Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers

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Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers

KENT BARNETT†

The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of scholars would allow only the political branches—Congress and the President—to defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle in minor matters that rarely affect regulatory outcomes.

This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural causes of action, arguing that institutional, constitutional, and doctrinal limitations preclude the branches from serving as structural protectors. Indeed, this Article concludes, contrary to recent scholarship, that private claims fit easily within established justiciability doctrines. To address legitimate concerns over utility and judicial intermeddling, this Article argues that courts should confront the underlying doctrine directly by adopting, where appropriate, a functional separation-of-powers doctrine with meaningful remedies. Doing so will limit successful claims to only the most important and thereby properly balance the political branches’ discretion under the Constitution to design the administrative state with useful judicial oversight.

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INTRODUCTION

The Federal Election Commission issues advisory opinions that affect political candidates’ campaigns. But all of the Commissioners’ appointments violate the Appointments Clause. An appellate military court affirms a court-martialed defendant’s conviction. Yet the judges’ appointments violate the Constitution. An accounting firm incurs the time and costs of an investigation under the Sarbanes Oxley Act. The enforcing agency, however, is not sufficiently subject to the President’s control as the Constitution requires. An Article I court rules against a party on a state-law claim, and that ruling, if effective, precludes a later-in-time state-court judgment in that party’s favor. That Article I court usurps federal courts’ Article III authority in deciding the state-law claim.

In all of these examples, regulated parties—those whom the agencies or Article I courts had authority to require to act (or not to act) or to penalize with jail time or a fine—asserted what I refer to as “structural challenges.” These challenges are based on constitutional separation-of-powers safeguards and thereby implicate how the federal government must be structured to pursue substantive policy. The judicial decisions that established these structural defects prevented the relevant provisions from being merely hortatory and furthered their goal of protecting individual liberty by limiting federal authority.

2. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124–43 (holding that all Commissioners’ appointments violated the Appointments Clause).
4. The Appointments Clause, as relevant here, and the implementing statute required the Secretary of Transportation—a head of department—to appoint the judges, but the Department’s General Counsel had improperly done so. See id. at 179–80; see also 49 U.S.C. § 323 (2012) (requiring the Secretary of Transportation to appoint officers of the Department); U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 2 (permitting “Heads of Departments” to appoint “inferior Officers”). The government conceded that the General Counsel’s appointment violated the Appointments Clause. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 655 (1997) (referring to Brief for the United States at 9 n.9, Ryder, 515 U.S. 177 (No. 94-431), 1995 WL 130573).
6. See id. at 484 (“We hold that such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President.”).
8. See id. at 2608.
9. These challenges can also include those based on federalism, as discussed where relevant in this Article. But I generally limit my discussion to separation-of-powers challenges because of my focus on regulated parties’ challenges and the federal administrative state.
11. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
But these challenges are of debatable utility. In nearly all of these cases, the structural defect likely has little, if any, effect on substantive agency decisions. For instance, consider the improperly appointed military judges mentioned above. The judges simply reaffirmed the challenger’s conviction after they were properly and swiftly reappointed.12 As another example, leading scholar Peter Shane has explained that the regulated party’s victory in challenging the recess appointments of certain National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) members in NLRB v. Noel Canning13 (the Court’s most recent structural decision) will almost certainly not “change the outcome of the [regulated party’s] case.”14

In light of these benefits and drawbacks, should regulated parties have justiciable causes of action to set aside agency action based on structural violations?

Part I.A describes how the Supreme Court has answered affirmatively but provided little analysis.15 Sometimes the Court suggests regulated parties have interests (or, sometimes, “rights”) and causes of action in structural safeguards. Other times, such as in its most recent structural decision (Noel Canning), it is silent.16 The Court indicated in Bond v. United States that individuals have prudential standing to assert structural challenges,17 but more recently the Court suggested a different paradigm that would render its analysis in Bond obsolete.18

In response to the Court’s cursory engagement with the utility concerning structural litigation, scholars have begun to question these challenges altogether. Part I.B discusses how the Court’s underlying separation-of-powers doctrine may be to blame. Relatedly, Part I.C considers how scholars have, instead, increasingly questioned the justiciability of these actions in three key ways: (1) regulated parties’

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17. 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2359 (2011); see also infra Part I.C.2.

Article III and prudential standing, (2) judicial remedies, and (3) the applicability of the political-question doctrine.

First, there are Article III and prudential standing concerns. Article III generally requires that challenging parties establish their standing to sue by demonstrating that they have an injury in fact, that a causal relationship between the injury and the wrongful government action exists, and that a court’s order can redress the harm.\(^1^9\) But regulated parties’ injury in fact (e.g., having to pay a fine, being subject to an investigation, or taking an action that they would otherwise not take) does not seem causally related to the underlying wrong because, as noted above, the same harm always continues after the court invalidates a separation-of-powers problem.\(^2^0\)

Relatedly, one prominent scholar, Aziz Huq, recently addressed the question of private parties’ prudential standing to assert structural challenges (i.e., whether prudential considerations should permit them to assert a structural cause of action regardless of their Article III standing). He concluded that private parties, as opposed to institutional actors, should lack standing (and a cause of action) to assert almost all separation-of-powers and federalism challenges because the regulated parties had no “rights” in the structural provisions.\(^2^1\) Huq’s main point is that permitting structural challenges is inconsistent with the Court’s general standing norms.\(^2^2\)

Second, I have highlighted elsewhere the often erratic and ineffectual remedies for successful structural challenges.\(^2^3\) Although the Court occasionally considers remedial concerns,\(^2^4\) courts often provide meaningless remedies, with little discussion, that may place prevailing regulated parties in a worse position than had they not brought their challenges at all.\(^2^5\) I asked (but did not answer) whether, if


\(^{21}\) See id. passim.

\(^{22}\) See, e.g., Huq, supra note 20, at 1464.


\(^{25}\) See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (2013) (severing structural defect provision, although challenging party appears to have sought invalidation of underlying ratemaking decision, see Opening Brief of Appellant at 18, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d 1332 (No. 11-1083), 2011 WL 3918320). Moreover, in internal conference memos in Buckley, then-Justice Rehnquist argued, without success, that “it would [not] be wise for the Court to make a holding [as to the proper remedy] without the benefit of any argument or briefing.” See Conference Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist re: Buckley v. Valeo (Jan. 20, 1976). All conference memos are available in Justice Powell’s papers, held at the library at Washington and Lee University School of Law. See Powell Papers, WASH. & LEE UNIV.,
courts don’t improve structural remedies, they should preclude private structural challenges because, after all, a right requires a meaningful remedy.26

Third, some scholars have invoked the political-question doctrine, under which courts abstain from hearing certain causes of action out of respect to the political branches. Huq, for instance, has argued that the President’s ability to remove executive officials should present a political question27 and that the legislative and executive branches—with limited exceptions—should be able to bargain over separation-of-powers boundaries.28 Another influential scholar, Jesse Choper, has gone much further, calling for the nonjusticiability of most structural challenges.29 Other scholars have advanced similar positions as to specific structural protections.30 These scholars, therefore, would generally leave structural protections to the political branches for enforcement and preclude judicial review in all or certain structural challenges.

Finally, scholars have criticized the Court’s underlying formalist separation-of-powers jurisprudence (as opposed to structural claims’ justiciability). This formalism erects strict boundaries as a prophylactic device, but it ignores historical ambiguities,31 realpolitik,32 its decisions’ effects,33 and other values in fashioning an administrative state.34 By tirelessly repairing fences among the branches’ boundaries without regard to the significance of the intrusion, formalism encourages parties to assert insignificant challenges and courts to grant limited remedies.


32. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2314 (2006) (“[T]he branches purportedly are locked in a perpetual struggle to aggrandize their own power and encroach upon their rivals. The kinds of partisan political competition that structure real-world democracy and dominate political discourse, however, are almost entirely missing from this picture.”).

33. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 27, at 52 (“[T]he presidential control/democratic accountability nexus is causally weaker than the Court’s narrative suggests. Amplifying presidential control consequently does not create a predictable quantum of greater democratic control of administrative policymaking.”) (emphasis in original).

34. See id. at 8 (noting that the Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund “view[ed] democratic accountability as a singularly important constitutional ideal,” despite scholars’ consideration of other goals).
This Article responds to these debates in three key ways. First, it concludes that the political branches cannot serve as structural defenders, rendering regulated parties’ challenges necessary for vindicating structural norms. Second, it concludes that these private challenges fit easily within existing Article III and prudential standing doctrines. Finally, it concludes that the better method of addressing concerns over judicial review’s utility is to create a more functional underlying separation-of-powers jurisprudence with stronger remedies.

First. Part II concludes that faith in the political branches as structural guardians is misplaced. First, the political branches lack institutional incentive to serve as structural stalwarts. The branches are driven by partisan and policy-based concerns, and they will generally defend structural prerogatives only when a branch’s constitutional powers align with the interests of the political party that controls it. Second, the Constitution and the Court’s current doctrine provide significant and defensible impediments to aggrandizing the branches’ litigation power, a solution for which certain scholars advocate.

The political branches’ disadvantages highlight the stakes in deciding whether regulated entities have justiciable structural claims. The branches’ limited incentive and questionable authority may lead to the underenforcement or nonenforcement of structural protections. Regulated parties, even if by default, are the better champions of structural rights. Courts should favor interpreting current doctrine to accommodate their structural challenges, especially if the doctrine can easily do so. In other words, courts should presume that judicial review is proper.

Second. With this presumption in mind, Part III concludes that, contrary to Huq’s view, structural challenges are not aberrations of standing doctrine. Instead, these challenges rest comfortably with existing standing and cause-of-action doctrine. To be sure, Article III standing often requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability. But the causation and redressability requirements are either inapplicable or significantly relaxed for run-of-the-mill, ubiquitous procedural challenges, and structural challenges should be treated similarly. Neither procedural nor structural rights exist to preordain substantive outcomes; they exist to further other values, such as those related to better decision making or the distribution of governmental power to prevent despotism, by regulating how and who within government acts. With standing in hand, regulated parties should also have an implied cause of action because (1) they fall comfortably within structural safeguards’ “zone of interests” (a longstanding inquiry) and (2) neither founding history nor historical practice is to the contrary.

Third. Although regulated parties’ structural challenges should be justiciable, Part IV addresses the utility concerns surrounding structural litigation. At bottom, the various objections rest on the judiciary’s overly active role in structural litigation and its failure to give the political branches sufficient discretion when structuring the administrative state. Discretion is appropriate because, as others have noted, the Court’s formalism as to several provisions is overly broad, lacks sufficient historical pedigree, and denies the political branches the opportunity to balance competing values when setting up a functioning bureaucracy. At the same time, judicial review of structural design permits invalidation of administrative structures that affect the branches’ core powers. Rendering structural challenges nonjusticiable (and thus unreviewable) is too strong a medicine to cure the maladies of structural jurisprudence.
This Article concludes by briefly considering how more functional jurisprudence can help and discusses two ways of how courts can turn to functionalism. First, departing from their current trajectory, courts can directly adopt, where appropriate, a more functional doctrine that grants the political branches discretion. Second, instead of the limited remedies that they now employ, courts can provide maximal remedies, such as not allowing agencies to act until the political branches enact curative legislation and not relying on various doctrines that blunt the force of judicial remedies (such as severance and stays of judgment). These meaningful remedies, perhaps counterintuitively, will lead courts to narrow the underlying rights—a phenomenon that scholars have identified in other areas. With fewer structural violations, courts can constrict structural rights to their core meaning, leave the doctrine more functional, and allow the political branches more, appropriate discretion. The political branches can assist the courts and increase their discretion by clarifying that they do not seek severance of structural defects. With a more functional doctrine, courts can—without abandoning the structural constitution to the political branches—provide optimal enforcement and address underlying utility concerns.

I. STRUCTURAL “RIGHTS” AND JUSTICIABILITY

The Supreme Court has long recognized that regulated parties can assert separation-of-powers challenges in multiple contexts. But exactly what relationship those parties have with the separation-of-powers safeguards is unclear, and justiciability questions linger, despite recent scholarly attention to them. These unsettled questions are becoming more pressing as the Court has warmly received structural challenges and welcomed a more meaningful judicial role in separation-of-powers disputes.

A. Individual Interests in Structural Protections

The Constitution has numerous structural provisions that affect administrative law. Perhaps the most prominent are the three Vesting Clauses, which vest legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the Congress, the President, and the Article III federal courts, respectively. Disputes over Congress’s legislative powers typically concern whether Congress has impermissibly delegated its power to one of the other branches of government (usually an agency) and thus violated the “nondelegation doctrine.” Disputes over the President’s executive powers typically arise in the administrative context when Congress has limited the President’s power to remove executive officials from office. And disputes concerning the Article III courts’ powers usually concern agencies’ or Article I courts’ jurisdiction over certain

35. See infra notes 380–384 and accompanying text.
common-law claims. But other key structural provisions, as relevant to this Article, directly affect administrative architecture. For instance, the Appointments Clause requires the President to appoint and the Senate to confirm principal officers of the United States, and it requires inferior officers to be appointed, as Congress thinks proper, in the same manner or by “the President alone, . . . the Courts of Law, or . . . the Heads of Departments.” Likewise, the Bicameralism and Presentment requirements in Article I provide a specific procedure for enacting legislation and otherwise limit the ability of Congress to alter legal rights.

Regulated parties have some kind of “rights,” “interests,” or other undefined connection to these structural safeguards. But the Supreme Court has been unclear about the precise relationship between regulated parties and these safeguards. For instance, the Court has said, at times, that regulated parties have “personal rights” and, at other times, “interests” in Article III protections. As I have noted elsewhere, the Supreme Court “has recognized a key difference between ‘rights’ and ‘interests’ (or ‘benefits’) in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and that difference affects the availability of judicial remedies. But it is not clear whether the Court intends for similar distinctions in the separation-of-powers context to have remedial consequences. Likewise, the Court has held that regulated parties have an implied right of action to assert challenges based on the President’s powers and the Appointments Clause under Article II. The Court has allowed challenges to proceed under Article I’s Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, but it did so without directly addressing whether the regulated party had rights or interests in those requirements.

Regulated parties’ interests—however described—derive from the purpose of structural provisions. The purpose of the separation of powers (and federalism) is, at one level, to divide or limit governmental power. This division of power does not, according to the Supreme Court, inure merely to the benefit of the relevant branches of government (or sovereigns) because the division of power is not an end in itself. Instead, it is a means for protecting individual liberty from tyrannical government.

