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action must be qualified by equitable considerations to prevent undue hardship upon a buyer.\textsuperscript{71} Additionally, nothing in the statute should modify such rights as the buyer may otherwise be entitled to under tort, contract, or equitable law. The legislature should place appropriate enforcement powers in the local governing unit and encourage their utilization. And, accordingly, as the governing unit takes the initiative in assuring realization of subdivision control objectives, the courts must seek to provide a minimum of injury and a maximum of redress for the lot purchaser.

**INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES: A STUDY IN DESULTORY REGULATION**

Forty years ago, the Clayton Act became a part of the antitrust laws of this country.\textsuperscript{1} However, it was not until 1953 that the Supreme Court of the United States was afforded an opportunity to construe Section 8 of the Act which prohibits a common director between competing corporations.\textsuperscript{2} John A. Hancock, a partner in the Lehman Brothers Investment Company, served as a director on the boards of six corporations (W. T. Grant and S. H. Kress Companies; Sears, Roebuck and Company and Bond Stores, Incorporated; Kroger and Jewel Tea Companies). After unsuccessful attempts to persuade Hancock to resign from the boards of one of each of the three sets of competitors, the Department of Justice filed complaints alleging that he held these positions in violation of Section 8. Soon after, Hancock resigned from the Kress, Kroger, and Bond Companies, apparently terminating all objectionable interlocking directorates.\textsuperscript{3} But this conclusion fails to contem-