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Protest: A Forensic Concept

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Today's police administrators need administrative policy statements that can be easily followed by individual officers in reacting to civil disorders. Historical analysis reveals a system in which the police have deepened racial divisions in the United States by failing to cope with problems in ghetto areas. Employing careless policies, sometimes initiated by the police chief and other times initiated by the individual officer, the police have shown weaknesses in two major areas. First, the police have no established procedures to follow when civil disturbances erupt. Second, the police have over-reacted to civil disturbances, apparently manifesting anti-black fury by means of discriminatory police behavior. As a result, the police of this century have had little success in preventing racial unrest from escalating into racial riots.

Through a view of the history of riots, this study reveals the police as: 1) an unorganized, ill-trained mass operating under policies that prove unworkable when confronted with civil disturbances; and 2) an organization that consciously socializes its members in an aura of discriminatory attitudes and beliefs toward blacks.

A study of seven historical riot studies shows that not only have police departments overlooked the adoption of workable policies that could enable more effective management of riot situations in their infancy, but that the police have been closely associated with the beginnings of such situations. In East St. Louis (1917), Chicago (1919), Washington (1919), Harlem (1943), Detroit (1943), Detroit (1967), and Washington (1967), the unprofessional actions taken towards the black community by the police had much to do with turning initial incidents into full-scale riots. It seems the absence of firm neutrality in the official possessors of legitimate violence often provided the final spark for many riots during a long period of U.S. history.

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EARLY RIOTS:

East St. Louis—1917

The attackers in the 1917 outbreak in East St. Louis, Illinois, committed acts of barbarity and savagery unmatched in other race riots, for East St. Louis represents the early twentieth century's peak of anti-Negro violence and brutality.²

Years of lawlessness had at last born bloody results. The proceedings that set the stage for this serious July riot began several days earlier when the city's labor leaders addressed a group of citizens at a City Council meeting concerning further migration of blacks. They argued that further migration of blacks would jeopardize job security. As the meeting closed, a rumor was circulated by the throng that a black had shot a white man in a hold up. The crowd soon lost control and began to physically attack any blacks caught in the wake. Brutal anti-black action resulted and was the first in a long line of incidents in which discriminatory attitudes and values have been released by the local police agency upon black inhabitants of the ghetto.

The account of how the police managed their role in the riot is presented in the report of a Special House Committee investigating the causes of the riot. It was found that the police department and city officials were indeed involved in the corruption that had infiltrated all portions of local government in East St. Louis. Further, no policy had been established to handle a riot-type situation at that time.

Indeed, the response on the part of police during the riot can best be characterized by the Committee's evaluation of the police department. When the lawlessness assumed serious proportions on July 2, the police could have quelled and dispersed the crowds, then made up of small groups. Instead, they either fled into the safety of cowardly seclusion or listlessly watched the depredations of the mob, passively and in many instances actively sharing in its work.³ In one instance when the police joined in on the wholesale slaughter of blacks, the Committee notes: "The police shot into a crowd of Negroes who were huddled together, making no resistance. It was a particularly cowardly exhibition of savagery."⁴

In short, the situation in East St. Louis was deplorable. The police worsened a racially-tense situation by overaction in some instances and not enough action in others.

Then, too, the police force was greatly understaffed. In a city of seventy thousand inhabitants, the police agency was clearly understaffed, with thirty-six patrolmen and sixteen plainclothesmen. Of these fifty-
two members, six were blacks and nearly all of these officers received orders to go home on July 2.

The combination of three elements: 1) police instigating racially-tense situations, 2) a police force totally inept at performing competent police work, and 3) a police force severely understaffed and lacking good supervision, personifies police response to the riot. Police clearly could have made no other response because of the character of the force and its supervision. No statement of policy was initiated from the department's chief to his subordinates in conjunction with the suppression of the riot. Therefore, the individual officer acted out his role as he perceived it. Hence, the entire organized force in East St. Louis was unable to cope with the riot situation.

**Washington Riot—1919**

What an official of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) called the "Red Summer" of 1919, began early in the year and ended late. Relations between the races had been put to a test in the Nation's Capitol during the time preceding the D.C. riot by several situations involving labor inequality and newspaper excesses.

