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statute did not depend on the sponsor’s consent to the licensee to drive on any particular occasion.

A New York statute\(^49\) imputes the negligence of the driver to the owner of the car if the driver was driving with the owner’s permission. This statute imposes an agency relationship on the owner and operator where there was none at common law, irrespective of family relationship or the age of the operator. Under the New York law the result in the Roland case would have been different and it seems preferable to place the loss on the one who has placed the car in the minor’s hands rather than on the signor who has no control over a situation such as that.

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A PERSPECTIVE ON NON-LEGAL SOCIAL CONTROLS:
THE SANCTIONS OF SHAME AND GUILT IN REPRESENTATIVE CULTURAL SETTINGS

INTRODUCTION

Particular modes of behavior tend to characterize any human community and distinguish it from all others. The observation that “morals are relative” is familiar enough, but disapproval of conduct in one society that merits praise in others is not the only factor making a group unique. Certain mannerisms and patterns of behavior simply remain outside the moral code or customs of any one society for the reason that it would seldom occur to its members to act differently, or at the very least, they would have no difficulty resolving the question if faced with a choice between the accepted way and possible alternatives. Folkways in this category (shaving the face and not the scalp, rather than the reverse, would be an instance, as would the use of eating utensils) are wholly accepted by the community and are contravened by virtually no one in it because there is no strong motivation to induce an alien course of action. Murder, theft, rape and adultery, on the other hand, are examples of behavior which at times have motivational roots deeply embedded in biological or psychological bases, and as might be expected, are inclined to manifest themselves in every society to some extent.

Of the behavior patterns actually found in a community, it may be said that they are either “sanctioned” or that they are not. In its technical usage unsanctioned behavior, contrary to appearances, does not signify disapproval of a particular act by the group, but rather indifference:

\(^{49}\) N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 59.
the act fails to elicit a response of any description from it. Sanctioned behavior is that which causes members of the community, or functionaries in whom authority is vested, to react—whether the reaction be for or against—thus tending to encourage or discourage the behavior in question. Positive sanctions may generally be said to express the approval of the community for the performance of expected duties, the fulfillment of obligations, attempting to live up to or surpassing norms of conduct the group regards as ideal, or even refraining from reprehensible deeds. Positive sanctions customarily depend on some sort of reward, the bestowal of rights and privileges, or the acquisition of prestige for their effect. Negative sanctions, conversely, are reactions of reprobation on the part of the community toward the conduct of one or more individuals, which conduct may consist of socially disapproved acts or, alternately, a failure to act positively in adhering to rules or discharging duties or obligations imposed by the community. Negative sanctions as a rule take the form of punishments, penalties, the denial of rights and privileges, or the loss in some manner of prestige, rank or status. Sanctions may be expressed with varying degrees of intensity, depending on how strongly the society, or segments of it, feel about the particular behavior. Members of the community may register their approval or disapproval spontaneously as individuals, or may follow traditional and recognized procedures. Or, authority to act in behalf of the community may be placed in the hands of certain persons or with special institutions. Sanctions imposed by such constituted authorities, whether political, military or ecclesiastic, are designated legal sanctions.1 To the extent and in the ways sanctions are employed, conduct of the individual is regulated and conformity to the established social pattern is maintained.

Sanctions appear to arise in response to a need felt by the community to enforce throughout the entire group notions collectively held concerning what is desirable and what is undesirable behavior. The unity and even the perpetuation of the group would seem to be founded, at least in part, in its members sharing the same or essentially the same credo.2

1. XIII ENCYC. SOC. SCI., Sanction, Social 531-34.
2. "... [I]t is not the effects of the sanction upon the person to whom they are applied that are most important but rather the general effects within the community applying the sanctions. For the application of any sanction is a direct affirmation of social sentiments by the community and thereby constitutes an important, possibly essential, mechanism for maintaining these sentiments. Organized negative sanctions in particular, and to a great extent the secondary sanctions [those which enforce "rights" between individuals, rights such as are found in modern property, tort or contract law], are the expression of a condition of social dysphoria brought about by some deed. The function of the sanction is to restore the social euphoria by giving definite collective expression to the sentiments which have been affected by the deed... or by removing a conflict within the community itself. The sanctions are thus of primary significance...
Small social groups, whose relationships do not extend far and which are not complex, are able to achieve the measure of conformity and control necessary to all communities without resorting to the use of legal sanctions. Hoebel has set forth a comprehensive statement of the reasons for this.  

The informal, or non-legal, mechanisms of social control—with an especial emphasis on the sanctions of shame and its parallel, ridicule, plus consideration of their counterpart, guilt, where appropriate—will be the primary focal point of this investigation, both in societies which rely on them almost exclusively and in those where they are employed merely as a supplement to legal sanctions. A greater understanding of the nature and limitations of social control, and of particular means typically employed to attain that end, may be afforded by proper consideration of the non-legal sanctions in their wider perspective—in their complementary or supplementary role with respect to the legal or authoritarian sanctions. With this prospect in mind, it is proposed first of all to conclude this introduction by reviewing a number of theoretical formulations suggested by recent psychological inquiries regarding the impact of shame and guilt sanctions on the individual. Whatever insight provided by these researches into the reasons behind the unquestionably potent effect informal sanctions appear to have in molding human behavior may be of some use in evaluating the empirical materials presented in sections following immediately thereafter. This latter information has been largely extracted from reports prepared by field investigators, and the intent here is to disclose a sufficiently detailed view of the modus operandi of non-legal sanctions that their resultant translation into an astonishing degree... in that they are reactions on the part of a community to events affecting its integration.” Id. at 533-34.

3. “As for law, simple societies need little of it. If the more primitive societies are more lawless than the more civilized, it is not in the sense that they are ipso facto more disorderly; quite on the contrary. It is because they are more homogeneous; relations are more direct and intimate; interests are shared by all in a solid commonality; and there are fewer things to quarrel about... [that] informal mechanisms of social control are more generally effective. Precisely as a society acquires a more complex culture and moves into civilization, opposite conditions come into play. Homogeneity gives way to heterogeneity. Common interests shrink in relation to special interests. Face-to-face relations exist not between all the members of the society but only among a progressively smaller proportion of them. Genealogical kinship links not all the members as it did heretofore but only a progressively smaller proportion of them. Access to material goods becomes more and more indirect, with greater possibilities for uneven allocation, and the struggle among the members of a given society for access to the available goods becomes intensified. Everything moves to increase the potentialities for conflict within the society. The need for explicit controls becomes increasingly greater. The paradox (albeit only a paradox for those who unwittingly assume that civilized people are more moral than uncivilized) is that the more civilized man becomes, the greater is man's need for law, and the more law he creates. Law is but a response to social needs.” HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 98.
of social conformity in the selected cultural areas may be rendered intelligible.

The feelings of shame and guilt brought on by certain acts, or even thoughts, are universally acknowledged to have a powerful influence on the behavior of human beings, both as a goad to particular kinds of activity and as a deterrent to other kinds. There seems to be little question but that for this reason they are looked to by many social groups to do the serious work of enforcing conformity, yielding up a considerable part of this task to legal sanctions only under the impersonal conditions encountered in civilization or in otherwise heavily populated areas. (As we shall see, however, the sanctions of shame and ridicule have remained unusually effective far into the advanced stages of civilization and dense population in at least one major instance, that of Japan, due to unique circumstances there.)

It has been customary until quite recently for anthropologists to classify human societies as "guilt cultures" or "shame cultures," depending on whether the emphasis of the non-legal sanctions in a particular culture tended to be such that the individual transgressor of its mores felt a sense of "guilt" rather than a sense of "shame" upon completing his antisocial deed or thinking his antisocial thought. The usual way of describing how shame and guilt function as social sanctions was to say that one who was motivated by feelings of shame was hypersensitive to the opinions of others and oriented his conduct almost entirely so that he would receive only praise from them, and never condemnation—which was emotionally intolerable to him—while on the other hand the guilt-ridden person had all his standards of propriety and impropriety instilled firmly within himself, presumably in childhood, and almost always referred to them when contemplating a particular course of action rather than try to make an estimate of what his associates would think of the act. Both want to do the "right" thing: the former thinks that what other people think is right is right; the latter "doesn't care what others think," he knows his principles will guide him along the path of righteousness. When the shame-driven individual misestimates others' reactions, or is compelled by some other more powerful psychological drive to do what he knows will be condemned, and is in fact soundly derided, he feels "ashamed" of himself; when the guilt-ridden person transgresses his inner principles, usually because of the overwhelming force of some con-
flicting need of the psyche, he feels “guilty.”

