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No Tunes of Glory: America's Military in the Aftermath of Vietnam (seven book reviews)

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SYMPOSIUM

NO TUNES OF GLORY: AMERICA'S MILITARY IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIETNAM

JOHN P. LOVELL†


During the years from the mid-1960's through at least the early 1970's, the American armed forces fought not one but several wars. The most obvious of these—thanks to the incessant focus of the mass media—was a costly and prolonged war in Southeast Asia. But beyond a war with Asian adversaries, the American military also fought a war of organizational discipline and control. There were also the related drug and race wars, the battlegrounds of which extended from Southeast Asia to virtually every other major overseas location and to posts in the United States. There was the war with corruption, exemplified by PX and service club graft scandals. Finally, inseparable from each of the other wars that raged concurrently, was the one that perhaps will have the most im-

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portant long term effects on the American military profession and on civil-military relations: the war for individual as well as collective integrity and self-esteem within the military.

Some of these wars continue. Whether the American military will emerge from all of the wars defeated (as one of the authors reviewed here suggests) or totally corrupted (as another set of authors implies), or whether, instead, the military will emerge battle-scarred, but wiser and ultimately more competent, are compelling questions. The importance of these questions extends beyond the concern for the well-being of members of the military. These questions involve, as well, such larger issues as the effectiveness of American deterrence and defense, the availability of force as an instrument of diplomacy, the viability of an all-volunteer military establishment, the usefulness of assigning roles to the military other than the traditional ones of combat and preparation for war, the responsiveness of the military to civilian authority, and the extent to which the military is, or should be, integrated into the society as a whole.

Although no consensus emerges from the analyses of these issues in the books under review, the appearance of the books augurs well for an informed solution to the problems. It is rare and perhaps unprecedented that in such a short span of time questions not only of the combat exploits of the American military but also questions relating to issues such as those identified above have become the object of numerous serious analyses. The outpouring of writing on these subjects in the early 1970's is only sampled here. However, the sample has been selected to include works by active-duty military professionals, by ex-military men, and by civilian observers.

THE AUTHORS AND THEIR APPROACHES

The Military “Young Turks”

Four of the authors whose works are reviewed here are military pro-

1. See appendix.

With the exception of Bletz’s book, which is included because of its significance as a work by an active-duty military professional, no book published prior to 1973 is included in the review. The only eligible book to be omitted is SOLDIER, by Anthony B. Herbert with James T. Wooten. Herbert’s views already have received much critical scrutiny, most notably in an exchange with Mike Wallace on CBS-TV’s 60 Minutes.

Absent in the books under review (with the possible exception of the Loory book) is a detailed analysis of the views of the American enlisted man. Such analysis is provided by C. Moskos, in THE AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN (1970); and by P. Barnes, in PAWNS: THE PLAGHT OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER (1972).

This review focuses on analyses of the American military, or the Army, as an institution in the contemporary period, thus omitting more specialized or historical works. Books appearing in the past few years on special topics such as defense spending, national security issues, and strategic doctrine are too numerous to list here.
They are representative not of military officers in general, but rather of the special breed of articulate "young turks" whose challenges to the conventional organizational wisdom may jeopardize their promising careers, or, if embraced by the "right persons" among the military hierarchy, may pave the way to top-ranking billets in the future. They are soldier-scholars who have coupled military experience with postgraduate education in prestigious civilian universities. Broad experience in the civilian academic community has not only familiarized the military "young turks" with a body of relevant social science literature, but it has also enabled them to exchange ideas regarding problems of the military with leading civilian scholars who also are studying them.

Entree to the academic community that is beneficial for scholarly purposes is not necessarily advantageous to a military career. However, each of the four military authors maintains other credentials that even the most narrowly spit-and-polish military colleague understands: combat service in Vietnam, one or more tours at high staff levels in the Pentagon, troop command, graduation from the Army War College or

2. Hauser, Bradford, Brown and Bletz are active-duty Army colonels. Hauser received an M.A. in history at the University of Southern California and subsequently spent a year as a research associate at the Johns Hopkins Center for Foreign Policy Research in Washington, where the book under review was written. Bradford received a Masters Degree in Public Administration from Harvard University, and subsequently became the first military officer to be selected as a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. As a young officer, Brown spent a year at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva as an Olmstead Scholar, returning there for a Ph.D. in international relations. Bletz has done post-graduate work at the American University in Washington, and at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, from which he received a Ph.D.