40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
43. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
44. See id.
45. Barnett, supra note 23, at 496.
46. See id.
49. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364–65 (2011) (referring to both federalism and separation of powers).
50. The Court has numerous statements to this effect. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989);
Indeed, Choper has written that the provisions’ purpose “cannot be seriously disputed.”51 Because protecting individual liberty is the end, individuals are “intended beneficiaries” of structural provisions.52 Their status, as the Court recently held when permitting a criminal defendant to challenge a federal law based on the Tenth Amendment, allows them to object to government action based on separation-of-powers principles.53 This is so, despite the separation-of-powers’ purpose of protecting the branches of government from the others’ incursion,54 because ‘a law ‘beyond the power of Congress,’ for any reason, is ‘no law at all.’”55

The Supreme Court has furthered individuals’ structural challenges in various ways. For instance, the Court has attempted to convey the importance of the Appointments Clause, which provides relatively specific appointment procedures for federal principal and inferior officers, by rejecting the view that the Clause’s requirements are mere “etiquette or protocol.”56 Getting the hint, lower courts have permitted Appointments Clause challenges outside of quo warranto proceedings,57 which usually impose procedural hurdles or require approval by executive officials.58 Moreover, they have eschewed engaging in harmless-error analysis, rendering a remedy more likely.59

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Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); id. at 299 (“There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates . . . .”) (quoting Montesquieu)); F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 318–19 (2008) (“The principal reason for dividing powers among the three branches is to prevent tyranny and unwarranted government intrusion on individual rights.”).

52. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364 (referring to federalism); see also id. at 2365 (referring to the “analogous context” of separation-of-powers challenges).
53. Id. at 2365.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2368 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 341 (1928)).
59. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that showing of harm was not required for structural violation to exist); Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1495 (“The [Appointments] [C]lause would be a nullity if it could be assumed that these very officials would in fact have been properly appointed and (especially) confirmed by the Senate.”)
B. Formalist Methodology

But the Court has done nothing more solicitous of regulated parties’ structural challenges than to rely mostly upon formalist (as opposed to functionalist) separation-of-powers doctrine. Because so many others have written at length about formalism and functionalism, what follows is only a brief comparison of the analytical methods. When engaging in separation-of-powers formalism, the Court understands the Constitution’s three Vesting Clauses as dividing federal power cleanly into the three branches. The separation of powers is “violated whenever the categorizations of the exercised power and the exercising institution do not match and the Constitution does not specifically permit such blending.” In contrast to formalism, the Court sometimes engages in functionalism by considering whether a particular practice or agency structure infringes the “core functions” of the branches. Functionalism grants Congress much more discretion to construct the administrative state under the Necessary and Proper Clause and generally recognizes that the branches’ outer boundaries are indefinite and porous.

John Manning has cogently criticized both methods’ implementation. Functionalism, he contends, can improperly “privilege general constitutional purpose over specific textual detail.” This complaint was noticeable in CFTC v. Schor. Despite longstanding precedent that Article III’s Vesting Clause prohibited the removal of common law, equity, or admiralty claims from Article III courts’ jurisdiction, the Court upheld an agency’s ability to hear a state-law counterclaim for the payment of brokerage fees. This was so, notwithstanding the Court’s concession that the state-law counterclaims were “at the ‘core’ of matters normally reserved to Article III courts,” because agency adjudication of the claims did not improperly undermine Article III’s purposes. With functionalism, in other words, even previously marked boundaries give way to administrative efficiency.

(emphasis in original); see also Ryder, 515 U.S. at 184 & n.4 (refusing to engage in harmless-error analysis and noting government had not preserved argument).


63. Manning, supra note 31, at 1951.


65. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1943.


67. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1954 (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856)).

68. Schor, 478 U.S. at 853.

69. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1953–54 (discussing Schor and functionalism’s “underreading” of the Article III Vesting Clause).
Manning’s key criticism of formalism, in turn, is that it reads into the three Vesting Clauses a background separation-of-powers norm without recognizing the following: the indeterminacy of the constitutional provisions, the failure of the Founders to set an agreed-upon separation-of-powers baseline, the import of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the numerous compromises in the Constitution that lack any shared theoretical basis. Manning identifies Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson as one example of this formalist failing. In arguing that the Congress could not constrain the President’s removal power over executive officers, Justice Scalia began by looking at the language of the Article II Vesting Clause. He noted that it vested the President alone with all of “the executive power.” But because the clause alone did not answer whether Congress could constrain (as opposed to wholly take away) the President’s power over executive officials, Justice Scalia had to turn to generalized separation-of-powers principles.

Despite its shortcomings, formalism has largely triumphed over functionalism. The Court has applied formalism to the legislative veto, the Appointments Clause, and the Tenth Amendment, generally without exception. Formalism, with one notable exception, has also come to rule Article II in the President’s

70. See id. at 2022.
71. See id. at 1965–69.
73. See id. at 1967–68.
74. See id. at 1968–69.
76. See Manning, supra note 31, at 1958 (noting that formalism, when applied to bicameralism/presentment and appointments, “simply enforce[s] the apparent exclusivity of the detailed procedures specified”); Matthew Hunter, Note, Legislating Around the Appointments Clause, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 753, 759 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court has “fairly consistently applied a formalist analysis” to Appointments Clause cases).
78. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (considering whether the impediment on presidential removal power was “so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch” to require that impediment’s invalidation); id. at 690 n.29 (rejecting Justice Scalia’s dissenting, formalist position).
removal-power decisions.\textsuperscript{79} Article III Vesting Clause jurisprudence has followed a similar trend in favor of formalism.\textsuperscript{80}

Formalism’s ascendency encourages structural challenges and judicial intervention. The Court has stated that separation of powers serves as “a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”\textsuperscript{81} By kowtowing to “the era’s perceived necessity” or “an expedient solution to the crisis of the day,”\textsuperscript{82} a functional inquiry would improperly permit extraconstitutional government, a fate “far worse” than a failed solution.\textsuperscript{83} To maintain the prophylaxis, the Court tirelessly patrols the outermost boundaries of each estate to prevent any minor incursion and repair any dented walls. Functionalism, in contrast, would permit judges to rock on the porch with shotgun in hand to protect each branch’s intimate living quarters.

\section*{C. Justiciability Concerns}

As the judiciary has encouraged structural challenges, scholars have begun to question their justiciability. These questions concern regulated parties’ Article III and prudential standing (and related ability to assert a cause of action), prevailing parties’ remedies, and the suitability of separation-of-powers questions for judicial review. The Court has generally left these questions unanswered and wholly failed to discern the multifaceted nature of the justiciability issues.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (concerning legislation to reopen final judgments).
\item \textsuperscript{82} New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (concerning federalism).
\item \textsuperscript{83} Id. at 187–88.
\end{itemize}
1. Tensions with Article III Standing

The Court has created, despite its questionable pedigree, a well-known, tripartite test that plaintiffs must satisfy to establish a “case or controversy” under Article III. Plaintiffs must first show that they suffer a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact, in contrast to a legal wrong or mere invasion of a legal right. They must show, second, that there is a “fairly traceable,” as opposed to speculative, causal connection between the injury-in-fact and the impropriety of which they complain. Finally, they must show that a favorable decision will likely redress their injury-in-fact, an inquiry that often overlaps with causation.

Regulated parties have little trouble establishing injury in fact because they are objects of government action. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court, before holding that beneficiaries of an environmental-regulatory scheme had failed to establish Article III standing, noted that if a plaintiff is an object of the action or inaction at issue, “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury.” This is so because the regulated parties must do what they would otherwise not do (including paying a fine) or refrain from doing what they would do. Because they are objects, as opposed to third-party beneficiaries of agency action or statutory schemes, much standing scholarship—considering so-called “public actions” and problems with restricting beneficiaries from suing—becomes irrelevant. Regulated parties don’t present the problem of extenuated (or no) injury or generalized grievances. They suffer injury because the government is directly


86. See id. at 560.


88. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

89. See id. at 560–61.

90. See id. at 561–62. Cass Sunstein has criticized the distinction between objects and beneficiaries of governmental action as a “conceptual anachronism.” See Sunstein, supra note 84, at 188. Unlike Sunstein, I take no position on the propriety of the distinction or of beneficiaries’ standing generally.

91. See supra note 84 (referring to scholarship concerning standing and “public” actions); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984).
affecting their behavior or purse. And governmental control affects only the select
class of regulated parties (i.e., securities traders, companies creating pollutants,
banking corporations, etc.), not the entire U.S. population. Indeed, the Court held
that the challenging party who faced deportation in Chadha satisfied the Article III
standing desiderata when bringing his structural challenge because of the effect that
the agency’s action would have on him.  

The key standing defects in structural litigation, as Huq has noted, concern
causation and redressability. The Supreme Court’s decision in Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization informs both issues. In that case, indigents
and organizations with indigent members sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the
IRS Commissioner for violating the Internal Revenue Code (and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)) because the agencies gave favorable tax treatment through a
Revenue Ruling to nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency-room services,
as opposed to both emergency and nonemergency services, to indigents. The
plaintiffs argued that the government’s action “encouraged” hospitals to deny
indigents nonemergency care. Nonetheless, the Court found it “purely speculative
whether the denials of [nonemergency] service . . . fairly can be traced to [the
government’s] ‘encouragement’ or instead result from decisions made by the
hospitals without regard to the tax implications.” Relatedly, the Court noted that
awarding the relief sought—requiring hospitals to provide more services to the
indigent to receive favorable tax treatment—would not create a “substantial
likelihood” that plaintiffs would receive their desired hospital services.

Analogous problems arise in structural litigation. For example, Ryder v. United
States illustrates causation problems. The Court held that the appointment of a
military appellate panel violated the Appointments Clause because the appointment
was not made by a head of department (the Secretary of Transportation) but by a
general counsel. Nevertheless, the same officers were later properly appointed,
and they once again rejected the enlisted man’s appellate arguments. The enlisted
man’s injury-in-fact—his conviction—did not appear to arise from the structural
defect because the same harm occurred both before and after the defect existed.

95. Id. at 28.
96. Id. at 42.
97. Id. at 42–43.
98. Id. at 45.
100. 515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995).
101. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
102. His injury-in-fact was not the violation of any right to a properly appointed tribunal.
Such an injury would be a “legal injury” that the Supreme Court has clarified does not count
as injury-in-fact and, despite contrary decisions before 1970, is no longer relevant to the
standing inquiry. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970); cf. Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 200 (noting that violation of a statutory procedural
right alone under the Freedom of Information Act amounts to legal injury, not injury in fact).
Redressability can be similarly problematic. For instance, in *Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board*, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) began investigating the plaintiff accounting firm. The firm argued that the PCAOB had too much independence from the President because its members could only be removed for very limited causes by the Securities and Exchange Commissioners (SEC), who, in turn, could only be removed for limited cause by the President. The Supreme Court agreed. The firm sought an injunction to stop the PCAOB from exercising its powers. The Court, instead, severed one of the levels of protection from removal (leaving the PCAOB members subject to the SEC’s at-will removal), otherwise left the statute and the agency fully operative, and permitted the investigation to continue before the PCAOB. That remedy allowed the investigation—the injury-in-fact—to continue, even if it was now pursued by a properly subordinate agency, and the Court did not remedy any past harm suffered. And, in fact, the investigation continued after the Supreme Court’s decision. To be sure, some challenges that could lead to the invalidation of a federal conviction, such as the one in *Bond v. United States*, are more likely to satisfy all three Article III-standing requirements. But, as *Ryder* and *Free Enterprise Fund* indicate, Article III’s desiderata do not always appear satisfied or even considered.

2. Prudential Standing (or Lack of Causes of Action)

Aside from Article III standing, challenging parties must establish their prudential standing or perhaps instead, based on a very recent Supreme Court decision, their causes of action. In *Bond v. United States*, the Court unanimously held that a criminal defendant had prudential standing to challenge a federal criminal statute under the Tenth Amendment. In doing so, the Court—after distinguishing modern notions of standing from an earlier decision’s inquiry into implied causes of action—disapproved of earlier suggestions that private parties could not have standing to assert Tenth Amendment rights in such cases.

104. See id.
105. See id. at 484.
106. See id. at 487.
111. See Huq, *supra* note 20, at 1475 (“In Bond, the presence of the three canonical elements of constitutional standing . . . were tolerably clear given the underlying proceeding’s criminal complexion.”).
112. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2366–2367.
113. That decision was *Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority*, and the language at issue is found at 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939) (“[T]he appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the [Tenth A]mendment.”).
Amendment claims.\textsuperscript{114} The Court relied upon federalism’s aim of securing individual liberty and, by analogy, on separation-of-powers jurisprudence in which private parties have been the principal challengers.\textsuperscript{115}

Huq has criticized Bond’s reasoning. In brief, he argued that private parties should lack prudential standing (or a cause of action\textsuperscript{116}) to assert structural claims for the following reasons: no individual “rights” to structural safeguards exist,\textsuperscript{117} their adjudication has substantial “spillover effects” (such as effects on states’ and federal authority) that the standing doctrine generally avoids in other contexts,\textsuperscript{118} plaintiffs have causation and redressability concerns,\textsuperscript{119} the relationship between liberty and structural safeguards is weak, and the challengers will usually be sore losers from the political realm.\textsuperscript{120} He argues that individuals should be able to enforce structural safeguards only when the affected institution cannot do so, with exceptions for matters that implicate due process concerns “based on assertions of legal authority that are manifestly unreasonable”\textsuperscript{121} or Article III protections.\textsuperscript{122} Huq’s main point is that, notwithstanding Bond, individuals’ structural challenges rest uncomfortably with general standing jurisprudence.

More recently, the Court has indicated that prudential standing should be reconceptualized as asking whether a particular plaintiff has a cause of action.\textsuperscript{123} In \textit{Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.},\textsuperscript{124} the Court, after noting its inconsistent use of the term “prudential standing” and the inquiries that are germane to it, stated that whether a plaintiff comes within the zone of interests of the law invoked is really a question of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.\textsuperscript{125} The

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Bond}, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Id. at 2364–65.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} See Huq, supra note 20, at 1515 n.321.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} See id. at 1448–52.
  \item \textsuperscript{118} See id. at 1466–75.
  \item \textsuperscript{119} See id. at 1484–90.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} See id. at 1491–1514.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Id. at 1517 (emphasis in original).
  \item \textsuperscript{122} See id. at 1519–21.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Scholars had so advocated for decades. See Bellia, supra note 84, at 779; William A. Fletcher, \textit{The Structure of Standing}, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 236, 252 (1988). But see Eugene Kontorovich, \textit{What Standing Is Good For}, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1684–85 (2007) (arguing that standing addresses “whether individuals’ rights overlap in a way that can prevent their efficient allocation” (emphasis omitted)). The Court continued merging justiciability doctrines during the same term. It noted that “Article III standing and ripeness issues in this case ‘boil down to the same question’” in \textit{Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus}, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5 (2014), and reserved answering whether ripeness factors concerning fitness and hardship had “continuing vitality,” id. at 2347.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
  \item \textsuperscript{125} Id. at 1387. Although the zone-of-interests test derived from prudential standing concerns under the APA, the Court has applied the test to statutory claims to which the APA does not apply, see Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011), and to constitutional provisions, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982). The Court also clarified that so-called “statutory standing” is a matter that goes to the merits and thus is not a jurisdictional inquiry under Article III. See Richard Re, \textit{The Doctrine Formally Known as “Statutory Standing”},
Court also clarified that, despite inconsistent treatment, inquiries into generalized grievances concern Article III standing. The Court in Bond, merely three years before, not only never spoke of the zone-of-interests test nor framed its discussion as concerning causes of action, but specifically distinguished prudential standing from a cause-of-action inquiry. Thus, it is unclear whether a prudential-standing or a cause-of-action inquiry (or both) applies to structural challenges.