The intrapsychic processes which, when subjected to appropriate conditioning influences, produce character structures typically found in the respective shame and guilt cultures may be said to function in somewhat the following manner, according to the conventional explanation as related by Piers:

. . . guilt feeling requires the formation of a Super-Ego . . . and consequently, it belongs to a comparatively late stage. The dynamic requisite for shame is merely that the process of Ego-finding be under way. Shame has much to do with body function and body performance as such; guilt requires another object—that, too, speaks for a later development of guilt. Comparison with others and awareness of “inferiority” must occur quite early, most probably earlier than any guilt feelings can.

4. One who is shame-sensitive has an advantage over his guilt-motivated cousin: he is safe until someone learns of his misdeed—if he “gets away with it” he has no reason to feel shame. The other, however, feels guilty even if he is not caught. He has sinned and he can not keep it from his “conscience” even if he can keep it from the rest of the world. It may be noted, on the other hand, that guilt has compensations of which shame cannot boast: one with pangs of conscience can have his psychic burden removed by simply confessing his evil deed or thought—to a religious functionary if his internalized sanctions came from that source, or even to secular parties such as psychiatrists (but often baring one’s soul to mere casual acquaintances will do) if the moral training was of unspecific origin, but he who is shamed must carry his shame with him. He always knows that others know of his humiliating behavior, and must live in mortification of the knowledge—unless by chance he is able to redeem himself in the eyes of others by doing something they highly approve of, and thus help them forget the time he revealed what a loathsome, detestable person he was, by demonstrating on the contrary what a noble, sterling fellow he in fact is. (Most “shame cultures” make some such provision for unburdening the feeling of shame. If they did not it is expected that private accumulations of shame would become socially disruptive, perhaps culminating in mass suicides, suicides being frequent enough in such places and mainly because of overdoses of shame. And, too, making it possible to start with a clean slate by doing praiseworthy acts promotes another aim of the society and of sanctions in general: encouraging desirable behavior.) But it must be said of “guilt cultures,” that it not be made to appear that they possess an unfair advantage of some sort over “shame cultures,” that most people in them never do get rid of all their guilt feelings (or a generalized sense of guilt without rational basis, which endows the individuals in question with an unconscious craving for punishment), and thus continually manifest outwardly the anxieties and tensions by which such psychologically injurious phenomena may be recognized. The reasoning back of this may be described briefly as follows: along with all the other moral baggage acquired in the childhood of most individuals come prohibitions against the expression of impulses—such as those of aggressiveness and destructiveness, as well as the familiar sex impulses—which are instincts quite as natural to the make-up of man as are any of his physiological or physical characteristics. Guilt-ridden persons are taught in their nonage not simply that these impulses ought to be controlled since uncontrolled they are not useful and may actually work to one’s disadvantage in human society—quite unlike their alleged usefulness to man in his primordial, simiad state—but rather that such psychic propensities are “evil” and something to feel guilty about. The impulses cannot be gotten rid of, so the guilt stays on ad infinitum.
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have developed.\(^5\)

Dr. Piers substantiates this view by reference to authorities such as Erikson, who, in his comprehensive Ego-development scheme, relates that shame (which he associates with "Doubt") is the "specific obstacle in the task of first establishing . . . 'autonomy.'"\(^6\) "Visual shame precedes auditory guilt."\(^7\) And in personal communications with other experts on early development (E. Sylvester, H. Ross and Th. Benedek), he learns that their view is much the same:

. . . shame must be based on that particular form of anxiety that comes about when the original unit with mother is first broken, the child starts to walk away and master the environment on his own. He has to learn how to depend on "long distance" directions from the parent conveyed through auditory and visual rather than through the more primitive contact senses. The important signals cease to arise directly from within the original mother-child unit, but come from another person, a "watcher" and "caller."\(^8\)

It may therefore be useful to characterize the Super-Ego as the repository of conditioned responses brought about by the reaction of parents or parental images to the child's behavior, in reference to which the child will subsequently respond in analogous situations. The Ego-Ideal, on the other hand, represents the later accumulation of moral standards and identifications which come largely from peer groups—siblings, childhood "gangs," schoolmates, professional group and social class—even though, as mentioned previously, conditioning for this receives its initial impetus from the mother at a very early age. It would thus appear that there is little difference between the two concepts, but actually a significant distinction is to be found and that is in the nature of the threats posed to the individual contravening the standards he has in one way or another absorbed from the external world. The real or imaginary threats to which he responds for transgressing the mandates of the Super-Ego are those of mutilation or annihilation, \textit{i.e.}, the punishing aspects, the wrath, of the parental images. The basis for this is the "Law of Talion," or the allegedly universal principle of retaliation—"an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." The individual comes to the awareness, ir-

\(^{5}\) Piers and Singer, Shame and Guilt—A Psycho-analytic and a Cultural Study 30.
\(^{6}\) Ibid.
\(^{7}\) Id. at 31; Erikson, Childhood and Society 223.
\(^{8}\) Id. at 31.
rationally and perhaps only unconsciously, that for expressing—or even acknowledging—his partially muted, inborn impulses toward aggression, destruction or incest, that mutilation, annihilation or castration in return will be his just desert. In fact, what takes place is that in accordance with the principle of projection, he tends to "project" his own primitive, destructive impulses into another, and so sees that other as he himself actually is. Thus it follows that without a punitive parent-image, based either on historical reality or projective imagination, and which plays such a large part in the formation of the Super-Ego, no one develops a sense of guilt.9 The threats held out by the Ego-Ideal, that is, shame, are of an entirely different sort:

Shame . . . occurs whenever goals and images presented by the Ego-Ideal are not reached. . . . Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the fear of contempt which, on an even deeper level of the unconscious, spells fear of abandonment, the death by emotional starvation. The parent who uses as educational tools the frequent exposure of the child's immaturity . . . will be the one to lay the foundation of such fear of contempt. We suspect, however, that the deeper rooted shame anxiety is based on the fear of the parent who walks away "in disgust," and that this anxiety in turn draws its terror from the earlier established and probably ubiquitous separation anxiety.

Withdrawal of love can be a threat only from positive images. It is as if the loved parental images, or the projected power and life sustaining sources of one's own [feelings of] omnipotence threaten to abandon the weakling who fails to reach them. Accordingly, on a higher, social and more conscious level of individual development, it is not fear of active punishment by superiors which is implied in shame anxiety, but social expulsion, like ostracism. . . . [I]t is not the malevolently destructive eye [i.e., "evil eye"], but the all-seeing, all-knowing eye which is feared in the condition of shame, God's eye which reveals all shortcomings of mankind.10

The foregoing seems clear enough, and is in all probability more than adequate for our purposes. Unfortunately, however, the simplicity of the analysis outlined above may lure the unsuspecting into thinking that all the literature on this subject exhibits the same comforting recon-

9. Id. at 6.
10. Id. at 16-17.
Nothing could be more misleading: the entire body of treatises and references is replete with conflict and conceptual discord. There is, for example, the widely adopted position that what differentiates shame from guilt is that the former arises in response to "external" sanctions, i.e., society reacts to the individual's behavior, shaming him, whereas the latter is the result of "internal" sanctions, by which is meant the individual looks only to his own inner moral code as a measure of his conduct or thoughts—if he violates those standards, he feels guilty. But several investigators have hopelessly confounded this theoretical distinction by describing the existence of a phenomenon designated by them as "internalized shame," in which the subject's behavior is oriented by an "eidetic," or fantasy, audience. Internal shame, in other words, is the feeling of shame that a person, knowing how others would respond if they had seen him commit a particular act, experiences exactly as though the others had in fact witnessed it. Presumably, this occurs as a conditioned response, the response of shame (or fear of rejection by society) having been conditioned to the act itself, irrespective of the actual presence or absence of an audience.

Other disquieting elements should be noted in passing to emphasize the doctrinally untidy state of affairs here, but they need not detain us.