3. One of the most fascinating hypotheses that Morris Janowitz explored in his landmark study, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (1960) was that whereas the average military professional who attains general officer or flag rank has had a sequence of assignments that represent what is essentially the "prescribed" career path, those flag-rank officers who comprise the "elite nucleus" have had unconventional careers—at important stages; they have departed from "prescribed" assignments to seek ones that are novel or otherwise deemed a risk to one's career. Although the Janowitz data (ch. 8) are inconclusive on the question of the kinds of challenges to the conventional organizational wisdom that might mark one as "a rising star" rather than brand one as merely a troublemaker, it does appear that in the military as in other large organizations, the maverick role is usually risky—but it can have its rewards. Some insight into why the enfant terrible may rise to the top of an organization in spite of the anxieties he generates among the conventionally-minded is provided in Robert Townsend's witty "survival manual for successful corporate guerrillas," UP THE ORGANIZATION (paperbound ed. 1971).

4. Hauser's book, for instance, evolved under the guidance of Robert E. Osgood, Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Research. The Bradford and Brown book was sponsored by the Inter-University Seminar (IUS) on Armed Forces and Society, chaired by Morris Janowitz. Hauser, Bradford and Brown are Fellows of the IUS and participate in its scholarly conferences. Bletz also has been active in IUS, and currently is a member of the governing council of the Section on Military Studies of the International Studies Association.
the National War College. Moreover, each has published articles in military journals, which, if raising hackles in some circles, have elicited support in others and have served to demonstrate the author's genuine concern for his profession.

All the military authors clearly indicate that they feel obligated to call attention to important problems confronting the military precisely because they have concern and affection for their profession. They hope that their work will promote needed reforms. Hauser expresses the thought which, in somewhat different terms, Bradford-Brown and Bletz voice as well:

It would be comforting at this point to say that the fundamental strengths of the military profession are reasserting themselves and that everything will be all right. It might also be more prudent, for an in-house critic. However, ignoring the existence of the Army's problems or the difficulty of finding solutions for them would be a false sort of loyalty.  

Of the four military authors, Hauser is perhaps the most outspoken about problems currently confronting the military. As he puts it in the introduction to the book:

The United States Army is undergoing the most trying period of its long history . . . .

. . . It is a crisis of confidence, born of an "unwon" war, of charges of mismanagement and incompetence attendant on that war, of increasing manifestations of public anti-militarism, and of doubts about the role of ground forces in the era of the Nixon Doctrine. It is also a crisis of conscience, stemming from charges of war crimes and official coverups, service club and post exchange kickbacks and embezzlement, larceny by the Army's top police official, and allegations of self-serving careerism in the professional officer corps. Finally, it is a crisis of adaptation, as the traditionally hierarchical and disciplined armed service attempts to come to terms with the Age of Aquarius—a revolution in American styles, manners, and morals.  

Hauser treats the crisis of adaptation as the most fundamental problem. Essentially he argues that if Army leaders develop the under-
standing necessary to effect the changes needed for successful adaptation, the other crises will resolve themselves. The requisites for successful adaptation include (1) determining what types of individuals should be recruited into an all-volunteer armed force, and what changes of regimen or "life style" are needed to meet recruitment needs; (2) developing an approach to such problems as race, internal dissent, drugs, discipline, and justice that maintains the organizational integrity of the military without pursuing the illusion of isolation from societal influence; (3) establishing standards of professionalism and career incentives and opportunities that reward individual initiative and utilize available talent without sacrificing combat effectiveness.

Brief case studies of the experiences of the West German Army since World War II, of the French Army after Algeria, and of the British Army in the period of the withdrawal from east of Suez are used to introduce the analysis of the American Army. The case studies are too sketchy to provide more than superficial treatment of each of the European experiences. Moreover, Hauser's claim that his goal is "to test the hypothesis that the U.S. Army is now entering a transitional process already well under way in other modern armies . . . ." is unwarranted except in the loosest sense of "hypothesis testing." Nonetheless, Hauser's conceptual framework usefully takes his analysis beyond the question of recuperation from the morass of involvement in Southeast Asia to the broader context of adaptation to a variety of domestic and international dimensions of change in the current era.

Although Bradford and Brown, in The United States Army in Transition, include a chapter focusing explicitly upon the military lessons of the Vietnam experience, they also define the current problems of the Army largely as those of adaptation to a changing international milieu and to social change domestically. Their analysis is generally clear and well written. However, because more than half of the discussion deals with questions of politico-military strategy and tactics and of the effective organization and utilization of ground forces, the book may appeal to a more specialized audience than does the Hauser book. Moreover, there is a platitudinous quality to some of the recommendations that Bradford and Brown make. Nonetheless, the book has many thoughtful

7. Id. at 49.
8. For example, the authors implore their military readers to keep in mind that [t]he professional standard is rigorous. Our reputation must be one of dedicated service, professional competence, personal integrity, and absolute honor. . . . There are no short cuts, no selling gimmicks that need be stressed.

and imaginative ideas, two of which deserve mention: in the first section of the book, the authors rebut the thesis that the American military in Vietnam blundered by using conventional military techniques to fight a guerrilla war; and they conclude the book with an argument for moving away from the Huntington model of military professionalism to a more pluralistic approach.

