Stop Stomping on the Rest of US: Retrieving Publicness from the Privatization of the Globe

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STOP STOMPING ON THE REST OF US: 
Retrieving Publicness from the Privatization of the 
Globe

ZILLAH EISENSTEIN

Professor Eisenstein's article discusses the effects of globalization on the 
relationship between privatization and public responsibility and how this 
dynamic impacts the future of women across the globe. She argues that the 
global growth of privatization in the North and West has disseminated around 
the world to the detriment of women. Privatization, she contends, has been 
broadened as the agenda of politicians for the late twentieth century, and public 
responsibility has been lost as a result.

According to Professor Eisenstein, globalization has been essentially an 
economic process in which a global economy surfaces without differences or 
borders. The global economy, however, fails to account for the divisions that 
are left in its wake, dividing people along racial, ethnic, religious, and 
gendered borders. The myth of "oneness" created by the global economy 
displaces women into the established gender hierarchies of the North and 
West, which continue to place the needs of women at the bottom of the global 
marketplace.

Professor Eisenstein exemplifies her views by focusing on the export of Western feminism to the rest of the world, the struggles of women in the South and East who strive for progress in the face of restrictive global gender hierarchies, and the problems facing the women of the former Yugoslavia.

The article concludes with Professor Eisenstein's suggestion that the "Platform of Action," put forth at the U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, be used as a basis for restructuring the public in a way that will make marked progress toward improving the rights and status of women around the world. The Platform is a basis for a feminist "publicness" that Professor Eisenstein feels should be attempted as we close in on the twenty-first century.

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I have some new queries for the twenty-first century that grow out of “new-old” challenges to democracy from women and girls. My queries start midstream: after the Gulf War, rwanda, somalia, bosnia, and O. J. Simpson and within the discourses of nationalism, globalism, multiculturalism, and feminism.¹

Some 800 million people are starving across the globe,² while women represent about sixty percent of the billion or so people earning $1.00 or less a day.³ Each day some 34,000 children die for want of food and medical care.⁴ On the other side of the ledger, new excesses of wealth exist like never before. The very rich become billionaires, while everyone else loses ground. This vulnerability is new for professionals of the middle class(es).

Today, class exploitation is back with a vengeance, and the vengeance is written in color, on women’s bodies. Greed and excessive wealth exist with new veracity alongside unbelievable poverty within the first-world north and west, among people who never expected it to be this way for them. Even white men are scared. There is a new arrogance to this exploitative abuse.

The “new-old” globalism fuels a corporate hysteria that demands downsizing, massive firings, and jobless recoveries. Corporate competitiveness is used to justify all forms of streamlining and workplace reorganization. Globalism becomes the new imaginary, like nation(alism) once was.

Of course, Vladimir I. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg called the global aspects of capital “imperialism.” And although much has changed, especially since the fall of communism in 1989, much remains the same. This absence of progress is best illustrated by the patriarchal, transnational division of labor that exists locally and globally, and is defined in and through racist structures with particular effect in the first-world north and west. Although the new technologies make everything appear dispersed, seamless, and worldly, some things, like the sexual division of labor(s) with their racialized meanings, are hardly “post.”

1. Portions of this paper are excerpted from ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, HATRED: SEXUALIZED AND RACIALIZED CONFLICTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (forthcoming 1996). See this volume for fuller explication of the issues at hand. NOTE: I do not capitalize nations, countries, cities, or racial identities to underscore their artificial borderlines.
Where are we headed here? Globalism, as an economic imaginary, asks us to see the world as one village made of freely competing parts. Whereas eighteenth century capitalism demanded “the” fantasmic nation, twenty-first century capitalism demands the fantasmic globe.

The former relations between politics/economics, state/economy, public/private, family/nation are utterly challenged. Global markets find political nations too constraining. They find traditional, patriarchal, and familial relations too constraining as well.

Enter the ugly politics of privatization. The neoconservative agenda demands the elimination of public responsibility. Forget federal regulations on the workplace or the environment. Forget medicaid or medicare. Forget vaccinations for poor children. Forget the public/nation as an imaginary/reality. This privatization takes place on top of the existing patriarchal and racist inequities that structure the public/private divides.

The new greed is too greedy, and yet the voices of outrage have been muted. Nevertheless, there are the women and men in chiapas, mexico, demanding accountability from their own government and its connections with transnational capital. Also, there were the women meeting in beijing, at the U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, who demanded an end to the massive poverty of the world’s women and girls.

I will use the beijing “Platform for Action” in order to imagine a different kind of globe—one that is not dominated by the privatization of public responsibility. My exercise may be more fantasmic than real, as I leave behind the constraints of the U.N., the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, etc. I will focus on the promissory of beijing’s feminist voices heard across the globe, demanding government participation in the creation of sexual equality for women and girls. This equality encompasses “sexual rights,” which requires a different kind of democracy than has ever been theorized or practiced before.

My querying is tentative and open. I theorize that a radically democratic potential exists within and between the conflicts of the transnational sexual division(s) of labor of the first-world north and west and the third-world south and east, and the promissory of western feminism for export and the feminism across the globe voiced at beijing. It is from these dialogues that a revisioned notion of publicness for the twenty-first century may be found.

What follows is an epistemological/political road map for revisioning publics/democracy, which remain partial and fragmentary. I intend to show how I have arrived at my queries more than I intend to answer them. The answers are yet to be articulated in the struggles of the twenty-first century.

ON THE NORTH AND WEST AND ITS PRIVATIZATION

The west exports its version of culture around the world. Disney and CNN both control and disseminate versions of the west for transnational consumption. Hollywood becomes the u.s. New borders are constructed, while old ones are dumped or renegotiated. Culture becomes globalized, and “america” becomes a brand name like Calvin Klein. The globe can watch Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich spar as they both accede to the dismantling of government “as we know it.”

The right-wing neocon attack on government spending, which began in the 1970s with President Jimmy Carter, took full bloom during the Reagan-Bush years, and continues with Clinton. It has profoundly shifted the relationship between public and private domains.

We seem to be moving beyond the public/private divide, but in inconsistent and contradictory ways. The loss of public space sometimes parallels the loss of private space as well. As Jean Baudrillard states: “The one is no longer a spectacle, the other no longer a secret.” The obscene are no longer hidden and forbidden, but rather, “it is the obscenity of what no longer has any secret.”

There are many private spheres—and many public ones. The publics of market, state, and politics all seem to be in turmoil. Gingrich’s contract with america basically says we need to end public regardingness and let private people and private enterprise guide the country. Nevertheless, the selfishness has already begun to destroy us.

9. Id. at 131.
Because privacy always exists in relation to publicness, and because they shift and conflict with each other simultaneously, the privatization of the public realm has created a crisis for both realms. As more is made of the private—the importance of individual privacy and freedom of choice and markets—the public is crumbling. What can privacy mean when the public is gone? If a notion of public is gone, how does one live outside the self? Transnational capital needs privatization of multiple publics. So neocons revise democracy for global marketing. As such, the revisions privilege the rights of the very rich. The rest of us get stomped on, while Disney fantasizes the process.

Full publicization of life leads to fascism or statist communism. But what does full privatization lead to? It leads to the depiction of “the” public as the enemy—as the arena of special/divisive interests that balkanize the country. The anti-tax, antigovernment stance has displaced publicness and made the poor the enemy.

Recognizing that enemies always have a color and a sex is important because race is already sexualized, sexuality is already racialized, and race is engendered while gender is racialized. Besides this, the sexual division of labor is racially encoded along class lines.

ON A “NEW-OLD” GLOBALISM

The global economy symbolizes a wholeness of a world without divisions, difference, or conflict. Some have called it a borderless world. However, this reduces and simplifies borders to an economic reading. Instead, religious, familial, heterosexist, and racial borders are called forth to renegotiate globalized spaces. Globalism, like nation, erases sex/gender hierarchies, while utilizing corporate multicultural views of racial diversity.