Although the shift from standing to causes of action may be merely cosmetic in some contexts, the more thorough inquiry for causes of action is preferable here. Standing focuses on a particular plaintiff, asking whether the plaintiff at bar is the proper person to assert a cause of action that is available to someone. The cause-of-action inquiry, in contrast, focuses more broadly on whether the (or any) plaintiff has a right whose violation warrants judicial remedy. As we shall see, speaking in terms of not only rights but also remedies, as causes of actions do, better reveals how regulated parties’ ability to assert structural challenges fits with existing doctrine, permits a broader consideration of justiciability arguments, and allows judicial flexibility to refashion the breadth of these challenges through substantive doctrine and remedies. I pursue this more robust cause-of-action inquiry in Parts II and III.

3. Pyrrhic and Minimal Remedies

Judicial remedies for structural violations often betray courts’ solicitous attitude towards structural challenges. As I have argued elsewhere, courts often fail to provide remedies that satisfy key remedial values, such as compensating for past harm, providing full prospective enforcement of the underlying right, incentivizing parties to seek redress, and deterring structural defects. These inadequate remedies derive from courts’ penchant in structural cases for minimalistic remedies, whether through severance of offending provisions, remedial-mitigation doctrines, or stays to avoid enforcement.

Courts often use severance to mitigate the remedial effects of structural defects. For instance, the Court in Bowsher v. Synar, held that Congress could not remove

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126. See Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4.
128. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1515 n.321 (“To my mind, nothing particularly significant seems to rest on the formulation of the issue as one of standing rather than a cause of action.”).
129. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975); Mary Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1088 n.18 (1979) (“A cause of action is distinguishable from standing, because a cause of action denotes that some party may sue under the statute, while standing focuses on whether the plaintiff has an interest sufficiently adverse to create a ‘case or controversy.’”).
130. See Bellia, supra note 84, at 781; Siegel, supra note 129, at 1088 n.18.
131. See Barnett, supra note 23.
132. See id. at 536.
133. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
the Comptroller General, who performed the executive function of deciding which spending cuts the President was required to implement, without impeding the President’s supervisory powers under Article II. The Court relied upon an express “fallback” provision in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 that, if the statute were deemed unconstitutional, called for the Comptroller General to lose his executive powers and allowed the budget-cutting process to continue without him.

Courts may also infer Congress’s preference for severance. Courts may also infer Congress’s preference for severance. \textsuperscript{136} The D.C. Circuit more recently extended \textit{Free Enterprise Fund}’s inferred severance remedy in response to the unconstitutional appointment of Copyright Royalty Judges\textsuperscript{137} because it sought to create “as little disruption as possible.”

Remedial-mitigation doctrines and stays of judgment also play a role. The Court has done so mostly with Appointments Clause violations. In severance’s place, the Court has turned to the de facto officer and different, though related, de facto validity doctrines to mitigate the effect of a structural defect. The de facto officer doctrine, although applied several times to prevent administrative chaos, is narrow.\textsuperscript{139} It validates the actions of an officer whose appointment, as determined on collateral judicial review, violated statutory law.\textsuperscript{140} For constitutional challenges brought on direct review, the Court has applied, yet later called into question,\textsuperscript{141} the de facto validity doctrine. Without any briefing from the parties,\textsuperscript{142} the Court in \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} applied the doctrine after finding that all of the Federal Election Commissioners’ appointments were unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{143} The Court held that the FEC’s past acts had “de facto validity” and allowed the Commissioners to continue functioning fully during a thirty-day stay that the Court granted Congress to reconstitute the FEC.\textsuperscript{144} The Court also stayed its judgment in \textit{Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.} and granted an extension at the Solicitor General’s request\textsuperscript{145} to give Congress time to refashion a bankruptcy system that complied with Article III.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[134.] Id. at 733–34, 736.
  \item[135.] See id. at 718–19, 734–36.
  \item[138.] Id. at 1336–37.
  \item[139.] See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995); Barnett, supra note 23, at 527.
  \item[140.] See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180–83.
  \item[141.] See id. at 183–84.
  \item[142.] See Barnett, supra note 23, at 530.
  \item[143.] 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
  \item[144.] Id. at 142.
  \item[146.] See Barnett, supra note 23, at 535.
\end{itemize}
The meaninglessness of these remedies for structural challengers may be most apparent in *Free Enterprise Fund* and *Buckley*. In *Free Enterprise Fund*, the regulated party prevailed in its Article II-based structural challenge to the agency that had begun investigating its activities. The Court’s severance-based remedy failed to compensate the prevailing party for past injury, failed to stop the agency from acting, returned the prevailing party to an investigation before officers whose very legitimacy it had successfully questioned, failed to ensure that any taint from the unconstitutional investigation would not impact future events, and failed to see that Congress and the President—who created the constitutional violation—had to take responsibility for violating Article II by enacting curative legislation. The prevailing parties in *Buckley* received a more insulting remedy. Despite the blatantly unconstitutional appointment of all FEC commissioners, the prevailing parties were not entitled to compensation or other injunctive relief for the agency’s past action (any sovereign immunity notwithstanding) because the past actions were de facto valid and the agency was allowed to continue functioning fully for another thirty days.

These inadequate remedies betray the Court’s paens to structural safeguards. Regulated parties’ interests or rights in structural safeguards do not appear as important as the Court’s rhetoric proclaims. As the importance of the rights begins to fall away, the case for structural litigation becomes less compelling.

4. Political Questions

Unlike most other justiciability doctrines, the modern political question doctrine allows courts to ignore constitutional questions altogether—no matter who brings suit, no matter whether proper remedies are available, and perhaps no matter how patently unconstitutional a government action is. The doctrine prevents judicial review when there exists:

- a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
- a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
- the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
- the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
- an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
- the potentiality of embarrassment


148. See id. at 530–34.

149. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that judicial review may be appropriate for unusual circumstances in impeachment trials).
This humorously vague, multi-headed doctrine is, in Erwin Chemerinsky’s words, “the most confusing of the justiciability doctrines,” becoming as unmanageable as the standards that it eschews.\footnote{150}{Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).}

What is more, the Court has applied it inconsistently to structural matters. It has applied the doctrine to, among other things, the Republican “Guaranty Clause,”\footnote{152}{Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).} various constitutional claims arising from elections and redistricting,\footnote{153}{See Chemerinsky, supra note 151, at 135–38.} certain matters concerning foreign relations,\footnote{154}{See id. at 140–43.} congressional proceedings,\footnote{155}{Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).} cases concerning military training,\footnote{156}{Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).} and matters related to impeachment-trial procedure.\footnote{157}{See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).} But the Court has refused to apply it to cases concerning the exclusion of elected members from sitting in the House\footnote{158}{See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).} and the Origination Clause.\footnote{159}{See id. at 263 (“The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President vis-
à-vis one another.”).} And the Court has addressed the merits of nondelegation, removal power, standard and recess appointments, and Article III challenges—those that are most germane to regulated parties and the administrative state—without mentioning the doctrine. Jesse Choper has urged the Court to apply the doctrine to these areas, too,\footnote{160}{See Choper, supra note 29, at 263 (“The federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President vis-
à-vis one another.”).} leaving them to “the national political process.”\footnote{161}{Id.}

Instead of addressing all structural challenges as Choper did, Huq has recently invoked the doctrine for cases concerning only the presidential removal power. He argues that the Court has not developed judicially manageable standards for resolving these disputes.\footnote{162}{See id. at 37–38.} In brief, he challenged the Court’s two premises in Free Enterprise Fund: (1) the President’s ability to remove officers gives the President control, and (2) presidential control leads to democratic accountability.\footnote{163}{See id. at 41–42.} He argued that the removal power can work against presidential control because bureaucrats may seek to take more modest actions to prevent losing favor with later administrations and that removal may be too blunt an instrument for control when the President, with informational asymmetries, may not know which matters were within officials’ control.\footnote{164}{See id. at 6.} Removal, too, can have high transaction costs.\footnote{165}{See id. at 37–38.} As for
control leading to political accountability, Huq argued that Congress’s budget-setting powers and committee oversight can render it difficult to tell who’s to blame for agency action or inaction.\textsuperscript{166} Moreover, voting is an ineffective method of signaling preferences on an “unfettered range of federal administrative actions.”\textsuperscript{167}

II. \textsc{The Necessity of Judicial Review}

Despite the significant justiciability concerns, structural challenges should be justiciable. As a preliminary matter, courts should not apply the political-question doctrine. Instead, they should presume that judicial review of individual challenges is proper because political branches (based on their partisan and policy-based decision making) cannot serve as structural defenders. Relatedly, the branches themselves cannot litigate structural defects, as Huq would have them do, without encountering doctrinal, constitutional, and pragmatic obstacles. The branches’ weakness as structural protectors in and out of court demonstrates the importance of addressing the justiciability of regulated parties’ challenges.

A presumption of judicial review is sound and important. It provides a background norm in assessing whether courts, in the face of ambiguity, should craft justiciability doctrine in favor of review. Notwithstanding contrary suggestions, Part III argues that regulated parties’ structural challenges rest relatively well with current justiciability doctrine. But even if others are prone to conclude otherwise, this presumption provides a normative reason for resolving doubts in favor of judicial review. For the reasons that follow, judicial review of regulated parties’ structural claims is vital because the political branches, contrary to other scholars’ assertions, cannot serve as faithful defenders of structural protections.

\textit{A. Political Branches’ Lack of Institutional Incentive}

Jonathan Siegel has made the institutional case for judicial review in the face of revived calls for \lq\lq popular constitutionalism.q\rq\textsuperscript{168} He concludes that the alternatives to judicial review—the electoral and the political/legislative processes—are worse for several reasons. As a preliminary matter, using the electoral process is impractical because of problems with engaging a majority of voters in relatively unimportant issues or even key civil-rights matters that don’t directly affect them or a popular group (such as Eighth Amendment rights for prisoners) and because of the costs in electoral campaigning.\textsuperscript{169} Likewise, theoretical differences exist between judicial review, on one hand, and electoral and political action, on the other. Judicial review is more focused,\textsuperscript{170} more transparent,\textsuperscript{171} more appropriate for protecting the rights of

\textsuperscript{166.} See \textit{id.} at 53–56.
\textsuperscript{167.} \textit{Id.} at 64; see also Jonathan R. Siegel, \textsc{The Institutional Case for Judicial Review}, 97 \textsc{Iowa L. Rev.} \textsc{1147}, 1165–69 (2012) (discussing practical difficulties of using electoral process to remedy constitutional violations).
\textsuperscript{168.} See generally Siegel, \textit{supra} note 167.
\textsuperscript{169.} See \textit{id.} at 1167–69.
\textsuperscript{170.} See \textit{id.} at 1169–70, 1178–80.
\textsuperscript{171.} See \textit{id.} at 1171–74, 1180–82.
minorities,\textsuperscript{172} and available for individual litigants without collective action.\textsuperscript{173} Moreover, judicial review is based on precedent, giving “rights” a more established character than when enforced through discretionary legislative or electoral processes.\textsuperscript{174} Because of the courts’ institutional advantage in addressing constitutional violations, courts should invoke doctrines that prevent judicial review with care.

But Choper suggests that courts’ institutional advantages are inapplicable to structural challenges. The political branches, he argues, have sufficient political tools to guard their boundaries “jealously.”\textsuperscript{175} Focusing on executive incursions into the legislative domain, Choper argues that Congress has the ability to resist executive aggrandizement through, as most relevant to the discussion here, its appropriation power,\textsuperscript{176} refusal to enact law,\textsuperscript{177} refusal to confirm appointments,\textsuperscript{178} and impeachment.\textsuperscript{179} Because of these tools, separation-of-powers challenges, he argues, should be “nonjusticiable.”\textsuperscript{180} Moreover, he argues that the electorate is the “ultimate political weapon against consequential separation of powers violations.”\textsuperscript{181}

Contrary to Choper’s foundational premise, the branches often don’t jealously guard their boundaries and thus don’t use the constitutional weapons at their disposal when structuring agencies. One needs simply to consider successful structural challenges to find supporting evidence. Consider that the President agreed to the defects that the courts have identified in the appointments in \textit{Buckley} and \textit{Intercollegiate Broadcasting System}, the removal power in \textit{Free Enterprise Fund} and earlier cases, and the “legislative veto” in \textit{Chadha}, although these defects limited executive power. Likewise, in the two cases in which the Court found a nondelegation violation,\textsuperscript{182} Congress enacted legislation that gave away its legislative power. And the courts have generally been exceedingly leery of finding Article III violations at all in the context of agency adjudication,\textsuperscript{183} suggesting hesitation from even the judicial branch. To be sure, Congress and the President have

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[172.] See id. at 1174–75, 1186–87.
\item[173.] See id. at 1175–76, 1187–88.
\item[174.] See id. at 1182–84.
\item[175.] CHOPER, supra note 29, at 275.
\item[176.] See id. at 282–85.
\item[177.] See id. at 285.
\item[178.] See id. at 285–86.
\item[179.] See id. at 286–88.
\item[180.] Id. at 263; see also Shane, supra note 30 (arguing that the Court should abstain under the political question doctrine from recess-appointment challenges).
\item[181.] CHOPER, supra note 29, at 311.
\item[183.] See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, \textit{The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration}, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384, 417–18, 452–60 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court in \textit{Stern} appears to grant Congress more room to assign adjudications to agencies than legislative courts); Joshua I. Schwartz, \textit{Nonacquiescence}, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1882 (1989) (“This ‘public rights doctrine’ appears to afford Congress freedom to commit resolution of disputes between the government and private entities either to the article III courts or to other tribunals—‘legislative courts’ or administrative agencies.”).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
taken adversarial positions in some circumstances, but these have almost always been
in the context of foreign relations, war powers, or criminal activity within the
executive branch.\footnote{184}{See Choper, supra note 29, at 282–308.}
The administrative state’s architecture has failed to engender the
same adversarial positioning.