The culmination of tensions resulted when the wife of a naval aviator was attacked by two black males. For several nights skirmishes erupted. Attempts by the NAACP to settle the situation with the District Commissioners and the Chief of Police apparently failed. Though pleas were made by both city officials and civil right leaders concerning the violence, they apparently went unheard. Nightly violence continued as did arrests of blacks by police. The riot was renewed and not quelled until federal troops saturated the city one day later.

Verbal and printed debate concerning just what role the police should play resulted. Many newspapers and prominent Washingtonians advocated a law and order strong police force start. Most blacks and some whites, on the other hand, called for a neutral police.

Two important factors emerged from the D.C. riot. First, the Washington riot indicated the blacks readiness to fight back on their own when the police would not protect them. Second, an obvious double standard of justice existed for whites and blacks.

Regarding readiness to fight, the Washington riot showed the first traces of what we today consider sniping (armed resistance) to real or imagined police harassment tactics. It was the initial riot in which blacks took up arms and mounted an offensive to guard their lives, homes, and rights. Black newspaper articles stated the obligation of a "New Negro" to racist America as: "These outbreaks of the mob in Washington and
Chicago have taught it one thing which it will not soon forget: That the Negro means to be merciless in repelling attacks upon him by the attackers. The New Negro, unlike the old-time Negro, does not fear the white man and will learn in time that he has in this new type of Negro a foeman worthy of steel.  

The second factor refers to an alternative to these self-defense tactics taken by blacks. This alternative postulated a neutrality in police enforcement, thus treating blacks and whites alike. It seems negligence on the part of the police in adopting such a policy before the riot played a large role in the disturbance. Arrest records produced from the police department indicate a higher rate of lawbreaking by blacks. But in thorough scrutiny, these records must not be placed beyond reproach because, as we have observed, blacks were arrested even for the most minor offenses. So strict was the policy on their arrest in Washington, that it led directly to the second night of rioting.

As a direct result of these two factors, we see another example of police creating wider racial divisions between themselves and the ghetto population. Further, the Washington riot is another example of deficient policy planning, coupled with biased and discriminatory police tactics by individual officers, leading to, rather than preventing race riots. The police did not quell this riot in its beginning stages and did not decrease the likelihood of future riots.

Chicago—1919

The so-called race riots in Chicago during the last week of July, 1919, started on a Sunday at a bathing beach. A black boy drifted across an imaginary line of segregation. Young white instigators began throwing rocks at him. The incident resulted in the boy being knocked off of the raft and in his eventual drowning. Blacks rushed to a policeman and asked for the arrest of the rock-throwing white boys. The policeman refused. As the body was brought to shore, more rocks were thrown by blacks and caucasians alike. The policeman held to his refusal to make arrests. As a result of this incident, fighting began to spread to the Black Belt, the densely populated area of Chicago.

During the next hours, atrocities to the black population in Chicago were multiplied by the ineffectiveness of the police to make any just response to the situation. Pictures taken by photographers revealed that white mobs chased and sometimes beat blacks to death in the midst of police officers. Blacks distrust of the police understandably increased. A Joint Committee from the Union League Club and the Urban League petitioned the Chief of Police to bring charges against the policeman.
who had refused to make the arrest of the white man on the beach that fateful Sunday afternoon.

On the theory that knowledge of police neutrality would help calm the city, the Joint Committee asked for a public announcement of these measures. The Chicago police did not comply. After the riot, State Attorney Hayne said before the Investigation Committee:

> There is no doubt that a great many police officers were grossly unfair in making arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses committed by white men while *they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could get.*

Again, public opinion about the role of the police varied. The first response by newspaper editors in Chicago was vastly in favor of more police strength in such matters. The police should have been stronger, should have acted sooner, and should have acted with more severity. The first reaction against this viewpoint came a full month later, when the *Daily News* called the request by the grand jury for an additional 1,000 police a “curious error.” The *News* argued that a well-directed, efficient, and honest police department would not need more men to deal with riots, whereas a demoralized, political-ridden force would merely fatten on the spoils of another 1,000 jobs.