Unlike the other two books by military authors, Bletz's *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy* does not treat problems of internal discipline and morale, nor those of the domestic social context, in any detail. Rather, Bletz is concerned with examining the following three questions: where the military professional "fits" within the American foreign policymaking apparatus, what the extent of integration of political and military dimensions of policy has been in the recent past and will be in the near future, and how adequately prepared military officers have been to assume responsible roles within the policymaking process. Bletz contends that the post-World War II experience, especially, suggests that military professionals have been increasingly involved in the formulation as well as the execution of foreign policy and will continue such involvement in the future. He argues that the American military should educate all of its professionals to an understanding of what he calls "the politico-military equation," but he is critical of the military for having failed to provide such education more broadly. Instead, he notes that many officers who have risen to high rank have been essentially technicians, largely ignorant of and insensitive to the international-political implications of alternative military policies.

The book is based upon Bletz's doctoral dissertation, and unfortunately in many places it reads like a term paper or thesis rather than a well-edited book for more general consumption. However, Bletz is sensitive to the complexity of the problems which he is analyzing; when he frees himself from his sources to offer his own observations, they frequently are perceptive.

The Ex-Military Critics

Whereas the four active-duty "young turks" share a common approach that offers critical analysis tempered by continuing loyalty to and responsibility for the military profession, the ex-military critics whose works are reviewed here differ sharply with one another in tone.

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9. For example, there is belabored attention to definitional details. There is undue deference to alleged "experts," whose views on various topics are quoted at length throughout the manuscript, resulting in a choppy flow of thought.
and outlook. They also differ from one another in age and experience. Indeed, in some respects the differences are virtually Consciousness I (Walton) versus Consciousness III (Galloway and Johnson). To Walton, a retired Army Reserve colonel whose active service included the lean years of the Depression and World War II, the problem with the military profession today is that it has tried too hard to be like the rest of the society. As a result it has compromised the traditional military ideals. Galloway and Johnson served more recently and for a shorter period of time as junior Army officers during the first years of major escalation of the war in Vietnam (where each served a tour of duty). To them, the problem is that the military profession is dominated by West Pointers who comprise an incestuous network extending from the top policy councils of the Pentagon and even the White House to major industrial contractors and to investment firms in Latin America.

Although Walton’s book went to press before the Galloway-Johnson book appeared, and although Walton is not a West Point graduate, he would doubtless have no sympathy for the Galloway-Johnson thesis. Indeed, in a section of his book chastising young officers who became conscientious objectors and who criticized American involvement in Vietnam, Walton cites disparagingly a newspaper column in which Johnson was quoted as being highly critical of the effects of a West Point education. Moreover, for Galloway and Johnson the “military-industrial complex” is an epithet, the source of untold domestic and international mischief and evil. For Walton, however, the term is merely descriptive of a fact of life, the consequences of which are by no means unfavorable. For instance, in a discussion of military developments during World War II, Walton, now Consciousness II, observes admiringly:

The saga of General Motors and its conversion from “guns and butter” to just “guns” is typical . . . .

The war stories of the other industrial giants of America are equally fabulous; Westinghouse, General Electric, RCA, and Ford all turned in records of accomplishment that are almost beyond comprehension. . . . The military-industrial complex had been born and no harking back would return those halcyon pre-Pearl Harbor days.11

The most provocative part of Walton’s book, and the one he has
drafted with the most assurance, is the final section, entitled "An Army That Fits Our Society's Needs." In the chapters dealing with military justice, Walton takes sharp issue with interpretations such as that provided by Robert Sherrill. The early parts of the book suffer from sketchy research, leading to shaky conclusions. Moreover, throughout the book Walton employs a prose style that would make even some sports columnists wince, for example: "In the early days of the revolution the Redcoats could have made mincemeat out of the colonial rabble that Congress called an army."

The one characteristic that the Galloway and Johnson book has in common with Walton's The Tarnished Shield is the frequent resort to sarcasm in expressing criticism. The target of Walton's sarcasm is less often the military itself than those "soft" or "liberal" elements of American society that he believes have undermined the commitment of the military to its traditional virtues. For example, in a passage critical of the groups who have given aid to deserters from the military, Walton notes with scorn:

It would, of course, be asking too much to insist that members of the Society of Friends be consistent. There are too many centuries of inconsistency behind them. It is much easier to emotionally determine that something is sweet or good, and then do that.

