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The Turkish Aid Ban: Review and Assessment

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Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 has had continuing repercussions: on the island itself, where forty percent of the territory is still under Turkish occupation and the two communities have had to absorb over two hundred thousand refugees; and in Greece, where the military junta's inability to cope with the fruits of its own crimes led to its downfall and to a return to parliamentary government -- which now faces war threats from its eastern neighbor. Its side-effects were felt even in the United States, where it became the occasion for a remarkable confrontation between the President and Congress.

It is to this last event, itself still unfolding, that the present article is devoted. It starts with a brief discussion of the historical facts and of the issues in the United States law that provided the formal basis for the confrontation, then moves to a review of related events in and out of Congress and of the arguments used by the two sides. The essay concludes with a discussion, and an interpretation, of the whole incident, including an assessment of the role of the so-called “Greek lobby” in the United States.

The Turkish Attack on Cyprus

The facts of the invasion are well known and need little further rehearsal. The opportunity for Turkish action in Cyprus was provided by a coup d'etat organized by the military junta then in power in Athens, through the mainland Greek officers in charge of the Cypriot National Guard. Although Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, managed to escape, thus foiling one of the military’s principal aims, the putschists took over the government and appointed as their president Nicos Sampson, an extremist of the right, noted for his hatred against both Makarios and the Turks and for his fanatical passion for enosis (union with Greece) at any price. The Turkish reaction was as swift as it was predictable: on the early morning of July 20, 1974, five days after the coup, Turkish armed forces landed on the island. The shock of the invasion did what active and passive popular resistance had failed to do. Sampson in Cyprus and the military junta in Athens collapsed and were replaced by parliamentary leaders. A shaky ceasefire was eventually arranged on Cyprus and equally shaky negotiations began in Geneva, under British auspices, between Greece and Turkey and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. On August 14, Turkey renewed military action, ending up in control of forty percent of the island's territory, including its most productive areas. Since then, the island has been divided: the Northeast is in the hands of the Turkish army, with a few thousand Greek Cypriots remaining in a few enclaves. The Southern part of the island is under Greek Cypriot
control; all Turkish Cypriots have moved away and one hundred and eighty thousand refugees (out of a total Greek Cypriot population of less than 520,000) have found refuge there.

The question of the degree of involvement of the United States Government in the coup and the ensuing invasion is at best open; at worst, complicity of various kinds and degrees has been changed. Some possible positions and interpretations have been conveniently classed by Professor Theodore Couloumbis into five "Theories." They range from the State Department's official "innocent bystander" view ("we did our best, but . . ."); to the "Terrible blunder" theory of Kissinger's critics in Congress and most of the press; to a "Realpolitik" version, stressing Kissinger's "divide and conquer" role; to the theory pointing at the continuity in American policy concerning Cyprus, as manifested in particular in the 1964 Acheson plan for partition of the island and its successors; to a final conspiracy theory, which attributes everything to well-laid American plans. There are indeed further categories or subcategories possible, especially when realistic attention is paid both to the likely or known plans and intentions of the United States and its various agencies and to "perverse," that is to say, partly independent, action by its client governments. Even if only the tip of the iceberg were taken into consideration, i.e., the official statements and actions of the United States Secretary of State and his associates, repeated and otherwise puzzling failures and continued mishandling of the situation can easily be documented. This problem is not the topic of my paper; I shall not therefore attempt to settle the issue here.

The Legal Context of the Aid Ban

A multitude of legal issues surround the current problems of Cyprus. Of these, only one will be briefly examined here, because of its relevance to the topic at hand, namely, the legal basis for the suspension of United States military aid to Turkey.

Since 1962, the United States Foreign Assistance Act includes a provision which, in its present form [22 U.S. Code, section 2314(d)], runs as follows:

Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense services furnished such country under [this Act, or other related Acts] in substantial violation of the provisions [of certain sections of the Act, specifying the purposes of aid] or any agreements entered into pursuant to such Acts shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

The principal purpose specified by the various legislative provisions and by the bilateral agreements in force between the United States and Turkey are internal security, self-defense, and action in conformity with UN recommendations or decisions. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus cannot fit under any
of these headings and the United States Government, as will be seen, has virtually admitted this.

Seen in broader context, the clause in question is a clear illustration of the hegemonic relationship between the United States and its allies or clients. The latter are provided, under rather favorable terms (partly in the form of grants, partly in the form of sales credit and for cash), military equipment. But they can use it only for certain purposes, never spelled out with any precision. Thus, in addition to uses which are clearly allowed (such as "internal security"), there are many doubtful ones. No method or institution is provided for determining the facts, when they are disputed, or for applying the law to undisputed facts. The very vagueness of the legal concepts involved leaves a considerable margin for compromise between the recipient and the United States, which frequently reaches the point of total disregard of the provisions and purposes in question. Yet the United States remains, by default, the sole judge. It is in a position to invoke at any moment the provisions in question and stop aid. The threat to do so is thus a major bargaining instrument for the United States (as it is, of course, for other hegemonic powers.)

The record of application of sec. 2314(d) in the past is spotty and inadequately documented. On a number of occasions, the United States has interrupted aid to recipient countries (e.g., to Pakistan and India, when they were at war with one another). On the other occasions, not all of which are known, the threat of an aid cutoff was expressly used. It was, for instance, used by President Johnson in his letter of June 5, 1964 to the Turkish Prime Minister, in connection with a threatened invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. The President reminded the Premier of the requirement in the bilateral agreement between the two countries that United States consent must be obtained for any use of military equipment "for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished." And he went on to state:

I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus, under present circumstances. The threat was certainly effective that time; although resented by Turkey, it did not lead to any serious change in its position vis-à-vis NATO, the United States, or the Soviet Union. No such threats were made in 1974, although it was widely known that an invasion was being prepared. The possibility of an aid cutoff was raised only in connection with a possible war between Greece and Turkey. As Secretary Kissinger put it, in an "informal news conference," on July 22, 1974, when a brief cease-fire had been arranged on the island:

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you threaten to cut off military aid to both Greece and Turkey in order to get them to accept the cease-fire?