“Capitalist universality” has triumphed to the point that it becomes invisible. The mythic “oneness” of the globe displaces the first/third-world divide and the devastating inequalities of rich and poor. Transnationalism stands in for capital. Corporatist multiculturalism uses and absorbs cultural/ethnic/racial diversity to naturalize and depoliticize multiracialism’s
potentially disordering aspects. Or, as Terry Eagleton clearly states:
"Difference, 'hybridity,' heterogeneity, restless mobility are native to the
capitalist mode of production, and thus by no means inherently radical
phenomena."

The problem with the prefixes of "post"-times is that they misrepresent the
newness of the twenty-first century. The new globalism and its multicultural
agenda are "new-old" developments with transnational origins. Corporate
structures are identified by their economic "trans-status" (across and through
and beyond) rather than their 1970s multi (many) national status. "Trans" cuts
through and creates mobile borders. Transnational imagines beyond known
boundaries and allegiances.

The anti-statist communist stance of eastern europe and western
antigovernment neoconservatism leaves global capitalists with quite a free
hand. Global capital operates in disguise with no acknowledged culprit. This
disguise remains racialized and engendered: racism is still used to cover over
the extreme poverty in africa, south america, asia, etc. The opportunism of
capital reconstitutes gender hierarchies while re-racing first-world and third-
world divides.

Patriarchal, familial, and national allegiances are unsettled by global
corporate searches for women's cheap labor in third-world south countries.
Further, new consumer markets in third-world east countries redeploy
sexuality to undermine former communist statist notions of women's equality.
Women, in these eastern european countries, are then summarily displaced by
these same markets and sent back to the home. These women view the new
consumerism, but with no money to spend. In first-world countries, women
are used to symbolize the market's consumerist possibilities for women in
third-world countries.

Global capital sends Avon to brazil, fancy lingerie to argentina,
prostitution and porn to eastern europe. There is little new here, but there are
new ways of doing it. Transnational corporations defy economic borders
while utilizing and adapting old formations and constructions of race and
gender. The question is whether capital itself will erode the
racialized/gendered borders upon which it depends.

64.
transnational corporatism and eastern europe

Global capitalism dominates eastern and central europe since the revolutions of 1989. The disintegration of the communist world allows for a mobility of capital which ignores Cold-War boundaries. These corporations can now operate “not merely without borders, but without responsibility.”

As a result, eastern europe has been repositioned globally as a new third world.

The mobility of capital has been enhanced by the anti-communist rhetoric of eastern europe and the neocon free-market model. The transition from communism to “free-market democracies” has left the most vulnerable people in eastern and central europe—albania, czech republic, slovakia, poland, russia, romania—poorer and less healthy. There has been a serious deterioration in people’s living situations: alcoholism has increased along with stress, infectious diseases, and malnutrition.

Global capital presents a conundrum: it is dispersed through the world, but is completely self-centered. With governments shrinking and transnational corporations growing, the relationship between public and private space collides. We can most clearly see this in arenas like public health, where the public cannot be wished away. As one russian health official, Yevgeny N. Belyavev, states: “These infections often come from beyond our borders, but once they are here it is a problem for all of us.”

Besides the problematic fallout for public life from privatized markets, the markets often do not work. General Electric bought the state-owned Tungsram in hungary (maker of lighting products), but has not been able to get it to turn a profit.

In russia, the market has been most successful for the criminal element. Seen from the eyes of a western businessman: “Russia is not an ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘developing’ country. It’s a misdeveloped country.”

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Nevertheless, many young, new middle-class Russians luxuriate in their newfound freedoms.22

The privatization of capital and the transnational corporate structure of the privatization deny public accountability. As a result, the process is highly undemocratic.23 The transformations of state apparati by global capital require downsizing, and the post-Cold War Pentagon becomes a little leaner and meaner.24 Nevertheless, no matter how much the U.S. government shrinks, it still seems to operate as an imaginary enemy, displacing global capital.25

As governments get redefined for the global economy, so do militaries. Consequently, the U.S. sends troops across the globe, similar to capital itself. And the post-Cold War global economy speaks the hegemony of free market ideology.

transnational racialized/gender and the twenty-first century

Even the United Nations acknowledges that transnational corporations are the central organizers of the world economy and that they are fighting to establish themselves in each others' home markets. Each of them tries to build its own regionally integrated, independent network of overseas affiliates.26 This web requires building international networks within culturally specific locales. The troubling relations between the universal and the particular, of sameness and difference, of transnational and national, meet in this globalizing corporatism.

The global web is trans-state and multination. Japanese corporate executives are controlling owners in CBS. Vast stretches of downtown Los Angeles are inhabited by internationally owned corporations. The "fortunate fifth"27 that succeeds in this global web can succeed without the rest. The

well-being of any nation as a whole is no longer necessary for capital’s success, and neither is the social welfare state.

Corporate america has never been dependent on the success of the nation as a whole for its profits, but today it has greater options to leave the rest of the nation behind. So the rest of the nation must become competitive with workers around the globe, or the u.s.--as distinct from corporate america--will become a part of the new third world. The key is “not which nation’s investors own what part of them,” but which work force is most valuable to the economic web.28

Economic transnationalism stands in contrast to the political racial/ethnic/sexual nationalisms of eastern and central europe and the complex racisms defining haiti, rwanda, south africa, etc. As economies diversify and internationalize, they utilize and corporatize the racialized and gendered constructions of otherness while also naturalizing the more traditional roles of race and sex/gender in bordering identities.

Transnational corporations do not promote a racism that is co-equal with the nation. Instead, corporate multiculturalism pluralizes race for transnational capital, although there is no simple or complete absorption or adaptation here. So, nationalisms in the former yugoslavia and soviet union are partial reactions to outsider economies symbolized by McDonald’s in zagreb, and Dairy Queen, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and Dunkin’ Donuts in budapest.29

The globalization of capital and its mobility have diversified and dispersed corporate interests in multiracial and multicultural ways. Although power remains concentrated in first-world corporations, nations—as well as their first-world status—are in turmoil. This stirs up fantasies of nation building that resonate with a fantasmic of gender hierarchy. The gender aspect of nation—the presentation of woman as never the sister, always the mother, and definer of border crossings—presses hard against the women of the third-world factories of the twenty-first century, the rape victims of bosnia and haiti, and the feminists of the north and west, south, and east.

As global capital spreads, women work harder—either in and from their homes and/or in specified third-world markets. They become the third world of the third world, and the third world of the first world. They are the cheapest

28. Reich, The Work of Nations, supra note 27, at 285. See also Reich, The Next American Frontier, supra note 27; and Reich, The Fracturing of the Middle Class, supra note 27.

29. Julie Mostov, Address at Cornell University (Nov. 4, 1993). I am indebted to Julie Mostov’s discussion, Do Women Have Something to Fear?: Nationalism in Eastern Europe, for eliciting the idea of an “outsider” economy (Cornell University, Nov. 4, 1993).
of the cheap workers. Reebok and Nike hire women in Indonesia for sixteen cents an hour and women in China for ten to fourteen cents an hour.\(^30\) These women build nations from their families and build the global market from their families, farms, and factories.\(^{31}\) They supply the flexibility global capital needs. Two-thirds of all part-time workers and sixty percent of all temporary workers are women.\(^{32}\) These women also supply enormous sustenance in the families they rear, and they meet private needs within this domestic sphere. As privatized markets force women into unemployment and dismantle state subsidies and access for eastern women in Southeast Asian factories, the global market unsettles a key network of domestic support.

The global marketplace is premised on a transnational sexual division of labor. Global capital displaces the economic nation, while relying on women in the family to nurture the globe. Women birth and rear children, and they labor in the sexual ghettos of the global market. In Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, those women who labor outside the home predominately work as agricultural laborers. In Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore, growing numbers of women are employed in the factories. In first-world countries, women disproportionately provide the low-paid service sector labor. This is also often true in South America.\(^{33}\)

The fantasmed Anglo-Western woman is marketed in and by the global economy as symbolic of the market’s freedom. This contrasts with the subordination of women in the global market. The contrast crisscrosses and unsettles the relations between family, nation, and globe. As public space is renegotiated, the masculinist dimensions of the globe are both exposed and promoted. This may just become a major stumbling block for global capital.

As global capital shrinks space and time, it allows for the subversive possibility of women seeing beyond the local to the global. This move puts male privilege clearly in view like never before.

