The Cyprus Panel at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting

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Recommended Citation
Fatouros, A. A., "The Cyprus Panel at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting" (1975). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 1907.
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At the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Ill., Professor Gerald Houseman, of Indiana University at Fort Wayne, chaired a panel on “United Nations Peacekeeping: Cyprus.” The panel met in the late afternoon of Friday, May 2, 1975.

Four major papers were delivered. Kyriakos C. Markides (University of Maine) spoke on “Internal Weaknesses and External Intervention: The Collapse of the Cyprus Republic.” Starting with a brief analysis of the Makarios government’s power and authority, he stressed the position of Archbishop Makarios himself as an elected, traditional, and charismatic leader and his control of major sources of economic and political power on the island. He then focused on the growth of a “disloyal opposition” within the Greek Cypriot community and explored the historical and social context and concrete manifestations of the division within the Greek Cypriot community between the majority which supported Makarios (and if not precisely independence, at least deferred “enosis”) and an increasingly violent minority, struggling for immediate “enosis” with Greece. This profound split made possible — and itself was greatly exacerbated by — extensive intervention by the Greek military junta into Cypriot affairs, through propaganda, indoctrination of the Cypriot National Guard, support for and ultimately (after Grivas’ death) control over EOKA-B, and eventually the July 15 coup d’etat against President Makarios. The speaker discussed further the measures that the Makarios government could have taken to prevent the coup and the reasons why no effective action was undertaken, concluding with a review of events in the tragic summer of 1974 and of United States policies and action.

In a highly condensed and informative paper, Van Coufoudakis (Indiana University at Fort Wayne) discussed “United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question.” He surveyed the three main periods of UN involvement in the Cyprus question: During the colonial phase of the question (1954-1959), attempts to utilize the United Nations by the interested parties (primarily Greece and, in opposition to it, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the United States) led to a reformulation of the entire issue. After the collapse of the first Cypriot Republic (1963) and the initiation of armed conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island, there were at first several attempts to settle the issue without recourse to the United Nations, either by arrangements among the guarantor powers or within the NATO structures. When these failed — chiefly because of Greek Cypriot opposition — the issue came before the UN Security Council. Eventually, a UN force (UNFICYP) was authorized and accepted by Cyprus and the other parties. The related UN resolutions also gave the organization a “peacemaking” role, charging it with the active pursuit of a permanent settlement. Yet, while the UN was successful in keeping the peace (until 1974), its peacemaking function was greatly impeded by lack of support from the superpowers and by the reluctance of UN members to push for any particular solution. The UN presence thus
led to pacific perpetuation of the conflict. The speaker examined further the causes of the inadequacy of the UN response in the latest phase of the conflict, since July 15, 1974. He cited the attitudes and actions of the United States and the Soviet Union, the coup’s destructive effect on the diplomatic standing of Cyprus, and various basic constraints on UN action. The Cyprus dispute thus illustrates both the possibilities and the limits of UN peacekeeping and peacemaking.

The third paper was delivered by Kemal Karpat (University of Wisconsin at Madison) and it dealt with “Turkey, the UN, and the Cyprus Question.” The speaker focused on the Turkish point of view, which he saw as primarily concerned with considerations of national security, especially avoidance of encirclement by Greek island territory. He stressed the Turkish perception of continuing Greek and Greek Cypriot moves aimed ultimately at enosis. He thus accounted for the Turkish attack of July 20 as a natural response to the fear of an immediate declaration of enosis by the Sampson administration imposed by the coup against Makarios. He noted that Kemal Ataturk’s policy of retaining only territories with a Turkish majority in the population was still in effect and insisted that the Turkish Government preferred an independent Cyprus rather than partition and “double enosis.”

Nikiforos Diamandouros (S.U.N.Y., Orange County Community College) spoke on “NATO and the Political Disintegration of Cyprus: A Case Study in Linkage Politics.” He approached the issue from a long-range historical perspective, describing the evolution of the separate religious communities on Cyprus — recognized within the Ottoman Empire — into distinct ethnic groupings under the distorting impact of British colonial rule. He insisted on the need to study the continuing interaction of factors traditionally described as “external” and “internal.” Discussing United States involvement since the nineteen forties, he stressed age-old Greek policies of subordination to the “Powers” and he pointed at the differing American images of Greece and Turkey which result in significant differences in the treatment afforded the two nations. He went on to explore the role of NATO in the Cyprus question, in particular after the establishment of the first Cyprus republic.

A. A. Fatouros (Indiana University at Bloomington) and Stanley Kyriakides (William Patterson College, N. J.) were the commentators. The first stressed a conclusion that appears to flow from both the Coufoudakis and the Markides papers, that all parties concerned, but especially the Greek Cypriot leadership, had failed to take advantage of the relative peace brought about by the UN action and the international situation and to push forcefully enough for a permanent settlement of the issues between the two communities during the 1964-1974 period. He went on to criticize the Karpat paper for its failure to discuss the conflicts and differing positions and interests on the Turkish side and for its misperceptions of some of the positions on the Greek Cypriot side. Stanley Kyriakides pointed out that he was undoubtedly affected by his immediate experiences in Cyprus, from which he had just returned; he criticized Professor Karpat for his uncritical support of the Turkish position and for his failure to acknowledge the evils of the Turkish invasion of the island.
There followed a brief discussion from the floor, mainly focused on the respective virtues of the Greek and Turkish positions.

In the main, the panel did not concern itself with the topic of its title (the principal exception being the Coufoudakis paper). Yet the papers offered valuable information and precious interpretative insights into many significant aspects of the Cyprus issue. The entire exercise was very useful in clarifying facts, identifying issues, and suggesting interpretations of particular events and of basic trends.

— A. A. Fatouros

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