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Book Review. All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes by Daniel W. Drezner

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to parts of the world yet to embrace republican politics at home. Instead, Deudney closes with a somewhat esoteric reflection on “nuclear one worldism.”

These shortcomings notwithstanding, Bounding Power is destined to become a classic work of IR theory, blending with remarkable innovation and insight the long tradition of republican theory with the field’s more familiar paradigms.

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— David P. Fidler, Indiana University

Daniel Drezner begins his book by throwing down a gauntlet: “Globalization is responsible for a lot of bad international relations theory” (p. 3). This assertion caused this reviewer to nod in agreement, but it heightened my expectations for what Drezner would produce. These expectations grew as he identified promulgators of “bad international relations theory,” which ranged from commentators, such as Thomas Friedman, to schools of international relations theory, including realism and liberal institutionalism, but especially theories that privilege the agency of nonstate actors in world politics. By and large, the author met this reader’s expectations by crafting a rigorous, robust, and accessible analysis of international regulatory regimes.

All Politics Is Global has a simple structure. In Part I, Drezner constructs a “revisionist” theory of international regulatory regimes. In the first three chapters, he announces his intent to bring the great powers back into the analysis of global governance, develops a theory of regulatory outcomes that supports privileging the great powers, and provides a typology of global governance processes to demonstrate that regulatory outcomes differ from regulatory processes.

In Part II, the author explores four case studies to test how well his theory explains them in comparison to other theories: global governance of the Internet (Chapter 4), the international financial system (Chapter 5), genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Chapter 6), and intellectual property rights and public health (Chapter 7). In the final chapter, he summarizes his arguments, discusses his theory’s limitations, and speculates about how changes in international relations may affect international regulatory regimes in the future.

Drezner’s salvo against bad IR theory makes his theoretical efforts worthy of heightened scrutiny. His theory explains why “[a] great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational issue” (p. 5). This state-centric, power-oriented approach rejects other interpretations of globalization, which have intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) or nonstate actors (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) primarily shaping regulatory cooperation. Unlike realists, Drezner takes account of IGO/NGO participation in international regulatory politics. Similarly, following liberalism, he argues that domestic actors and institutions determine state preferences, even those of the great powers, rather than the anarchical structure of international politics.

Initially, Drezner’s theory sounded as though he had merely visited the IR theory buffet table and taken the bits he liked best. But does it represent a coherent theory? This question highlights the importance of his “theory of regulatory outcomes,” which he develops using game theory models. (For the mathematically oriented, the author provides an appendix describing proofs for his propositions.) His theory building explains 1) how state preferences flow from domestic calculations of economic adjustment costs created by different outcomes in regulatory cooperation, and 2) why the market size of the great powers alters the nature of outcomes over such cooperation.

Drezner carefully defines his terms, and he defines the “great powers” in international regulatory cooperation as the United States and the European Union, based on their respective market sizes and reduced vulnerabilities to external disruptions (pp. 35–36). The great power concert that is necessary and sufficient for effective global governance depends on how U.S. and EU preferences align. Drezner acknowledges that the countries that qualify as great powers can change, and that changes, such as China’s continued rise, could make international regulatory cooperation increasingly difficult (p. 219).

After constructing his model, the author argues that it is “unaffected by the introduction of new actors” (p. 63). In assessing the impact of IGOs or NGOs, he distinguishes regulatory outcomes, which the great powers determine, from governance processes, which can involve state and nonstate actors. For Drezner, the key to separating outcomes from processes is the great powers’ ability to “forum shop” for governance processes conducive to achieving the outcomes they want (p. 63). This approach leads to his “typology of regulatory coordination,” which predicts four regulatory outcomes (sham standards, rival standards, club standards, and harmonized standards) based on the divergence among 1) the great powers’ interests and 2) the great powers’ interests and those of other international actors (p. 72).

Drezner tests his model in four case studies, which analyze the development of harmonized standards (e.g., governance of Internet technical protocols), club standards (e.g., international financial standards), rival standards (e.g., data privacy and the Internet; GMO regulation), and sham standards (e.g., regulation of Internet content) predicted by the typology of regulatory coordination. He concludes that his model explains international regulatory regimes better than competing frameworks (see particularly Table 8.1, p. 207).
Though not surprising as a conclusion, the quality and rigor of his analysis are impressive, certainly impressive enough to avoid being labeled bad IR theory.