ON WESTERN FEMINISM FOR EXPORT


Glitzy advertising and romanticized displays fantasize the freedom of the "west." Beautiful, healthy, fashionable women image the promise of democracy. This feminism of the west "for export" assists in constructing the "new-old" gender borders of the global economy alongside and in dialogue with corporatist multiculturalism. This process uses multiracialism while establishing western cultural hegemony of the market. Women's bodies are the sites for these renegotiations.

There are troublesome effects of this mass-marketing strategy for women of color and poor women across color divides inside the west, as well as outside. Western feminism is itself being privatized by the market and reduced to self-help strategies, while women, especially poor women, are losing all forms of public help as government programs are dismantled. This mass marketing of depoliticized feminism is crucial to the downsizing and privatizing of the u.s. government. The market advertises the successes of feminism as justificatory of the rollback of an affirmative-action state. The rearticulation of racialized/sex/gender borders for the twenty-first century is undermined by the global market, even as the boundaries of the fantasmatic "east" and "west" are re-encoded in the "export" version of feminism.

Feminism of the "west" is marketed as a caricature of sex equality and victimhood and becomes a fantasmic nightmare, both locally and globally. Feminism operates discursively: man-hating, equal rights, and victimization/protectionism stand in for each other and are positioned against one another. To complicate things further, feminism "for export" creates its own allure.

This popularized/publicized feminism is marketed domestically, as well as offered as a part of colonialist and global politics. Some variants hegemonize the "west"; others assist the porn industry in eastern europe; others are used to mass market products within our own borders. Some variants are used to demonize white women in women of color communities; others are used to criticize women of color for racial disloyalty. Others are used to normalize feminism and strip it of its militant voice.


35. I do not hold to a neat division between "popular" (meaning of the people) and "mass" (meaning of the market). The two realms of culture collide too often. See ELLA SHOHAT & ROBERT STAM, UNTHINKING EUROCENTRISM: MULTICULTURALISM AND THE MEDIA 240-342 (1994), for clarification of the distinction.
nation-building and Hillary

Today, much political talk about women acts to neutralize once militant ideas. This process happens more often as the borders between public and private become further skewed and the lines between politics and culture are muted. As the government gets more privatized, our president visits talk shows. As the nation is reconfigured for globalism, there is more need to co-opt political militancy into the privatized stances of the market.

This was before the multiply-orchestrated Hillary transitions. Her shifting borders and ambiguity are much like the contours of gender today.36 She is used to symbolize and write the contradictory meanings of motherhood, wifehood, and nation as they collide with feminism. Given one read, she stands for the marketed/popularized version of feminism: she is white, professional, smart, and determined; has a child, but does not spend much time raising her; appears aloof and focused on power; and cares about her maiden name.

But this is only one depiction. Hillary also changes her hairdos' and wonders why she is not liked more by the public. She carries a message to the nation in global times: as able as she is, she still is not president, but “his” wife. It is her glass ceiling, and she will live with it. But she tries to do it differently, more actively as a professional type. She gets nailed at every turn. People keep asking: Who elected her anyway?

Even though Hillary has never identified herself as a feminist activist, feminism has been attached to her: defame one and hurt the other. It is so much trickier than with Nancy Reagan or Barbara Bush. With no private identity allowed, Hillary becomes the scapegoat for men and women who fear feminism—whatever they think it is. She unsettles sex/gender borders because she collides the symbolization of woman with her presence. She provokes hostility because she is a wife first, but not just a wife. She creates fear and hate because she is both stereotypic of feminism and not enough of a feminist.

As a result, some hate her because she is too much like them and is supposed to be different. She stays with a man who has told us all, in so many words, that he has “betrayed” her. Her marriage is supposed to sustain the

nation, but it appears shaky. People do not want to be reminded that marriage is a sham. The nation does not need this right now.

The problem is that the Clintons are a bit too unsettling for unsettled times. Hillary represents the gender disorder that the nation needs to forget. This is all too much to handle. On the other hand, Bill’s marital infidelities humanize Hillary as the suffering wife, even if they democratize her a bit too much for everyone’s liking. The aggressive bitch is refeminized, while Bill, the wimp, is remasculinized.

Before becoming First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton was a committed advocate for children’s rights. There is little sign of this commitment while the attack against poor women and their children dominate the news. Such advocacy would position Hillary with a feminism that questions the privatizing of the state and the enforcement of traditional familial relations.

When Hillary presented the outlines of the health care package on Capitol Hill, she did so always positioned vis-à-vis a male patriarch: as “a wife, a mother, a daughter . . . [and] grateful for this chance to . . . serve [her] country.” We are presented yet another viewing here: a domesticated professional woman for the twenty-first century. She is wife and mother for the post-Cold War nation.

This time Hillary subtextually speaks a “power feminism” as a devoted citizen with market appeal. She focuses on what women can do and not on how they are kept from doing. She shows “no rage at men, no rhetoric about oppression or empowerment, not even a whisper of a Ms.” While on Capitol Hill, she shows her competence, her intelligence, her fortitude. She is “the feminist,” recoded and neutralized as citizen-mother in a changing transnational and multicultural world.

Several months later, she looks different and talks differently, again. The health plan failed, and Hillary, the professional, is disciplined; she is domesticated back to her family, once again. Gender is rewritten on her body: her hair, her clothes, and her voice are rescripted. She tells a group of women reporters that she does not know who the woman is that she reads about in the news. She says she is sorry for making a mess of health care and will take the blame. She says she must work harder at being good. The citizen-mother has

39. Id at section 4, page 1.
been unfairly victimized, but she will do better. She is speaking the language of personalized co-dependency on a national level.

Hillary wants to rewrite her role as citizen-wife for post Cold-War times. As an active player/co-equal partner, she needs new rules--like global capital. Unfortunately, gender changes are even more unsettling than global ones. Therefore, her media experts nervously write old stories: on her headbands, pageboy hairdos', and pink angora sweaters. The borders of feminism are left fluid and manipulable for the nation: popular culture vaporizes feminism while it privatizes it for the market and depoliticizes it for the state.

By March 1995, after the 1992 Congressional election defeats, Hillary starts to stress the issues of women and children as she travels abroad. It is interesting to see how her focus shifts once she leaves the country. Once outside u.s. borders, she speaks quite readily on behalf of poor women in india. From this space outside the u.s., Hillary criticized the "rampant materialism and consumerism" of western countries.

However, Hillary Clinton reinscribes the east/west divide in her depiction of women's lives in southeast asia. She states: "When I think about the women who've been imprisoned, tortured, discouraged, barred from involvement in education or professional opportunity--what any of us in America go through is minor in comparison." According to this, america seems to have no great inequities. But the suffering elsewhere seems to be overwhelming. Women of the "west" have little to complain about in comparison to women of the "east."

So, Hillary leaves the country in order to speak as a feminist in other countries and at United Nations conferences on women—most recently in beijing. She takes feminism, as an export, abroad. She defines the backwardness of sri lanka as the backdrop for her concern with "girls and women," which becomes a "human rights" issue. Strangely enough, because she is speaking about children, some in the media now call her a traditional first lady. Wrong again.

Hillary has been called just about everything because the nation does not know what she needs to be. Hillary merely embodies the changing familial structures of the nation during globalization of the market, while the nation

41. Id.
42. Id.
needs more fluid borders than the racialized/gender structure can easily deliver.

The assaults on feminism utter forth from multiple cultural spaces. Much like liberalism, feminism is attacked for being too radical in all its guises: too committed to sexual equality, too committed to its victimhood, too committed to sexual freedom, too committed to women's difference, too committed to women's sameness. Forget that no one feminism is depicted fairly here. And forget that the earliest forms of western feminism were radically liberal in that they demanded women's inclusion into the bourgeois/liberal individualism of the day. Equal rights doctrine followed suit.

