the law students here. One of the glories of our profession is the opportunity to do many different types of jobs over the course of a lifetime. Most of you in law school have a half-century or more in which to do some professional gearshifting. I, for one, hope you will not be afraid to do so. In the last decades, I have heard and reheard two tales that trouble me greatly—and the two are closely related.

The first comes most commonly from middle-aged and seemingly successful lawyers. Most are partners in major firms. They struggled hard to achieve what they have achieved. And now they ask—openly if they have the courage, to themselves in all events—is this all there is to my professional life as a lawyer? Is this all I can look forward to for the next twenty-five to forty years? The answer, too often, seems to be yes—that's all there is. For one reason or another they have become locked into careers that provide inadequate personal satisfaction. They are convinced—rightfully or otherwise—that they cannot escape.

The other tale comes from law students considering their first full time jobs in law. Many seem to feel they must get on and stay on a narrow treadmill. Even graduates of law schools as fine as this one seem to be struck by that myopia. It just isn't so. Please believe that. The law offers an extraordinary range of opportunities to do what you want to do in ways that provide real satisfaction. Don't settle for less—in your first job and in all your jobs, don't take the easiest, most comfortable position unless you are sure it is really what you want.
I care particularly about legal services for poor people. But I also know that it is just one of many careers that can offer great satisfaction. You have enormous opportunities ahead. You also, in my view, have obligations as lawyers to use those opportunities. Make good use of them.