Two principal observations resulted from these occurrences. One asserted the only way to solve the problems was to strengthen or impartialize the police. The other looked further into the problem of the disorder, viewing it as a product of the social and economic structure that the black was forced to cope with in Chicago.

Two investigatory groups— a grand jury and a Chicago Commission—came to similar conclusions in their studies concerning the Chicago Police Department. The grand jury reported “the failure of the police to arrest impartially at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite and aggravate the colored population.” The grand jury also recommended that, “There should be organization of the force for riot work for the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages.” Working independently, the Chicago Commission prepared a list of nine recommendations to be used by the department to avoid such explosive situations in the future.

Unfortunately, though the Chicago Commission provided a thorough investigation of the riot, it soon became an organization orientated toward the study and invention, but not implementation of new policy. In evaluating the Commission’s success with implementing its recommendations, Waskow comments, “to the extent that its recommendations were adopted, the Commission would not fare well.”
RECENT RIOTS

Few major racial incidents occurred during the twenty-four year period following these early racial conflicts. Blacks seemed willing to give local police agencies another try at restoring their decayed systems. Then, two unfortunate incidents occurred in 1943 that brought back the sad memories of a time most Americans wished to forget. Few efforts had been made to clean up areas and produce workable reforms concerning police practices in the ghetto area. Therefore, the gap concerning racial division was enlarged due to police overlooking the real and apparent danger of episodes like those that occurred in the early 1900's. Though white America tried to forget, there were persons who could not overlook the growing problems in the ghetto—the ghetto dwellers themselves.

Harlem Riot—1943

This riot situation was quelled with some degree of success. It substantiates the theory that through workable policies handed down by a department's hierarchy and known to the men before the actual incident occurs, a riot can be successfully negated.

The riot began when a black soldier was shot for not obeying a police officer's command to halt. As rumor spread through Harlem that a black soldier had been shot in the back by a white policeman, Mayor LaGuardia and Police Commissioner Valentine immediately took steps to quell the riot. A few minutes after hearing the news, the Mayor and the Commissioner were on the scene and remained there to guide the riot procedures until the end. By utilizing both blacks and whites, the Mayor and Commissioner effectively quieted the disturbance, as White notes in several interviews conducted afterwards, "They were out to do a job of restoring order, and it was all in a day's work." Peace returned to Harlem in a matter of hours.

This endeavor was one of the first to channel police strength to quell a disturbance in its infant stages. Accurate steps were taken in quick succession and policies were given from above with these men leading the way in their administration. Strangely enough, this policy formulated in Harlem was not utilized at Detroit in 1943.

Detroit Riot—1943

Racial unrest in 1942 paved the way for a serious fight that occurred on a hot Sunday afternoon at Detroit's Belle Isle Amusement Park. Though a disturbance of some sort had long been anticipated, police reaction to this and similar incidents ran true-to-form. Anxiety reached riot proportions because the police again enforced the law with an un-
As police poured in heavy reinforcements to control the disturbance, hatred and distrust between the police and blacks were prevalent everywhere. While police used night sticks, riot guns, and revolvers against blacks, they used "persuasion" rather than decisive action in response to white rioters. Though black rioters numbered in the hundreds and whites in the thousands, seventeen blacks were killed by police. Not a single white died. Of 1,300 persons arrested by the police over 85% were blacks. Newspaper accounts document well this brutal action of law enforcement officers toward blacks.

A Presidential proclamation brought in the United States Army and established an armed truce between Negroes and Caucasians in Detroit. The presence of troops maintained almost complete order and, within the week, Detroit went back to its wartime pattern of life. Racial hostilities, however, remained for yet another disturbance.

An evaluation of policies shows Police Commissioner Witherspoon instructed his officers to apply a "kid's glove" policy in handling the situation. However, he never specified to whom his "kid's gloves" policy was applicable.