The backlash today is deep and profound: it is against individualism as it operates radically for women. The market has to transform the militancy of this feminist individualism into a privatized consumerism. It attempts to do this by focusing on freedom—which the mass market absorbs—instead of equality—which the market rejects. Feminism gets redefined as an individualized consumer self-help market, and the politics surrounding the struggle for equality drops out the bottom.

mass-marketed pop feminism

Depictions of women's victimization and powerlessness blanket the media. Talk shows are filled with the concerns originally articulated by radical feminists such as date rape, pornography, incest, sexual abuse, etc. But the media disconnects the original critique of patriarchal privilege from the sexual battery. Whereas radical feminists connected the personal to the political, media depictions of sexual violence appear individualized and privatized. There is no politics to the personal because the personal is made private. "Sexual politics" and the uncovering of power-defined private moments is mass-marketed.

Patriarchal privilege is depoliticized through a stunning array of individualized women's tragedies. Many of these moments are further appropriated by the fantasmania of T.V. news. O.J. Simpson decries that his marriage was abusive for both himself and Nicole, and both become victim

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45. See the original radical feminist writings: Ti-Grace Atkinson, Amazon Odyssey (1974); Feminist Revolution (Kathie Sarachild ed., 1978); Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (1970); Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (1969); and Sisterhood is Powerful (Robin Morgan ed., 1970).
and victimizer. In this instance, the abuse is not merely neutralized, but concealed.

The consumer side of feminist discourse and its commercialization operates both to publicize feminist concerns and to disconnect these issues from their radical critique of male privilege. The popularization mainstreams their radically political content, although not completely. This process of depoliticization is similar to the corporatist use of multiculturalism; but in this instance, the market focuses and isolates gender. Corporatist multiculturalism pluralizes ethnicity while privileging euro-american centrism. Feminism, in its mass-market guise, popularizes women's victimization, while leaving the phallus intact.

Interestingly, the racialized aspects of sexuality recombine in the market's attempt at neutralization. Anita Hill46 and O.J. Simpson became household names in large part because of the popularization and mass marketing of feminist concerns and the racialized content of their meaning. Both of these cases are instances, though quite different, of the already popularized cultural discussions of sexual harassment and domestic violence and their interplay with race. Anita Hill's testimony about her sexual harassment mobilized women in extraordinary ways.47

The collusion of the marketization of feminist concerns in the popular media crisscrosses the arenas of racial hate and sexual violence. This collusion is why the Simpson trial was a media bonanza: domestic violence meets football star; interracial marriage meets racial hatred; racism meets sexism. Mix up the players on both sides of the courtroom by race and sex, and one has a significant cultural event.

The process of popularization blurs the lines between using women as icons for the market and encoding feminist claims. These conflictual processes operate to create the fantastic of success. The mass marketing absorbs, publicizes, normalizes, and disciplines all at the same time. The marketing redefines the boundaries between privacy and publicness, inside and outside, mainstream politics and mass culture, feminist language, and women's

47. EISENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 82.
identities. Radical feminist politics drops out of the renegotiated boundaries, while woman's victim status becomes the new voyeurism.

Feminists are said to wallow in their victimhood, while this very status is used to underwrite a huge industry. T.V. news, talkshows, newspapers, self-help books, videos, movies, tabloids, and MTV write their own text with the words and images from feminist discourse. Even trials and politics have become a part of this massified culture market. In this media-driven age, elections and courtrooms have none of the boundary markers they once had. Politics enters our bedrooms on T.V. and collapses the public/private divide, but not entirely.

The language of sexual violence and battery is used to catch women's attention rather than change their lives. This mass-marketed feminism is a bit like fat-free food. Victimization and sex sell. Liberal feminism's opportunity/equality focus is not sexy enough for the market these days. And, sadly, its demands have either become neutralized or (once again) become too radical for the neocons. Nevertheless, feminism of the west, as export, mixes the two. It advertises women in the u.s. as sexy—"free and equal"—to third-world southern and eastern countries. The media moguls just forget to mention the domestic battery, the glass ceiling, and the poverty rates among women here.

Across the world, women's responses vary. Some women in eastern Europe react suspiciously to the equal rights stance of feminism which sounds too reminiscent of statist communism. Some Muslim fundamentalists, as well as women in Muslim countries, reject the pop/market version of "man-hating" feminism as the worst of the excesses of western colonialism. These misreadings and misuses—with their transnational effect—construct anti-feminist stances both at home and abroad.

Today, although some aspects of liberal feminist equality discourse have been incorporated into everyday language, much remains unchanged. The mainstreaming of an idea is not equivalent to creating its reality. Saying women are to be treated equally is not the same as equal treatment. Expecting women on welfare to find jobs is not the same as enabling them to do so.

The limitations of political/legal talk are clearly in evidence if one is poor and needs an abortion. Even though one has the right to choose an abortion—as an idea—one may not be able to get an abortion—as the reality.48

48. For a discussion of the complex relations of real/ideal and how this is embodied in liberal law, see ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, The Female Body and the Law 6-78 (1988).
Some feminist successes act to conceal the continuation of patriarchal structures that radical feminists target for dismantling. I have long argued that the individualist model of opportunity cannot contain feminism.49 I believe that liberal feminism—with its individualism (liberal rights) and collectivism (recognition of women as a sexual class)—strains to radicalize beyond itself.50 The inclusion of women is never simple addition. A fundamental rearrangement is always necessary, and as a result, equality, even when it simply means sameness of treatment, is always destabilizing to racialized/patriarchal layerings.

Feminism always embodies a tension between individuality and collectivity, and it is a tension that cannot ever be fully resolved. It is this irresolution—between the self and others—that contains utter uniqueness. Liberalism resolves the tension between self and others in favor of the individual. Communism favors the collectivity, but feminism redeployes the unanswerability of the tension in order to explore relationships between the private and public, familial and individual, and identities and communities.

Different historical moments trigger crises for feminism. As white, middle-class, first-world women were pulled into the labor force through the 1970s, the conflicts between capitalism and patriarchy were exacerbated. Wage-earning women who traversed the worlds of market and home absorbed these conflicts within a double and triple day of work. These conflicts have more fully deepened as we enter the twenty-first century. In third-world countries of the south and east, the excesses of transnational capital further heighten the exploitation of women factory workers in particular. They work endless hours for below poverty wages, and the women are often girls.

The radical recognition of women as distinct and discriminated against destabilizes the individualist stance of the new market economies, while calling attention to women’s lack of individual rights. Individualism, and its corollary embrace of freedom, is completely seductive as fantasy. It is what the revolutions of 1989 imaged for themselves.

Transnational markets are patriarchally individualist. Feminism(s) is egalitarian, collective, and individualist simultaneously. The promissory lies within these conflicts. So today, I say that the feminisms across the globe share the possibility of a radical future that develops out of the contradictory, promissory, and punitive aspects of global capital.

49. See generally Eisenstein, supra note 34 (analyzing western feminism).
50. See id.
Liberalism, as well as liberal feminism, has become too radical for the new north American global state \textit{at the same time} that it is marketed. Radical feminism has always been too radical. But the pop/mass/culture market has blended the two in brilliant fashion. The radical/structural critique of patriarchy has been reduced to a personal/individualized statement of victimhood. Therapy and recovery have become the solution. T.V. is very often its mode. The radical future of liberal feminism has been renegotiated to read as the privatized future of radical feminism.

“Feminism” is everywhere and nowhere. It operates in veiled references and orchestrated absences. It is disparaged at the same time that it is embraced. It becomes the perfect fictive symbol. Few ever quite know what it means, but it is the fantasy to fear.

The newly transnationalized economies are not fully able to absorb feminism. Nor are third-world countries of the south and east. But, western feminism for export has begun a dialogue of its own with women of these countries. Even the pope is worried about this talk. So he apologized in his 1995 papal letter on women, for those in the church “who have contributed to the oppression of women.”\textsuperscript{51} In addition, he acknowledges the need to “achieve real equality in every area: equal pay for equal work, protection for working mothers, fairness in career advancements, equality of spouses with regard to family rights. . . .”\textsuperscript{52} He does all this \textit{in order} to speak against abortion.

A transnational discussion among women is the most hopeful sign yet that it might be possible to think--together--through the nation, beyond transnational capital.