11. "In a recent paper Mead notes that shame has sometimes been 'internalized to such an extent that an Indian alone in the middle of a lake could be so ashamed by his paddle breaking that he would commit suicide.'" Id. at 51 quoted from Mead, Collective Guilt, in PROCEEDINGS, INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MENTAL HEALTH (London 1948).
12. Ibid.
13. Fenichel, for instance, in his book THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS, insists that "being ashamed of oneself" be classified under the heading of guilt. Piers and Singer, op. cit. supra note 5 at 9. Reider, on the other hand, contends that shame is used by some as a defense against a more intolerable sense of guilt. Ibid.; Reider, The Sense of Shame, 3 SAMIEKAA 147 (1950). But Erikson, at least, evidently is not in full accord with this view: "Shame is an emotion insufficiently studied because in our civilization it is so early and easily absorbed by guilt." ERIKSON, op. cit. supra note 7 at 223. Dr. Piers, commenting on this analysis, states that the "author distinguishes between these two tensions very clearly . . . ascribing their respective onset to different stages of development," despite his subsequent admission that Erikson "prefers to think of the shame-impulse 'to bury one's face, to sink into the ground' as 'essentially rage turned against the self' which is an important guilt mechanism." Id. at 9-10. Piers quotes Franz Alexander as a "good example of both the greatly advanced understanding and the still remaining unclarity" in the literature on shame and guilt: " . . . in spite of the fact that in structural terms inferiority feelings and guilt feelings can be described with the same formula as a tension between ego and ego-ideal they are fundamentally different psychological phenomena, and as a rule their dynamic effect upon behavior is opposite." Dr. Piers concedes, however, that "It would seem almost imperative that emotions phenomenologically and dynamically so different would also differ structurally," Id. at 10. See also Alexander, Remarks about the Relation of Inferiority Feelings to Guilt Feelings, 19 INT. J. OF PSA. 41 (1938). On the same point Dr. Piers in another context states that he prefers "to use the more inclusive term 'shame' rather than 'inferiority feelings.' The latter term implies comparison with external figures . . . [and] does not well describe that particular inner tension which stems from failure to reach one's own potentialities [i.e., failure to bridge the gap between the Ego and the
Nor do they require us, simply because we are forewarned of the folly of asserting any one view as incontestable gospel, to consider ourselves precluded from sifting through the medley of conflicting observations in an effort to set aside the more dubious claims and, by way of summarizing, focus on those findings which appear not only to be of greater substance, but as well seem more likely to be accommodating to the stated design of this project. Discarding the "internal-external" criterion, which appears to be completely devoid of usefulness at this time as an indicator of shame or guilt, would be an obvious step in this direction. A phenomenon such as "internalized shame" does not thus loom on the scene as an anomaly. It is then no more deserving of special comment than guilt: if it is irrational, in a situation of "internal shame," for an individual's act to have as great an impact on him as when an actual audience is present, then it is just as "irrational" for him to succumb in utter resignation to non-existent threats of punishment upon the performance of certain acts for the sole reason that, years prior, those same acts were accompanied by actual threats of punishment. The nature of the threats posed to the individual, that of rejection and abandonment in the case of shame, and that of punishment, mutilation or annihilation in the case of guilt, remains as the most serviceable and valid means of classifying these two entities, and can be applied in the above instance without difficulty. Further, should a comprehensive rationale eventually be offered for the occurrences to which a number of authorities have drawn attention—that, for instance, shame is sometimes transformed into guilt, or is absorbed by it, or is often set up as a defense to a more intolerable sense of guilt (see footnote 13)—no obstacle presently discernible would of necessity disturb this elemental proposition.

Two Primitive Culture Areas

It has been the practice until recently, when re-examinations of a more painstaking character caused serious misgivings about it, to regard primitive groups, almost without exception, and virtually all the societies

Ego-Ideal by not reaching the goals and living up to the images presented by the latter."

PIERS AND SINGER, op. cit. supra at 15. In fact, it is not at all evident that the one term is more appropriate than the other. It is perfectly plausible that a person could feel as "inferior" about not measuring up to the abstract standards presented to him by his Ego-Ideal as he does about unfavorable physical comparisons, or comparisons of performance, with others. If he does not feel "inferior" about inability to live up to the Ego-Ideal image, what is it that he does feel? In either case it is the threat of rejection that troubles him; why should it matter conceptually whether the image to which he compares himself is abstract or "real"? The abstract standard, after all, is nothing more than generalizations distilled down from the entire compass of norms emanating from the individual's peer groups, thus the distinction between this and specific instances of comparison with members comprising these groups is largely a semantic one.
of Asia as "shame cultures," while restricting the term "guilt culture" to those of Western Europe and the Americas, that is, the Americas since the influx of European settlers and European ways. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the highly individualized sense of guilt prevailing in the latter has been responsible for their "progressiveness," i.e., industrialization. The general consensus in Western civilizations that hard work, thrift and continence are ennobling, when linked with the uneasy sense of guilt which descends upon a person imbued with the "Protestant Ethic" should he momentarily backslide into the false ways of indolence, improvidence and profligacy, makes the perfect setting for the accumulation of machines and factories. In fact, the process of capital accumulation becomes all but automatic, and perhaps even irreversible. Thus, to the lack of guilt-feelings and a "conscience" in non-Western countries may be attributed their obduracy in taking up the call to ever-increasing technological mastery of the physical world. A. L. Kroeber is one among a number who has registered dissent toward this view. In his book, ANTHROPOLOGY (p. 612), his skepticism is revealed in these words: "the reputedly independent and separate verdicts of Anglo-Saxon anthropologists on Asiatic, Oceanic, native American, and African cultures, that shame is a far more influential motivation in them than a sense of sin, does not really specifically characterize these cultures nearly so much as its opposite—conscious sinfulness—characterizes Anglo-Saxon and Protestant culture." The outcome of this controversy, however, need not deter us from actually looking into several culture areas in which, even if the "shame culture—guilt culture" distinction is not wholly

14. Id. at 46. And Dr. Singer himself stresses that it is not difficult "to point to many developments of modern history which cast serious doubt on the neat correlations between shame and guilt mechanisms on the one hand, and the major trends of technical, social, and moral development on the other. . . . Many progressive changes have occurred and are going on now without the prior or even simultaneous development of the "Protestant personality": the industrialization of Japan and the more recent beginnings of the process in India and China. There are nonindustrialized cultures, like that of Islam, with absolute moral standards, which are effectively enforced for the general population not by an 'inner voice' but by the pressures of law and public opinion. Within the West itself, the belief in the individualized sense of guilt as the standard bearer of civilization and progress has been considerably shaken by studies which seek to link the major pathologies of modern civilization—war, dictatorship, and mental disease—to the 'heightened sense of guilt.' And some students of the West have discovered the emergence of a new radar-like mechanism of character formation which functions more like the group-mindedness of primitive cultures than like the individualized conscience upon which the West has prided itself." Id. at 46-47. A particularly forceful statement of the latter point has been made in RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD, A STUDY OF THE CHANGING AMERICAN CHARACTER, in which the author elaborates the thesis that the typical American is no longer as "inner-directed," i.e., guided by principles and absolute standards of morality inculcated on him in his early years, as his forebears were, but is rather increasingly "other-directed," that is, responsive to the casuistic evaluations of his associates.
valid, it is evident at least that public opinion plays a very significant role in character formation. But before embarking upon a more detailed examination of shaming practices and institutions in the specific places that have been singled out for study here, it will be advantageous to briefly establish the relationship between the use of non-legal sanctions and the educative process in general.\(^5\)

Public shaming and ridicule should be seen in their broader context as simply one part of the overall educative process undertaken by primitive societies, rather than as isolated, totally unrelated phenomena. Civilized peoples, as well, recognize the necessity of transmitting the established cultural patterns—their traditions, beliefs, ideals and aspirations—to the younger generation if the culture is to survive.\(^6\) But there is a difference in the way the problem is dealt with: anything like school systems familiar to us appears to be totally lacking among primitives, and therefore they must resort to other procedures and institutions.\(^7\) Pettit warns of drawing the wrong inference from this; indeed, the methods employed by primitive societies, he feels, are considerably more effective in attaining educational goals than is a modern school system, which is often expected to shoulder the entire burden by itself. This is especially so concerning the vital task of instilling the community’s ideals and traditions in the youth, in order that the world view peculiar to the culture may go on unimpaired from generation to generation.\(^8\) His description of this process in the following passage is particularly illuminating:

\[\ldots\] primitive education was a community project in which all

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15. It should be noted that non-legal sanctions are not unique in this respect. A number of eminent students of Western judicial institutions have recognized for some time that courts in our system, particularly appellate courts, are not confined to the functions of resolving disputes and applying the law only, but in addition fulfill a distinctly educational role in our society. The higher court’s almost instinctive reaction to dispose of cases before them by means of opinions with a pronounced didactic aura about them, rather than simply deciding the matters without further ado, is rendered more understandable in this light. Of course, there is merit to the contention that appellate courts ought to demonstrate the logic of what they do, but this proposition does not adequately treat of the conspicuous moral overtones revealed in these decisions, or of the horatory mold into which the opinions are cast.

16. “The psychology of the child presents the same social problem to all cultures . . . [in effect] a ubiquitous factor tending to promote culture parallels and convergences, not to mention influencing culture diffusion.” PETTIT, PRIMITIVE EDUCATION IN NORTH AMERICA 14. “Cultural ideals have changed, but cultural goals fall largely into the same categories.” Id. at 3.

17. Perhaps the situation would be more aptly stated the other way around: the circumstances of primitive life permit education to be successfully achieved without the establishment of formal schools.