The various commissions that were established highlighted the great bias the riot characterized. They used the opportunity to discredit black youths who were supposedly agitated by such organizations as the NAACP. They asserted there was no need for a grand jury investigation, when in fact it was the last thing that city and state officials or the police wanted. This line of action leads one to believe that if an investigation had been conducted, even more gross misconduct on the part of the Detroit Police might well have been discovered. The conclusion reached by most of these reports placed blame for the entire event upon the black community. As we have seen, such conclusions are highly questionable.

**Detroit Riot—1967**

The Detroit riot of 1967 seems to be described accurately by the journalist who wrote:

"... whole sections of the nation's fifth largest city lay in charred, smoking ruins. From Gratiot Avenue six miles to the east, tongues of flames licked at the night sky, illuminating the angular skeletons of gutted homes, shops, supermarkets. Looters and arsonists danced in the eerie shadows, stripping a store clean, then setting it to the torch."

The Detroit Riot of 1967 began when a decision was made to make a police raid in the midst of the ghetto. It was early Sunday morning—a time when the police force is at its weakest and the streets are filled with
the resentful, the alienated, the don’t-give-a-damn-for-anything, residents.20 If Machiavelli had wanted to provoke a confrontation between the police and the blacks, he couldn’t have chosen a better time and place than Twelfth Street on that Sunday morning.21 A “blind pig” (an illegal tavern) had been raided, and large numbers of its occupants, both drunk and sober, marched into the street. Many were arrested. As a belligerent crowd, made largely of persons described above, gathered at the scene, the first bottle or stone was thrown. A rumor, perhaps based on fact, that the police had abused a black woman at the “blind pig” incident, circulated throughout the ghetto. As a result, Detroit became the scene of the bloodiest uprising in a half century and the costliest in terms of property damage in the history of the United States.22 When police failed to interfere, the looting spread.23

The precipitating incidents of this riot were many: a survey conducted by a University of Michigan psychologist accurately described the real concerns of the black populations; a number of unaccounted for killings occurred in the city; rumors ran rampant; when the riot did ensue, the police chief’s “walk soft” policy for police conduct was sufficiently vague to be ineffective.

It was hoped that a strict policy of observation and containment would quell the riot. But finally on a Sunday afternoon, the Mayor called for additional forces. Until then, there had been hope that as the people blew off steam the riot would stop.24 Later that evening he issued a message instituting a 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. curfew. At 9:07 p.m., the first incident of large scale sniper fire was reported.25 Rumors incited skirmishes, and shooting intensified when the National Guard and state troopers were called. It seems as conditions grew worse, (more sniping, looting), the police commissioner and the Mayor renegotiated their position and gave orders for police to start shooting and use necessary force to quell the riot. As it turned out, this change of policy served only to further strain the racially-tense situation which the police had been major participants in initiating.

In short, what happened has become the legacy of the police department of Detroit. Seared in the memory of Detroit’s black population was this breakdown of law and order—a police department unable to control its own men and pretending otherwise.26 In the space of some twenty-four years between riots in Detroit, little had been accomplished.

The three policies formulated to quell the riot were the “walk soft” policy, the use of weaponry policy, and “Operation Sundown”. Each failed miserably. The “walk soft” policy, had been formulated in advance and broadcasted down to subordinates. At the riot’s inception, police “assumed” it was in effect. However, the policy proved grossly
ineffective. The tactics were not tested thoroughly in the field before the riot occurred. The weaponry policy was, of course, a rerun of the Detroit Riot of 1943. Local authorities made the same mistake. As Mayor Cavanaugh later admitted, "our police weren’t ordered to shoot or not to shoot. They were supposed to use their judgment." When specific orders are not sent down from superior to subordinate concerning when a service weapon is or is not to be used, the local authorities are leaving themselves open for a blood bath. This is exactly what happened in Detroit for the second time in a span of twenty-four years. "Operation Sundown," a plan to coordinate the National Guard, State Police and Detroit Police, apparently was never implemented. The National Guard was at least as ineffective as the police, because of this error in policy formation.

As a result, the Detroit Police Department acted with little team effort during this riot. Various officers took the law into their own hands and inacted their own forms of retribution upon Detroit blacks. The officers simply manifested their highly biased and discriminatory attitudes. The various police policies proved unworkable, unleashing a disorganized mass on the ghetto dwellers to inflict enormous losses.