\textbf{ON FEMINISMS OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH AND EAST}

Feminism of the west, as export, operates colonially and imperialistically in third-world countries of the south and east. Then, it brings these women back to the west as foreigners. So, women in these countries must find a way out of this dilemma on their own terms: requiring a non-colonialist feminism which challenges the patriarchalism of third-world nationalisms.

\begin{flushright}
52. \textit{Id.}
\end{flushright}
There are many ways to think this dilemma through. Some women in Iran, who wear the veil, support women's rights; others do not. Some women in Algeria who identify themselves as feminist mean that they support women's right to education; others mean the right to a good job. Others in Egypt, Slovakia, and Iran, believe in these very issues, yet say they are not feminist. Others believe deeply in women's need to control their fertility, but silence their views within their Islamic communities. Others in Russia see abortion as a necessity and wish it were not.53

Numbers of women in Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, and Islamic culture, want a dialogue between North and West and South and East. The U.S. itself is already home to many of these cultures. Women of Poland, Romania, the former Soviet Union, Algeria, Egypt, etc., have histories from which women in the West can learn. Women in these countries often already know the Westernized feminism exported globally. But they also need to know the more dissident Western feminisms, particularly that of Western women of color.

I am not arguing that there is one kind of feminism, or woman, or one kind of equality. But that the debate should focus on recognizing different feminisms rather than questioning their theoretical viability. Let us use the dialogues between feminisms to build connections between these communities of women.

Feminism recognizes and names women as a collectivity. It is, in part, fantasy and imaginary. It imagines beyond the differences between women to a community that respects diversity and radical pluralism. This pluralism recognizes a shared idea among women that is not a given, but is rather a possibility. Sometimes the conflicts are too great—other allegiances overwhelm the possibility of feminist identities. By naming women at the start, so to speak, I mean to call attention to their absences and silences in the "isms" of the twenty-first century.

women in post-communist nationalisms

Whereas the western media depicted the revolutions of 1989 as a victory for capitalist democracy, exclusionary nationalisms now dominate the

53. See generally MARGOT BADRAN, FEMINISTS, ISLAM, AND NATION: THE MAKING OF MODERN EGYPT (1995); FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS: WOMEN'S CLAIMS TO HUMAN RIGHTS (Margaret A. Schuler ed., 1995); FEWDA MALTI-DOUGLAS, MEN, WOMEN, AND GOD(S): NAWAL EL SAADAWI AND ARAB FEMINIST POETICS (1995); RECASTING WOMEN: ESSAYS IN INDIAN COLONIAL HISTORY (Kumkum Sangari & Sudesh Vaid eds., 1990) (discussing how women outside the West incorporate feminism into their lives).
Women in eastern and central Europe have had a troubled status in statist communism which makes them exceedingly important and yet particularly vulnerable to the process of nationalizing identity(ies). Gender boundaries are redefined for the privatized and global market, and this affects women’s lives.

However punishing the new markets have been for women, women still hope for the freedoms that marketization promises. Nevertheless, there is no one scenario to uncover in women’s lives in Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, and Bosnia. The wide variety of circumstances, which vary from country to country, also tells a similar story. State services and supports for women have been cut everywhere. The privatized markets are with transnational gender effect. And the Bosnian war represents the ugliest side of the underbelly of post-communism.

The new economies in eastern Europe have displaced majorities of women in the labor force. These women have worked in the market for a long time, and their forced unemployment is not welcomed. Many of these women’s children, now also in the market, have been brought up in state day care centers. They have had access—however humiliating the actual service rendered is—to abortion for several decades now. Women—their individual histories, their exhaustion, their desires, the assaults against them, the existence of dispersed and uncoordinated women’s actions—are part of the feminist story starting to unfold. It is a story of new markets, new kinds of poverty, leftovers of statist communism, and nationalist wars.

Privatization and new markets are redefining the relationships between states and their economies, families and public/private life, and political and cultural life. Because these renegotiations retranslate masculinist privilege, women have a particular interest in affecting these changes. Agitation on the part of women in these post-communist societies is not new, and yet, it is also not simply like western feminism. After all, “feminism has no particular ethnic identity.” So there are new possibilities for a crossover dialogue among women in the east, and between “the” east and west given the transnational privatization of the globe.

54. See Eisenstein, supra note 5, at chapter 1.

55. See generally Women in the Politics of Postcommunist Eastern Europe (Marilyn Rueschemeyer ed., 1994) (discussing the transition from communism to a market economy in eastern Europe).

Early on, the revolutions of 1989 "imagined" religious, political, and sexual freedom. The hope was for a freedom for the "private" self. Slavenka Drakulic, a feminist from zagreb, captures this sense of privacy when describing the lack of consumer goods under communism, like toilet paper and tampons. Many of her concerns with privacy are tied to bodily/sexual needs, which were much ignored under the old regime. At home, in croatia, Drakulic is treated as a traitor to her country because of her feminism and her antinationalist views, which make her more popular outside her country than inside.

Equality, and most particularly sexual equality, had a bad name with women living in statist communist regimes. Sexual equality was identified with forced work, low pay, abortion as the method of contraception, and triple days of labor: home, job, and shopping. It was also associated with a series of expected entitlements like state day care, pregnancy leaves, child subsidies, etc., which were sporadic and contradictory in their effect. Even though few women are happy about losing their jobs and their state entitlements to global capital, fewer yet, at least up to this point, would want to return to the old regimes.

Liberal democrats, as the philosophers of capitalism, and marxists, as the theorists of communism, totalize "the" economy. Supposedly communism was to end class conflict and all other conflict with it. There is no theorization of gender hierarchy within the communist economy. Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as well as Vaclav Havel, make the same mistake; women are not imaged in their nations as active citizens. Gorbachev even promised that perestroika would allow women to return to their homes and be feminine again.

Women are made absent in discussions of the 1989 revolutions and their aftermath. Little is said about how many czech dissidents were women. Little is said about the way women kept civil society alive as a counter to the totalitarianism of the various regimes. Tatiana Bohm, of the g.d.r., says that


the revolutionary changes in eastern and middle europe would never have been possible without the widespread participation of women.60

One also hears very little of the women in ex-yugoslavia who fought against the war. Sonia Licht, of belgrade, tells of how women built a peace movement, helped organize the May 1992 demonstration of 100,000 people against the bombing of sarajevo, and maintained a candlelight vigil for victims of the war from October 1991 through February 1992. She tells of the "women in black," the Crisis Line, and Centers for Raped Women in belgrade—all of which were actions by women to stop the war.61 One hardly hears mention of Vina Zena, an antinationalist women’s magazine published in sarajevo, or of the women’s therapy center in multi-ethnic tuzla and medica, or of the mixed ethnic women’s therapy project in zenica. These women stand against masculinist nationalism and tell a different story.62

phallocratic markets and transnational capital

Statist communism’s rhetoric bespoke a sexual equality that overburdened women with multiple responsibilities as wage earner, mother, and domestic drudge.63 The rhetoric was largely sexless. Although abortion was available, its assembly line manner was humiliating and often medically unsafe. Zarana Papic says that yugoslav women were so overworked and humiliated that they were effectively silenced by the rigors of everyday life.64 Marina Blagojevic calls this drudgery of the everyday the “tyranny of triviality” and “self-sacrifice.”65

Prior to World War II (WWII), women in yugoslavia were very often restricted to domesticity within a confining patriarchal culture. After WWII, with the coming of socialism, women were granted the right to vote, the right to abortion, and equal pay for equal work.66 This came to mean forced

60. Tatiana Bohm, The Women’s Question as a Democratic Question: In Search of Civil Society, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 59, at 151.
63. See generally Between East and West: Gender in an Era of East European Transitions, SOC. POL., Spring 1995.
66. Dasa Dubacek, Women’s Time in the Former Yugoslavia, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 59, at 133.
emancipation (working dreary jobs), protective legislation (which assisted women, while creating "mommy politics"), and the necessity of abortion (given that it was the main form of contraception), which was thoroughly paternalistic.

The concern with women’s equality was manipulated for the purposes of patriarchal communism throughout eastern europe. The state functioned in interventionist paternalist ways to create a form of egalitarian patriarchal privilege which served the state above all else. Men and women suffered in this process, but women suffered more within this masculinist frame. Crude ideological manipulations encouraged women to bear children they did not want. The state used special legislation for women to provide a minimal amount of relief from their double burden. This was quite different from the state's promise. If socialists had wanted to emancipate women, they would have figured out a way to socialize housework and transform the family.