In contrast, Galloway and Johnson direct their sarcasm almost exclusively at West Pointers. In a discussion of a comment in the West Point alumni magazine that had been critical of a journalist's reporting, they assert:

This illusion of understanding is preserved by a solid lack of contact with "distasteful" worlds and by an iron discipline. After all, effective communication often requires changing one's own view of reality. This is a little too much to expect from "America's best."

One senses that the anger that pervades and often distorts the Galloway and Johnson analysis stems from profound disillusionment. Johnson graduated from West Point in 1965, and much of the discus-

13. WALTON, supra note 11, at 5.
14. Id. at 246.
sion of the Academy seems to be drawn from his personal observations. Like a theologically-minded Notre Dame graduate who has made the discovery that his alma mater recruits football players, Galloway and Johnson have discovered, behind the glowing account in the catalog and in other public relations documents, the imperfection of the real West Point. Unfortunately, their account takes us from the virtuous stereotype of the West Pointer provided by academy public relations to an antithetical portrait that also is a stereotype.

Despite the title, only the first three chapters of the Galloway-Johnson book are devoted to West Point itself—its customs and its academic and military routine. However, it is in the remaining five chapters, where the web of links among West Point graduates is traced, that the potential contribution of the book lies. Although Galloway and Johnson treat the “power fraternity” that binds West Point graduates together as unique, the significance of such fraternal ties lies precisely in the fact that they are not unique. Rather, “old boy” networks are prevalent in virtually all governments of the world—in traditional societies, where kinship and other ascriptive criteria for advancement to positions of power are overt, and in so-called “modern” societies where a professed reliance on norms of rationality and achievement criteria for advancement obscures the simultaneous reliance on nonrational and ascriptive criteria. Especially in modern societies, “old boy” networks deserve more careful scholarly attention than to date they have received. This reviewer would hypothesize that a thorough and careful analysis of the workings of such networks would reveal a subtle admixture of ascriptive and achievement criteria—“old boy” ties serving to enhance one’s visibility and sometimes to bypass bureaucratic channels, but seldom guaranteeing advancement in the absence of demonstrated competence. But such subtleties tend to be ignored by Galloway and Johnson. Consequently, although they have gathered bits of information about the careers and interrelationships of more West Point graduates than any other single source provides, the shrill tone with which they interpret the data considerably reduces the potential value of the study.

16. It is of some interest that Hauser joined the Social Sciences faculty for a three-year tour at the Military Academy that year, and Frederic Brown had been on the West Point faculty during most of Johnson’s cadet years, serving there until 1966.

17. To the credit of Galloway and Johnson, their book, along with Loory’s, evoked a favorable review by Gore Vidal in the New York Review of Books, Oct. 18, 1973, at 21. The Vidal review is of interest not for the rather uncritical endorsement that he provides of the two books, but rather for the rambling account that he provides of West Pointers he has known—among others, his father.
Civilian Observers

Like the two books by the ex-military critics, those of the civilian observers of the military afford contrasting styles and outlooks. In the case of the civilian authors, however, the contrast reflects not the difference of generational temperaments but rather that of professional training. Loory, a journalist, is colorful and sharply opinionated. America's armed forces, as Loory describes them, are suffering both the paralysis and the paranoia of defeat. Loory provides a merciless diagnosis of the sickness of the military institution and offers a sweeping prescription for a cure. In contrast, Clotfelter, a political scientist, is restrained and dispassionate to a fault, seldom venturing his own opinion. Instead he moves methodically from historical context to analysis of current policy problem areas. Both books are impressive research efforts: Loory interviewed extensively over a period of several months; Clotfelter conducted an exhaustive search of relevant primary and secondary source materials.

Loory is currently Kiplinger Professor of Public Affairs Reporting at Ohio State University, but he has extensive experience as a journalist. Since his graduation from Cornell University he has served as the Moscow correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune and as the White House correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. In addition, he possessed, for a time, editorial responsibility over Washington news for the Times. In the winter of 1971–72, having left the last assignment, Loory began the research for this book. On numerous visits to American military installations throughout the world, he was "armed," as he puts it,

with a telegram from the Department of Defense asking officers at the bases to extend to me normal courtesies and a letter from the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York to its "Dear Brothers in Peace" asking that its antimilitary representatives in the Far East cooperate with me.18

The research was supported by a grant from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. While at the Center, Loory became acquainted both with Hauser and with Bradford; he acknowledges their contributions to his research.