Instead, partisanship often subsumes the political branches. Daryl Levinson and
Rick Pildes have demonstrated that James Madison’s institutional-competition
model\footnote{185}{See The Federalist No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”).} has given way to government organized not by branch, but by political
parties.\footnote{186}{See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2312, 2313. Others have made similar
observations about the states’ failure to advocate for their own interests under our federalist
system. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 633, 648
(2014) (noting that “state officials have numerous reasons—ideology, political needs, fiscal
concerns, personal gain, and more—to depart from the federal structure”).} The branches do not have “wills” of their own; instead, the branches only
have their respective members’ (including the President’s\footnote{187}{See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2322.}) ideological or political
goals.\footnote{188}{See id. at 2317–18.} Divided government should generally lead political parties and the branches
to have aligned interests as each party seeks to achieve different aims or limit the
other party’s (and branches’) victories. Likewise, unified government should cause
interbranch competition to wane.\footnote{189}{See id. at 2329; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“Senators may have little interests in opposing Presidential encroachment on
legislative prerogatives, especially when the encroacher is a President who is the leader of
their own party.”).} Since 1832, the government has more often been
unified than divided,\footnote{190}{See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2330.} meaning that the competing-branches model of U.S.
government is more often fictional than real. And even during divided government,
the President has weakened the executive branch. For instance, the unconstitutional
appointment in \textit{Buckley}, the improper grant of removal power to Congress in \textit{Bowsher},
and the improper tiered protections from removal in \textit{Free Enterprise Fund}
were all enacted during times of divided government.\footnote{191}{The Federal Election Commission Act of 1971 was enacted by a Democratic
legislature and Republican President, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985 was enacted
by a Republican President and Senate with a Democratic House, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 was enacted by a Republican President and House and a Democratic Senate.} In addition, the electorate’s
limited concern for structural matters and its practical inability to influence structural
matters, as Siegel notes, render it unlikely that the electorate will become the valiant
protector of structural safeguards.\footnote{192}{See Siegel, supra note 129, at 1167–69; see also Choper, supra note 29, at 311.
Despite the limited salience of structural defects, I identify the President’s removal power over
high-level officers as a structural safeguard whose effects (but not its violation) could be
meaningful to the electorate. \textit{See infra} notes 207–208 and accompanying text.} Because institutional incentives do not
necessarily align with political ones, it is far from clear that the judicial branch, as
Choper argues, should abstain from deciding structural challenges.

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\textit{184.} See Choper, supra note 29, at 282–308.
(“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”).
\textit{186.} See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2312, 2313. Others have made similar
observations about the states’ failure to advocate for their own interests under our federalist
system. See, e.g., Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 633, 648
(2014) (noting that “state officials have numerous reasons—ideology, political needs, fiscal
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\textit{187.} See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 32, at 2322.
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\textit{189.} See id. at 2329; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (2014) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“Senators may have little interests in opposing Presidential encroachment on
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\textit{192.} See Siegel, supra note 129, at 1167–69; see also Choper, supra note 29, at 311.
Despite the limited salience of structural defects, I identify the President’s removal power over
high-level officers as a structural safeguard whose effects (but not its violation) could be
meaningful to the electorate. \textit{See infra} notes 207–208 and accompanying text.
Huq’s narrower call to deem removal-power cases nonjusticiable is more compelling. Although Choper does not clarify the precise ground for nonjusticiability, Huq identifies the Court’s problem as its inability to create “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for achieving the constitutional good of political accountability (via the President’s control over subordinates).\textsuperscript{193} Recall that Huq challenged the removal power’s relationship with presidential control because of bureaucratic timidity, informal asymmetries, and transaction costs.\textsuperscript{194} Recall, too, that he challenged control’s relationship with political accountability because of Congress’s influence over agencies and the limited ability of the electorate to signal displeasure with the President’s oversight of the administrative state.\textsuperscript{195} Because of what he viewed as the unsound premises underlying the Court’s removal-powers jurisprudence, he called for the political question doctrine to apply. Although having some merit, Huq’s arguments are not wholly satisfying because the power to remove is likely more robust than he argues (at least when the President hasn’t permitted Congress to limit the President’s power to remove agency officials), suggesting that the President’s inattention to the removal power in initial agency structuring is misplaced.

First, bureaucratic timidity seems unlikely for many politically salient officers. Political appointees (and thus higher-level officers) are unlikely to be timid merely to retain their jobs with incoming administrations. This is because they are unlikely, by tradition, to remain at their positions when another party takes over.\textsuperscript{196} Former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates’s service under the Bush and Obama Administrations, for example, was noteworthy because of its rarity.\textsuperscript{197} Indeed, the officers seem likely to go along with current presidential preferences to curry favor for better positions within the administration, to show loyalty that could appeal to later administrations of the same party,\textsuperscript{198} or to obtain presidential protection from congressional reprisal.\textsuperscript{199} Lower-level officials may have more incentive to act timidly because they seek to be career bureaucrats. Yet, even for them, many are subject to removal for insubordination by failing to fulfill higher-up officials’ policy preferences.\textsuperscript{200} Thus, removal (whether at will or for cause) can allow the President

\textsuperscript{193} Huq, \textit{supra} note 27, at 22 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).

\textsuperscript{194} See \textit{supra} notes 164–165 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{195} See \textit{supra} notes 166–167 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{198} To be sure, Presidents, even without at-will removal power, can obtain significant influence over independent agencies because of budgeting, regulatory coordination, and chairmanship-appointment powers. See Rachel E. Barkow, \textit{Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design}, 89 \textit{Tex. L. Rev.} 15, 30 (2010); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, \textit{Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies)}, 98 \textit{Cornell L. Rev.} 769, 818–23 (2013). It is hard to see how the President’s power over officers whom he can remove at will is any weaker.


\textsuperscript{200} See Kent H. Barnett, \textit{Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon}, 87 \textit{Notre Dame L. Rev.} 1349, 1374–76 (2012) (discussing accepted view that insubordination is proper ground
to control them, too. This is not to say that bureaucratic timidity doesn’t exist, but it is a dull sword for severing the connection between removal and control.

Second, Presidents can remedy their lack of information concerning executive officers’ control over regulatory results. They can seek to educate themselves about how the decision-making process works, the legal regime in which the decision-making occurred, and the external constraints influencing the officer’s action. Doing so should not become too onerous considering the rarity of threatened removals. Indeed, the removal power itself is one of many tools that the President (and senior officers) can use to obtain information relevant to supervisory decisions. Thus, the removal power can have a role to play in informational gathering and in controlling bureaucrats’ actions.

Third, the significant transaction costs in and rarity of removing an official do not prevent removal—“a doomsday machine”—from being effective. As Brigham Daniels has argued in the context of agencies’ use and threat of “regulatory nukes” (such as revoking a broadcasting license or an entity’s tax-exempt status) under a game-theory model, nuclear powers provide leverage less through their use than through their existence and threatened use. They allow policymakers, in other words, to get their way without incurring the political costs of detonating the nuke. This same phenomenon appears to exist with the removal power. Presidents rarely have to remove officials; the mere threat of removal encourages resignations.

Fourth, the removal of senior officials, unlike almost all other structural matters, may be sufficiently salient to affect political accountability. As discussed above, one should be generally skeptical of achieving political accountability through electoral or lobbying efforts when low-salience matters or minority rights are at issue. But the removal or resignation of salient officials, including Cabinet Secretaries, can influence public attitudes of the President as the CEO-in-chief by mitigating his association with bureaucratic incompetence or wrongdoing. The removal power provides a tool for obtaining resignations and thereby allows the President to be

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201. See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (noting “an outer limit on the number or frequency of terminations that any administration can tolerate without suffering the negative political repercussions of instability”).

202. And, of course, the removal power can also serve as a partial antidote to bureaucratic drift. See Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1826 (2007).


204. See Barkow, supra note 198, at 30 (noting that removal is “politically costly for presidents”).

205. See Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Biggest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442, 445–46, 504 (2012).

“doing something” about governmental problems. Recent examples abound. To be sure, retaining or removing any one official is unlikely to affect many voters. But the removal power allows the President to shape the composition of the executive branch and help control the narrative that surrounds the President’s administration and his or her political party’s performance. The historical practice of encouraged resignations (likely obtained under the Damocles Sword of removal) suggests, at the very least, that presidents view removal as influencing political accountability.

All of this is not to say that the Court has correctly understood the importance of the removal power; correctly concentrated on this one executive power to the exclusion of other powers, values, and political dynamics in drawing Article II boundaries; or correctly decided Free Enterprise Fund. Nor is all of this to undermine Huq’s useful insight into the limitations on the Court’s Article II jurisprudence. My claim is modest. The removal power has some relationship to both control and accountability even if it is weaker than the Court or certain scholars suggest, and it suggests that the President should care about limitations on the removal power when structuring agencies. Moreover, even if Free Enterprise Fund’s reasoning is not satisfying (especially in the context of tiered protection from removal), it does not follow that the removal power is always insignificant, that manageable standards for removal-power controversies do not exist, or—perhaps most importantly here—that judicial review is undesirable in all cases.

**B. Concerns with Branches as Litigating Parties**

Aside from lacking institutional incentives, the branches (or the members that comprise them) cannot assert structural challenges—as Huq advocates in almost all structural cases—without doctrinal, constitutional, and pragmatic concerns. The

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207. See Harold J. Krent, *From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency*, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 523, 527 (2008) (“The power to remove an official is emblematic of a continuing relationship between the President and subordinate officials and, in the public eye, links those officials’ conduct to the Presidency itself.”).


210. Huq has proposed a rule that “[w]hen an individual litigant seeks to enforce a structural constitutional principle redounding to the benefit of an official institution, and there
Court has been consistently hesitant about allowing the branches and their individual
members to serve as parties in litigation. The Court has worried that permitting such
actions would lead courts to resolve purely political disputes. Moreover, the lack of
institutional incentives for the political branches to guard their boundaries in the first
instance also suggests that they would lack incentives to litigate. Branch-standing
proponents overlook these doctrinal and institutional limitations, rendering their
proposed solution more complicated than it first appears.

As noted earlier, most structural defects arise through legislation that satisfied
bicameralism and presentment, meaning that both houses of Congress and the
President agreed to the structure at issue. Accordingly, likely challengers would
be the individual members of the affected branch who failed to convince their
colleagues otherwise. But they lack standing. In *Raines v. Byrd*, the Court held
that individual senators and House members lacked standing to have the federal
courts declare the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court
noted that awaiting lawsuits from private individuals, as opposed to politicians, keeps
the courts out of political disputes. Quoting Justice Powell’s concurring opinion
in *United States v. Richardson*, the Court argued that courts serve to protect
individual citizens’ constitutional rights and liberties, not to provide amorphous
supervision for government action. To support its position, the Court noted the
historical practice by which legislative members, executive officials, and Presidents
have not challenged legislation based on structural defects—including the limitations
on the President’s removal power in the Tenure of Office Act, the limitations on the
Attorney General’s authority based on the “legislative veto” at issue in *Chadha*, the
FEC appointments in *Buckley v. Valeo*, and the President’s pocket veto.

Moreover, allowing the branches themselves, as opposed to the individuals within
the branch, to assert structural challenges presents its own problems. First, the *Raines*
Court seems schizophrenic on the propriety of institutional standing. It relies upon

is no reason the latter could not enforce that interest itself, a federal court should not permit
the individual litigant to allege and obtain relief on the basis of the separation of powers or
federalism.” Huq, supra note 20, at 1514. I have queried whether, if courts do not improve
remedies in structural litigation, “only the branches of government themselves should have the
ability to enforce . . . structural safeguards.” Barnett, supra note 23, at 545.

211. See generally, e.g., Huq, supra note 20 (failing to address doctrinal difficulties of
institutional standing for structural challenges).

212. See supra Part II.A.


214. Id. at 813.

215. See id. at 827–28; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2704 (2013)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the “opportunities for dragging courts into disputes hitherto left
for political resolution are endless” if branches can seek judicial review for usurpations of the
other branch); Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(denying review, on equitable grounds, of individual legislators’ lawsuit even if private parties
(noting that court would approve of congressional standing when private parties could not
bring claim at issue).

216. *Raines*, 521 U.S. at 829 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).

217. See id. at 826–28.
the failure of the President (the head of the executive branch) and the Attorney
General (the head of a department) to assert structural challenges in the past when
arguing that the individual legislators lacked standing and suggests that such standing
is improper under the “regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date.”
But, then cryptically, it “attach[ed] some importance to the fact that [the individual
legislators] ha[d] not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of
Congress in [the] action, and indeed both Houses actively oppose[d] their suit.”
How much importance attached is unclear, especially because the Court closed its
opinion by saying that “[w]hether the case would be different if any of these
circumstances were different [including if the Houses approved of the litigation], we
need not now decide.” At the very least, institutional standing after Raines was of
questionable propriety.

The Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission further undermines branch standing. To be sure, the
Court held that the Arizona legislature, as authorized by both legislative houses, had
standing to challenge under the Elections Clause an independent redistricting
commission’s power to set legislative districts. But, citing Raines, the Court
carefully distinguished a state legislature’s standing from congressional standing:
“The case before us does not touch or concern the question whether Congress has
standing to bring a suit against the President. There is no federal analogue to
Arizona’s initiative power, and a suit between Congress and the President would
raise separation-of-powers concerns absent here.”

But even if the federal political branches have standing, the Court’s jurisprudence
suggests that the branches can serve, at most, as proper parties only when they are
defending, as opposed to challenging, structural norms that the branches themselves
enacted. When Congress has served as a party in litigation, the Court has blessed its
service in defending legislation from a structural attack. This was the case in Chadha,
where the executive branch sided with the private party who argued that the
legislative veto violated bicameralism and presentment, and both Houses of
Congress intervened as parties in the litigation to defend the legislative veto.
Likewise, although not resolving whether the House had standing, the Court in
United States v. Windsor relied upon the House of Representatives’ Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group’s (BLAG’s) intervention to defend the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) when holding that the executive branch, despite
its agreement with a challenging private party that DOMA was unconstitutional, had
prudential standing. Justice Alito, in his dissenting opinion in Windsor, found that

218. Id. at 828.
219. Id. at 829.
220. Id. at 829–30.
223. Id. at 2663–66.
224. Id. at 2665 n.12.
227. Id. at 2686, 2688–89.
the BLAG had standing “to defend the undefended statute.” These opinions all suggest that legislative standing extends to the defense of enacted legislation but say nothing about standing to assert initial challenges.