Post-communism has been no kinder to women. They have been the first to lose their jobs in the economic restructuring. Day care subsidies and social welfare entitlements have been cut, thus “straightjacketing” women’s options. The editor of a new woman’s journal, Jedním Okem (One Eye Open), in the czech republic states that although capitalism provides new opportunities for women, it has also been responsible for major cuts in funding for women’s projects.

Alongside the market changes and increased levels of unemployment and poverty, Tatyana Mamonova says there is rampant crime, drug abuse, prostitution, and new forms of violence, particularly in the former soviet union. Anything seems to go. There are “brazen insolence,” beauty contests, rape, and porn.

New markets in poland have brought Slim-Fast, the american diet product. Plastic surgeons are supposedly doing a brisk new business in breast enlargements and liposuction. Cosmetics are more easily available, if you have the money, but most women, experiencing a new poverty, do not.

Many polish women now find the catholic church more oppressive and constricting than the old communist party. This criticism of the new

69. TATYANA MAMONOVA, WOMEN’S GLASNOST V. NAGLOST at xiii (1994).
70. Ewa Hauser et al., Feminism in the Interstices of Politics and Culture: Poland in Transition, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 59, at 269. See also John Darnton, Tough Abortion
regimes is also made by women in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Albania where they compose sixty percent of the unemployed. In Romania, women make up eighty-five percent of the unemployed.\textsuperscript{71}

Seventy-three percent of Russia’s unemployed are women.\textsuperscript{72} Half of these women have higher educations, and more than forty percent of them are under the age of thirty. Russian feminists readily critique the lack of democracy for women amidst the new changes. Gennady Melikyan, Russia’s labor minister, made this traditionalism clear. When asked about labor practices he said: “Why should we employ women when men are unemployed? It’s better that men work and women take care of children and do the housework.”\textsuperscript{73}

In the former Soviet Union, commercialization of the female body is a central element of the transition to market relations. Once again, we see the marketing of gender for masculinist purposes. Since glasnost, films more readily depict sexual violence against women. Freedom of speech has been used on behalf of the pornography industry.

It is now quite clear that the revolutions of 1989 and perestroika were written with men, not women, in mind.\textsuperscript{74} The new markets have instigated and nurtured a nostalgia for pre-communist patriarchal society on which post-communist nationalisms capitalize. Also, nostalgic masculinism constructs the contours of the new national identities. It is a transnational nationalist stance within Eastern and Central Europe that marks similarities between women beyond national borders. This traditionalist patriarchal domesticity stands in stark contrast to the wage-earning/domesticity of former communist regimes.

The deindustrialized service economies of Western first-world countries have necessitated a majority of married women to enter the labor force, although never to the degree communist regimes like Poland, the Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia did. Liberal democratic rhetoric never argued that it was woman’s duty to “work,” nor was sexual equality ever tied to labor force participation. In the 1950s, U.S. women were depicted as housewives, while women in Eastern Europe were slugging it out in the factories in the name of sexual equality. In the 1990s, a majority of U.S. white women have joined


71. Peggy Watson, \textit{The Rise of Masculinism in Eastern Europe, \textsc{New Left Rev.}, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 72, 78.}

\textsuperscript{72} Jennifer Gould, \textit{On Their Backs, \textsc{Village Voice}, Jan. 11, 1994, at 18.}

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{74} Pilkington, \textit{supra} note 67, at 220.
women of color in the labor force, while their eastern european counterparts are losing their jobs. Transnational global markets may change this yet again as the u.s. competes alongside eastern europe for jobs in this global marketplace.

Neither statism--communist or nationalist--nor capitalist markets per se are friends to women. Both statist communism and global capitalism are patriarchal and paternalist. Statist communism forced western european women into the centrally planned economy. Globalized capitalist markets and the nationalistic responses they trigger in eastern and central europe reignite the contestation over women’s domesticity. The process of transition is not all even and smooth. The same global market that necessitates an increase in women’s unemployment in some regions also promises new freedoms. These freedoms run counter to traditionalist nationalisms of “the” east or west. This same global market demands that women enter the market as the cheapest of cheap labor in central america and southeast asia without the promise of much of anything. Women’s bodies—their commodification and their control—are at issue as the new markets take hold. On the one hand, there is the sex and porn market, and on the other, there is the attempt to restrict abortion and reproductive choice. The same market that popularizes sex videos seems uninterested in condoms and other contraceptive items.

Masculinism is remapped on the economy and women’s bodies in the struggles over abortion in poland, croatia, and germany. Even in russia, where abortion is the main form of birth control, a small right-wing assault is developing. Although it is still rare to find somebody who speaks against abortion in russia, anti-abortion forces held their first major conference in early 1994.75 These challenges take place while the limited availability of contraceptive pills, condoms, and other birth control devices makes them pricey, as well as difficult to get. As such, russians viewed abortion as a necessity of equality discourse of the communist period, which has been discredited as flawed and “imposed” from above. This has created an allergic reaction to the rhetoric of the communist past, even among pro-abortion women.76

75. Vladimir Shlapentokh & Tatiana Marchenko, Family Values on the Rise While Women Fall in Russia, 12 FEMINIST ISSUES 43-46 (1992); Alessandra Stanley, Russians and Americans Join in Anti-Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at A12.
76. Anna Titkow, Political Change in Poland: Cause, Modifier, or Barrier to Gender Equality?, in GENDER POLITICS AND POST-COMMUNISM, supra note 59, at 255. See also Snitow, supra note 70, at 558.
Continued disputes over the borders and parameters of abortion choice express the transnational contestation over women's bodily autonomy. Transitional market societies attempt to redefine and re-encode masculinist and patriarchal family structures to enhance the options for men in the new markets. Post-communist society re-articulates traditionalist familial fantasies in the hopes of ordering a very disorderly economy. Such fantasies, however, require a refutation of statist equality and economies that support patriarchal familialism, which necessitates male wages capable of supporting wives and children. Transnational capital in eastern europe is unable to subsidize these nationalist fantasies as these countries become a part of the "new" globalized third world.

A new politics may emerge in eastern europe to stem the nationalist rhetoric of domesticity after half a century of enforced "sex equality." There is new history to be written out of this post-communist nationalist repositioning of women as the global market gives women little choice. Women's oppositions will be charted through the maze of tensions between statist communism's enforced equality, a new domesticity enforced by racialized nationalisms and global capital, and the promissory freedom of the market itself.

**post-communist/nationalist women's identities**

The legacy of enforced collectivism and universalism encircles any and all possibilities for developing feminist politics in eastern europe. Many eastern european women remain highly critical and skeptical of the deformed gender similarity espoused in hypocritical ways by their former regimes. Communism's version of sexual equality meant standardization, weariness, sameness, and dreariness. For these women, democracy represents the promise of a new freedom of individual expression: political, economic, and sexual. In this scenario, equality and freedom are constructed as opposites.

Women, as a transnational category, with all their racial, ethnic, sexual, bodily, and religious differences, can reveal the inadequacy of false homogeneity as a standard, either in relation to themselves or to men. These differences necessitate a revisioning of equality discourse—both communist and liberal democratic styles. Like communist discourse, liberal democratic notions of equality also assume likeness and similarity to a male standard. To

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be treated equal is to be treated like a man, but not exactly. Women are expected to have a job, but it will not be as well-paying. Pregnancy is treated like a disability a man might have, even though it is completely female.

No wonder lots of Russian women have been quite vocal in that they are not interested in being treated like men any longer, and that they are not interested in western feminism if it is limited to this equality rhetoric. They are tired of their triple day of labor. They have yet to experience the enforced domesticity of the 1950s that white, western, middle-class feminists critique. Their wariness is quite similar to the position of women-of-color feminists in the west during the 1970s. These women, already in the labor force and experiencing its racialized/gender ghettos, imagine beyond likeness to an equality rich in diversity.78

Alena Heitlinger interestingly argues that human rights discourse may hold more promise for eastern European women than western feminism simply because women’s rights, as a politics, is overly identified with the former communist regimes.79 The Global Campaign for Women’s Human Rights takes this tact. It uses the specific gender aspects of human rights to bring attention to the transnational violence against women.80 Human rights discourse is used to erode the public/private division that occludes the everyday familial violence of women’s lives. This focus transforms and relocates the meaning of human rights through a gendered lens.