Although Loory speaks admiringly of Hauser and Bradford and of some of their contemporaries, it is clear that he regards them as the

18. S. LOORY, DEFEATED: INSIDE AMERICA'S MILITARY MACHINE 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LOORY].
exception rather than the rule among military professionals. His book is a sweeping indictment of the "military machine." More generally, he criticizes the militarism that he sees as a pervasive manifestation of the overgrown national commitment to military spending and institutions. Loory's keen eye for nuance and detail contributes to an anecdotal style that is both a strength and a weakness of the book. Loory is often superb at describing the symptoms of the various ailments that have plagued the military in recent years. For example, his chapter on "Hair and Harassment in the Garrison-Ghettos" captures masterfully the ludicrous obsession that military officialdom developed with regulating hair length. The height of lunacy was reached in 1971 when the Army issued a 27-by-17 inch poster to every Army unit describing the officially sanctioned hair length and style, only to issue a follow-up memorandum reflecting General Westmoreland's second thoughts about the standards: "the posters and illustrations represent the outer limits of neatness and grooming required the day before a haircut—not the day after."

However, Loory is better at dealing with symptom than with cause. He asserts at the outset the inference he draws from his various observations of bureaucratic myopia, mismanagement, and corruption:

The American military machine today is not qualified to protect the nation's vital interests in situations short of nuclear exchange. There is some question that it could function properly even in that ultimate holocaust.

Such a finding would be truly alarming if substantiated; but Loory's anecdotal data simply do not provide a basis for either accepting or rejecting the proposition. Moreover, the assertion is relatively insensitive to the possibilities for change. Even in the few months since Loory's book was published, changes of Army personnel policies have provided greater stabilization of tours of duty both for officers and for enlisted men, thereby also enhancing the climate of leadership and training. Moreover, the Army has taken positive steps to deal with its racial frictions and with its drug problem. The point is that most of Loory's observations were perceptive at the time he made them; but the implications drawn from them for the state of the military in 1975 and 1976 are of questionable accuracy.

19. Letter Memorandum, Warren K. Bennett, Major General, Secretary of the General Staff, in id. at 172 (emphasis in original). As Loory wryly observes, "Thus did Major General Bennett succeed in making the posters depict, instead of legally sanctioned styles, haircuts that were within a day of becoming illegal." Loory, supra note 18, at 172.

20. Id. at 10.
Clotfelter is a member of the political science faculty at Emory University in Atlanta. Like Bradford and Brown, he has received support in his research efforts from the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society; and like Bletz, he has been affiliated with the Section on Military Studies of the International Studies Association. He received his Ph. D. from the University of North Carolina and has specialized not merely in defense politics but rather in American politics more generally. Far more than the other authors under review, Clotfelter displays a sensitivity to the kinds of data that would be required to substantiate or to refute the alternative propositions that he investigates.

His examination of the nature and political impact of the "military-industrial complex" (ch. 4) is an especially noteworthy example of Clotfelter's attentiveness to evidence on various sides of pertinent questions. In marshaling data on defense spending, he notes: (1) that by 1970 the greater share of the defense budget was devoted to research and development and to materiel procurement; (2) that the core of such spending went to defense contractors, rather than to the military establishment per se; (3) that, contrary to many New Left theories, the period of major escalation in Vietnam was "more burdensome than bountiful" for most defense contractors; (4) that Vietnam, on the other hand, was a mere temporary departure from a trend in which defense contracting is increasingly done with firms (aerospace and electronics) almost totally reliant upon a government market for their goods; (5) that much of the inertia supporting the maintenance of various weapons systems and defense contracts comes from the ten percent of the labor force employed in defense-related industries; (6) that "almost 90 percent of contract awards have been negotiated under 17 exceptions to [the Armed Services Procurement Act], with 55 to 60 percent of contracts being single-source negotiated arrangements;"21 (7) that neither the depth of their training nor their continuity in office adequately equips most military officers who handle procurement decisions to make the fifteen million annual purchasing decisions for the armed forces, or the follow-up decisions regarding performance by the contractors.

By discussing the military profession within a broader complex that includes elements of industry, labor, academe, Congress, and civilian components of the military services, Clotfelter usefully moves from the

conventional perspective of "civilian control of the military" to broader questions of countervailing political influences and political accountability. On the other hand, because his approach directs less attention to the military profession per se than to the "defense establishment" as a whole, it tends to be insensitive to the individual and the collective crises of identity and self-respect that military professionals have been experiencing in the transitional years of the early 1970's.

THE "LESSONS"

Several years ago, during one of the first conferences convened to perform a postmortem on American involvement in Southeast Asia, Albert Wohlstetter wisely cautioned that "of all the disasters of Vietnam, the worst may be the 'lessons' that we'll draw from it."\(^2\) The warning has special applicability to questions regarding America's armed forces and might be restated in somewhat broader terms: of all the disasters that the American military has experienced in the crisis period of recent years, the worst may be the lessons that are drawn from the experience. Perhaps sensitive to the warning, several of the authors reviewed here show reluctance in moving from diagnosis to cure.