Although space constraints prevent full discussion of institutional standing’s normative contours, doctrinal limitations make sense in light of circumscribed, enumerated powers under Articles I and II. As Tara Leigh Grove has recently argued, the President obtains standing in federal court based on his or her power under Article II to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” This power allows him or her to defend federal law and to refuse to enforce unconstitutional laws. But it doesn’t give the President standing, Grove argues, to challenge a federal statute merely to protect his or her own institutional or political interests. The President does not need judicial standing to prevent the enforcement of an unconstitutional act; instead, he or she has the power to refuse to enforce or comply with it. Article I, for its part, does not grant Congress any enumerated power to challenge federal laws. Instead, Congress has familiar tools to control what it views as structural defects—for instance, the House’s withholding of originating revenue bills, the Senate’s refusing to confirm executive officers, and both branches’ refusing to enact legislation that the President favors. Moreover, permitting lawsuits by only affected individuals ensures that the dispute is more than merely abstract and any judicial opinion more than advisory. By looking outside of Article III when considering institutional standing, it becomes apparent that allowing the branches to assert structural challenges would create, at the least, significant constitutional questions and upset longstanding historical practice with a defensible normative basis.

Finally, the same concerns that surround institutional incentives for the branches to monitor separation-of-powers boundaries likely also apply to litigation. Recall that partisanship and policy concerns affect how the branches look after their own interests in drafting legislation. Recall, too, that the branches would be less likely to protect their boundaries during times of unified government than during times of divided government. These same concerns should be expected to affect the branches’ decisions to litigate. The incentives for legislating and litigating are the

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228. *Id.* at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting).
231. *See id.* at 1326 (“The Supreme Court has never held that the executive has standing to assert an institutional interest in the enforcement of federal law or, relatedly, in protecting any other duties or powers conferred by Article II. In fact, the Court has suggested precisely the opposite: the executive lacks standing to protect its institutional concerns.”).
232. *See id.* at 1356, 1361. Indeed, Grove argues that, contrary to *Chadha* and *Windsor*, Article I does not allow Congress even to defend federal law.
236. *See supra* Part II.A.
237. *See supra* note 186 and accompanying text.
238. *See supra* note 189 and accompanying text.
same; it is merely the nature of the action that differs. Accordingly, substantial doctrinal and institutional-competence concerns suggest that reliance on the branches as litigants is misplaced.

Disallowing institutional standing does not mean that the branches cannot have a role in structural litigation when they are so inclined. As Huq has insightfully noted, structural litigation—which impacts the powers and rights of competing branches and individuals—is multipolar and thus “inevitably generates . . . spillovers to unrepresented parties.”239 Allowing the branches to serve as amici and present their views, as the Court has done,240 addresses much of this concern because it allows courts to account more easily and thoroughly for the various interests involved. To be sure, amici do not control when to sue, factual development, or the framing of legal issues.241 But given the Court’s current receptiveness to interlocutory structural challenges242 and formalism, it is far from clear that any narrowing of legal issues is necessary or that factual development has much effect on the resolution of the structural questions.

III. REGULATED PARTIES’ CHALLENGES SHOULD BE JUSTICIABLE

Regulated parties have Article III standing to assert structural challenges, despite causation and redressability concerns, because these challenges are akin to procedural challenges for which Article III relaxes or ignores its otherwise mandatory desiderata. Likewise, regulated parties can also establish causes of action because they are within the structural provisions’ zone of interests and because history provides no compelling basis for holding otherwise. In short, their challenges, contrary to others’ arguments, rest comfortably with existing doctrine.

A. Article III Standing

Not only do regulated parties serve as better guardians of structural protections than the branches, but the Article III causation and redressability concerns surrounding their structural challenges are not meaningful because of their procedural complexion. The Court relaxes (or ignores) these two traditional Article III standing requirements for procedural challenges to agency action. If it did not do so, the mere possibility of a different outcome in continued or later proceedings would, under Simon, be insufficient to establish standing.243 Structural challenges should be understood as analogous to procedural challenges because both kinds of challenges concern values related to how and who within the government acts, not substantive outcomes.

239. Huq, supra note 20, at 1469; see id. at 1469–72.
240. See Grove, supra note 221, at 1361.
241. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1507–08. Huq also argues that allowing the branches to serve as amici does not solve causation and redressability problems for Article III standing. Id. at 1508. But, as described infra, the lack of causation and redressability is not meaningful for structural rights. See Part III.A.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 95–98.
When understood as analogous to procedural challenges, structural challenges fit well within existing standing doctrine (notwithstanding Bond). This is important. Huq, in seeking to limit individual structural challenges, readily concedes that his proposal is inconsistent with Bond and several other cases. But recall that he contends that Bond, which permits individual standing, does not fit as comfortably with current standing doctrine as his proposal for more muscular institutional standing. Not only did Part II, supra, identify significant concerns over institutional standing, but this Part concludes that Huq is mistaken as to justiciability.

1. Relaxed Article III Desiderata for Procedural Challenges

Article III does not require causation and redressability (nor even injury in fact) in all cases. In a footnote after outlining the three-part Article III test, the Lujan Court deemed procedural rights “special” because one asserting a procedural right need not meet all the “normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” The Court then gave an example in which a challenger who lived next to a proposed federally-licensed dam could challenge an agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, as required by statute. Presumably the challenger’s injury in fact would include the aesthetic or economic harm from having to live next to a dam. This challenge would be permissible despite, as the Court admitted, a lack of a causal connection between the statement’s preparation (the procedure at issue) and whether the dam would be built (the substantive decision that creates the injury in fact). And, relatedly, a judicial order that required the agency to prepare the statement would not necessarily redress the challenger’s harm in fact because the dam could be built after the agency prepared it. The Court reaffirmed the procedural-challenge exception in Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that standing exists “if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”

Evan Tsen Lee and Josephine Mason Ellis have identified an even more striking example under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). FOIA allows “any person” to obtain nonexempt records if properly requested. If the request is denied, the curious party could sue to obtain the documents. The denial would not create an injury in fact because hindering one’s curiosity would, under the Court’s doctrine, very likely not constitute a sufficiently concrete or otherwise cognizable

244. Huq, supra 20, at 1515.
245. See id. (“[M]y proposed rule fits more comfortably with current standing doctrine than Bond.”).
247. Id.
248. See id.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. See Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 193–201.
251. See id. at 194, 173 n.18.
252. See id. at 194.
harm.\textsuperscript{254} Moreover, the mere violation of one’s legal right to obtain documents is not an injury in fact, but a mere (and, since 1970, irrelevant) legal injury. Because there need not be any harm, there is no causation between the nonexistent injury-in-fact and the complained-of action, and a judicial order requiring the government to grant the request does not (and cannot) redress the nonexistent injury in fact.\textsuperscript{255}

The procedural exception—although rarely expressed as such before \textit{Lujan}—has established provenance in judicial review of administrative agencies. Under a well-enshrined principle from \textit{SEC v. Chenery}, courts can uphold agency action only on the grounds upon which the agency relied.\textsuperscript{256} If the court does not uphold the agency action, the court generally must remand to the agency for the agency to reconsider its decision.\textsuperscript{257} The judicial remedy provides the prevailing party a chance for the agency to change its decision and thus a chance to cure its injury in fact. But the remedy does not guarantee it because “most petitioners have at most a slim chance their underlying injury will ever be redressed.”\textsuperscript{258} Ultimately, had \textit{Lujan} not recognized a procedural exception, \textit{Lujan} would have “imposed a constitutional obstacle to most ordinary administrative law cases.”\textsuperscript{259}

The procedural-rights exception makes sense because requiring redressability misses the point of procedural rights. “[P]rocedural rights have only speculative consequences for a litigant.”\textsuperscript{260} They do not exist, as Cass Sunstein has pointed out, to “dictate outcomes but to . . . produce certain regulatory incentives.”\textsuperscript{261} Unless the Article III desiderata are relaxed, judicial review would be absent. The consequence is that the regulatory incentives for better decision making, accountability, transparency, and fairness, among other values, lose their force. Regulated parties’ procedural rights—such as the rights to provide comments on pending rules to the agency, to have the agency follow self-enacted rules, to require the agency to disclose certain information publicly, or to appear before unbiased fact-finders—would be nothing but platitudes whose enforcement depends upon the whim of the administering agency.

Moreover, allowing these procedural challenges to proceed is consistent with broader historical practice.\textsuperscript{262} Public actions, whereby private parties seek to vindicate public interests and limitations on government action without establishing injury in fact, were features of English and early American law.\textsuperscript{263} This was so even after the enactment of the Federal Constitution, which requires a “case or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{254} See id. at 196.
\item \textsuperscript{255} See id. at 197.
\item \textsuperscript{256} 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
\item \textsuperscript{257} See id. at 95.
\item \textsuperscript{258} See Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 202.
\item \textsuperscript{259} Sunstein, supra note 84, at 208.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Id. at 225.
\item \textsuperscript{261} See id. at 226.
\item \textsuperscript{262} See Lee & Ellis, supra note 84, at 229.
\item \textsuperscript{263} See id. at 174; see also supra note 84. Likewise, “[f]airness, as a property of procedural schemes, may also be a value that generates rights that do not necessarily promote the interests of particular right-holders in either a well-being or an agency sense.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., \textit{Individual Rights and the Powers of Government}, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 355 (1993).
\end{itemize}
controversy” under Article III. Indeed, “there is no direct evidence that injury in fact or concrete interest was intended to be a constitutional prerequisite under Article III.”

As a final matter, procedural rights can be reasonably defined. Procedural rights, as Sunstein argued, do not mandate what government does. Instead, the values that they seek to further relate to different matters: how government must act to implement policy and who within government can act. Within the former category are rules that, for example, require agencies to provide notice-and-comment opportunities or provide explanations of their decisions. Within the latter category are rules requiring an administrative law judge to preside over formal hearings or provisions that identify which agency has jurisdiction over a particular regulated party. In contrast, provisions that foreclose certain outcomes that affect regulated parties’ behavior—like triggers for deportation or those that concern elements for a civil violation—are substantive.

To be sure, these distinctions between substantive and procedural actions, as elsewhere in the law, are not without indeterminacy problems. Debates are almost certain to occur around the margins in the procedural-exception context, just as they do in the Erie choice-of-law context. For instance, how should one categorize statutory or regulatory rules of evidence? Although they concern how the government must prove its case, they are subject to harmless-error review, thereby leading courts to consider the likelihood of changed results on remand (and notions of causation and redressability, even if not in the standing context). Likewise, questions of an agency’s jurisdiction over certain subject matter may implicate not only who may regulate (for instance, as to which agency has authority to regulate the challenging party’s industry) but also what that agency may do (for instance, whether the agency can require certain industry disclosures even if other procedures are followed). This definitional indeterminacy gives me pause. But I take comfort in the fact that, despite more than twenty years passing since Lujan, courts have not appeared to face significant difficulty over categorization, the solid footing upon

264. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 354 (1875) (allowing suit in which merchants sought to enforce “a duty to the public generally”); Winter, supra note 84, at 1394–95 ("[T]he English, colonial, and post-constitutional practices suggest that the contemporaneous understanding of the 'case or controversy' clause considered as justiciable actions concerning general governmental unlawfulness, even in the absence of injury to any specific person, and even when prosecuted by any common citizen . . . .").

265. Sunstein, supra note 84, at 173.

266. See id. at 226.


271. See, e.g., Gunderson v. U.S Dep’t of Labor, 601 F.3d 1013, 1027 (10th Cir. 2010).

272. The majority in Lujan did not define “procedural rights.” Lee and Ellis defined the
which the procedural exception rests in administrative law based on *Chenery*, and
the ubiquitous substantive-procedural divide throughout law.

2. Similarities Between Structural and Procedural Challenges

Structural rights share key characteristics with procedural ones found in statutes
or regulations. None seek to mandate a particular outcome for any substantive
decision. Instead, they seek to further other values. For instance, presentment and
bicameralism seek to “protect[] residents of small states and minimiz[e] interest
group influence.”273 The Appointments Clause, as another example, seeks to limit
despotism (through what the Founders understood as the “insidious” appointments
to office) and create accountability in appointing officials or branches.274 Judicial
enforcement of these and other constitutional structural safeguards, like statutory or
regulatory ones, does not mean that a prevailing party will always obtain relief for
its injury in fact.275 It merely provides validation of the norm that seeks to further
underlying values.

Procedural and structural rights further these values in similar ways. They seek to
affect either values related to how a decision is reached276 or who can take a certain
action. For example, the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses and the
Appointments Clause detail how to enact legislation and to appoint officers (and to
some extent, who can legislate, sign legislation, and appoint). Similarly, the Vesting
Clauses, the Recess Appointments Clause, and Impeachment Clause identify who
can exercise judicial, legislative, and executive functions. None of these clauses
require or prohibit any particular underlying policy decision. The same substantive
policy that failed to undergo bicameralism and presentment (say, as particularly
germane in 2015, immigration policies promulgated via questionable executive
orders277) can gain force as legislation by following constitutional procedural

term as they understood Justice Scalia to have done—rights conferred by statute or regulation
that are divorced from “‘real-world’ desiderata” and that may not “make any difference in the
real world.” Lee & Ellis, *supra* note 84, at 174 n.21. But Justice Blackmun, in his *Lujan*
dissent, lamented that the meaning of the term was far from clear and sympathized with “courts
cross the country that will struggle to understand the Court’s standardless exposition of this
dissenting). I have not uncovered a decision in which the federal appellate courts, in the more
than twenty years since *Lujan*, have had to grapple with the definitional problems in footnote
seven, suggesting that the significant definitional problem that Justice Blackmun feared has
not come to pass.


275. *See supra* notes 100–102 and accompanying text (discussing *Ryder* and proceedings after remand).


277. For example, the President’s executive actions concerning immigration have been the
requirements. An individual who was appointed by the wrong process, entity, or person can still be appointed by the constitutionally appropriate one. A matter that was improperly adjudicated in an Article I court can be adjudicated in an Article III court, and the Article III court can reach the same outcome as the Article I court. Congress can legislate the same norms that violate the nondelegation doctrine when the executive enacts them without sufficient legislative guidance. The President could retain or remove an officer that the legislative branch, without proceeding through impeachment proceedings, had attempted to retain or remove. In contrast, other limitations on government actions, principally those in the Bill of Rights and other constitutional amendments, concern what the government can substantively do: abridge the right to free speech, constrain the free exercise of religion, limit gun ownership, take property without reasonable compensation, or inflict cruel and unusual punishment. Although not free from all indeterminacy, the structural concept is established and cabined (especially because the structural provisions in the Constitution are necessarily limited in number) and thus may be even better defined than its “procedural” counterpart.278

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court’s discussion of harm in the context of structural safeguards reveals their similarity to procedural rights. In Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit rejected the government’s argument that a regulated party had to show prejudice from an administrative law judge’s alleged unconstitutional appointment.279 In so doing, the court noted that the Supreme Court in Ryder left open the question of whether harmless error could apply.280 But it noted that the Court had referred to separation-of-powers safeguards (including those arising under the Appointments Clause) as “structural.”281 These structural errors require automatic reversal without regard to harm.282 The Supreme Court, in fact, said that structural safeguards are not “a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified.”283 Thus, treating structural challenges like procedural ones not only makes sense but even fits comfortably within separation-of-powers doctrine and rhetoric.