**Washington Riot—1968**

For many years the citizens of Washington D.C., both black and white, had told one another that the city was riot-proof. They rationalized a major reason being that many black Americans held well-paying government jobs with good retirement benefits.

Though the spark that ignited the April 1968 riot was the assassination of Martin Luther King, many prior incidents in 1967 gave substantial weight to the theory that Washington was becoming less riot-proof.

When violence did break out, the initial reaction of the police was to follow Police Chief Layton’s policy of restraint. Still, the crowds became so large and unruly that the police could not control them. Later a magazine would explain, “Often, in the early hours, outnumbered police simply stood by—under orders—watching the arson and pillage.” They refrained from making arrests, and violence increased. Police in many areas began to radio for tear gas and help. Where mobs threatened their lives, they fell back under orders to avoid shooting. In some areas, the looting and fires continued unobserved by the police. Blacks beat whites on the street; officers riding motorcycles were taken off their vehicles and assaulted. In still other instances, officers in cruising police vehicles were good targets for well-aimed bricks and stones. Police using megaphones to instruct rioters and bystanders to go home were ignored.
Police sealed off some sections in the black ghetto. But this expensive use of manpower only left other sections of the area open to full scale looting and burning. Thus, this tactic failed to stop the battle.

Rioting intensified. Mayor Washington declared a curfew, banned all liquor sales, stationed himself on the scene, and made periodic reports on television. Even so, the situation became worse. "Mayor Washington was an eyewitness to looting and vandalism. The mayor had hoped to convince his fellow blacks to 'cool it'. But a close look at the uncontrolled disorder convinced him that he did not have a chance." It was not until federal troops were called in that the riot came to a halt.

When the riot ended in Washington, local authorities termed their policy of restraint a success. After all, only two blacks had been killed by police, and one of those had died as a result of an accident. Therefore, we may surmise that the criterion for failure or success of a policy concerning a riot in the "Washington Plan" is judged by how many persons were killed by police bullets. Should the killing of rioters by police be the only variable considered when a policy is going to be termed a success or failure? It seems that there are other variables to be considered when such a policy is to be considered a success insofar as its effort to quell a riot.

In Washington, for example, local authorities found glaring difficulties in three areas while employing this policy: 1) It did not quell the riot in its infant stages; 2) The local businessmen who owned establishments in the ravaged area were very unhappy about the way the police reacted to looting and arson; and 3) The role of the policeman thoroughly disappointed many members of the Washington Police Force.

In respect to the first issue, this policy did not come even remotely close to quelling the disturbance in its infant stages. Further evidence of its failure is significant by the fact that on Friday, April 5, Federal troops had to be called upon to help quell the riot after the Washington police lost control of the situation.

The second issue concerns itself with attempts to keep the ghetto from turning into a "ghost town" when the small and large business operations pull up stakes for more safety protected areas. Most urban areas are finding it more and more difficult to keep business operation from moving away from the region. Therefore, if the police make little or no effort to stop rioters from looting and burning business establishments in the ghetto during a riot, such inaction can only serve to infuriate an already disgruntled businessman.

Concerning the third issue, it is the author's belief that such policy did, in fact, lower police morale in Washington. As a result, policemen felt they were not performing their traditional role as law enforcement
officers. In reality, they were acting as highly paid observers and, understandably, many Washington police voiced their disapproval of this role. Such policy encourages more breakage of the law by ghetto residents, for “if they did not try to stop me this time, why should they try to stop me in the future.” To support this type of policy may be to reinforce the businessman’s fear that this area is not the most advantageous location for the operation of a business.

Therefore, this policy is not as successful as Washington officials would like us to believe. It did not help to quell the riot in its early stages. On the contrary, it inflamed men who ran businesses in the area and policemen who were on the force. This policy in the future may bring about a higher crime rate that adversely affects the operation of business establishments in the area. For these reasons, the author finds this type of policy inadequate as a single measure for the quelling of a riot in its infant stages.