The theorized visibility of women—the naming of women as a collectivity of females with the possibility of shared transnational identities as “sisters”—is always absent in the ruminations of nationalism and post-communism. In contrast, feminism names women and the possibility of their shared identities.

In the west and north, industrial capitalism initially distinguished public and private life: wage labor and non-wage domestic labor. White, middle-class, married women were relegated to the home. Women of color worked for wages, often as paid domestics. In the east and south, Arab/muslim women have been defined by a family that de-emphasizes public life while allowing

78. For a sampling of this discussion, see HOME GIRLS, A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY (Barbara Smith ed., 1983); BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984); GLORIA JOSEPH & JILL LEWIS, COMMON DIFFERENCES (1986).
80. See generally CHARLOTTE BUNCH & ROXANNA CARRILLO, GENDER VIOLENCE: A DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE (Attic Press 1992) (discussing the state’s responsibility to recognize violence against women as a human rights violation).
them to work outside the home. Now global capital once again redefines a public/private divide for new third-world countries, privileging the market against the labor intensive domesticity of the home and an absent state. Meanwhile, de-industrialization in first-world countries writes new divides out of increasing privatization. What once was the public purview of the state is now privatized by neocons so that every individual must take care of herself.

Global capitalism demands these new realignments. So eastern european women lose their jobs, while privatization displaces the public arena. Religious muslim fundamentalists, in partial reaction to global capital, demand the return of women to the home--or the veil. Meanwhile, transnational capital turns women into poverty-wage workers in mexico, korea, and indonesia. Global capital privatizes more and more of the globe, and women and young girls "man" the factories, and/or are forced into prostitution. In the free-trade zone factories in central america and the caribbean, maquiladora workers slave away at thirty-eight cents an hour, in fifteen hour-a-day shifts. The workers are mainly girls, some as young as fourteen years of age, who make the garments for Gap, Eddie Bauer, and Banana Republic.

Despite economic uncertainties, nationalist horror stories, and ferocious fears, a large number and range of women's informal groups have sprouted up. By 1990, in the czech republic, there were numerous women's groups and parties of all varieties. The Political Party of Women and Mothers formed a national network to encourage political participation and provide information on women's rights.

Because established political groups are viewed with much suspicion, many of the women's informal groups remain disparate and haphazard. Very often there are just "anonymous" women who take initiatives into their own hands because there is still a stigma of "top-down authoritarianism." Many women prefer to identify individually rather than politically. Jana Hradilkova, a czech woman, states: "Feminism smells like an ideology and people have had their fill of ideology here." Any "ism" remains suspect. This said, it

81. See generally Annette Fuentes & Barbara Ehrenreich, Women in the Global Factory (1983) (discussing the effect of multinational corporations on women's lives); Enloe, supra note 30, at 10.
85. Hana Havelkova, A Few Prefeminist Thoughts, in Gender Politics and Post-Communism, supra note 59, at 65. See also Anna Hampele, The Organized Women's Movement in the Collapse of the G.D.R.: The Independent Women's Association (UFV), in Gender Politics and Post-Communism, supra
is also true that many women say that they will not let anyone push them back to the home--or anywhere for that matter.

The new economy in Russia, despite its negative consequences for women, has opened up "opportunities for independent women's organizations to challenge the centralized, state-sponsored women's organizations and to forge a new feminist politics." There are both traditional and emerging women's groups. The feminist possibilities are many. They stem from "women in small business, mothers of soldiers, women in defense conversion . . . women's environmental groups, a soup kitchen movement, women's centers . . . ." Few would argue that there is a mass feminist movement in Eastern Europe today. Fewer yet would say that Western feminism has taken root in Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, or Bosnia. But Laura Busheikin argues that there is already a Western style backlash before there is a Western style feminism. In the Czech newspaper, the Prague Post, Josef Skvorecky caricatures Western feminism as lesbian and radically anti-male. He launches his attack against man-hating "lesboid feminism" in their hopes of delegitimizing women's oppositions.

Feminism, as export, is beamed across the globe. So it exists even where it has no local roots. Anyone can see it if they have a T.V., watch Hollywood films, listen to worldwide news, or use E-mail. The feminism they see is affluent and consumerist. Still, in spite of this capture by the Western/global networks, feminism is not entirely contained by its advertisers. Feminism makes women as "female" visible, even if its partial viewing makes women in "the" South and East less visible than those in "the" North and West.

Local feminisms and women's oppositions can emerge through and in dialogue with this transnational communications network. The telecommunications global web potentially allows communication across the

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note 59, at 183. For further discussion of women's informal actions, see Mary Buckley, Political Reform, in PERESTROIKA AND SOVIET WOMEN 54-71 (Mary Buckley ed., 1992), and Ol'ga Lilpovskaia, New Women's Organizations, in PERESTROIKA AND SOVIET WOMEN 72, supra.


87. Id. at 830.


very divides that transnational capital constructs. Women can "see" themselves, across the globe, in ways that were just not possible before.

Feminism(s) as transnational—imagined as the rejection of false racialized/gender borders and falsely constructed "others"—is a major challenge to masculinist nationalism, the distortions of statist communism, and "free" market globalism. It is a feminism that recognizes individual diversity, freedom, and equality, defined through and beyond north/west and south/east dialogues. It recognizes the necessity of entitlement and yet is cautious about statist interventionism, rejects privatization by global capital, and moves beyond masculinist nationalisms.

Such a feminism is poised between communism and capitalism; between collectivism and individuality; between publicness and privacy; between samenesses and differences; and between women's different imaginings. This demands feminisms beyond nationalism and global capitalism.

I began to believe such a feminism is possible, in spite of the tremendous odds against it, on my visit to Belgrade, May 1995. Belgrade, as a part of the new Serbia, is also home to feminists who daily reach out beyond the horrific borders of this new struggling nation. They shunned the safety of their birthing and instead spoke against the war, and for their sisters in Sarajevo, Zepa, Bihac, and Gorazde.

women in Belgrade and Sarajevo

The nationalisms in Bosnia speak the horrors of racialized/gender warfare. Serb nationalism uses and violates women as it nationalizes identity along bloodlines. In this scenario, motherhood has "national" meaning and so does rape. Rape destroys "others" and establishes Serbia at the same time. In an interview with two Bosnian Muslim rape survivors, one a lawyer, the other a judge, they said that by killing/raping older women, history is erased; by killing/raping young women, the future is wiped away; and a Serb nation is

91. What Can We Do For Ourselves?, East-European Conference, at Belgrade (June 1994) (on file with author).
93. CALLING THE GHOSTS (Bowery Productions 1996).
built. Nevertheless, women in the refugee camps are “resisting the temptation to hate.”

This was the backdrop for women’s actions throughout the war-zone of Bosnia. Everyone I met wanted the war to end. They identified more readily as Yugoslav than as Serb. They were desperate for an end to the slaughter in Sarajevo, but saw no end in sight. Many of the women I spoke with said that they lived in an immoral situation in Belgrade; they were free of bombs, while friends and family were being killed elsewhere.

The war’s madness seemed more real when I was closer to it. Not one woman I met would call herself a nationalist. Many identified themselves as feminists and were desperately concerned for the fate of women, especially in Sarajevo.

Many people tried to leave Belgrade because they could not stand to live there while others died so close by. Others came to Belgrade as refugees from Sarajevo and Mostar. It is a city steeped in loss and tension.

While there, I met with women who were both victims and survivors, who had no hope and still hoped; who searched for candles and cans of food to send to Sarajevo; who were deeply torn between guilt about the war and activism against it. They wished the profiteers of the war would be stopped. They wished that they could get everyone out of Sarajevo, especially the women and children.