Finally, the courts’ relaxed (or absent) injury requirement for structural violations to federal administrative architecture is consistent with the relaxed injury requirement for “structural errors” in the judicial process. For instance, courts do not require a showing of causally-related harm for matters that go to the structure of a

278. The differences in statutory or regulatory procedural rights, on one hand, and constitutional structural rights, on the other, are not meaningful for Article III standing purposes. To be sure, they originated from different sources, and, as discussed above, may affect agencies in different ways. But these differences, alone, do not concern Article III standing. None of these differences affect whether the plaintiff has an injury in fact, whether the government had to follow some norm, or whether the harm could be cured on remand. Instead, these differences may affect whether the provision at issue conveys an express or implied private cause of action. See infra Part III.B.

279. 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

280. See id. at 1130 (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995)).


282. See id.

283. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239.
judicial trial, including the appearance of impartiality of the judge, the denial of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel, the exclusion of certain races from the jury, or the denial of a public trial. In all of these cases, the error concerns how the judiciary went about exercising its powers, but it does not assume that the court, when complying with structural protections, could not reach the same judgment as before. Likewise, structural challenges to the administrative state concern how (and who within) the government acts without suggesting that the government cannot, through proper means, orchestrate the same outcome. In sum, the Court routinely treats claims that concern how government or courts go about exercising their substantive powers as different in kind from other challenges.

To be sure, the Court has sometimes indicated that structural errors require no showing of harm because the presumed harm, often in criminal trials, is extremely likely. Errors concerning government architecture, the argument goes, may not warrant the same presumption of harm as in criminal matters and thus should not be deemed structural errors for which no harm is required. But the Court’s stated likely-harm justification is questionable because presuming harm often presents its own problems or is unsound. For instance, successful Batson challenges concerning the exclusion of jurors based on their race are not subject to harmless-error review and call for an automatic new trial. But this remedy is very likely not actually based on presumed harm to the defendant. If it were, courts would have to presume that jurors of different races would reach different verdicts and would have to engage, thereby, in the very stereotyping of races (with notions of groupthink) that the Batson doctrine seeks to prevent. Relatedly, defendants are more likely, as the Court has recognized, to cause harm to themselves by demanding to proceed pro se in a criminal trial, instead of relying upon counsel. Despite the lack of any likely harm to the individual in having counsel, the violation of the individual’s Sixth Amendment right to represent himself or herself is a structural error for which


285. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 112 (1996) (discussing how the Court grounded its remedy of automatic reversal after right-to-counsel violation on the premise that an infected criminal trial “cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court in part and dissenting in part)).

286. See, e.g., United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The government contends that even if the district court committed error [in rejecting the Defendant’s Batson argument], we should consider such an error harmless. This suggestion has been resoundingly rejected by every circuit court that has considered the issue.”).

287. Cf., e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (“Defendants in criminal proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection. People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial exclusion.”).


automatic reversal is required. These examples reveal that grounding a structural error on something more than serious, likely individual harm is not novel.

B. Granting a Cause of Action—Rights and Remedies

As with Article III standing, regulated parties should have inferred structural causes of action because they fit well with existing doctrine. Whether a party should have a cause of action is an indeterminate inquiry. The current conception of a cause of action looks at the “operative facts” to determine whether “a plaintiff is entitled to some remedy,” with less focus than in the past on a particular remedy. Because the Constitution’s text fails to answer whether regulated parties have a cause of action for structural violations, any viable cause of action must be inferred. With statutory implied private rights of action for damages, the Court has, of late, required clear legislative intent to create private rights of action. But the Court has been much more permissive of allowing causes of actions premised on the Constitution that seek only nonmonetary equitable relief. This permissive attitude makes sense in the context of structural challenges, too. Regulated parties fall within the zone of interests of most structural safeguards, suggesting a colorable individual right in structural provisions. Although some contend that the historical record undermines inferred structural rights, that record is, at best, unclear.

1. Colorable Rights in Structural Safeguards

How the Court goes about inferring a private cause of action for equitable relief under the Constitution is far from settled. It often handles structural cases under a generalized-grievances standing paradigm and advances no further. Or the Court simply operates with the presumption that equitable relief against the government is appropriate. When considering the more controversial question of whether an implied cause of action for money damages exists, the Court requires that the basis for the relief “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” But when the Court considers the availability of equitable relief under the APA (and, at times, under the Constitution), the Court applies what appears to be a more liberal inquiry: the

290. See id.
291. Bellia, supra note 84, at 798 (emphasis omitted).
292. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1449.
298. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
zone-of-interests test. That test requires “the plaintiff [to] establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the . . . provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.”299 The Court has recently clarified that the zone-of-interests inquiry asks whether a cause of action exists for a “particular plaintiff’s claim,”300 although the inquiry may be narrower with provisions, such as constitutional ones, that exist outside the APA.301 Because of the Court’s recent reliance on the zone-of-interests test in determining whether a statutory cause of action exists, because the Court has applied the test to constitutional provisions and suits for equitable relief, and because the test is as developed as any other for inferring causes of action, I rely on it for the inquiry here.302

Regulated parties’ challenges easily fall within the structural provisions’ zone of interests. Their harm is the cost of being regulated by a government that has not followed constitutional protocols before acting. This harm causes loss to property (regulatory fines), liberty (ability to act in a certain way or within a certain industry), or dignity (having to engage in administrative proceedings by an unconstitutional entity). The Founders intended the structural provisions, as even Choper concedes, to prevent tyranny and despotism and thereby preserve liberty (and perhaps also property).303 In fact, Choper says that this understanding “cannot be seriously disputed.”304 And, as previously discussed, the Court has repeatedly and consistently noted that the provisions’ purpose is to preserve individual liberty.305 Indeed, in his recent concurring opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning, Justice Scalia (joined by three other Justices), noted that structural provisions are “designed first and foremost not

299. Air Courier Conf. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523–24 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)) (internal quotation omitted). As a corollary, when “the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). Presumably, the same standards govern suits based on constitutional, as opposed to statutory, provisions.


301. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16.

302. This is not to say that the zone-of-interests-test doctrine is without its own problems. See Sanford A. Church, Note, A Defense of the “Zone of the Interests” Standing Test, 1983 DUKE L.J. 447, 456–59 (describing critics’ views of the test); infra note 307. Nevertheless, the test has had an ever-expanding place for more than fifty years in the Court’s doctrine and facilitates easier discussion of implied causes of action than other, lesser defined inquiries. In other words, I take no position on the propriety of the test as a normative matter; I use it as an accepted tool for discussing implied causes of action in the regulatory context.

303. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 264–65.

304. Id. at 264.

305. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
to look after the interests of the respective branches, but to ‘protect[] individual liberty.’”

Even if the branches are more closely connected than regulated parties to the structural provisions’ purposes, regulated parties are still within the zone of interests. The Court has noted, albeit in a statutory context, that the subject of a regulatory action need not be the only one with a cause of action. Because “[t]he test is not meant to be especially demanding,” the provisions need not be intended to benefit the plaintiff at issue. Instead, the plaintiff need only be “arguably” within the zone of interests that the provision at issue intends to protect. Under these principles, it is beside the point that the branches of government may be the subjects of the structural provisions. Instead, it is enough that the regulated parties are within the zone of interests that the structural provisions seek to further—preserving individual liberty and limiting despotism.

Relatedly, even if the zone-of-interests test is more demanding in the constitutional context, it should still cover regulated parties’ claims. The regulated parties can point to a specific invasion of their property or liberty interests because the agency directly regulates their behavior by, say, ordering the regulated party to pay a fine or to stop (or start) certain activities. In contrast, structural challenges from the populace at large (taxpayers or voters) or perhaps the beneficiaries of a regulatory regime who seek to challenge an officer or agency’s deviation from Congress’s regulatory objective provide concrete examples of plaintiffs whose interests (regardless of Article III standing concerns) are too tangentially related from the purposes of the underlying structural provisions. The relationship between their interests (whether liberty, property, or dignity) and structural defects are much more attenuated than regulated parties’.

Analogizing individual enforcement of structural rights to procedural rights helps allay prudential concerns over structural causes of action. For instance, the fear that expending judicial resources on litigation that may have little impact on the outcome seems misplaced because the same concern exists for the much broader category of procedural rights. Likewise, structural safeguards’ procedural complexion reveals

306. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011)).
308. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400.
309. See id. at 400 n.16.
310. Contra Shane, supra note 30 (“[U]nlike other separation of powers disputes that the Court has resolved – in cases such as Youngstown Steel, Chadha, or Boumediene – Noel Canning does not relate to individual rights or liberties. . . . Life, liberty and property are simply not at issue.”).
311. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (stating in the context of an Article III standing inquiry that “[t]he proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries”).
312. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 30, at 506 (describing hypothetical where regulatory beneficiaries assert Appointments Clause challenge against EPA Administrator).
the shortcomings of the “absolute privilege” objection. Some have argued that structural safeguards cannot be individual rights because they do not create an “absolute privilege to act in a certain way,” where an “individual (or firm) has a zone of privileged action from any federal or state regulation.”

Instead, structural safeguards do not create rights, they argue, because “the exact same act by the exact same individual can plainly be regulated by some governmental entity.”

But this argument proves too much because it would also lead courts to stop entertaining ordinary procedural challenges. Procedural rights provide no “absolute privilege” from governmental action. Instead, the privilege falls away after the government complies with procedural requirements, whether statutory or constitutional. Those requirements may even apply to one sovereign but not another (for example, a state constitution’s due process requirements that exceed the Federal Constitution’s), but their limited reach does not prevent individual enforcement.

In the separation-of-powers context, the fact that one branch of government may face procedural or structural limitations before acting, while another does not, says nothing about whether individuals can challenge the noncompliance. Structural rights permit the government to act against the individual when the entity’s composition complies with structural norms. If the entity does not, it has no authority to achieve its chosen end, and regulated parties retain their privilege from government action. This is so even when the structural norms apply to only certain branches. Due process limitations may be the most obvious example. For instance, common-law courts and legislatures can establish similar substantive norms although legislatures need not comply with due process. The mere fact that one branch must comply with constitutional procedural requirements while another branch does not has no bearing on whether enforceable rights exist. A private party could seek to enforce due process protections if a court acted without doing so. Furthermore, one government entity may be required to follow certain procedures before enacting a substantive norm, but it may be able to reach the same end by taking another kind of action without having to comply with those same procedural requirements. For instance, an agency must comply with due process in adjudication that creates a substantive norm (like a common-law court’s adjudication), but it likely has little or no obligations under the Due Process Clause if it enacts that same norm through rulemaking.

In other words, the limited reach of a procedural or structural safeguard to one branch or to certain methods of action does not prevent an individual from enforcing that safeguard.

313. Huq, supra note 20, at 1450 (emphasis omitted). Choper made a similar argument: “[I]f the presidential conduct allegedly violates individual constitutional rights—that is, those personal liberties that are secured against all governmental abridgements, presidential or congressional—then . . . the Court should intervene.” CHOPER, supra note 29, at 272 (emphasis omitted).

314. Huq, supra note 20, at 1451.

315. Compare Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that due process attaches to agency adjudications), with Bi-Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that due process does not reach rulemaking or quasi-legislative actions).

316. Proponents of the contrary view have offered no reason to support their views. See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 272; Huq, supra note 20, at 1450–51.
Finally, challengers’ potential loss in the political realm over the agency’s structure or powers should not limit their structural challenges. Understanding structural rights as similar to procedural rights is key here, too. It may well be that challengers lost the substantive battle in the political arena over, say, whether or how a particular industry or action should be regulated. But the federal government—just like agencies and courts—has to comply with constitutional and statutory procedural norms to act. Challenging an agency’s structure may prevent or delay agency action. Nevertheless, even assuming that seeking such prevention or delay is somehow improper, losing parties can cause the same delay in procedural challenges, too, such as those brought under the APA, under the Due Process Clause, or under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Unless one is ready to end procedural challenges generally, structural challenges should be able to proceed even if their goal is to stop or slow government action. From an even broader perspective, the mere fact that the Constitution gives losing factions a weapon against governmental action is neither novel nor contrary to current conceptions of judicial review—whether in the procedural or substantive context. Allowing the Constitution to serve as a counter-majoritarian check on legislative action is foundational to judicial review.

Considering the propriety of regulated parties’ structural cause of action from a zone-of-interest and procedural vantage point is another way of vindicating the valid-rule doctrine, often encountered in overbreadth or facial challenges. Under this well-accepted doctrine, “[E]veryone has a personal constitutional right not to be subjected to governmental sanctions except pursuant to a constitutionally valid rule of law.” Indeed, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer concurred in Bond by relying on this doctrine. The valid-rule doctrine is consistent with judicial allowance for procedural challenges and the ability of regulated parties (as contrasted with other third parties) to demonstrate why they are sufficiently related to the structural provisions to seek their enforcement. What the doctrine fails to explain is how structural challenges fulfill Article III standing requirements. The procedural exception helps fill this void and bolster the valid-rule doctrine.

Armed with examples, Huq argues that because the Court fails to apply the doctrine consistently to all structural matters, the doctrine cannot explain the Court’s structural-standing jurisprudence. To be sure, the Court’s haphazard use of the political-question doctrine, as discussed in Part I.C.4, reveals consistency problems with structural provisions that tend to arise outside of the administrative context. But Huq’s examples aren’t as damning as they first appear. For instance, he notes that the Court has significantly limited Bicameralism Clause challenges by deferring conclusively to congressional leaders’ factual attestation that each congressional

317. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1491–1514.
320. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1453 (“But [the valid-rule doctrine] is simply not a plausible account of current constitutional practice. Individual litigants cannot now complain about any flaw in the official process leading to the enactment of a challenged law.”).
house passed the bill in question. But in the absence of an attested bill and a conclusive presumption on a matter of fact, the Bicameralism Clause challenge could proceed. Likewise, he notes that the Court has denied taxpayers and citizens standing to assert challenges under the Emoluments Clause (which prevents congressional members from serving in the executive branch while serving in Congress and from being appointed to offices that were created or given a raise during the congress member’s elected term). Yet nothing in these cases indicates that a regulated party’s challenge would be nonjusticiable. His broader point that the Court’s jurisprudence is inconsistent is correct, but it does not mean that the valid-rule doctrine is mistaken. Instead, it suggests that the Court should do a better job of applying the doctrine to all of the Constitution’s structural provisions, relying on factual presumptions, and limiting (or at least better distinguishing) political questions. Recognizing structural challenges’ analogy to procedural challenges may well help courts improve their consistency.