Comparisons and Conclusions:

The above discussion is based upon a review of literature of seven race riots which occurred from 1917 to 1968. The review presents conclusions in response to the hypothesis that police have been: 1) an ill organized and ill trained mass which operated under policies that were unworkable when confronted with civil disturbances; and 2) an organization that consciously socializes its members in an aura of discriminatory attitudes and behaviors regarding blacks. In a final analysis of this material, it is advisable to ascertain whether the police have taken the necessary steps to correct a situation that has been prominent on the national scene since the beginning of the twentieth century.

The first segment of this hypothesis dealt with the failure on the part of the police to adopt certain workable and/or feasible policies to enable them to channel their resources for far better effectiveness, gain greater centralization of control over their numbers as well as define to officers policies that are not ambiguous or self-demeaning. An illustration of police inadequacies in this area can be seen upon close observation of the Washington Riot in 1968.

The policy attempting to quell the racially-tense situation in its early stages was one of complete restraint. It proved unworkable because it not only tolerated mass looting and arson, but it brought many of the Washington police force to the conclusion that they were not to be entrusted with the power to help restrain such actions in their lawful capacity as peace officers. This policy, therefore, demeaned the force’s morale.
Further, we have seen the police as being guilty of prejudicial and discriminatory practices. An excellent illustration of incompetency is the Chicago Riot of 1919. In this characterization of biased or one-sided law enforcement, a Chicago policeman witnessed the fatal drowning of a young black youth who had been stoned to death by white ruffians after he had crossed an imaginary line of segregation. The policeman failed to arrest the white troublemakers and one of the worst race riots in United States followed.

Given this historical foundation, recommendations can be formulated which may tend to reduce the tendency for history to repeat itself.

Proposed Policy Recommendations

*Team Policing for the Ghetto*

A major problem in police work has been and continues to be the tendency of police to create racially-tense situations in various ways. By creating such circumstances, the police have actively deepened the racial divisions between themselves and ghetto residents. Today’s problems have grown larger, paralleling the increase in city population and area. As a result, the police have adjusted the motor patrol to cover miles of the city’s land. Responding to this action, the ghetto area has experienced a dehumanization of the city’s police department. Very infrequently do these citizens ever see the same officers regularly in the ghetto area. Correspondingly, the officers dislike being assigned to the ghetto area because they consider the work to be difficult and sometimes dangerous.

When these problems of huge urban areas, few effective policies developed to handle such circumstances and dehumanization of police, exist together in any large city, racially-tense situations may occur. Because of these racially-tense situations, there is a deepening division between the black community and the police.

In an effort to try to curb these problems effectively, the author suggests the police implement a Team Policing Policy for the ghetto. The configuration of this policy can have many forms; the one described here is just one type of configuration.

To initiate the project, a group specifically chosen for the task must determine where to divide the ghetto districts to create a number of more readily accessible small sectors. A predetermined number of men who have shown a willingness to participate in the program must then be chosen from within the department’s ranks to serve in each sector. One intelligent and innovative sergeant would command each group and make all necessary decisions concerning allocation of re-
cources (including manpower) that the central department would
provide for him. Each sergeant would be held directly responsible for
the complete coordination of his sector.

In such a configuration, the sergeant would also assign a collator
to the car whose specific task would be to synthesize all intelligence
information gathered from his beat and other surrounding beats. He
would place the information in a meaningful order to be presented to
the patrolmen on the beat. Hopefully by such transmission, law en-
forcement would improve. The collator would, then, act as the first
assistant to the sergeant and would get to know the patrolmen and their
capabilities almost as well.

As a result of this operation, six important objects may become
observable:

1. In effect, this operation may “decentralize” the police force
by making each specific sector a regular identifiable law enforce-
ment body.

2. If the system is run to its fullest capabilities, certain officers may
take up residence in their sectors in order to facilitate “response
time.” Instead of calling downtown to the central office for assist-
ance, the complainant calls these officers at home. They, in turn,
can ring the collator by walkie-talkie, and the collator in turn will
transfer this information to a patrolman on the beat.