Secretary Kissinger: I made clear on Saturday in San Clemente [at a July 20 news briefing] that no war would be fought between NATO allies with an open American supply line. So this put a limit to the escalation that could be conducted. As to the
other steps that were taken, there were no specific threats made. It was very clear that we would consider a continuation of a military confrontation between NATO allies as a very grave matter.\textsuperscript{10}

As to a Turkish invasion, however, no cutoff was mentioned:

Q: Mr. Secretary, before the Turkish invasion did the United States warn the Turkish Government that it would lose aid if it moved, military aid?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we made very clear that we were very strongly opposed to military action.\textsuperscript{11}

Much later, Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco gave a somewhat different version which can be squared with that of his principal with great difficulty - only by emphasizing its qualifications and evasions rather than its apparent affirmations. On being reminded of the 1964 Johnson letter and asked whether he delivered “substantially the same message” to Turkey in 1974, the Under Secretary responded:

I don’t want to use any analogies but it was very, very clear on the basis of what I said in Ankara that one of the possible results of military intervention was the cutoff of aid. I don’t want to mince morsels about it.\textsuperscript{12}

After the second Turkish attack on August 14, 1974, Secretary Kissinger insisted once again that such threats were not used. He explained at length:

The United States did not threaten the cut-off of military aid to Turkey, for these reasons: First, it was considered that such an action would be ineffective and would not prevent the threatening eventuality; secondly, as was pointed out in this statement, we are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our common interest in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean. Once such a decision is taken, it will have the most drastic consequences and not just over a period of time covering a few days but over an extended period of time. For all these reasons, it was judged that the United States would be both ineffective and counter productive to threaten the cutoff of aid. Short of this, however, we made the most repeated and urgent representations to Turkey in order to prevent the military action that happened. We have criticized the action, and we believe also that the inflexibility of all parties in Geneva contributed to it.\textsuperscript{13}

At the same press conference, on August 19, 1974, the issue of the applicability of sec. 2314(d) was brought up by a journalist. Kissinger responded that he would “have to get a legal opinion on that subject” and that he had not done it yet.\textsuperscript{14} That “legal opinion” had a sad fate. A team of lawyers under the former legal adviser of the Department of State, Carlyle E. Maw, was indeed charged with a legal study. However, they reached the conclusion that there was no way to avoid the application of sec. 2314(d), that is to say, aid to Turkey had to be cut off. Secretary Kissinger rejected the advice and never released the legal opinion.\textsuperscript{15} By December, 1974, the Department of State was stating that “it was impossible publicly to express a legal conclusion on the issue of Turkey’s eligibility for further assistance and sales.”\textsuperscript{16}

In the meantime, the issue was raised in Congress. At the very
beginning, after the July 20 invasion, several resolutions condemning Turkish action were introduced, but they did not refer to sec. 2314(d). Only at the end of August was the legal question raised, in Congress and in the press. The Administration temporized but soon came to admit, although never publicly or expressly, that continuing aid to Turkey was, under United States Law, illegal. On September 19, 1974, in a closed meeting with the Democratic caucus of the Senate, conveniently leaked to the press, Secretary Kissinger admitted that the “preponderant view” of the State Department lawyers was in agreement with Senator Eagleton’s opinion that continuing aid was in violation of the law. This memorable exchange then followed:

Senator Eagleton: If my opinion is the dominant and right one, do you have any choice but to enforce it, or to seek its change by legislative process?
Secretary Kissinger: We are exploring our options and will consult with the appropriate Congressional leaders.
Senator Eagleton: Do you have any alternative but to obey the law?
Secretary Kissinger: If your legal opinion is correct, it will have very adverse foreign relations consequences for an important ally.\(^\text{17}\)

The Congressional Debate

Accordingly, by the early fall of 1974, the terms of reference of the political debate were set. They changed little over the next year. Two main periods of Congressional activity may be distinguished, the first until the suspension of aid on February 5, 1975, the second from that time until the decision for the partial lifting of the ban, on October 2, 1975. There were some interesting, although not fundamental, differences in the argumentation on the two sides during each of these two periods.

By early October 1974, both houses of Congress had passed an amendment tied to a continuing appropriation resolution which provided for suspension of all military aid, sales and deliveries to Turkey until the President of the United States certified that Turkey was in compliance with U.S. foreign aid legislation and that “substantial progress” was being made toward agreement concerning military forces on Cyprus. Proponents of this provision had to fight off a last-minute effort of Congressional leaders substantially to weaken the amendment. They were then faced, on October 14, 1974, with a veto by the President, which they were unable to override. A second version of the amendment was again vetoed three days later. Finally a compromise was reached and the President signed an amendment requiring a halt of aid but allowing the President, virtually at his sole discretion, to suspend the aid cutoff until December 5, 1974. The date was later moved to February 5, 1975, in new amendments attached to another continuing appropriations resolution and to the annual foreign assistance act.

When the cutoff date came, the Administration complied with the aid ban, although it sought to minimize its impact by providing increased aid as
the cutoff date approached and by promoting the provision of military equipment to Turkey by Western European NATO countries. It also embarked on a new Congressional effort, spearheaded by the Senate foreign affairs leadership of both parties, to pass a bill removing the specified cutoff date from the related provisions, thus giving the President the power further to suspend the aid ban. The bill was reported out to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 26, 1975, and passed the Senate by a vote of 41 to 40 on May 19, 1975. It reached the House floor in late July, after considerable amendment in the House International Relations Committee. In its final form, it only allowed delivery to Turkey of equipment it had already paid for; further sales or aid would be permitted only by the next annual foreign assistance act. Despite these amendments, the bill was defeated in the House, on July 24, 1975, by a vote of 223 to 206.