Similarly, Huq argues that the courts’ remedial practice—with harmless error, qualified immunity, and nonretroactivity, for example—undermines the valid-rule doctrine. I agree, although I identify different culprits in the structural context, such as severance and stays of judgment. But these remedial failings do not indict regulated parties’ ability to assert structural challenges. Instead, their identification serves as a call for the Court to improve its remedial practice to render regulated parties’ causes of action more meaningful.

2. Neither History nor Practice Are to the Contrary

The Founders’ intent as to structural causes of action is too indeterminate to serve as a meaningful objection to allowing individuals to vindicate structural safeguards. I am not aware of any direct evidence of whether the Founders intended regulated parties to have structural causes of action. But Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78 made the case for significant judicial review, whereby the courts “must . . . declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.” He repeatedly advocated for broad judicial review to reach “every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor” of the Constitution. Reaffirming the sovereignty of the people to limit governmental action through the Constitution, he stated that “[n]o

324. For instance, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, along with certain other states, applies only a prima facie presumption (as opposed to a conclusive one) that an enrolled bill is valid and permits clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. See D&W Auto Supply v. Dep’t of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Ky. 1980).
325. See supra Part I.C.3.
327. Id. at 466.
legislative act . . . contrary to the Constitution[,] can be valid.”

And he stated that it is the courts’ role “to keep [the legislature] within the limits assigned to their authority.” In other writings, Hamilton said that “there ought always . . . be a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constructional provisions.” Implied structural causes of action are consistent with Hamilton’s call for strong judicial review.

To be sure, James Madison failed to mention judicial review in his discussions of the mechanisms for ensuring the separation of powers. But as Raoul Berger concluded after reviewing the constitutional debates and concern over legislative aggrandizement, the “[F]ounders must have welcomed any traditional mechanism that could aid in keeping Congress within bounds.” In fact, Berger pointed to statements of James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that “if any congressional act should be ‘inconsistent with those powers vested by this instrument in Congress, the judges . . . will declare such laws to be null and void.’” These calls for significant judicial review do not suggest exceptions for governmental overstepping.

Huq identifies another of Hamilton’s statements, but it’s inapposite. Huq argues that Hamilton “urged that the original Constitution—which, of course, contained the separation of powers and federalism principles—not be understood in terms of vested rights” because, in arguing against a Bill of Rights, Hamilton argued that the Bill “would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.” Yet Hamilton’s point was not that individuals had no ability to challenge governmental action that exceeded federal power or violated constitutional provisions. His point was that the Bill of Rights would, contrary to its purpose, undermine individual freedom by intimating that the federal government had powers not mentioned in the Constitution’s text. Hamilton gives no indication that he eschewed individual rights in structural provisions. To the contrary, he suggested that rights remain with the people to prevent government action that is not constitutionally given because he argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary for a constitution “professedly founded upon the power of the people.”

Bradford Clark, reviewing the debates over the Bill

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328. Id.
329. Id.
332. Berger, supra note 84, at 834 (emphasis in original). The historical absence of structural challenges by the branches suggests that the Founders may not have viewed these challenges as “traditional mechanisms” for checking congressional action.
333. Id. at 835 (quoting 2 J. Elliott, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 489 (1881)).
334. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1449 (quoting The Federalist No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) ( Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)).
335. See id. (“Alexander Hamilton thus urged that the original Constitution—which, of course, contained the separation of powers and federalism principles—not be understood in terms of vested rights.”).
337. Id.
of Rights and federalism, concluded that “the Founders understood individual rights vis-à-vis the federal government to depend in large measure on the limited nature of federal power. Given this understanding, it is anachronistic to distinguish sharply between judicial review under the Bill of Rights and judicial review of the scope of federal powers.”

Like the Founders’ intent, more recent congressional intent does not provide grounds for a meaningful objection. Although congressional intent (as well as its relevance) is far from clear, the APA suggests that structural claims are permissible. Most regulated parties’ challenges to agency action fall within the APA (even if the parties fail to recognize this). The APA requires courts to set aside agency action that is, among other things, “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” Although the legislative history on the meaning of this provision is unhelpful, it is notable how broadly the provision is written. It does not limit itself to constitutional rights or privileges. It also refers to actions that are contrary to constitutional power, a conception that would easily cover actions that contravene structural safeguards. After all, government action through an agency is contrary to constitutional power if the agency’s architecture violates structural principles because those provisions limit how and who within government can act. It is doubtful that Congress intended the words to serve as appositives for one another. While privileges, immunities, and rights seem to have broadly consistent meanings concerning the freedom of an individual from governmental action in ordinary parlance, power focuses not on individuals but on the government’s authority to act or not.

Moreover, even if congressional approbation is unclear in the structural context, longstanding judicial practice awards equitable relief for violations of federal

339. See Fletcher, supra note 123, at 223–24 (“Congress should have some, but not unlimited, power to grant standing to enforce constitutional rights. The nature and extent of that power should vary depending on the duty and constitutional clause in question.”). In the statutory context, Justice Kennedy argued in his concurrence in Lujan that Congress has the power to define injuries broadly and thus bestow standing on a broad section of the public. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 501 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). If Congress’s attempt to define injuries is germane in the constitutional context as well, then the APA provides relevant guidance on whether challenging parties have standing.
340. See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1669. Key exceptions are for interlocutory challenges, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (requiring final agency action for judicial review of administrative action), and challenges to actions by the President, the Congress, or other non-agencies, see Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding that President is not an “agency” under the APA).
342. Unfortunately, the most specific statement about the provision that I uncovered in the tome of collected legislative history on the APA was the following from Representative Springer: “There is no one in the world who could object to a provision of that kind [the contrary-to-the-constitution provision] because that is based upon the sound philosophy of the law.” 92 CONG. REC. 5657 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Springer). The four listed terms track Hohfeld’s well-known list of legal conceptions. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (1917).
statutory or constitutional law. So-called nonstatutory review (so named because courts have traditionally provided review without pointing to any statutory authority for doing so) permits courts—whether or not the APA applies—to provide injunctive relief against government officers to prevent unconstitutional action or to invalidate entire statutes on constitutional grounds.\textsuperscript{343} The longstanding practice of granting injunctive relief for constitutionally prohibited executive action\textsuperscript{344} suggests that courts should have few qualms in awarding equitable relief in structural litigation. And indeed, the ground for liberal equitable relief comes from the fear that constitutional limitations on legislative authority (including those concerning how the legislature may structure the government) “amount to nothing,” a fear that seems even more pronounced in the structural realm.\textsuperscript{345} To deny an implied private right of action for equitable relief for structural matters would be to create an exception to standard judicial practice.

This is not to say, as I have elsewhere, that courts cannot improve remedial practice in the structural context. Remedies for structural violations often fail to incentivize litigants properly or deter the political branches because they seek to create “as little disruption as possible.”\textsuperscript{346} But these concerns do not mean that the courts cannot provide a sufficient remedy. Indeed, sometimes they do, generally by requiring legislative or executive action.\textsuperscript{347} Instead, as I discuss in Part IV.B, infra, it suggests that courts should be more cognizant of effective remedies and ultimately, from a realist’s perspective, less willing to find violations in the first instance. Curable remedial insufficiencies should not overcome otherwise strong arguments for judicial review.

By examining the fit between regulated parties’ standing for structural actions and other standing doctrine, and the relative ease of inferring a cause of action under traditional doctrine, one can see that regulated parties’ structural challenges are not aberrations of justiciability doctrine. Moreover, the procedural exception for causation and redressability requirements makes normative sense because it is the process, as opposed to the substantive outcome, that procedural rules seek to regulate. The doctrinal and institutional limitations on branch standing further complicate the ability of the branches to serve as defenders for structural norms, and these limitations provide additional normative support for permitting claims by regulated parties in the structural context. Calls to abandon the individual action and permit mere branch

\textsuperscript{343} See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1623; id. at 1668–69 (noting that nonstatutory review is so common, courts don’t “even think[] about it”); id. at 1669–70. For actions under the APA, the legislative history indicates that Congress sought to codify so-called nonstatutory review “where Congress has made no contrary provision for judicial review.” See 92 CONG. REC. 5654 (1946) (remarks of Rep. Walter).

\textsuperscript{344} See Preis, supra note 294, at 34–38 (discussing Court’s equitable remedies in constitutional cases).

\textsuperscript{345} See Siegel, supra note 296, at 1630 (quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).


\textsuperscript{347} See Barnett, supra note 23, at 527–36 (discussing more successful remedies in Ryder and Northern Pipeline).
enforcement—whatever their doctrinal and normative bases—must grapple not only with doctrinal disruption but also with the normative basis for this doctrine.

IV. ADDRESSING UNDERLYING CONCERNS

To say that individuals should have a cause of action for structural challenges is not to say that structural challenges should remain as they are. Legitimate concerns continue to bedevil structural challenges, including the overall utility of structural litigation (in light of causal and redressability questions),\textsuperscript{348} challengers’ opportunism in seeking legal redress after losing political fights,\textsuperscript{349} the failure of the courts to consider factors that lead to structural innovation and thus not allow the political branches discretion in creating the administrative state (absent relatively clear constitutional prohibitions),\textsuperscript{350} and the limited effectiveness of judicial remedies for prevailing parties.\textsuperscript{351} Courts can address many of the problems that create discomfort with an individual cause of action in less dramatic ways than denying individuals the right to sue.

The underlying cause of much of these concerns is too much judicial involvement in structural challenges. For instance, by setting strict branch boundaries, courts decide matters concerning relatively immaterial structural innovations (such as the tiered protections from removal in \textit{Free Enterprise Fund}) and thereby exacerbate concerns over the utility of structural litigation. Relatedly, judicial decisions that sharply delineate the branches’ boundaries deny the political branches discretion to adjust them in the face of new challenges. As the courts reach more issues and encourage more litigation, they attempt to limit the effect of their rulings by providing less meaningful remedies.\textsuperscript{352} Limiting, but not ending, judicial review mitigates these concerns.

Courts can limit their review by turning, where appropriate, to functionalism for separation-of-powers jurisprudence. The Court can get there in two ways. First, it can directly alter the underlying doctrine. Second, if the Court is hesitant to alter its doctrine directly, it can reach the same ends indirectly by providing more significant remedies. In doing so, as I explain below, courts will very likely begin to defer to the political branches without abandoning judicial review altogether.

But, before considering how to alter the underlying substantive law, let me address a potential objection: Why shouldn’t the Court instead alter its justiciability doctrine to permit only the most significant challenges and thereby give the branches more structural discretion? The key reason is that the focus of the justiciability doctrines is not the quantum of harm or the potential benefits from innovation. Instead, it focuses on the mere existence of harm (if required). Relatedly, justiciability doctrines are intended to be trans-substantive because they apply

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{348} See supra Part I.C.1.
\item \textsuperscript{349} See Huq, supra note 20, at 1502–14.
\item \textsuperscript{350} See CHOPER, supra note 29, at 298–305; Huq, supra note 28, passim.
\item \textsuperscript{351} See supra Part I.C.3.
\item \textsuperscript{352} See infra notes 379–380 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
generally to all lawsuits or, at the very least, challenges of a particular kind.\textsuperscript{353} But some structural protections, as discussed below, permit more discretion (the President’s removal power, for instance) than others (say, those under the Appointments Clause). The underlying doctrine, which is provision-based and not trans-substantive, can better address how much or little discretion exists for the political branches as to each structural protection. Moreover, creating more doctrinal disruption in an already confused area of the law\textsuperscript{354} is especially troubling in the structural context because regulated parties’ structural challenges, as discussed above, fit reasonably well within existing justiciability doctrines and respond to theoretical concerns over lackluster institutional incentives. For these reasons, the substantive doctrine itself can better accommodate concerns over structural challenges.

\textit{A. Proper Place for Functionalism and Political Discretion}

Formalism is ill-suited for interpreting indeterminate text. This is the case with the vesting clauses for each branch because they fail to describe where the branches’ boundaries should be. Indeed, it is very difficult to argue that prophylactic boundaries are appropriate\textsuperscript{355} after courts have recognized that the boundaries must, by necessity, be somewhat porous.\textsuperscript{356} To use the President in an example, the President in executing the law must create generalized standards to fill statutory gaps (for instance, when are veterans as a class sufficiently “incapacitated” to trigger entitlement to benefits?) and adjudicate specific issues (for instance, is a particular veteran entitled to benefits?). Moreover, as Manning has explained, formalists must often rely upon a separation-of-powers background norm despite the Founders’ lack of any agreed-upon baseline norm\textsuperscript{357} and ignore Congress’s powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.\textsuperscript{358} And there is the concern that certain symbols of a branch’s power assume disproportionate importance. The removal power, for
instance, has come to symbolize the President’s executive power despite longstanding questions surrounding its utility.359

Formalism still has a limited role. For instance, it makes sense to apply formalism to the fairly detailed text of the Appointments Clause and the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause.360 But its reach should be much more limited than under the Court’s current jurisprudence for the reasons discussed above.