18. It is his view, however, that this fact may well be turned to our own advantage: “Through study of such school-free efforts we may obtain a clearer conception of the manifold ramifications of the process of conditioning children and of safeguarding a culture pattern.” PETTIT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 3.
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reputable elders participated at the instigation of individual families. The result was not merely to focus community attention on the child, but also to make the child's education a constant challenge to the elders to review, analyze, dramatize and defend their cultural heritage. Their own beliefs, understanding and faith, their personal integration in the culture and their collective unity, all were promoted by the necessity of assuming the role of educators of their children. . . . In primitive society the stimulus to elaboration of a culture, to dramatization of it in the minds of all elders and to strengthening of its historical and logical plausibility comes more certainly from the children, who enter the social group as total strangers, than from any other source. In modern society, perhaps, much of this stimulus is being absorbed by the school system . . . and has become so highly institutionalized that the need for transmitting culture to the younger generation is no longer reflected in the culture as a whole. . . . [T]he gradual concentration of responsibility for education in school systems has led to a sloughing of responsibility by other agencies. . . .

The situation is significantly different on the primitive level; for no single institution exists there to meet the educational need. As a result all institutions, or at least the great majority of them, have to see to their own perpetuation. The educational role which they play is largely unformulated and even unconscious, and it is for this reason, perhaps, that its importance has been overlooked. . . . [T]his accessory function has influenced the character and, not improbably, stimulated the development of the institutions concerned.19

Not only does the process seem inevitable, but according to Pettit, to state it solely in terms of an effort to effect cultural transmittal is to do an injustice to the great vigor and gusto with which the whole enterprise is undertaken. So much so, indeed, that serious doubt is cast over the belief that man is by nature a progressive animal, being bent, rather, on frustrating any conceivable possibilities for change, at least cultural change.20

19. Id. at 3-5.
20. "... [T]here are many students of anthropology and sociology who admit that the human mind, protected from distracting environmental changes, seems to exhaust its ingenuity in mastering and then maintaining the cultural status quo. . . . Cultures may differ widely, but all must approach each other most closely in education, for the simple reason that they cannot develop a peculiar kind of infant to fit their needs. They must take what nature gives them—an infant who is more like all other infants in the
Perhaps one of the reasons primitive peoples succeed in firmly implanting in their offspring the community's cherished beliefs and ideals, whereas we, for example, with our elaborate schools and other pedagogically oriented institutions often fail so dismally that a typical end-product of this years-long, compulsory system cannot even formulate an intelligible account of the basic precepts of the American credo—let alone develop a cogent defense in their favor—is that educational methods adopted by primitives show a high order of sophistication and ingenuity, if not to say a thorough-going understanding of practical human psychology, an understanding superior, it has been alleged, to that demonstrated by modern theories of education.

This apprehension of preliterate folk for what a society must do to indoctrinate the younger generation seems to include not only an awareness of the advisability of all adults in the community taking an active part in the educative process, and of practicing what they preach, but also the importance of not entrusting education of the children to mere chance imitation of their elders. Very little is left to either spontaneous imitation or individual initiative of an experimental variety, though in the past practically all of the credit for education among primitives had been erroneously assigned to spontaneous imitation. An elaborate system of rewards and punishments to promote the cultural ideals and behavior recognized as desirable by general consensus of the community, which at the same time discourages frowned-on activities, will customar-
ily be found in full operation in most preliterate societies. The bestowal
of specific privileges and the imposition of artificial restrictions are ex-
pedients extensively relied on, and can readily be identified as the incen-
tives for particular achievements which, they feel, are in the final analy-
sis a measure of maturity. Such devices actually push the child toward
full-fledged adult responsibility; the earlier years are designed quite pur-
posely to be less carefree than they might be in order that the child does
not see adulthood as something disadvantageous by comparison, making
him reluctant to qualify for the new status.22

Primitive man appears also to appreciate fully the more fruitful
possibilities of positive sanctions vis-à-vis negative sanctions, in his search
for ways to promote social conformity and make his children more amen-
able to those ways. Because in all social groups negative sanctions are
more definite than positive ones,24 the temptation is to believe that they
are more effective as well—a view which research has not borne out.
Though the present study is directed primarily at the negative sanctions
of shame, ridicule and guilt, positive sanctions are of such consequence
that to neglect them altogether in a discussion of informal social controls
is to suggest a schema that is somewhat less than authentic. Praise, the
positive counterpart of the negative sanctions of ridicule or condemna-
tion, is especially indicated to receive distinction and precedence as a
technique for effecting social conformity. Primitive man and modern
psychologists are in accord on this.25 The efficacy of praise can un-

23. "Childhood was not permitted to be an unadulterated pleasure which the child
would dislike to leave. Arbitrary restrictions were numerous enough to add tangible
desirability to the acquisition of the skills and status of the mature individual. More-
over, the process of maturation was not only distinguished by the sequential removal of
restrictions, but was also given additional significance by the granting of publicly sanc-
tioned rewards in the form of social privileges, and decorative rights. The primitive
peoples gave more than lip service to the ideals which they sought to inculcate in their
children. Those ideals were recognized in tangible and important ways, and there was
less confusion of purpose generated in the minds of children than is true where achieve-
ment of social ideals does not guarantee power, prestige, and other social rewards." Id.
at 57.


25. "[A] reacting audience or environment, one that praises success or condemns
failure, but particularly one that praises success, stimulates learning. Lack of reaction
from the environment has the opposite effect." Pettit, op. cit. supra note 16 at 47,
quotted from AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, op. cit. supra note 22 at 124. "If any
practice is generally resulting in satisfaction, the practice will be continued. The use of
artificial rewards or punishments merely carries out this idea; it is, in fact, a form of
conditioning. . . . Of the two methods, the reward is more effective. . . ." Ibid. quoted
from JENSEN, PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILD BEHAVIOR 446. " . . . [P]raise seems to precede
ridicule in the life of the Indian child, and take precedence in the reaction of the group
toward the individual. In other words, an ego, like a balloon, must be inflated before
it can be punctured, and must be patched and occasionally reinflated if it is to retain its
vulnerability." Id. at 50. "Primitive man wants, above all, to shine before his fellows;
he craves praise and abhors the loss of 'face.'" Id. at 47, quoted from LOWIE, ARE WE
doubtedly be attributed to the positive, outward-going influence it has in character formation, as contrasted with the destructive, stultifying effect negative sanctions often have. Primitive societies value praise more highly, perhaps simply because this fact is all too evident to them; hence they employ it if not exclusively, then at least in preference to derision and detraction. Margaret Mead has illustrated this well in her study of Manus children:

... every gain a child makes in acquiring independence and dexterity is noted and used as a new basis for further stimulation. Whole groups of busy men and women will stop to encourage a child's first step, but they ignore its first fall. The only way the child holds an audience is by doing things and trying again. A boy who has been allowed to steer the family canoe can get it into difficulties without arousing a change of expression on his father's face, but the moment he succeeds in getting the canoe out of danger he receives an immediate word of approval.28

The foregoing considerations should provide a more adequate basis for an appreciation of what appears at first glance, to those outside a particular cultural arena in any event, phenomena of a most bizarre species, such as the exaggerated sensitivity of individuals who are part of the primitive community structure to shaming devices, ridicule and public opinion in general.

Shaming Techniques of North American Indian Groups. Compliance with cultural patterns within the primitive tribes of North America, according to Pettit, is largely a result of the same mode of dealing with children as has already been set forth in some detail. From birth on the child is conditioned to praise and ridicule, often with the willing cooperation of the entire adult community. In effect, there is a socially recognized ladder of privilege up which the individual climbs to prove he is progressing toward maturity. Besides the removal of artificial restrictions, there are rewards for advancing up this ladder, such as public recognition through forms of etiquette, terms of address, titles, precedence in social gatherings, ceremonial homage and styles of address and adornment. In this, too, primitive societies are not alone, but it is not

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28. Id. at 47-48, quoted from MEAD, GROWING UP IN NEW GUINEA 26-30.
NOTES

far off the mark to say that they are outstanding in this respect, and are therefore deserving of study, Pettit thinks, by cultures that by and large neglect such practices.²⁷

Some of the specific procedures employed by North American Indian groups to bring home to the individual the importance of public opinion, and to utilize these collective value judgments to maximum advantage for purposes of integration and perpetuation of their respective cultures, are presented in the following paragraphs:

a) Trivial or ridiculous names were often conferred upon young children and would not be changed until the individual child had in some way distinguished himself. These "might be applied just before or at the beginning of puberty when pressure was being brought upon the individual to assume the responsibilities of maturity."²⁸ The nicknames would call attention to some peculiarity of appearance, behavior or experience.²⁹ Even if the youth were as far along in age as the usual onset of puberty when he first had to contend with the approbrium of such a nickname, the process of conditioning apparently had progressed to the point that he did not have to learn further the significance of public opinion in regulating his life. Indeed, about the Quinault, Olson writes that "a youth was sometimes so sensitive about his nickname, especially if he were of high birth, that no one but the professional joker of the village dared twit him about it."³⁰ However, the actual pedagogical effectiveness of these names depended "... on the opportunities provided to gain a better name through good behavior or self-development and personal achievement. ... [T]here is always the implication with nicknames that the individual overcomes their ridiculousness or triviality by his own efforts along socially approved lines."³¹