3. It builds up police-community relations because police get to
know the neighborhood better, and the ghetto dweller gets to know
the policeman better as well.

4. It sensitizes the community to the policeman. In effect, the
community does not see him as being just a symbol—they see him
as a person.

5. It boosts police morale with a “team” spirit.

6. There is a definite fixing of responsibility involved making it
difficult for a policeman to shirk his responsibilities.

It can be surmised that through the installation of a Team Policing
Policy the number of racially-tense situations caused by police stand
a good chance of decreasing. This can be concluded because the in-
dividual patrolman who would now regularly be assigned to one sec-
tor will soon realize that the area has certain identifiable problems.
He will find out through active community involvement that there
are feasible ways to handle these difficulties. As a result, racial division
between the police and the ghetto residents may well take a turn for the better. Such policy implementation aims at halting perceived race riots before they can occur.

**Moderate Education, Salary and a Determined Look at the Socialization Of Recruits in our Present Day Police Forces**

It is difficult to estimate how much education and pay affect police behavior and attitude since few studies have been conducted in this area. As a result, it is difficult to determine how distinctly these two variables affect the policeman’s attitudes and behaviors while performing his everyday work. Commissions organized after riots have invariably emphasized that policemen are not educated enough or paid appropriately for the job they perform. There is, however, much merit in an opposing essay by Dr. Burn Levy, the Director of Community Services Division, Michigan Civil Rights Commission.

Concurring with Levy, the author agrees that more education and higher pay for law enforcement officers may not be the answer to improve police-black relations. Further, it is proposed that huge sums of money from federal, state, and local governments may be of little use in trying to achieve better relations.

Recent studies indicate a policeman should have a college education or at least exposure to such fields as psychology and sociology in order to be better qualified for a position on a police force. The author argues this is unfeasible, uneconomical, and probably unnecessary for city governments to hire strictly college graduates for regular police work. They may not change police attitudes and behaviors for the improvement of police-black relations. I suggest approaching this problem from a different perspective—that perspective being a look at police socialization of its recruits into the system. As Donald J. MacNamara said,

> "The police community is a closed society, and its own customs, morals, and taboos—and those who are not conforming to the police society, to its attitudes, to its customs and traditions, taboos and mores, are ostracized and then excluded . . . whatever prejudices and discrimination, whatever anti-minority attitudes he (the recruit) brought in with him, have been tremendously reinforced because they are part of the community attitudes of this police group of which he becomes a member."

For this reason, the college graduate may not resolve the problems he might be recruited to help alleviate. First, the recruit may not possess any biased or discriminatory feelings toward blacks. However, as a
result of not identifying with the prevailing attitude, the recruit will first be ostracized and then excluded from the police society. Secondly, if the recruit possesses any of these qualities, he is reinforced since these qualities are dominant attitudes of the group that he now becomes a part. As a result, a top college graduate stands a good chance of resolving few problems. On the contrary, he may act to incite a new one. In this case, pay is comparable to education in that the salary received for services is not dependent upon the quality of service rendered.

The resolution to police-black relations lies in specific policies formulated by the city’s police chief—a police chief who is strong enough to initiate controls over the behavior and attitude of patrolmen in the ghetto. If this can be accomplished, new recruits can be initiated into a system condoning bias and discrimination.

Perhaps the need for professional guidelines is indeed an idea whose time has arrived. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice has just published a five volume operational manual entitled Prevention and Control of Collective Violence. Each volume presents guidelines structured for a specific organizational unit within police departments, including the chief of police, the patrol commander, and patrol personnel. Hopefully, this historical analysis of seven riots and the dismal police reaction thereto will motivate earnest consideration of recommendations made herein and those of the National Institute.

FOOTNOTES
7. Ibid., p. 21.
9. Ibid.
10. op.cit., The Negro in Chicago, p. 47.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. op.cit., From Race Riot to Sit In, p. 103.
15. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 168.
22. Ibid., p. 167.
25. Ibid., p. 93.
29. Ibid., p. 29.
32. Lecture notes from Professor H. Trubitt, 11-5-72 and 11-27-72.
34. Ibid.