Administration efforts to reverse the House decision started immediately afterwards. They intensified as Turkey proceeded to close some United States bases in its territory and to place the rest under formal Turkish control. On July 31, the Senate approved, again by a single vote's majority (47 to 46), a new bill, identical to the one rejected by the House. The intention was to force a vote in the House before adjournment for the summer but the opposition by some representatives foiled these plans. Debate on the bill started again in the fall. Finally, on October 2, 1975, the Administration's bill was approved by the House, by a vote of 237 to 176.

When the Foreign Assistance Act for fiscal 1976 came up for discussion, a few months later, controversy was much less heated. Administration proposals provided for grant aid and cash and credit sales of military equipment to both Greece and Turkey ($50 million in military grants and $110 million in military sales for the former and $75 million in grants and $130 million in sales for the latter). At the time of writing, the bill had passed both House and Senate but had not yet become law. Grant aid of $50 million to each country and military sales of $110 million for Greece and $125 million for Turkey was approved. However, sales to Turkey are limited in time and are subject to a number of conditions regarding Cyprus: observance of the cease-fire, no increase of Turkish military forces or civilian population on the island, and no transfer of U.S. supplied equipment to Cyprus. The President must determine that those conditions have been met on a case-by-case basis for each sale and communicate his findings to Congress.

The Arguments on the Two Sides

For our study of the argumentation of the defenders and opponents of an aid ban we rely on congressional documents and on press reports. It is appropriate to note here that the position of the mass media on the issue at hand followed a peculiar path. At the earliest phase of the debate, in late summer and early fall of 1974, the more influential newspapers and several of their columnists took strong positions against the illegality of continuing
aid to Turkey and, expressly or by implication, in favor of an embargo. Their stand became increasingly milder in the ensuing months and, by the start of 1975, a radical reversal had occurred. Directly or indirectly, in their overwhelming majority, the mass media adopted a position identical, for practical purposes, with that of the Administration. Every time a vote in Congress on this issue approached, a cloud of editorials and comments advocating the lifting of the embargo and attacking the alleged influence of the "Greek lobby" would appear. So that Congressional proponents of an aid ban found that their stand — which remained unchanged — was, if the press were taken seriously, highly popular in mid-1974 and most unpopular a few months later. Such a radical change of position over a short time gives the impression that the Administration's efforts at manipulation of the mass media were, in this instance, successful.

The argumentation on each side of the issue remained rather simple and straightforward during the first phase of the debate. Opponents of the aid embargo generally avoided touching on the legal issue, i.e., on the illegality of continuing aid to Turkey. They used instead policy arguments: the likely negative consequences of an aid ban, the need for flexibility in dealing with both Turkey and Greece, the dangers from Congressional interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by the President. The President's veto messages in October 1974 are typical: they eschew any mention of the legal issues and stress instead that an aid cutoff would lessen the influence of the United States, diminish its ability to persuade the parties to negotiate and jeopardize NATO interests. On the rare occasion that Congressional opponents of the aid ban referred to the legal question, it was to point out rather casually that the facts, or the law, were not all that clear, or to suggest vaguely that the aid cutoff provision should be applied to Greece as well as Turkey.

Proponents of the aid ban, on their part, focussed almost exclusively on the legal issue. They stressed the illegality of further aid and the need to respect law. Occasionally, they referred to the plight of the refugees on Cyprus and the need for the United States action. In their emphasis on illegality, they generally referred solely to United States law; they did not try to build a case for the illegality of Turkish action under international law, or under the UN Charter. Their emphasis was exclusively domestic.

Once the aid ban went into effect, and especially after the bill against it passed the Senate, the President and his Secretary of State undertook an all-out campaign to change the position of the members of the House of Representatives. More than a hundred Congressmen were invited to the White House in successive mass breakfasts to hear the President and Secretary Kissinger develop the reasons for continuing aid to Turkey. Their argumentation followed two basic directions: It stressed the great importance of Turkish bases for the United States defense posture and it pointed at an increase in Turkish intransigence on the Cyprus issue as long as the aid ban was enforced.

Strategic information concerning the bases was selectively leaked to the
newspapers to support the view that, United States bases in Turkey being designed to collect information from the Soviet Union through electronic means, they were precious and irreplaceable. It was even argued that the bases in Turkey were necessary to insure the application of the disarmament and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

The rigid Turkish position on Cyprus, on the other hand, was presented as an affirmation of national independence and of unwillingness to submit to foreign pressures. There was no suggestion that the Turkish attitude reflected an aggressive or expansive position. The President and his Secretary of State stressed, in rather untypical manner, the need to respect the independence of American allies and to avoid intervention in their political affairs. Moving to more realistic argument, they attributed Turkish reluctance to negotiate on Cyprus to the country's political instability. All this, according to them, showed that the aid ban had totally failed as a method of exercising pressure on Turkey and that only the continuation of aid would give to the Turkish government the ability to make concessions concerning Cyprus, without appearing to submit to external pressures. Continuation of aid was therefore to the advantage of all interested parties.

At this point, the executive argumentation began to move in an interesting direction -- although always indirectly and not for "attribution." Its audience was assured that the common benefits which flow from the continuation of aid to Turkey were well understood by the Greek government; this was the reason why the latter was not opposing the suspension of the aid ban. These assurances were not new; similar arguments were made much earlier. But in the spring and early summer of 1975 these assertions built up in intensity, were repeated to anybody who wanted to listen, and reached the public through the columns of friendly commentators. The Greek government, and in particular the Washington embassy, kept for a long time its usual "correct attitude," and refused to comment in public on the problem of the aid ban. Yet, a few days before the July 24 vote in the House of Representatives, the issue reached such proportions that the Greek Ambassador to Washington felt obliged to issue a brief statement:

It has come to my attention that doubts have been created in the minds of members of the House of Representatives concerning the position of the Greek government on the resumption of arms shipments to Turkey by the United States. It is clear that it is not up to me to interfere in the relations between the legislative and the executive branch of this country. It is equally clear, however, that nobody save the responsible representatives of the Greek government is empowered to express its positions. I should like to state in this connection that the position of the Greek government is known and that it cannot have changed, since the factual circumstances which determined it have not changed.