The nicknames play an important educational role, as it has before been intimated, because "... primitive society was capable of acting in unison, and ... there was little chance of escaping from a sanction set within the group. Osgood has said of the Kutchin: 'Children who do not behave are talked about by the whole group. The children do not like this and often mend their ways.' So long as his parents have not transgressed against the code of proper behavior toward children, the force of social pressure is seldom if ever diluted by non-conforming

²⁷. Id. at 48.
²⁸. Id. at 61.
²⁹. Id. at 53.
³⁰. Id. at 61, quoted from OLSON, THE QUINAULT INDIANS 101 (University of Washington, 6 Publ. in Anthropology No. 1).
³¹. Id. at 62-63.
adults or age-mates to whom the transgressor can flee for sympathy or support.\textsuperscript{32}

b) Generally, the right to ridicule with impunity was limited in North American primitive tribes. A distinction could usually be made between sanctioned and unsanctioned ridicule. The reason for the restricted use of ridicule appeared to be the heightened sensitivity of people to it. Unsanctioned attempts at ridicule tended to end in catastrophe, e.g., suicide or even murder: "If an antient Man should say to a young Man, by way of Reproach, before others, Thou Hast No Wit, he would presently go and poison himself, they are so sensible of Ignominy and Disgrace."\textsuperscript{33} And an Ojibwa man killed the one who had "... made a slighting reference to his nose, even though he knew it was a most peculiar organ, it having been badly chewed in a brawl some years ago."\textsuperscript{34}

Among the Iroquois ridicule that otherwise might involve considerable risk could become sanctioned when their most popular dance, the War Dance, was being performed. By making a gift to the dancers one could then speak for two or three minutes on any subject. He could, as he chose, sing praises of himself, condemn social transgressors in general or satirize particular individuals—and seemingly no suicides took place as a result of the latter.\textsuperscript{35}

Further indication of the delicate treatment the use of ridicule had to be accorded might be seen in the tradition of assigning particular individuals, who could in addition be disciplinarians in other matters, to the task of carrying out ridicule the community felt was necessary. Quite often these persons were thought to have supernatural protection, and perhaps this is why they could indulge in what otherwise would be dangerous mockery. If other-worldly guardians were not relied on in this way, resort would often be made to concealing the identities of the principals. The agents of ridicule would be masked or somehow disguised. One of the more amusing instances of this, in which anonymity was achieved in great numbers, was related by Wissler in his \textit{Social Life of the Blackfoot Indians}. "Caustic remarks about some individual were shouted at night from inside a tipi on the far side of the great camp circle and taken up in gleeful chorus by hundreds of voices until the air reverberated and the victim dared not show his face until he had accom-

\textsuperscript{32} Id. at 62, quoted in part from OsGooD, \textit{Contributions to the Ethnology of the Kutchin} 147 (Yale Univ., Publ. in Anthropology No. 14).
\textsuperscript{33} Id. at 50. Stated in reference to the Iroquois, as quoted from Hennepin, \textit{A New Discovery of a Vast Country in America} 550.
\textsuperscript{34} Id. at 50-51, as related in Tanner, \textit{Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner During Thirty Years Residence Among the Indians} 175.
\textsuperscript{35} Id. at 51, taken from Morgan, \textit{League of the Iroquois} 258.
plished some great deed to wipe out the disgrace."

In the same tribe, "An unpopular chief, whom, perhaps, no one dared ridicule to his face, would be treated to the ignominy, one dark night, of having a frightened colt, which had been given a sound whack on the hindquarters, headed into his lodge entrance." 37

c) Primitives, too, have long recognized the influence woman has had, immemorially, over her menfolk. Accordingly, in certain Indian tribes the ridicule privilege was theirs—especially the potential wives of the individuals concerned. "[I]f a Cree youth showed cowardice on a war party, his best girl composed derisive songs and sang them publicly." 38 "Mandan and Hidatsa girls who had won distinction in feminine pursuits would ridicule young men of their age-class who had not yet won war honors." 39 "Among the Pueblo, boys who went on hunting trips and came back without any game were jeered at and mocked by the girls." 40

d) Even ridicule which was not fraught with so many calamitous consequences was relegated to particular persons in the community. This was nothing exceptional, however, for most forms of disciplinary practice were the responsibility of someone outside the immediate family group. "One fundamental practice of the primitive peoples . . . is to reserve to those groups intimately concerned with the allegiance of a youth, the pleasantest educational tasks, and to place the responsibility for the majority of the unpleasant duties upon some outside individual or agency. . . . It is more correct to say of primitive peoples that parents avoid disciplining their children if possible, than it is to say that children are not disciplined [as many observers had previously supposed because of the conspicuous absence of these activities on the part of the parents]. . . . If there was any recalcitrance to be overcome, the parents called in a relative or a friend or some warrior or leader to perform the disagreeable duty." 41 (Perhaps this is a lesson we would do well to learn from "uncivilized man," whose understanding of human nature apparently is not fettered by notions of the "rationality" of human beings. This is especially so in view of the universally acknowledged—and socially

36. Ibid., quoted from this work of Clark Wissler in the Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, No. 7, pt. 1, 24.
37. Ibid., quoted from McClintock, THE OLD NORTH TRAIL 298.
38. Ibid., quoted from Harmon, A JOURNAL OF VOYAGES AND TRAVELS IN THE INTERIOR OF NORTH AMERICA 308.
40. Ibid., quoted from Bandelier, THE DELIGHT MAKERS 22.
41. Id. at 15.
disruptive—tendency for deep-seated, though repressed, hostile feelings to develop in parental-filial relationships—which often even death does not eradicate.) This “discipline by outsiders,” when it is of the derisive, satirical sort, is so well marked that it is often referred to in anthropological literature as “the joking relationship,” but, as Pettit remarks:

No explicit identification of the joking relationship with ridicule as a form of social coercion and stimulus, or more pertinently, as an incentive to learning and achievement, has come to my attention. This may result from the fact that the comments passed between individuals having this relationship may be mild and seemingly harmless. It should be remembered that they gain their force from the previously acquired sensitivity of the individual, and from the publicity given. It is the chorus of snickers that greets the jest, and the allusions to it later, rather than the jest itself, that strikes home.42

Sometimes cousins, either true cousins or clan cousins (children belonging to fathers of the same clan), would have this joking relationship. “A Mandan or Hidatsa boy who had just achieved a war honor might publicly give some other boy who was his joking relation a public, humiliating haircut, to stimulate him to do likewise by indicating that so far he was remiss.”43

The “avunculate” relationship often encountered in primitive societies, in which the mother’s brother appears to have taken over most of the responsibilities for raising her (his sister’s) children—responsibilities we normally would expect of the biological father—seems more often than not to be accompanied by this joking relationship. Pettit therefore feels that a better view of the avunculate structure is not the traditional one that saw it as an inevitable result of the kind of provisions for property inheritance usually obtaining in societies based on matrilineal descent—a view which has never been adequately understood, perhaps because of the prejudices of Western investigators who invariably inclined to focus on the inheritance of property—but rather that it is a natural concomitant of the educational procedures preferred by primitive peoples. The evidence he adduces to substantiate this cannot be reviewed here, but would appear to warrant more work along these lines.44

e) As the effectiveness of belittling names as an educational incentive, and thus as an instrument of social control, depended on the op-

42. *Id.* at 51-52.
43. *Id.* at 52, quoted from LOWIE, *op. cit. supra* note 39 at 42-43.
44. *Id.* at 17-24.
portunities for their removal through the expiatory procedure of performing laudatory deeds, in like manner did much of the effectiveness of derisive public opinion derive from the fact that the good graces of the community could be won back by positive action. An observation made of tribes of the Northwest Coast may serve to especially stress the point. There it was noted that an "... individual takes vigorous steps to wipe out the disgrace of events which make him a potential butt even though they are accidental in nature, and regardless of any indication of a public intention to use them as a basis of ridicule."  

f) Not only is the growing child not left to his own devices in acquiring skills that would make him economically self-sufficient (in fact, even the spur of personal hunger is almost universally avoided in the training of children), being instead beset with every possible incentive, both positive and negative, but the same approach is taken toward learning the art of war—which, of course, in large part is a matter of survival as well. "[R]idicule is a strongly emphasized aspect of war training. Warriors seek to mock the neophyte by treating him as a girl, or by playing jokes on him, or making him a servant."  