Bletz argues that the military profession must become more sensitive to the "polito-military equation," and he outlines several steps necessary to accomplish the goal; but otherwise he makes few policy recommendations. Walton confesses in his concluding passage that there may be no answer to the present plight of the American armed forces:

All that can be done is to batten down the hatches, ride out the storm, and hope for the day when the Army will again become the shining shield of the Republic.\(^23\)

Galloway and Johnson offer no suggestions. Instead, they conclude their book with a grim scenario of West Point Dr. Strangeloves run wild:

Is Vietnam the terminal point for America's love affair with counter-insurgency? No—not if it is up to the West Point military, whose officers have gained valuable experience in guerrilla warfare, whose new weapons have been developed and tested on the people of Asia, and whose "lessons learned" conferences have eagerly approved the new, revised techniques

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23. WALTON, supra note 11, at 255.
—totalitarian control of the population, massive dispossession of the peasantry, and ruthless technological reprisal with bombs and chemicals rather than troops against those who stray. . . .

. . . All the rationalizations used to deny the fact of revolution in Vietnam are being reapplied in the U.S. to classify dissent as insurgency. . . .

. . . And so, blind until the end as to whose words "beget violence and destruction," the West Pointers seek to apply the "techniques" of Vietnam to the "solution" of America's problems. Morality is their possession, order is their cry, and stability is their goal—a uniformed America marching on a West Point Plain that extends from coast to coast. 24

In sharp contrast, Clotfelter's concluding chapter, like the body of the book, offers a balanced appraisal of his findings regarding defense spending, the military-industrial complex, militarism, and civilian control of the military; but no advice is offered.

Hauser, Bradford and Brown, and Loory are less shy about advocating specific reforms. Each has a great deal to say about what ought to be done in this period which each views as an important transition in the life of the American armed forces and of American society. In varying degrees, all these authors believe the military is confronting the dilemma of reconciling the needs for combat readiness with the development of an all-volunteer force that has sufficient short-term and career appeal to attract and retain the necessary skilled and dedicated personnel.

The detailed proposals offered to resolve the dilemma differ from one author to another. For instance, Loory would have the military abandon all overseas garrisons and assume a posture for defense of the United States only. Such a restricted role could be performed, Loory asserts, with a far smaller force than the present one. The officer corps, especially, would be reduced in the Loory plan. Surprisingly, he would require all young men and young women to commit a year to some form of public service to the nation. Bradford and Brown also would reduce the officer corps, especially at general officer levels. Similarly, they would trim the chain of command by eliminating a number of headquarters and staffs. Nevertheless, they would retain American forces in Europe and in Korea. Hauser would maintain the Army

roughly at present levels, while trimming somewhat the number of troops deployed abroad. However, differences among the authors are less significant than the similarities in their recommendations. Basically the authors are pleading for the acknowledgment of the organizational and societal facts of life facing the military in the 1970's.

Structurally, the armed forces are a complex of organizations that are highly diverse in terms of their missions, composition, and skill requirements. Moreover, military units perform their duties within a wide variety of operational milieux; for example, the close quarters of a nuclear-powered submarine, the recurrent element of risk for an airborne infantry battalion, the bureaucratic maze of the Pentagon.

In recognition of the organizational complexity of the military, Loory advocates adapting disciplinary measures to the distinctive needs of the particular unit. Hauser, Bradford and Brown would agree with Loory's point; but they go further in developing it. Hauser would explicitly designate certain Army units as the "fighting Army," those known now as the "combat arms" plus such support elements as would actually be on the battlefield in time of war. Other units would be designated as the "supporting Army." Not only would standards of discipline differ from "fighting Army" to "supporting Army" (along the lines Loory has suggested), but the length of duty tours, promotion and retirement policies, the degree of isolation from civilian communities, and even the uniform that is worn would differ as well. For instance, whereas those members of the "supporting Army" serving either stateside or overseas would have tours of duty of three to four years, members of the "fighting Army" would serve overseas for only six months to a year at a time. Whereas members of the "supporting Army" serving overseas would be provided with facilities enabling them to bring their families with them, members of the "fighting Army" would serve overseas without their families, devoting most of their time abroad to rigorous field training. They would then return to a designated stateside "home post" (where, for married service personnel, their families would

25. For example, missions vary from infantry basic training to electronic systems maintenance to air-sea rescue. Composition diversity is reflected in high versus low levels of prior education, racially mixed versus racially homogeneous groupings and pyramidal rank structure versus top-heavy rank structure. Skill requirements vary from labor intensive to machine intensive tasks and from high to low technological complexity.

26. Loory says:
The standards necessary for men in the combat arms must remain rigid. Orders must be obeyed on command without discussion or dissent. But elsewhere in the bureaucracy that is much of a modern military machine, different standards can easily prevail.

Loory, supra note 18, at 381.
be living) for longer tours of three to four years.