Although somewhat oblique, the statement was unmistakeable in its intent. It did not receive much publicity in the American press, but seems to have had some impact.
Closely related to the official assertions concerning the position of the Greek government was the insistence on the role of the so-called “Greek lobby.” We shall return to this topic, but it should be noted now that, in a sense, the publicity given by the Greek-American community and its leaders to their campaign for the interruption of aid to Turkey served well Secretary Kissinger’s plan. His supporters did not stop stressing the dangers facing American national policy because of the activities of ethnic lobbies. The hints as to the understanding of the United States position by the Greek government were often coupled with disapproval of “chauvinist” pressures by the “Greek lobby.”

The legal arguments in support of the aid ban were difficult to refute, so the opponents of the aid ban continued to try to evade them. They now referred to the legal argumentation occasionally used by Turkey, concerning application of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, without, however, wholly adopting it or approving the Turkish position. They only noted that the Turkish invasion did have some legal basis. During this second phase of the debate, there was no attempt to deny that the continuation of aid was in violation of United States legislation. During debate in Congress, several of the aid ban’s opponents began by admitting the illegality of aid and then proceeded to make whatever other arguments they could. Another set of legal arguments had to do with Greece and its alleged violations of the conditions for the supply of American aid. They mentioned the introduction of personnel and equipment in Cyprus from 1963 to 1967, as well as the removal of supplies from the naval base in Crete during the summer of 1974 — information on which had been very conveniently leaked to the press. The lack of detail and clarity in these allegations is interesting, if only because it shows that the officials responsible were still more interested in keeping secret United States involvement or toleration of client governments’ activities than in winning this particular argument.

The proponents of the aid ban responded in the main by stressing once again the illegality of the continuation of aid. They pointed out that, if pressure through the aid ban had not been effective, this was due to Secretary Kissinger’s negative stance, to his opposition and undermining of the Congressional decisions, which encouraged the Turkish government in its intransigence. On the legal arguments, they responded by distinguishing between the landing of Turkish forces on July 20, 1974, and their attack on August 14, 1974. They argued that, as to the first, it could be argued that there was some legal basis, in view of the provocation by the Athens military government. But there were no such excuses for the second action, which had no legal basis and was in clear violation of U.S. law. Finally, proponents of the aid ban stressed the importance for Congress and the United States of resisting Turkish “blackmail” through threats of the closing down of bases.

Some False Approaches

To place the debate concerning Turkish aid ban in its proper political
and constitutional framework it is useful to begin negatively with a brief account of what this debate was not.

The debate did not express any radical differences of opinion between the President and Congress (or a majority of its members) concerning the fundamental directions of the United States foreign policy. There are, of course, several differences, and they are sometimes of importance, but they are of many kinds and point to several directions. Progressive or reactionary positions are not divided symmetrically between the executive and the legislative branch. The views and arguments of the Representatives, Senators, and other politicians who supported the aid ban show clearly that their basic positions and biases coincide in substance with the positions and ideology of United States foreign policy as it has been established since the end of the Second World War. In their argumentation, there is no opposition, or even doubt, concerning NATO and its functions, concerning the leading role of the United States in the "free world," the need for military aid to friendly countries, the fundamental anti-Communist direction of American foreign policy. Some of them disagree with some of these positions. Others disagree with the specific handling of the Cyprus issue during the summer of 1974, or more generally with Secretary Kissinger's policies. Many have been stressing that Greece is a better ally than Turkey or that its bases are more useful than the Turkish ones. To support this position, they invoked the opinions of various retired officers, such as General Van Fleet and Admiral Zumwalt -- persons whose name symbolize the continuity as well as the problem of American policy in Greece during the last thirty years. The views of the aid ban proponents are clearly within the bounds of established policy and ideology, they do not subvert them, they do not even tend to change them to any serious degree.

The aid ban debate does not reflect, therefore, a disagreement between those who support a foreign policy which favors and utilizes direct and indirect intervention in foreign countries and those who condemn such intervention. Disagreement on this issue begins to acquire considerable importance in current American political life; but it plays no serious role here. No choice between an interventionist and a noninterventionist position arises: both the continuation and the interruption of aid to Turkey constitute methods for interference in the affairs of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus (although Secretary Kissinger tried to show that only the cutoff of aid constituted intervention.)

It is characteristic of the lack of any profound ideological differentiation on this topic that the continuation of aid to Turkey was supported by several Representatives and Senators who in earlier years had struggled strongly and effectively against the dictatorship in Greece. On the other hand, although the leadership of the aid ban campaign was in the hands of Representatives Rosenthal and Brademas and Senator Eagleton -- there were in their camp several others who had in the past tolerated, supported, or eulogized the Greek military junta.
The Role of the “Greek Lobby”

Another interpretation of the Turkish aid ban episode treats it primarily as a manifestation of “ethnic politics.” The so-called “Greek lobby” is credited (or charged) with a successful campaign of political pressure on vote-conscious Congressmen. As has been said, there are three million American citizens of Greek origin in the United States and only a few thousand of Turkish descent. The actual role of the Greek-American community in the whole affair is difficult to assess with any precision; yet it cannot be ignored. Pressure from the Greek-American community, united and mobilized for the first time in recent decades, undoubtedly played an important role. But it is easy to exaggerate its importance and its effectiveness. In the absence of thorough empirical studies, some fragmentary personal observations seem in order.