g) Perhaps it cannot be inferred that primitives were aware of the psychologically unsatisfactory aspects of corporal punishment both in the socialization of the child and in the regulation of adult behavior, but the fact remains that they made very little use of it, and when they did, it seemed to have but little potency compared to the far more effective techniques they had developed. "The whole control of the local group in aboriginal days seems to have been exercised by admonition and mild ridicule instead of by force and punishment."  "Children were taught that good conduct would earn a reward and evil conduct would bring sorrow... a few words of praise from a parent or an elder was regarded as the highest prize that could be given for good conduct. A child would strive with all his might to win such praise while he would be indifferent to bodily punishment. One punishment that was always a bitter one to an Indian child was to have his faults told to a visitor or friend."  "Because the local groups [of the Northwest Coast] themselves are small kinship bodies they are able to handle their internal personal problems on other than legal bases. Shaming suffices for this, 'The big stick which is relied on in this control system [is] not physical punishment, but social attacks upon the extremely vulnerable egos of the members of the

45. Id. at 53.  
46. Id. at 75.  
47. Id. at 53 and authorities cited therein.  
48. Id. at 50, quoted from WISSLER, THE AMERICAN INDIAN 189.  
49. Id. at 49, quoted from ALFORD, CIVILIZATION (As told to Florence Drake) 19-21.
“Zuni sanctions are extraordinarily negative, the fear of being shamed. . . . [but] Zuni individuals [are not] controlled by organised external sanctions, such as execution, banishment, official plunder, etc. . . .”

h) Among the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island, where not only is a “quick reaction to the sentiment of shame” found, but the peculiar institution of the “potlatch” has developed to inordinate proportions, the two may often go hand in hand. By means of “potlatching”—the orgiastic destruction or distribution to others of large amounts of valuable property—ordinarily a man rises in social status or maintains the social status he already enjoys. But we are informed it can be used as well to eradicate the humiliation of a shameful situation: “When a young prince capsized in a canoe, his father felt it necessary to wipe out the shame of this trivial accident with the distribution of property.”

i) Shaming is often used to resolve disputes in family relations and otherwise enforce a society’s notions about sexual morality. Where chastity is highly esteemed, promiscuous wives or even unmarried women are often made the object of derisive abuse. But among the Zuni even a “. . . married man who is promiscuous in his sex relations is shamed in public by his wife, who chooses some public ceremonial to make her gesture of disapproval.” Or, a man may publicly shame his wife into giving him a divorce if she otherwise will not. And there was the case of a man, “who, when he learned that his wife was dancing in a dance in which only unmarried women may participate, was so ashamed that he did not attend.”

j) It is difficult to conceive the expression “dying of shame” as being anything but figurative, but apparently such a belief would only serve to illustrate the differing degrees of intensity with which shame is felt in various cultures. “On the Northwest Coast . . . an individual unable to show himself superior to a situation that has shamed him commits suicide or ‘dies of shame.’ The chief who discovered that his eldest son had married the common daughter of a youngest son died of shame, not because the marriage was considered incestuous but because his son had been tricked into a low marriage.” Moreover, even though one

51. Mead (Ed.), Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples 495.
52. Id. at 205, quoted from Boas, Contributions to the Ethnology of the Kwakiutl 132 (Columbia Univ., Contributions to Anthropology).
53. Id. at 333.
54. Id. at 339.
55. Id. at 206, quoted from Boas, op. cit. supra note 52 at 412.
who has undergone an extremely mortifying experience does not "die of shame" directly, in the sense that the emotional impact is in some imperfectly understood way psychosomatically fatal, shame may drive him to the point of taking his life by his own hand. In certain cultures suicide resulting from shame has developed to such an extent that it is virtually an institutionalized practice. As such, institutionalized suicide may often be regarded as a measure of the degree of ego development in the society, hence as a measure of the responsiveness of the individual to shaming techniques and their prevalence in the society.  

k) Mead states that shame may become internalized when it is very strongly developed. Speaking of the Ojibwa she reports that "... the group takes a comparatively passive part in defining the situation as shameful but permits the vulnerable ego of the individual to declare itself shamed before them."  

It is suggested that this is an example of the confusion still prevalent in the matter of shame and guilt. This would seem more like atonement by way of public confessional, and Dr. Mead, by her own words, admits that this is more a characteristic of guilt than shame: "Guilt ... represents a disordered state within the psyche which can be righted only by atonement. ... In societies in which the individual is controlled by fear of being shamed, he is safe if no one knows of his misdeed; he can dismiss his misbehavior from his mind. ... But the individual who feels guilt must repent and atone for his sin."  

And in the same passage she describes guilt as a "... response to a past threat; for the Arapesh to the threat of loss of love if aggression has been manifested, for the Manus to the threat of loss of support if the emotions have not been controlled and socially directed."  

But if the analysis of Piers and Singer holds valid, we must see shame as a response to a past threat as well, though a threat of a different order than that found in guilt: it is the threat of loss of love—which Dr. Mead has just identified as the threat involved in guilt feelings. It appears that contradictory reports such as these will continue to be written until there is more agreement about the actual nature of the phenomena, and until the fundamentals—if full accord can ever be reached on them—are more widely disseminated among field investigators who must deal with these concepts.

By way of concluding, the fact should not be lost to sight that the material presented here is meant to illustrate merely the ways in which

56. Id. at 488.
57. Id. at 494.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
shame and ridicule may be used as social sanctions. While it is thought that the conditions usually encountered in primitive societies are more conducive to the development of shaming techniques, it is by no means intended to suggest that all primitive communities place their main emphasis on the force of public opinion rather than on organized, coercive measures. Three such groups, at least, are not able to rely heavily upon easily-assailable egos: “In Bathonga, Samoa and Maori it is not sufficient for the group to jeer at or frighten its members; it has to use central authority against them.” And as will be indicated shortly, shaming techniques and ridicule may be employed quite extensively in densely populated societies that are modern and technologically and industrially advanced, such as Japan, and to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.

The Eskimos: Social Conformity Through “Song Duels.” A curious variation of the use of public ridicule as an instrument of social control is afforded by the “song duels” of a number of Eskimo societies. Actually, song dueling is a quite substantial institution with them, and even tends to take on some of the functions of a judicial organization, in contrast to the exclusively satirical role one might expect. That is to say, the song duel not only serves to make known to all members of the community what modes of behavior should be abstained from if derisive abuse is to be avoided, but operates as well to smooth over ill feelings that have developed between estranged members of the group, and so prevents such discord from evolving into open hostilities. Doing satisfaction between disputants so that an aggrieved party need not resort to “self-help,” that is, retaliatory measures taken at one’s own initiative, is a function claimed by any reputable legal system. A number of scholars and authorities on legal institutions, however, have called attention to the fact that the judicial remedies, of whatever sort, available in civilized legal systems often tend to overlook certain psychological factors—perhaps in their “rationalistic” emphasis on material compensation for injuries and wrongs of every description, physical or otherwise—and thus do not quite put the complaint to rest.

The Eskimo groups reported here seem to have achieved certain of these intangible satisfactions in a measure greater than have we, even though concepts of “substantive” law, i.e., meticulously delineated rights and privileges between persons and detailed rules governing their relations with one another, play no part in these determinations. “It is sufficient that the litigants (contestants) feel relieved—the complaint

60. Id. at 495.
61. HOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 3 at 98-99.
laid to rest—a psychological satisfaction attained and balance restored. This is justice sufficient unto the needs of Eskimo society as the Eskimos conceive it.”

Though the song duels may have this auxiliary “civil law” function of resolving disputes, there is no feature of song dueling that contradicts the thesis that the effectiveness of ridicule and shame as social sanctions is generally, but not always, a derivative of the intimate, face-to-face relations of social groups which are not populous and which thus do not permit escape from public opinion in anonymity. Hoebel has pointedly brought out the elements of their life that make Eskimos acutely responsive to community opinion.

The comprehensiveness, simplicity and conclusiveness of social control left entirely up to spontaneous reactions of society unquestionably have a certain appeal, but their supposed merits are deceptive from several points of view. For one, social control without authoritarian sanctions just does not seem to work outside small, highly-personal social groups. Moreover, not only is it entirely possible to entertain the value judgment that social control effected primarily by rule of written law is distinctly preferable to an unremitting deference to everyone else's notions-of-the-moment about what is fitting and proper, but problems of paramount importance can arise to the individual caught up in these situations of “excessive social control by society,” if you will. The example

62. Id. at 99.
63. Hoebel, Law-Ways of the Primitive Eskimos, 31 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & C. 665. Quotations from Anderson and Eells, Alaska Natives: A Survey of Their Sociological and Educational Status 89b. and Birket-Smith, The Eskimos, 54-55: “Riding in its mother’s parka, peering at the world from under its mother’s hood, the Eskimo child is intimately associated with adult life from its earliest years on. No nursery or formal school is necessary, for the infant’s home is a one-room iglu where the whole range of domestic economy and family experience passed before him and gave him a part in the enterprise.” In western Alaska young boys spend many hours in the kaziqi (men’s community club-house) where the adult males gather and work when not out hunting. . . .