Feminists in Belgrade travel to Sarajevo whenever they can. After one recent visit, the feminists in Belgrade wrote to the women in Sarajevo:

We are writing to you with the knowledge about the complexity of the fact of where each of us comes from. . . . We came back changed more than ever. We are full of traces of your testimonies and our deep feelings that life is far more difficult for you than you wanted to show us. We have seen your different women’s groups. We have taken your papers, and statements to share with others. We will let others know what is happening to you. We are supporting you totally and ceaselessly. We will repeat ten thousand times how you are courageous. We will come to you again, as soon as possible. Drinking coffee with you in Sarajevo touches our souls.

Lepa Mladjenovic, from the "women in black" and the "autonomous women’s center" in Belgrade says that the women from Belgrade and Sarajevo are "very different" and not "so different," and we "keep moving through." Jasna, one of Lepa’s friends who is a feminist from Sarajevo, says that each one of them "must be dignified for the position she occupies." She says of the packages sent from Belgrade, that they "were equal to a dream... We would all sit around the table and open a box slowly and put each item out one by one and look, and not know whether to cry or feel joy; if we should just look at the food, or eat it." Jasna argues that she could "have never received these packages if the women in [b]elgrade were not precisely in [b]elgrade" to send them. And Lepa sadly acknowledges that "we precisely could only send packages and do nothing else from Belgrade."

The "women in black" demonstrated in Belgrade for the world to hopefully hear and see that they are against the Serbian regime, against militarism and war violence, against the raping of our sisters of all nationalities from all sides... We are also against killing the treasure of differences that we have been living with for centuries, enjoying the differences, feeling more rich with them and really being rich from them.

The warriors in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina needed to listen to these women. And feminists across the globe must be witness to their ability to move through and beyond deadly difference.

restructuring the public at Beijing

Beijing happened after a quarter century of global capitalist marketing of women’s lives, while the majority of the more than 1 billion people living below the poverty line are women. The transnationalizing of the sexual division of labor intensifies with the globalization of capital. Women of color in first-world countries, defined by their racial/ethnic status, occupy the

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96. Interview with Lepa Mladjenovic (May 1995) (on file with author).
97. Letters from Lepa Mladjenovic to Zillah Eisenstein (June 5, 26, 1995) (on file with author).
Global Legal Studies Journal

Margins of the labor force. White women increasingly find themselves in similar situations. In the third world, most women farm and/or work in industry for slave wages.

At the same time that the globe advertises western women as free and glamorous, the new markets in eastern europe displace their women and create new levels of poverty. Poverty and AIDS wreak havoc on women’s lives throughout africa, and new levels of exploitation define the women working in the factories in asia. Amidst all this, and in part because of it, women from across the globe met in beijing to demand a better life for themselves, their children, and by default, their countries.

By the time women met in beijing, they had already clarified, at previous meetings, their goal to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. This stance against discrimination included “the right to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children.” This demand was connected to their overriding concern with women’s poverty, which they argued has a “gender dimension.” In other words, “poverty is becoming increasingly feminized.”

Although the women in beijing readily recognize their heterogeneity as a group, they also believe that “the world’s women share a common feature: discrimination.” Further, they feel that they have a prominent role to play in the democratization of their societies. Their rights, as women, are seen as part of their human rights and, therefore, necessary to any conception of democracy.

Their vision of democracy necessitates women’s equality as part of the development of a country as a whole. They envision a democracy that allows them reproductive rights as a necessary part of determining their own lives. This notion of sexual rights revamps rights discourse. It redefines the relationship between public and private life because sexual rights break through the borders of patriarchal citizenship. Woman’s control over her body becomes a fundamental human right. According to the beijing “Platform for


101. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, supra note 100, at 46.

"Action," the human rights of women include "their right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence."\(^{103}\)

Interestingly, the Beijing initiative makes no mention of patriarchy or male privilege. The women ask for shared partnership—shared power and responsibility between men and women at home. The equality of women is seen as necessary for the public good of all countries, not as simply a specific need of women.

The Beijing "Platform for Action" also calls for active participation by governments to end discrimination. It demands that governments promote, increase, provide, and insure availability and access for women to move out of poverty; receive the health care they need; get the education that is required for literacy; end violence against women; and eliminate sexual harassment.\(^{104}\)

The Beijing imaginary views the improvement of women's lives as benefiting the whole of society. Feminism assumes a "self" that is not simply self-contained. Instead, women are seen as fundamental to, and yet connected with, society as a whole. Improve women's lot and society as a whole will benefit. This is a version of feminist "publicness" which attaches the importance of the individual to something other than the self, without denying the importance of the self. In this case, the self is a woman who must be freed of the constraints of poverty, illiteracy, violence, discrimination, and, most important, reproductive vulnerability. Meet her needs, and you move toward democracy.

This feminism imagines beyond the individual woman and beyond the communities of women to the public at large. Hillary Clinton, somewhat more paternalistically, makes a similar argument. "If women are healthy and educated, their families will flourish. If women are free from violence, their families will flourish. If women have a chance to work and earn as full and equal partners in society, their families will flourish. And when families flourish, communities and nations will flourish."\(^{105}\) Beijing says less about family, and more about society.

As a result, Beijing has given us much: an instance of incredibly different women coming together to try and inhabit the globe in better ways; an instance of imagining active governments creating access and limiting violation; a

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103. Fourth World Conference on Women, supra note 100, at 94.
104. Id. at 23, 32, 41, 54, 99.
105. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks to the Fourth World Conference on Women, in Res. Rep., Center for Res. on Women, Fall 1995, at 5.
vision of sexual and racial equality; a notion of rights which starts from a recognition of women’s bodily needs; and finally, a notion of sexual rights which enables the public as a whole.

The promissory is also limited by the very conflicts that exist among women about the borders of sexuality and bodily autonomy. There is no declaration in the platform calling for the legalization of abortion. There is no discussion in the platform of “sexualized female bodies claiming pleasures rather than fending off abuses.” Issues of sexual freedom, as distinguished from sexual rights, have yet to be articulated.

Nevertheless, reproductive health for women requires a change in resources, both globally and locally. In a period when “rights” discourse has been rejected in the U.S. as overly egalitarian, and when Western governments plead poverty rather than try to address poverty as a human crisis, Beijing stands as a fantastic of what women across the globe can begin to imagine. It is an imagining of a globe, with governments willing and able to actively end discrimination against women, recognize their sexual rights, and embrace democracy for the “rest of us.”

feminist publics and new democracies

Given the epistemological and political construction of feminism—that it starts from the self and moves outward; that it is personal as well as political; that it is at one and the same time individualist and collectivist; that it requires an understanding of individual women as part of a larger complex community which is permeated by differences of color, ethnicity, economic class, colonialism, and nationhood—it stands counter to the masculinist, nationalist constructions of separatism and false universalisms.

My feminist imaginings allow me a counter to global privatization and masculinist nationalisms. They elicit the possibility of a feminist network made up of women who share different ethnicity, religion, color, and economic class. Moreover, they come together to demand the importance of their personal, bodily boundaries, while rejecting racialized nationalist border constructions.

106. Rosalind Petchesky, _Reproductive and Sexual Rights in International Perspective—A Post-Assessment_, Talk at Rutgers University, Center for the Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture (Oct. 17, 1995).
Antoinette Fouque expressed this idea in a slightly different way when she said: “Each according to her own uniqueness, together.”¹⁰⁷ We can reinvest feminism with new meanings that speak people’s different histories, cultures, bodies, etc. The “we” here is imagined; it is not not-western, even though mass-marketed western feminism dominates the global discourse. As Chela Sandoval says of u.s., third-world feminists, “we” also must move between ideologies.¹⁰⁸

The “we” will represent a cacophony of particular selves who share female bodily borders. The “we” of feminism identifies a commitment to build a solidarity among and between women transnationally and multi-racially. As such, it must recognize but also subordinate differences. The imagined “we” must see and not-see: it must see how differently “we” live all over the globe and not-see only the differences; it must see the differences and not-see them as barriers; it must see likeness and not-see it only. If feminisms across the globe can see through and beyond the barrier of colonialism, racism, nationalism, and transnational capital, they might be able to limit the hatreds that threaten to engulf the twenty-first century. From this specific stance, an inclusive publicness can be crafted.

The public will be constituted by multiple and shifting identities that imagine a community that stands at odds with the necessities of global capital. This publicness begins with women’s bodies and makes sure they are treated freely, fairly, and equally.