Certain distinctions must be made among Greek-Americans (and Greeks resident in the United States) who participated in the campaign for an arms embargo to Turkey. Several groups or categories may be distinguished. In discussing them, all too briefly, particular attention will be paid to each group’s position toward the military dictatorship which ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974. Such consideration of the groups’ political orientations does not merely reflect my own concerns and biases. In view of the definite connections between the junta’s Cypriot coup d’etat and the Turkish invasion, an individual’s or a group’s attitude toward the junta had definite effects on its behavior concerning the aid embargo.

A first, small but important, category includes politicians of Greek descent, members of Congress as well as other professionals of politics (former government officials, administrative assistants of legislators, etc.). These are in the main highly assimilated individuals, distantly, if at all, attached to their parents’ original homeland. Yet, while other factors (e.g., desire for increased political visibility, creation of an “ethnic” political base, opposition to Henry Kissinger’s foreign policy) may have played roles of varying importance in each case, ethnic origin was undoubtedly an important factor in the decision of some of them to lead the efforts for an arms embargo. It is interesting to note that the relationship of some of these politicians with the other categories of Greek-Americans discussed below was not always close, and sometimes not even friendly. Especially those among them who had taken a strong stand against the Greek dictatorship had often found themselves attacked by the leaders of Greek-American organizations. Finally, it should be noted that many Greek-American politicians, especially those who hold, or have held, important non-elective offices – the political “technocrats” if you will – did not participate in the campaign against Turkish aid.
The second main group consists of the Greek Orthodox Church of America and its leaders. A separate long study would be needed for a proper analysis. The power of the church is much greater among earlier immigrants, and generally among older people, than among more recent immigrants and young people. In fact, during one of his frequent visits to Greece during the dictatorship, the Archbishop complained that Greece was sending to the United States in recent years too many “communists” (meaning presumably people who did not easily fit into the traditional parish patterns of the North American church). The church’s institutional role and activity during the seven-year reign of the military junta was generally favorable to it. Not only had the church leadership no difficulty in accepting the military government as the legitimate successor to earlier Greek governments, but it multiplied its contacts with it and its trips to Greece, it allowed the utilization of the churches as centers for the distribution of propaganda materials, and kept at a distance all groups opposing the dictatorship. Only in 1973, after the replacement of King Constantine by Colonel Papadopoulos as formal head of state, did the Archbishopric begin to express certain doubts; even these, however, did not reach the point of protest against the junta’s repression or tortures in Greece or of any increased tolerance of local manifestations in support of Greek resistance.

In the efforts concerning the Cyprus issue the role of the church was predictably conservative. At the start, the effort was made to limit any grassroots participation to charitable activities (“clothes for the refugees”), leaving any active political role to the (church) leaders. This attempt did not work, but the church kept trying to limit and “keep within proper bounds” any public manifestations or political action. Open condemnation of the past American policies, or any emphasis on the role of the junta was avoided. The symbol of Greek Cypriot resistance to outside pressures from friends and foes, Archbishop Makarios, was rarely mentioned: At a memorial service for the Cypriot dead in the fall of 1974, Archbishop Iakovos achieved the difficult feat of speaking for half an hour on Cyprus without mentioning once his brother prelate’s name. Finally, the church leadership grasped this opportunity to reassert its role as leader and representative of the Greek-American community, as regards both United States political structure and the new Greek Government.

The third category includes traditional Greek-American organizations and associations (some of which are of general membership, while others are based on the place of origin of the immigrants). It is hard to determine the actual importance of these organizations in the life of the Greek communities today. Their constituencies are largely the same as those of the church: earlier immigrants and older people; their leaders are often those who have had some financial success. How representative that leadership is, in terms of the entire Greek-American community, is open to question. During the dictatorship in Greece, the majority of the officials of these associations, whether because of traditional anti-Communism or for other reasons, supported and defended
the junta, stigmatizing as anti-Greek the efforts of those who tried to oppose it. It is highly probable that the great majority of the associations' members had a much more temperate, or perhaps indifferent, stand.

In the campaign concerning Turkish aid, the Greek-American associations' action was somewhat stronger than that of the church. A significant facet of their effort was that, for the first time, large numbers of younger persons, whether recent immigrants or young people of Greek descent, took initiatives and played an important role in the campaign.

The last category includes a rather formless aggregation of individuals and small groups whom we could call, more for convenience's than for precision's sake, the professional elite of the Greek-American community. It consists of academics, students, professionals of various kinds. Generalizations are extremely difficult here. During the dictatorship, this group (along with recent immigrant laborers and skilled workers) provided many of those who actively opposed the junta -- although some of its supporters were also found among them, along with a large proportion of those who neither assisted the dictatorship nor worked against it. The contacts and channels which had been established by many antidictatorship groups with American politicians were particularly useful in promoting the campaign on Cyprus and the arms embargo. It is no accident that most Congressional leaders of the aid ban struggle had also been active in the efforts against the dictatorship.

During the period when the aid ban issue was most active, several ad hoc groups, committees and organizations sprang up. The two most important (and longest lasting) among them were the United Hellenic American Congress and the American Hellenic Institute.22 The former is closely associated with the church and has directed its efforts at grass-roots mobilization of the Greek-American community. The latter has more of an elite orientation, its major effectiveness being its ability to coordinate and assist the activities of members of Congress engaged in the aid ban campaign. Both groups are essentially conservative (in terms of foreign policy and Greek politics) and tend to focus their attacks on Turkey (rather than the Greek junta or United States policies).