The Bradford-Brown approach is similar to Hauser's. They call for a "pluralistic Army" with two main components, a "combat Army" and a "support Army," the composition of each corresponding to that suggested by Hauser.

These advocates of pluralism for the military recognize more than the reality that the armed forces are a large complex of diverse organizations. They recognize, as well, the need—made especially acute with the transition to an all-volunteer armed force—to adapt to changing societal values without sacrificing combat effectiveness. Bradford and Brown realize that relaxation of the standards governing life styles may be an inadequate response to the problem. As they put it:

Attempts to develop one life style satisfactory to attract and retain [the airborne infantryman, on the one hand, and the sophisticated electronics repairman, on the other] . . . may result in an unhappy compromise—an undisciplined infantryman and an unhappy technician each continually frustrated as he seeks greater technical competence. The Modern Volunteer Army concept may be just such an unhappy compromise.

Unfortunately, the least-common-denominator life style can be a source of alienation and frustration. Alienation develops from dissatisfaction with the dishonesty and pretense surrounding attempts to enforce one pattern of conduct. Frustration develops as the individual seeks the life style he wants. One man finds satisfaction in a highly structured, authoritarian environment of high traditional esprit and danger while another craves the satisfaction of vocational improvement leading to union journeyman status in a comfortable environment.27

Similarly, Hauser argues that a "dual culture" Army will attract personnel with the distinctive attributes and attitudes needed by each of the two components. The spartan, physically demanding regimen and lifestyle of the "fighting Army" will appeal to a segment of young men because of features "which have appealed to youth from time immemorial: adventure, manliness, the smartness of the uniform, and what Teddy Roosevelt called 'the rugged life.'"28 On the other hand, because the demands and life-style provided in the "support Army" would be similar to those of analogous jobs in the civilian sector, an adequate cross-section of men and women could be recruited if the pay were

27. Bradford & Brown, supra note 8, at 178.
competitive. Hauser also suggests that lateral entry at mid-career into the "support Army" be permitted "so that the organization could more readily adapt to technological change." 29

The pluralism that Bradford and Brown, Hauser, and, to a lesser extent, Loory propose represents an imaginative and constructive response to the problems of effecting a transition to an all-volunteer armed force in the aftermath of Vietnam. 30 Moreover, the reforms anticipated as necessary in implementing pluralism would largely remedy many of the ills that these authors, and the others reviewed here, have diagnosed. However, one wonders if the authors have gone far enough in their proposals to "make military service safe for diversity" (if one may take some liberties with the slogan John F. Kennedy adapted from an earlier one by Woodrow Wilson). Hauser and Bradford-Brown correctly argue that some of the social amenities and relaxation of rules appropriate for support units might detract from the effectiveness of combat forces. However, the worrisome possibility is that "effectiveness" will be sought (1) at the expense of liberties and protections that even the GI preparing for combat ought to enjoy; and (2) at the cost of squelching mavericks and dissidents whose views might contribute to more enlightened policies. In an era when suppression of dissent and invasion of privacy have occurred within the society as a whole in the name of maintaining "national security," it seems appropriate to examine with careful skepticism the restrictions upon individual liberty that would be "required" in order to maintain a "combat ready" army. It seems important also to continue the process of reform of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 31 Hauser's is the only book of the three that describes the process to date in any detail; but even he refrains from advocating expansion of the protection offered to the individual, even though the rationale for treating military "justice" as merely an instrument of discipline has eroded. 32 One questions whether the proposed reforms in the direction of pluralism will have more than a cosmetic effect unless the risks attached to "rocking the boat" are reduced. 33

29. Id.
30. Charles C. Moskos, Jr. is among the most prominent students of the military who for some time have been advocating a pluralistic military. See, e.g., the work cited by Bradford and Brown: Moskos, The Emergent Military: Civilianized, Traditional or Pluralistic? (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1971).
33. The annual efficiency report is a particularly insidious factor that has heightened these risks.
Loory may be exaggerating somewhat in his claim that the related "ticket punching" approach to career planning in the military has produced "a generation of yes men." However, one wonders what the career survival rate will be of "young turks" who occasionally say "no"—or at least "now, wait a minute!"—in response to official edicts, programs, or policies that they regard as ill-advised. Moreover, aside from concern for those who have the security of established professional reputations—like Hauser, Bradford, Brown, and Bletz—one wonders what the retention rate will be among junior officer "young turks" and young enlisted men who speak out. The problems of the efficiency report and "ticket punching" are acknowledged by Hauser and by Bradford and Brown. But the problems merit more detailed analysis, and, to repeat, the continued prevalence of the problems raises the question whether the authors have gone far enough in their proposals to "make military service safe for diversity." However, if reform in the direction indicated is to occur, advocacy for change will have to come not only from military "young turks" but also from the civilian sector.