The Court’s overreliance on formalism has caused much of the concern over structural actions. By serving as a prophylaxis for demarcating boundaries and proudly recognizing one concern to the detriment of other values,361 formalism provides more victories to challengers than functionalism would and thereby encourages structural litigation over relatively minor structural innovations. Because the impact of the innovation on the branches or individuals is irrelevant, formalism encourages litigation whose utility is, at the very least, questionable because the ruling may do little to protect while invalidating useful structural innovations.362 Relying upon functionalism helps mitigate these concerns because the Court, by deeming fewer structures unconstitutional, will discourage litigation over minor structural innovations. Indeed, functionalism has limited nondelegation363 and Article III challenges.364 Moreover, as structural challenges are generally less successful, regulated parties will necessarily take their administrative-structure concerns to the political branches.365

By giving the branches more breathing space, functionalism allows the branches to set their own boundaries. Huq’s call for allowing the branches to bargain over structural boundaries (in both a federalism and separation-of-powers context) comports with original meaning. He notes that nothing in the text prohibits bargaining, and, indeed, it is consistent with the First Congress’s rejection of Madison’s proposal to treat the branches’ powers as exclusive (and thereby prevent structural innovation).366 Moreover, looking at acquiesced-in actions, as the Court

359. See Barkow, supra note 198 (considering other methods of creating agency independence and noting limited effect of removal power).
361. See Huq, supra note 27, at 16 (“[T]he Free Enterprise Fund majority opinion is drafted as if the only constitutional good to be pursued in administrative agency design is democratic accountability. The Court, that is, ignored the pleadings of scholars who had pointed to the plurality of goods a reasonable designer could seek to vindicate in drawing up an administrative agency.”) (emphasis omitted)).
362. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1480–90 (discussing spillover effects in structural litigation).
363. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate To Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 443 (2001) (“[T]he Whitman decision does not foreclose the possibility that nondelegation challenges can be successfully (if only rarely) mounted in the future.”).
364. Article III challenges outside of bankruptcy are exceedingly rare.
365. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1491–1508 (discussing regulated parties’ litigating purposes and concerns over allowing “losers” in political process to use structural challenges to pursue deregulatory goals).
366. See Huq, supra note at 28, at 1649.
recently did in *Noel Canning*, can reveal the branches’ accumulated wisdom. After all, from a perspective of institutional competence, the political branches have access to factors that “courts systematically lack,” such as political costs, responses from other political actors, relevant norms within bureaucratic institutions, and the efficacy of other constitutional or political instruments to control agency costs.

Of course, there are limits to this discretion and bargaining. Providing a governing rule under a functionalist approach is probably impossible (and therein lies the allure of rigid formalism), but one could do worse than the standard that the Court in *Morrison v. Olson* applied—asking whether a structural innovation impeded the central functions of the branch at issue. *Morrison*, however, can be criticized for misapplying its standard in that case (because the President’s control over prosecutors is central to the effective functioning of the executive branch, as the Clinton-Lewinsky investigation later suggested) and for not giving the standard more definition by identifying prohibited structures. Despite *Morrison*’s failing, certain structural “innovations” would likely command widespread condemnation. For instance, the political branches should not be permitted to limit the President’s power to remove key Cabinet members—such as the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense—whose positions go to the heart of traditional and constitutionally specified executive powers over foreign affairs and national defense. Likewise, permitting only Article I courts to decide constitutional questions would likely violate Article III because it strikes at the heart of Article III courts’ power of judicial review and the rationale for creating a judiciary independent of the political branches. Outside of these and similarly significant structural innovations, the branches deserve discretion. By granting the branches room while retaining judicial review for especially troubling cases, courts can provide the discretion that the political question doctrine permits without allowing the constitutional safeguards to become merely aspirational.

367. See id. at 1625; see also passim NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (relying on historical practice surrounding recess appointments to determine what qualifies as a “recess” and when vacancies “happen”).
369. Manning, *supra* note 31, at 1989 (“Even an indeterminate bargain, however, has boundaries.”); see NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573–77 (2014) (finding violation of Recess Appointment Clause, despite largely functionalist reasoning in prior portions of the opinion, because three-day break between pro forma Senate sessions was insufficient to permit recess appointments).
370. *Morrison v. Olson*, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (“[W]e simply do not see how the President’s need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require . . . that the counsel be terminable at will by the President.”).
371. See Barnett, *supra* note 200, at 1356 (noting Kenneth Starr’s investigation into Whitewater highlighted the problems with permitting independent counsel to investigate the executive branch).
372. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”); U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 & § 3 (referring to powers “to make Treaties” and “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”).
B. The Utility of Maximal Remedies

Because of the Court’s general trend in favor of formalism, it may be hesitant to return to functionalism. But there is a way of getting there more gradually and indirectly—by providing more significant remedies. As I have argued elsewhere, the courts’ minimalistic remedies for prevailing parties in structural litigation undermine structural safeguards. Recall that this minimalism takes shape by using severance, de facto doctrines, and stays of judgment. I have suggested that courts provide more meaningful remedies, such as requiring the political branches—without stays of judgment or de facto doctrines as countervailing forces—to enact curative legislation for the agency to continue acting. By doing so, they provide, for instance, a better chance for the challenging party to get something beneficial from the successful challenge (an incapacitated agency) and a meaningful rebuke to the political branches to deter future structural violations. But I asked—but did not resolve—whether such remedies may unfairly affect those who rely upon the agency to go about their businesses and favor parties who advance a deregulatory agenda.

After more reflection, I conclude that maximalist remedies are likely to prove useful, even if accompanied by some unfair consequences, because they will be rare. My reasoning, although perhaps paradoxical, is simple: as judicial remedies expand, the underlying rights shrink. This phenomenon exists because courts do not seek to expend judicial capital on defending judgments with significant resistance, either because of political backlash or pragmatic problems for third parties. Empirical evidence of this phenomenon is limited, as Daryl Levinson has noted, by our inability to know whether judges would act differently with different remedial regimes in place, but we can evaluate how judges have responded over time to maximal remedies.

The inverse relationship between remedies and rights is perhaps most evident in Fourth Amendment litigation, where the powerful exclusionary rule came to limit the reach of the underlying right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures. Similarly, the Supreme Court has limited the notion of a “liberty interest” in the face of significant monetary remedies for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

374. See supra Part I.B.
375. See supra Part I.C.3.
377. Cf. David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 644 (2008) (arguing that when courts use severance too freely, “the legislature may come to depend on the courts to fix statutes rather than doing the hard work necessary to enact a properly tailored statute in the first instance”).
379. See Levinson, supra note 288, 866–70.
381. See Levinson, supra note 288, at 890 (discussing methodological problems with obtaining empirical evidence and noting “the best we can do is observe the changes in judicial decisionmaking over time and test likely causes”).
383. See Levinson, supra note 288, at 892–94 (discussing the Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which held that reputation does not count as a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause).
One may observe this inverse relationship, too, from a partly controlled experiment concerning whether trial and appellate courts find the same number of *Batson* violations, that is, challenges to the exclusion of a juror based on that juror’s race. Faced with a *Batson* violation, trial judges can simply include the wrongly excluded juror, while appellate courts must order a new trial for this structural defect.\(^{384}\) Pamela Karlan found that appellate courts—which must issue a more severe remedy than trial courts—hesitate more than trial courts in finding a *Batson* violation.\(^{385}\) In the separation-of-powers context, maximal remedies should likewise be rare.

Congress, for its part, should express its desire for maximal judicial remedies to obtain more discretion. The Court’s current presumption is that Congress prefers the severance of structural defects instead of the invalidation of the agency’s organic act or substantive power.\(^{386}\) In *Free Enterprise Fund*, for instance, the Court severed a removal provision after saying that it generally sought to sever structural defects when the remainder of the act could function independently and when Congress did not make it “evident” through statutory text or historical context that it would prefer a maximalist remedy.\(^{387}\) To have courts apply maximalist remedies in the future, Congress needs to overcome this presumption by clarifying in newly enacted legislation that it intends courts not to sever structural violations. Although the political branches fear administrative disruption, the disruption, as discussed above, should be rare and ultimately give the branches more discretion in structural matters.

Turning to maximalist remedies does no violence to the Court’s general remedial practice. First, the Court’s presumption concerning severance remains, but the presumption is overcome (perhaps categorically over time) if Congress makes its preference for maximalist remedies for structural defects clear. The Court need not alter its baseline for all constitutional remedies. Second, it makes sense to seek maximalist remedies here, as opposed to other constitutional rights, to give the prevailing parties a meaningful benefit. As I have argued elsewhere, structural remedies are less effective than remedies for most other constitutional rights. With the enforcement of substantive rights, the prevailing party gets something—the ability to act in a certain way and the ability to avoid government sanction.\(^{388}\) This benefit is not always certain with procedural rights; the right to procedure does not guarantee a favorable outcome. But typical administrative procedures—such as the right to comment on agency action, limits on ex parte communications, or

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385. See id. Levinson notes that notions of appellate deference to trial-court observations may play a part in the more limited appellate findings of a *Batson* violations, but he contends that “Karlan’s study should be counted as strong evidence that the scope of the *Batson* right on appeal has been diminished by the reversal remedy.” Id. at 892.


387. Id. at 508--10.

388. See *Barnett, supra* note 23, at 502, 515 n.190. To be sure, challenges may decrease in number if challengers noticed the ineffective remedies awaiting them at judgment. But history (and current challenges, see, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 240--45, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 4229466 (asserting several structural challenges to the CFPB)), suggests that they have not noticed or have otherwise allowed hope to spring eternal.
requirements for impact studies—often affect substantive decisions. Structural safeguards, however, seem even less likely than run-of-the-mill procedural rights to affect agency action. Because the prevailing party is less likely to obtain any benefit from the challenge, the remedy must be more significant than in other constitutional litigation to incentivize litigation and deter structural defects. A maximalist remedy that hinders regulation likely qualifies. Nevertheless, in a balanced fashion, a more functionalist doctrine that finds few structural defects will limit the number of challenges to the most meaningful.

One of the benefits of turning to remedies for structural challenges is that it causes little disruption to existing doctrine. Courts have given scant attention to these remedies. They are undertheorized, barely discussed, and often provided without the parties’ request. Because of the relationship between remedies and rights, by turning to remedies and providing significant ones, courts can adjust the doctrine gradually. Nor is there anything improper about doing so as long as the Court is candid about what it is doing. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Court should not pretend that structural safeguards are more important than their remedies indicate. Maximal remedies would be congruent with the importance that the Court has ascribed to structural safeguards, while recognizing, even if only over a series of decisions, that those safeguards should refer to core protections or those that have a strong textual basis in the Constitution.

Finally, the disruption that maximal remedies cause will be limited and appropriate. Because the rights will constrict as the remedies become stronger, the use of the remedies will be rare and thereby limit the instances of disruption. But when the remedies apply, the disruption that they cause will be appropriate because the structural defect will go to the core of the structural safeguard or violate a specific constitutional requirement. An agency, for instance, whose principal officers are all improperly appointed (as in Buckley v. Valeo) should not function. The disruption is appropriate because Congress has ignored straightforward constitutional requirements. The Court should seek to deter Congress and require it to absorb political fallout from the structural defect. And the Court should give the challenging party something that it seeks—a deregulatory remedy—to incentivize the regulated party’s suit. In this way, the putative vice of maximal remedies becomes their virtue. And, at any rate, the political branches aren’t helpless. They can seek to mitigate the disruption by taking curative action, such as by providing, as the political branches did in Noel Canning, unquestionably constitutional appointments before judicial decision.

C. Achieving Optimal Enforcement

Validating, yet limiting, individual structural actions with more functional jurisprudence and maximalist remedies provides optimal enforcement of

389. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 511–12.
390. See supra Part I.C.3.
391. See Barnett, supra note 23, at 541–44.
392. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2558 (2014) (“[T]he President has nominated others to fill the positions once occupied by Members Block, Griffin, and Flynn, and that the Senate has confirmed these successors.”).
constitutional structural norms. The optimal amount of enforcement is not static throughout the Constitution. Instead, as discussed supra in Part IV.A, Manning has persuasively demonstrated that formalism should apply to well-defined structural provisions and functionalism should apply to open-ended provisions. The formalist provisions benefit the most from rigorous individual enforcement, while the functional provisions need only occasional defense and should properly remain largely within the discretion of the political branches to define.

First, regulated parties’ ability to enforce provides a meaningful check on governmental action when the political branches have failed to heed defined structural limitations. The political branches’ failure is most evident with the more formalist provisions, such as the Appointments Clause violations in *Buckley v. Valeo*, where both the President and the Senate permitted the dilution of their appointment and consent powers.\(^{393}\) or such as the bicameralism and presentment violations in *INS v. Chadha*, where both the President and the Congress, once again, permitted dilution of their powers to agree to legislative action.\(^{394}\) Regulated parties in both instances validated the clear, detailed structural provisions. Permitting regulated parties’ actions does not impede the political branches from enforcing structural protections; the regulated parties merely serve as a second line of defense when the branches fail to do so.

Second, the regulated parties can protect the functional structural provisions from the political branches’ abuses of discretion. The political branches properly have significant discretion in defining the boundaries between the branches through the Vesting Clauses because the Founders did not prove strict boundaries or even agree on what underlying principles should guide the separation of powers generally.\(^{395}\) Moreover, the necessary overlap of legislative, executive, and judicial functions reveals the impossibility of setting crisp boundaries between the branches, and this indeterminacy permits the political branches to account for the various values and goals that they hope to balance or achieve with components of the administrative state.\(^{396}\) But such discretion can be abused, as I suggested it was with the overly independent counsel in *Morrison v. Olson*.\(^{397}\) It is in these rare cases that the regulated parties’ ability to sue and obtain a meaningful remedy adds value and permits optimal enforcement.

Let me conclude with a final, possible objection. Do these benefits of litigation matter if the Founders’ connection between liberty and separated powers was mistaken either originally or in the modern administrative state?\(^{398}\) In other words, should we waste judicial energy in enforcing structural provisions whose utility is questionable?

Even assuming that the Founders overstated the connection between liberty and separated powers, that mistake should be corrected by constitutional revision, not judicial dereliction. The formalist provisions have not meaningfully prevented

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393. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
395. See supra Part I.B.
396. See supra Part IV.A.
397. 487 U.S. 654 (1988); supra Part IV.A.
398. See Huq, supra note 20, at 1484–89 (arguing that the link between liberty and structural requirements is contestable empirically and normatively).
government action (because, after curing the structural defect, the government almost always pursues the same substantive policy) and thus require no judicial self-help to keep the federal government functioning. Moreover, such self-help is especially troubling in the structural context because the judiciary, by refusing to enforce relatively detailed provisions whose purpose is well understood and instead championing its own notions of good constitutional policy, would usurp constitutional (and macrolegislative) prerogative. The danger of the courts ignoring structural prohibitions becomes even more apparent when one considers the normative case for the judiciary ignoring court-related procedural requirements merely because the court doesn’t think that the constitutional framers or legislature made the correct policy decision in the first instance.

CONCLUSION

As this Article’s title suggests, my goal here is to further two independent conversations and reveal how they relate to one another. First, regulated parties should have standing for separation-of-powers challenges. That is, they should have a justiciable cause of action based on separation-of-powers protections because these actions, contrary to recent scholarship, rest well within current doctrine and normative goals of judicial review. Second, scholars and jurists should stand up to the Court’s currently overly formalistic separation-of-powers jurisprudence. A more functionalist jurisprudence will better address lingering litigation-utility concerns than fiddling with justiciability. Regulated parties’ challenges, when properly limited, provide the best mechanism for providing enforcement of constitutional structural safeguards while still allowing the political branches to structure an effective administrative state.