It is evident that, at most levels of the Greek-American community, leadership in the campaign for the aid ban was in the hands of relatively conservative elements. While progressive individuals and groups participated actively in the campaign, they were not, in the main, in leadership roles -- they were not the ones President Ford and Secretary Kissinger talked with, or whose comments were reported in the mass media. Indeed, by and large the leadership on the "Greek lobby" side was more conservative than the Congressional protagonists in the struggle, whether of Greek origin or not. In Congress, it was people like Senator Eagleton and Representatives Brademas, Rosenthal and Sarbanes that took the lead. These are liberals, of varying degrees of orthodoxy; more conservative politicians were also found among those voting for the aid ban, but not in leadership roles.

The conservative orientation of the Greek-Americans openly leading
the aid ban campaign may have been helpful in promoting their cause, in view of the general lack of any desire radically to contest established foreign policy tenets among Congressional proponents of the aid ban. Nevertheless, it may also have had some negative impact. Their concern with avoiding broader attack on United States policies toward Greece and Cyprus or any "undue" emphasis on the role and responsibility of the Greek junta, although frequently justified on tactical grounds, may have ultimately lessened the strength of the community's efforts. The lack of any expression of alarm or opposition by the Greek lobby principals to the coup d'etat that overthrew Makarios and invited the Turkish invasion, the participation, and indeed prominence, in the lobbying efforts of persons who had assisted and defended the Greek junta raised difficult problems of consistency and gave easy arguments to the aid embargo's opponents, who waxed sarcastic on the belated appearance of a democratic and legalist conscience among many representatives of the "Greek lobby."

In the absence of thorough empirical studies, it is hard to determine, with any claim to reasonable validity, how effective were the activities of the individuals and groups, collectively called -- by their opponents -- the "Greek lobby," to what extent they determined or seriously influenced the position of the majority of the members of Congress between the summer of 1974 and the fall of 1975. That some political pressure was exerted, and felt, is clear. Beyond this no one can go, at present. One should note, however, that the votes on the aid ban issue are distributed, in the main, in predictable manner across the political spectrum. Despite some notable exceptions, most Democrats, Liberals, and Administration critics voted for the aid ban; most Republicans, conservatives and proponents of Administration policies voted against it. And it is useful to remember that, during the dictatorship in Greece, some of these leaders of Greek-American associations and groups had sought, with strong support from the Administration, to influence legislators in a manner favorable to the Greek junta. Their efforts failed; Congress' stand was much less favorable to the junta than the executive's.

It follows from all this that the decisive importance of the activities of the "Greek Lobby" in the Congressional struggle for the cutoff of aid to Turkey is by no means certain. It is important to remember once again that it was the opponents of the aid ban who, directly or indirectly, gave special attention and publicity to the role of the "Greek lobby," in part taking advantage of the publicity given to its campaign and to the self-promotional efforts of many of its "leaders." In its confidential briefings, the Department of State stressed that this new lobby was most effective; the position (and vote) of a majority of Congressmen was attributed to an effort to capture Greek-American votes -- in contrast, of course, to the objective position of the executive branch which kept in mind only the national interest. Similar points were made by Congressional opponents of the aid ban. Even the Turkish Prime Minister has repeatedly referred to the role of the "Greek lobby" and has attributed to it and to the machinations of the Greek govern-
The Aid Ban Issue As A Constitutional Conflict

The fundamental conflict between the President and an important number of members of Congress over the arms embargo concerns the degree and the manner of participation of Congress in making and applying decisions concerning the country's foreign policy. The President and his Secretary of State insist that Congress has an advisory role in this area, never a decision-making one. The evolution of American constitutional structures and policies in the past forty years tends to support this view. Ever since the time of the New Deal, the initiative as well as the final decisions in matters of foreign policy have been increasingly in the hands of the President (and, of course, his Secretaries of State and Defense). Only in the areas of commercial and economic relations has Congress retained a role which is to some extent autonomous and which is usually manifested not by taking initiatives but by refusing to accept Presidential proposals, until some compromise is reached. With respect to most other topics, Congress has found it sufficient in the past forty years to authorize the President to act within broad discretionary bounds or to approve his actions ex post facto. Secretary Kissinger goes perhaps even further when he insists that Congress not only must not make any of the decisions in matters of foreign policy but must also support -- i.e., must not criticize or undermine -- all Presidential decisions.

Most of the members of Congress who disagreed with the President on the continuation of aid to Turkey are trying to stop and to reverse this evolution of constitutional policy. They argue that Congress is competent to decide along with the President on the principles which govern the country's general foreign policy. They stress that the executive cannot subvert or violate such principles, once they are established, any time it would be convenient to do so. They insist that it is not enough for the President to inform Congress of his final decisions on foreign policy but that he must keep Congress informed and must consult with its members during the actual process of decision-making and implementing. It is this fundamental constitutional issue that is at the center of the dispute concerning aid to Turkey, as it is in other recent disputes between the President and Congress.

For those immediately involved, the central issue in the aid ban dispute is not the substantive one, the Cyprus problem and United States relations with Greece and Turkey, but the question of competence, the jurisdictional issue: who decides concerning the foreign affairs of the United States -- more precisely, since the central role of the executive is not disputed, to what extent is Congress to participate actively in the development of foreign policy?

Substantive issues did affect, of course, in various ways and to varying degrees the position of many of those involved. Each of the substantive arguments (i.e., indignation at Turkish aggression, resistance to Turkish
blackmail over the bases, concern for the legality of United States action, and, on the other side, belief in the need for the bases in Turkey, or in the need for flexibility in the executive's response) probably reflects issues that had some influence on some people. Additional, more or less extraneous, considerations were also of some importance. Turkey's reneging on promises concerning opium cultivation were clearly of determining significance in some instances. Then, several people in both parties were, by late 1974, strongly opposed to the policies and perhaps especially the political style of Secretary Henry Kissinger. The reason for this opposition are many and sometimes contradictory; some consider him far too soft and not aggressive enough, others too conservative and ruthless. The arms embargo gave some people an opportunity to do something to express their opposition.