“So direct and intimate experience in so limited a social world, in which sharing and economic cooperation are the supreme virtues, makes all individuals (excepting the abnormals) extremely sensitive to social pressure. The fundamental problem of control is solved at this point. It means that the need for an elaborated law system is forthwith forestalled. It is sufficient, for the most part, that ridicule and disapproval in ‘public opinion’ are effective goads to conformity. This accounts for Birket-Smith’s judgment, ‘if there is anything that can disturb the mind of the Eskimo, it is the prospect of standing alone against the crowd.’”

64. One well-regarded theory of social anthropology has it that when a culture places undue stress on securing certain kinds of behavior of its members and denies them completely the expression of activity which is contrary to these officially sanctioned ways, that if the proscribed behavior is in fact the would-be manifestation of fundamental psychological drives, those drives will somehow find an outlet—whether that outlet be a sublimation of the basic motive force, a sub rosa expression of it, or merely an admitted (but of course, regretted) contradiction of the theoretical cultural emphasis. In other words, if a culture attempts to thoroughly crush a basic human drive, it will
of the Eskimos under consideration here appears to be a case in point. Here is wholesale control over the individual by his fellows, and here is correspondingly undiluted pressure to find deliverance from this control. If individual Nunivak Eskimos wished to avoid being gossiped about—or lampooned before the group in satirical song—they had to submit to the general requirements of conformity and agreeableness in everyday behavior. Thus, on the face of it, this mechanism would seem to operate as a vicious circle, automatically resulting in a minimal amount of gossiping and the maximum amount of social conformity: eccentric behavior would bring on gossiping, but the effect of being talked about by others would be to enforce conformity on the deviationists; the increase in conformity, however, would mean fewer opportunities for gossiping, and so on ad infinitum. But in point of fact sharp gossiping is prevalent among the Nunivak Eskimos. This is taken as an indication, not of widespread, overt infractions of the general mandate for cooperativeness, but rather that the gossiping itself is a release from the excessive pressures for conformability. In other words, Eskimo society simply would not acknowledge that unwarranted gossip of others is in itself a violation of their professed philosophy of social harmony at all costs, or, alternatively, if they did have a vague awareness of the necessity for some outlet for personal feelings that otherwise could not be expressed, then we might put the practice down as a mere inconsistency that, so far as the Eskimos were concerned, was to be winked at.

The song duels and joking partnerships, in like manner, may be seen as an escape valve for aggressive tendencies: "Although physical aggression was punished in one way or another, a rather devious verbal aggression was actually encouraged." Another institution that provided a haven of respite from the continual interference of everybody

just simply fail. Cultural notions of the good life which commonly fail are overly-strict ideas about not expressing aggressiveness or hostility, overly-pure attitudes toward premarital chastity and marital fidelity, and overly-exacting demands on each person to suppress his individuality in favor of the common weal, i.e., utter submission to the expectations of others in matters of behavior.

The escape mechanisms from tight, inflexible systems of morality are an absorbing study in themselves: sometimes relief comes in the form of a periodic holiday in which most of the rules go by the board, as with one primitive group that permits virtually no expression of individuality the whole year long except during one period of festivities in which everyone indulges to his heart's content in a veritable orgy of individualism; more often, as with the relatively private violations of the authorized code of propriety, there is simply an incessant moral teeth-gnashing on the part of official keepers of the public conscience, and profuse alarums about the general state of moral decay.

66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
into one's private life was the "serious partnership." Unlike the mockery one had to put up with in the joking partnerships, a person could always turn to his "serious partner" for help and a sense of security from the usual stresses of interpersonal relationships: "... in the intimacy of such a relationship, one could express oneself freely without fear that every statement would be ridiculed as so often happened in other situations."

The joking partnerships and song duels themselves have evolved particular forms and styles which must be followed if one is to achieve the desired effect, or, in any event, which must be adhered to if one would but avoid the disapprobation of his fellows for failing to live up to the rules of the game. These rules are suggestive of the unwritten rules of etiquette in most Western cultures that permit incisive verbal attacks upon one's enemies in polite society so long as there is a certain wit and cleverness about it, and so long as a high degree of control is maintained over the actual base, aggressive drives that motivate the attack.

... [T]he singer here endeavors to present his opponent in a ludicrous light and hold him up to derision. Such songs always originate in some old grudge or unsettled dispute, some incautious criticism, some words or action felt as an insult, and perhaps breaking up an old friendship. The only means then of restoring amicable relations is by vilifying each other in song before the whole community assembled in the qag-e. Here no mercy must be shown; it is indeed considered manly to expose another's weakness with the utmost sharpness and severity; but behind all such castigation there must be a touch of humour, for mere abuse itself is barren, and cannot bring about any reconciliation. It is legitimate to "be nasty," but one must be amusing at the same time, so as to make the audience laugh; and the one who can thus silence his opponent amid the laughter of the whole assembly, is the victor, and has put an end to the unfriendly feeling. Manly rivals must, as soon as they have given vent to their feelings, whether they lose or win, regard their quarrel as a thing of the past, and once more become good friends, exchanging valuable presents to celebrate the reconciliation.  

Reconciliation of the parties, of course, is not the expected outcome of a

68. Id. at 250.
verbal clash according to the folkways of modern civilization, but among
the Eskimos, whether the song contest be of the conciliatory kind or
whether it be of the kind engaged in by friendly rivals who call them-
selves "song cousins" ("Song cousins may very well expose each other
in their respective songs, and thus deliver home truths, but it must always
be done in a humorous form, and in words so chosen as to excite no feel-
ing among the audience but that of merriment.")° the recipient of the
metrical abuse had to show personal qualities that were highly esteemed
by members of the community: patience, forebearance, good humor.°
It is significant to note that these derisive songs could be used with im-
punity as vehicles for insults that under any other circumstances would
even lead to killings, such was the highly magnified sensitivity of mem-
ers of most Eskimo communities to slighting references of this kind.°°

Rasmussen lists as the subjects which might be dealt with in the
song duels, "Acts of cruelty . . . or infidelity, or immoral conduct,
whereby is understood incest or sexual intercourse with animals. . . ."°°
and Pettit reports of other authorities having observed that, "A man
without children, and more certainly still, a woman without children, was
likely to be the butt of derision."°° Even delay in marriage raises un-
complimentary implications concerning personal qualifications.°° In the
Point Barrow region the individual is humiliated by the mere knowledge
that he has been talked about in the men's house, even without specific
information on what was said."°° The same writer has recorded ver-
batim a number of songs actually sung in his presence, which in the
original forcefully illustrate the character and tone of the institution of
song dueling, in addition to disclosing in greater particularity some of
the topics dealt with (i.e., the specific kinds of unwanted behavior the

70. Id. at 231.
71. LANTIS, op. cit. supra note 65 at 250. Also, Id. at 244: "... no matter how
sharp the jokes might be, one had to take them like a good sport." It is hardly necessary
to add that with us as well the victim must show considerable restraint over the internal
rage such personal attacks actually engender, unless he is to suffer even greater loss
of caste.
72. PETTIT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 52, and RASMUSSEN, op. cit. supra note 69,
Vol. II, No. 2 at 74: "Strangely enough, such revelations are always taken very coolly,
whereas angry or malicious words can otherwise produce the most far-reaching effects."
74. PETTIT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 52.
75. Ibid., taken from RASMUSSEN, PEOPLE OF THE POLAR NORTH (Herring trans.
and ed.).
76. Ibid., taken from NELSON, THE ESKIMO ABOUT BERING STRAIT 293 (Reports of
the Bureau of American Ethnology No. 18).
songs, in effect, were intended to cope with).”

77. RASMUSSEN, op. cit. supra note 69, Vol. VII, No. 2 at 74-76 (the first song is set out in full; the last two are excerpts of the original versions only):

Kanaihuaq derides Utahânia:

Ah, there you are, hayaiya —
Now what can it be
That strikes upon my opened ears?
Up on top of a hill
I heard
One of my cousins
Make up this song
Make up a song that ran thus:
It strikes upon my opened ears
Up on top of a hill:
Something I heard,
I should now like to tell
Everyone else . . .
That little habit of yours:
A hiding place for meat,
Utahânia —

I am not much good at this sort
of thing.
Do I make too long a song of it?
. . .
It was his sister that he wanted,
So I heard
People say,
Well, he ought to be ashamed of himself!
. . .
Do you think I would make up a
song of lies,
All lies, about one
Who never casts looks of longing
Towards his own little sister?
He ought to be ashamed of himself!
. . .