The "semideviant" case that challenges his theory, Drezner concedes, involves the controversy over the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Public Health (see Chapter 7, pp. 176–203). He admits that arguments that global civil society (GCS) activism shifted the great powers' positions in the adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 2001) "cannot be summarily dismissed" (p. 184).

Although Drezner mounts an alternative explanation, I wondered, on the one hand, whether he conceded too much to GCS arguments, which indicated the power of his analysis in the other case studies. On the other hand, I sensed that the TRIPS case revealed things Drezner did not discuss. He counters the GCS explanation of the Doha Declaration with arguments that draw on the great powers' security concerns about HIV/AIDS and worries about the impact of September 11, 2001, on the WTO's future (pp. 184–94). What jumps out is how the ideas and material actions of nonstate actors (GCS groups and terrorists) and transnational phenomena (epidemic disease, global terrorism, and GCS activism) affected the great powers' approach to international regulatory cooperation in ways not well captured by Drezner's state-centric, power-oriented theory. Read in this light, the case study is more than "semideviant" because it contradicts the assertion that the introduction of new actors does not affect the great power concert.

The author's claim that such a concert is a sufficient condition for effective global governance over any transnational issue invites the hunt for other incidents that might confound the theory. The insufficiency of a great power concert to produce a badly needed international regulatory regime on the sharing and exploitation of avian influenza virus samples might constitute a stronger "deviant" case than the Doha Declaration. Drezner's recognition of his theory's limitations (pp. 207–8) suggests, however, that he welcomes critical scrutiny of the ideas he has impressively added to the body of IR theory.


— Tim Büthe, Duke University

This volume examines and exemplifies the usefulness of principal-agent (P-A) theory for the study of international relations through a set of well-integrated analyses of delegation to international (governmental) organizations (IOs). The editors begin with some useful, explicit definitions of key terms. They define delegation as a revocable "grant of authority" from one or more "principal(s)" to an "agent," which enables "the latter to act on behalf of the former" in a specified domain and/or for a limited period of time. The agent's discretion in how to pursue the principal's objectives is a direct inverse function of the precision of the rules laid down by the principal. Agent autonomy, by contrast, is defined as the possible range of actions the agent can take contrary to the principal's interests, net whatever mechanism the principal may have put in place to control the agent. To the extent that an agent actually pursues his own interests contrary to the principal's, we see agency slack.

Ten substantive chapters then use this common terminology to adapt and extend P-A theory to analyze various specific cases of delegation to IOs, including the International Monetary Fund (J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Hawes, Erica R. Gould, Lisa L. Martin), multilateral development banks and aid agencies (Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney, Helen V. Milner), the European Union Commission and Parliament (Mark A. Pollack), the World Health Organization (Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson), the United Nations Security Council (Alexander Thompson), international courts and the World Health Organization's Appellate Body (Karen Alter, Andrew P. Cortell, and Susan Peterson), and the Commission and Court under the European Convention on Human Rights (Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby).

One of the general insights from this volume is that P-A theory travels well from domestic to international delegation, across a wide range of issue areas. The same set of expected benefits motivate delegation, and cost or difficulty of monitoring increase agent autonomy, for instance in Gould's analysis of the IMF, just as for domestic agents.

So is there anything that makes international delegation distinctive? Some of the authors suggest that there is. Cortell and Peterson, for instance, argue that IOs-as-agents are more likely to have preferences that differ from those of the member states when the IO has a staff of its own rather than a staff seconded from national bureaucracies. David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins, in their concluding chapter, suggest that the importance of information provision by third parties with the requisite expertise for keeping IOs-as-agents accountable creates incentives for states to retain specialized bureaucracies at the domestic level, even if most of their policymaking functions have been delegated internationally. There is no functional equivalent for this duplication in domestic delegation, which also suggests that international delegation may tend to be less efficient.

Another difference arises from Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney's distinction between an agent with multiple principals and an agent with a "collective principal," consisting of a group of otherwise independent actors who jointly...