It is also important that the aid ban issue came to Congress in a particular legal posture, since American politics are particularly susceptible to legal arguments. Americans often give legal formulations to their problems, so as to resolve them on the basis of legal reasoning (broadly defined) rather than as political or economic problems. The manner in which Kissinger handled the entire issue, by essentially admitting an open violation of legal rules and principles, was ultimately favorable to the position of the Congress majority on the issues of jurisdiction and allocation of power.

Precisely because the issue is not primarily one of substance but is related to basic problems of constitutional structure, one should not have expected that a clearcut and final solution would have been given. It was possible to predict from the start that Congress would eventually give in. To begin with, Congress faces basic structural problems which limit radically both its capability and its will to oppose the President in matters of foreign policy. In the issue at hand, its main purpose had been achieved the moment the issue came to the fore. Congressional claims concerning allocation of jurisdiction had now been posed; once this was done, the substantive problem was to a great number of members of Congress of limited interest. On this topic, as on so many others, Congress is not united and has no single position. Many of its members wholeheartedly accept the view that foreign affairs is the exclusive responsibility of the President. Others find the utilization of aid as a means to exert pressure improper and ineffective. The lack of any radical disagreement concerning the basic principles of American foreign policy was also of significance. The debate concerned only means, not ends. Such considerations as the danger of "loss" of Turkish bases or the degree of immediate effectiveness of the aid ban acquired in this context particular importance.

Some Concluding Observations

The Turkish aid ban episode was essentially a United States domestic issue, reflecting the current phase in the secular struggle for predominance between Congress and the President. That it happened at this time, and with
respect to this particular issue, was due no doubt to a constellation of special circumstances. The current lack of a well-settled consensus on foreign policy issues set the stage for a conflict of this type, although, as already noted, there was little fundamental disagreement on principles and basic directions in this particular case.

As with most historical events, many of the more fundamental issues raised were not given any clear or definite answer. The effectiveness of manipulation of aid as a means of pressure was not really tested, in view of Secretary Kissinger's actions in undermining any such effects. The question of the legitimacy of such manipulation, obscured by the legal posture of the issues in this instance, remains a difficult one.

For politically progressive Greek-Americans and Greeks, the role of the "Greek lobby," and the Greek-American community in general, raised another set of problems. Was the effort to stop aid to Turkey, in which most progressive Greek-Americans participated, worthwhile? Or was it predestined to failure, or indeed, given the conservative orientation of "Greek lobby" leaders and the lack of fundamental disagreement on policy among Congressional opponents, did the effort have the unintended effect of increasing the legitimacy of orthodox policy positions? To state the issue at its most extreme, was the whole aid ban campaign a farce, calculated to disorient and neutralize possible Greek efforts of disengagement from United States influence and planned and directed in every detail by "dark forces" in United States (and Greek) politics?

One's answer can only reflect personal perception and convictions. To the extent that the "farce" argument is based on a perception of United States politics as monolithic and subtly but fully manipulated, to the extent it assumes that "dark forces" are in total control and possess the capacity entirely to cover their traces, it may be counterargued that everyday experience as well as more systematic study do not bear out such a view. The complexities of real-life political interactions refute the dogmatic purity of the positions described. One is forced to choose among a limited number of positions and activities available at a particular time. Sitting it out and criticizing the "inevitable" outcome is no substitute for becoming involved and attempting, however hopelessly, to affect events. That those who opposed the arms embargo, starting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, felt seriously threatened by it seems today undeniable. Moreover, in struggling against it, the Administration and its supporters had to give up their impartial, benevolent, outsider's stance and to make clearer their involvement and the considerations on which they base their choice. If it had achieved only this "demystification," in such concrete and clear context, the aid ban campaign would have been justified.

Afterword

The agreement on the status of the United States bases in Turkey, sign-
ed on March 26, 1976, by Secretary Kissinger and Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, is part of Kissinger's counter attack in his war with Congress over control of foreign policy. Blithely disregarding the aid ban agitation of the last year and a half, the Secretary of State undertook to provide to Turkey in the next four years one billion dollars (one fifth of it in outright grants). He chose thus to reaffirm his government's unambiguous support for Turkey, amply rewarding her for the invasion of Cyprus, for her intransigence since 1974, and for her blackmail over the bases. This clear assertion of support comes at a time when negotiations over Cyprus are deadlocked, because of Turkey's refusal to consider any settlement not totally on her own terms, and when Turkey's provocation statements concerning her claims over the Aegean have created a tense, warlike atmosphere between Turkey and Greece.

The Secretary's gesture cannot therefore be seen merely as an expression of concern with "security," military might and foreign bases. It has several important dimensions. With respect to the Soviet Union, it is a reassertion of the predominance of a Cold War approach to military and political objectives. As regards Greece, it is a well-calculated move designed to humiliate and weaken the administration of Premier Karamanlis, with which he is currently negotiating on the fate of United States and NATO bases there and whose efforts towards a more independent stance raise for the Secretary the specter of a Greece which is no longer under the total control of the United States, while remaining within the "Western" camp. Karamanlis' enemies, on the right as well as the left, can now point at the ineffectuality of his moderate approach and his failure to temper in any way the continuing encouragement by the United States of Turkey's intransigence. Kissinger's move is also a challenge to Congress, daring it to vote down the aid proposals - now expressly tied to the status of the United States bases. The Congressional "foreign policy leaders" are already reported to have assured him that his ploy has good chances of success. It remains to be seen whether Congress will once again acquiesce, thus regaining the docile and humble status it had, on foreign policy matters, until a few years ago.

Notes

1. Among several longer articles in English, I have found the following helpful: L. Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus," *Foreign Policy* No. 19 (summer 1975), 34; V. Coufoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question. A Case Study in Cold War Diplomacy," in T. Couloumbis and S. Hicks eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Greece and Cyprus. The Clash of Principle and Pragmatism* (Washington, D.C., 1975); M. Evriviades, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Current History* v. 70 (1976), 18; as well as the studies cited below, notes 3 and 5.