In his concluding passage Hauser is, without doubt, on generally solid ground in warning that unduly radical proposals for reform of the military advanced by civilian critics may prove counterproductive. If military professionals regard criticisms from external sources as unfair or superficial, they will become more defensive and resistant to change. The other side of the coin, however, is that "young turks" within organizations seldom succeed in effecting reform without the assistance of external pressure or support for change.

The fate of the proposals for change in the State Department, set forth by various task forces, is instructive. One of the most challenging and insightful of the task force reports is that on the "Stimulation of Creativity." Noting at the outset that "an organization which seeks to establish a climate conducive to creativity must be willing to tolerate dissent, if not actually to encourage it," the task force concluded by observing what was required of top leadership in the Department if reform is to be attained:

The biggest effort to bring about this change must be made at the top. The top leadership sets the tone for the rest of the organization. The leaders of the Department have asked us to give them our ideas on how to stimulate creativity in the

34. These task forces are published in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8551, DIPLOMACY FOR THE 70's: A PROGRAM OF MANAGEMENT REFORM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1970).
Department and the Foreign Service. They must now ask themselves whether they are really prepared to live in an organization where creativity flourishes—where the habitual intellectual mode is innovative, skeptical, nonconformist, where the received wisdom is habitually questioned, where established policy is habitually challenged as a matter of sound professional practice, where the Ambassador’s leadership reposes less on traditional status than on sound management principles, where youth is allowed to participate in the decisionmaking process.35

Unfortunately, abundant evidence suggests that top organizational leadership is not prepared to make the changes necessary to adopt the recommendations that they have solicited from the task forces. The reply of a bureau chief and former member of the Task Force on Creativity to a question posed by this reviewer aptly describes the situation. He was asked: “What have been the effects of the task force recommendations on the organization and operation of the department?” “Zilch!” was the reply.36 An ironic footnote was provided a few weeks after this discussion when this man was dismissed from his position as bureau chief by Secretary Kissinger. According to a Senator quoted by Evans and Novak, the reason for the dismissal was that he had “contradicted the secretary and expounded on his own interpretation of the disputed point” in a top-level policy discussion.37

The American military establishment, like the State Department, is likely to experience significant change only if the voices of the “young turks” advocating change are reinforced by external support, or even demand, for change. The books reviewed here go only part way in developing a program for reform; but they go far in identifying and highlighting problems that vitally deserve attention.

35. Id. at 291, 336.
36. The discussion occurred at the State Department early in 1974.

APPENDIX

A number of general works on the American military were published in the years 1970–1972, including: C. Ackley, The Modern Military in American Society: A Study in the Nature of Military Power (1972);

Edited collections were omitted from this review. However, there are several recent ones of interest, including: *The American Military* (M. Oppenheimer ed. 1971); *Civil-Military Relations: Changing Concepts in the Seventies* (C. Cochran ed. 1974); *Conscience and Command: Justice and Discipline in the Military* (J. Finn ed. 1971); *The Military and American Society: Essays and Readings* (S. Ambrose & J. Barber, Jr. eds, 1972); *Military Force and American Society* (B. Russett & A. Stepan eds. 1973); *Military Honor After My Lai* (W. McWilliams ed. 1972); and *New Civil-Military Relations: The Agonies of Adjustment to Post-Vietnam Realities* (J. Lovell & P. Kronenberg eds. 1974). Also the product of a number of contributors, although one author assumed responsibility for synthesizing the contributions, is *The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society* (A. Yarmolinsky ed. 1971).

Some interesting collections of studies on the military have appeared as special issues of periodicals in recent years also; these include: *The Military and American Society, 406 Annals* (March 1973); *Military Sociology, 16 Pacific Sociological Rev. no. 2* (April 1973); and *The Military-Industrial Complex: USSR/USA, 26 J. Int'l Aff. no. 1* (1972). Similarly, special reports have been published by *Congressional Quarterly, The Power of the Pentagon: The Creation, Control and Acceptance of Defense Policy by the U.S. Congress* (1972); and by the *North American Congress on Latin America, The U.S. Military Apparatus* (1972).


It is worth noting that the number of works published that deal with the American military establishment shows no sign of diminishing in the months ahead. Among the books scheduled for publication in the near future are M. Mylander, *The Generals* (New York: Dial Press); J. Ellis & R. Moore, a book about West Point to be published by the Oxford University Press; and a collection of original studies by various military officers who have participated in "Young Turk" conferences at the Air Force Academy. Richard Rosser, who was largely instrumental for the conferences as Chairman of the USAF Academy Political Science Department prior to his retirement from the Air Force, is editing the volume, tentatively entitled *The Military Force for the Twentieth Century* (not yet under contract).
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