3. Cf., e.g., Christopher Hitchens, "Detente and Destabilization: Report from Cyprus," New Left Review (London), No. 94 (November 1975) 61, at 69: "Andreas Papandreou and Vassos Lyssarides have both analysed the period as one in which the Americans used Greek and Cypriot dupes to stage a coup in Nicosia and provoke a Turkish landing. This analysis is unduly elaborate and fails to explain why it is that the Americans would risk war between Greece and Turkey as well as ditch the junta which they had nurtured for so long in Athens. The idea was much more simply to annex Cyprus and then divide it with Turkey - it failed because they underestimated the strength of Turkish feeling and overestimated the competence of their Greek nominees. Once the attempt to kill Makarios had failed, the Turks had no choice but to defy even their strongest ally and patron."

4. The "leaked" findings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence are conclusive on this point. While the report stressed U. S. intelligence "failure" during the Cyprus crisis, it also notes at one point: "This episode, the exclusive CIA access to Ioannides, Tasca's indications that he may not have seen all important messages to and from the CIA Station, Ioannides' suggestions of U.S. acquiescence, and Washington's well-known coolness to Makarios, have led to public speculation that either U.S. officials were inattentive to the reports of the developing crisis or simply allowed it to happen, by not strongly, directly, and unequivocally warning Ioannides against it." A footnote quotes in this connection an "Internal Department of State memorandum" observing: "It is reasonable to ask whether this U. S. action was perceived in Athens as a reflection of the depth of Washington's concern about Ioannides' scheme to oust Makarios. Clearly General Ioannides had much ground to believe that in light of the direct contact he enjoyed with the CIA station, he would have received a stronger, more categoric warning if the U.S. were genuinely exercised about protecting Markarios, whom he regarded as a communist sympathizer." All quotations are from the text of the report as printed in the Village Voice, Feb. 16, 1976, 69 ff., at 80, 81.


6. For a more detailed discussion of this question, see, Fatouros, supra n. 5, at 29 ff.

7. For instance, as congressional opponents of the Turkish aid ban did not fail eventually to note, successive Greek Governments had sent "secretly" military personnel and United States supplied equipment to Cyprus, but no action was taken by the United States. (It appears moreover that Turkey was not interested in raising this issue, because it was itself engaged in similar activities.) Other cases of selective "blindness" of this sort are legion.
8. The letter was recently reprinted in an opinion by the Office of the Comptroller-General of the United States, in Cong. Record, v. 121 (daily ed., May 19, 1975) at S8630 ff.

9. See, for instance, the House Intelligence Committee report, supra note 4, as well as the studies cited in notes 1, 3, and 8.

10. See, Department of State Bulletin (DSB), v. 71 (1974), 257, at 258. And see also, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1974, 13:6 (Gwertzman); and Sept. 9, 1974, 8:1 (Gelb).

11. DSB, supra note 10, at 261.

12. Suspension of Prohibitions Against Military Assistance to Turkey. Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, July 10, 1975 at 20.


14. Id. at 356.

15. For details on newspaper reports concerning the unpublished legal opinion, see Fatourds supra n. 5, at 35, 36 (and note 66-67, 74).


17. N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1974, 4:3.

18. The most important incident involved a meeting in the fall of 1974 between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and Archbishop Iakovos. The Greek Church leader was told that the Greek Government (at that time, Premier Karamanlis and Foreign Minister Mavros) "understood" and acquiesced to United States policies on the Cyprus issue and in particular to the continuation of aid to Turkey. The alleged contents of a related memorandum by the Archbishop were later published and became the object of much controversy in Greece.

19. Translation from the Greek text, in Kathimerini, July 22, 175.

20. After the July 24 vote in the House, the United States Department of State complained to the Greek Ambassador that his statement constituted "interference" in United States domestic politics.

21. A valuable beginning in this direction is an unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in February 1976, by Sallie M. Hicks and Theodore Couloumbis, under the title, "The Impact of Greek-Americans Upon United States Foreign Policy: Illusion or Reality?" Their succinct description of the "formal" (lobbying groups, see infra note 22), "semi-formal" (associations, press and radio) and "informal" (church) networks of the Greek-American community are particularly useful. And see also note 24, infra.

22. Hicks and Couloumbis, supra note 21, provide valuable summary descriptions of these two groups on which my discussion is in part based. The exact role of other such ad hoc groupings in mobilizing the Greek-Ameri-
can community has not yet been adequately studied.

23. Representative Wayne Hays (D-Ohio) particularly distinguished himself in this respect. See, e.g., Cong. Record, v. 121, H7086 (daily ed., July 18, 1975) and H7422 (July 24, 1975); Hearing cited supra note 12 at p 135.

24. But cf. Hicks and Coulomfia, supra note 21, who attempt a statistical study of the connection between the presence of large Greek-American communities in a constituency and the votes of Senators and Representatives on the aid ban issue. Their preliminary findings are negative, in the sense that no significant correlation can be established. Even if a correlation could be found, of course, a casual link would not be necessarily proven, in view of the several other factors present.

25. Secretary Kissinger's Middle East policies are a prime area of contention. Opposition to them probably induced some members of Congress to vote for the arms embargo. Yet it is difficult to accept the argument that the "Israel lobby" in the United States was mobilized in support of the aid ban. In recent years, the Israeli Government has forcefully opposed President Makarios because of policies which Israel perceived as pro-Arab, and which have been undoubtedly open to non-aligned countries and rather reserved toward NATO. It is rather unlikely therefore that Israel would have suddenly decided to support the position of the Greek Cypriots against a NATO power, Turkey, and contrary to the wishes of the United States executive. Several intermediate or qualified interpretations are of course possible.

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