I heard it said
That Utahânia
Went out hunting
In the winter
. . .
It was at that season when the
caribou are scarce.
At any rate, the sort whose skins
are used for breeches.
. . .
And your stepson and your dear
wife

Far up by the end
Of the cooking place in the passage
way of the house,
So that your dear wife's
Food place by the lamp
Never was greasy with meat
At Itivneq
(i.e. he starves his wife but
feeds luxuriously himself).
And that was in the depth of the
great winter
Ayaiyai — ya
Yaiyaiya
Eyaye — hayai — ya
Now I wonder how
This song will be received
In our feasting house?
Ufva yai — ya

III.

It is said that you, Utahânia.
Came stealthily creeping
In to your little sister
Qahâtlovaq
To go a-whoring with her!
And then, when she asked you
“What is it you want?”
You looked rather foolish, did
you not?
And so to deride you,
I sing this song
. . .

IV.

Had to go creeping
When you left them behind
(i.e. deserted them, leaving
them to starve to death)
But they came up with your sledge
tracks all the same.
. . .
For you never had any food to
give them,
Every mouthful
Was snapped up by you first . . .
. . .
In summary of this discussion of the Eskimos' elaborate use of ridicule in song—a procedure on which other cultures place little if any emphasis—it is appropriate to consider Pettit’s general interpretation of the matter, in which he suggests what may be the ultimate raison d’etre of the song duels and the peculiar forms into which they have developed: “The effectiveness of this song dueling lay not simply in reciting calumnies, but rather in the accuracy with which the foibles of an opponent were depicted, and in the cleverness of the verse. The real object was not so much to insult an individual by what was said as to gain the support of the audience and to drown the victim in a flood of derisive laughter. . . . According to Birket-Smith the object of these contests is to make the other fellow realize that public opinion is against him. It is a form of punishment, though not consciously recognized as such.”

**TWO CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS**

The generalization has been enunciated several times already that conditions of primitive society are the most favorably disposed for the development of institutions and techniques of shaming as modes of social control, and that “legalistic” sanctions become necessary when these conditions no longer obtain—as in highly populated civilizations. The point once made, however, should not be overemphasized. As has become evident, not all primitive groups are able to rely on the force of public opinion to control human behavior, and even those which are able must resort to other measures, in part at any rate. And, conversely, at least a few populous, civilized societies find it expedient to use shaming techniques to a surprising extent. This part of the study will explore shaming procedures utilized in two modern civilizations, Japan and the Soviet Union, and examine the rationale purporting to lie behind those procedures—whether such theoretical or practical substantiation is openly volunteered by the society in question, or instead must be pieced together from information implicit in available materials of whatever origin. A greater appreciation of the limits a sense of shame as a social control mechanism has in surroundings not generally suited for its enhancement,

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Kanaihuaq, it turns out, is not beyond reproach himself and Utahânia puts every effort into making the most of the fact. His first song relates in embarrassing detail how Kanaihuaq was soundly defeated, both physically and morally, in a family tiff with his wife that he himself had brought about, and for no good reason. Having the whole sequence of events repeated before the group was more humiliating than the incident itself. *(Id. at 77-78.)* In the second song Kanaihuaq receives abuse on the ground that he “has been making up to the white man in a snobbish fashion, has learned to write the sign alphabet of the missionaries, and now finally imagines himself a great man, a chief, one who thinks for others and can order his neighbors about.” *(Id. at 78.)*

PETTIT, op. cit. supra note 16 at 52, taken in part from BIRKET-SMITH, op. cit. supra note 63 at 55.
as well as the particulars of those factors seeming necessary to offset the inhospitable environment, it is hoped, will be the outcome.

Japan: A Case Study in Shame as an Institution. Japan is the foremost example of densely peopled societies in which shame sanctions feature predominately enough to entitle them to the designation "institution." The phenomenon there, in fact, reaches to inordinate lengths, at least in comparison with other civilizations that do not instill such a degree of sensitivity to the opinions of others into their populace.

The immediate reason for this seems unquestionably to be that it is simply part of the Japanese culture pattern to condition children to be responsive to what others think about one's behavior, much in the way primitives do. For the primitives, however, it is the eminently manifest course to pursue: they see it, if only unconsciously, as the simplest and most direct way of achieving and maintaining conformity—and they recognize that the circumstances of their life will make it work. As for the ultimate reason Japan has chosen this cultural pattern and stayed with it—and elaborated it exquisitely—when other civilized societies have had to make much greater use of authoritarian sanctions, perhaps it is because, despite the complexity of their culture and their great population, one vital feature of the small primitive group still remains there to a greater extent than might be anticipated: "Because there is little privacy in a Japanese community . . . it is no fantasy that 'the world' knows practically everything he does and can reject him if it disapproves. Even the construction of the Japanese house—the thin walls that permit the passage of sounds and which are pushed open during the day—makes private life extremely public for those who cannot afford a wall and garden." 79

It will be useful, then, for a critical assessment of shame as a regulator of human behavior, to proceed by examining in greater detail the ways of the Japanese in "sensitizing" individuals to the expectations of others, and how these expectations and responses function to make up a considerable segment of, and integrate with, the overall pattern of social control in that country. Similarly, as has been suggested earlier, an acute sensitivity to shame sanctions, while it may typify primitive societies, does not derive entirely from the conditions of life as such usually encountered in them. Rather it comes from an intense process of conditioning commenced in early life. Perhaps it is imperfectly, or even instinctively, understood by those upon whom the responsibility devolves, that such methods of enforcing cultural ideals are feasible to a much

greater degree after a period of "training," but the very least that can be said is that the development of a responsiveness to shame sanctions is not by any means left to mere chance, that is, left to whatever pressures of public opinion might normally be operative in the intimate relations of a small social group. We might expect, therefore, that a culture such as that of the Japanese would engage in child-rearing practices calculated to produce shame-sensitive adults as assiduously as do primitive peoples, if not more so in view of the fact that most complex civilizations like theirs find it necessary to resort to guilt sanctions and authoritarian legal or religious institutions to do most of the heavy work of enforcing conformity to the collectively held cultural ideals. And such is the case.

The process begins when the child is still an infant of two or three years, and can barely grasp the significance of what is going on about him—a process of molding, of character formation that will profoundly affect his entire life. He is even shamed into weaning: "... all mothers tease [their children] by telling them that they are mere babies if they want to nurse. 'Look at your little cousin. He's a man. He's little like you and he doesn't ask to nurse.' 'That little boy is laughing at you because you're a boy and you still want to nurse.' Two-, three-, and four-year-old children who are still demanding their mother's breast will often drop it and feign indifference when an older child is heard approaching." And in the following extract from the same source we see convincing support for the view of psychological researchers that shame anxiety finds its roots in the early separation anxiety and the threat of loss of parental love:

This teasing, this urging a child toward adulthood, is not confined to weaning. From the time the child can understand what is said to it, these techniques are common in any situation. A mother will say to her boy baby when he cries, 'You're not a girl,' or 'You're a man.' Or she will say, 'Look at that baby. He doesn't cry.' When another baby is brought to visit, she will fondle the visitor in her own child's presence and say, 'I'm going to adopt this baby. I want such a nice, good child. You don't act your age.' Her own child throws itself upon her, often pommeling her with its fists, and cries, 'No, no, we don’t want any other baby. I'll do what you say.' When the child of one or two has been noisy or has failed to be prompt about something, the mother will say to a man visitor, 'Will you take this child away? We don't want it.' The visitor acts out his

80. Id. at 261-62.
role. He starts to take the child out of the house. The baby screams and calls upon its mother to rescue it. He has a full-sized tantrum. When she thinks the teasing has worked, she relents and takes back the child, exacting its frenzied promise to be good. The little play is acted out sometimes with children who are as old as five or six.

Teasing takes another form too. The mother will turn to her husband and say to the child, 'I like your father better than you. He is such a nice man.' The child gives full expression to his jealousy and tries to break in between his father and mother. His mother says, 'Your father doesn't shout around the house and run around the rooms.' 'No, no,' the child protests, 'I won't either. I am good. Now do you love me?' When the baby has gone on long enough, the father and mother look at one another and smile. They may tease a young daughter in this way as well as a young son.

Such experiences are rich soil for the fear of ridicule and ostracism which is so marked in the Japanese grown-up. It is impossible to say how soon little children understand that they are being made game of by this teasing, but understand it they do sooner or later, and when they do, the sense of being laughed at fuses with the panic of the child threatened with loss of all that is safe and familiar. When he is a grown man, being laughed at retains this childhood aura. [Emphasis added.]

The drilling in what amounts to an almost pathological concern in the Japanese for how others will regard one's behavior continues with full vigor after the second or third year of school:

More emphasis at home and in school . . . is laid on the dangers of getting into 'embarrassing' situations. Children are still too young for 'shame,' but they must be taught to avoid being 'embarrassed.' . . . Many Japanese say that it was their schoolmates who laughed at them first when they made mistakes—not their teachers or their parents. The job of their elders, indeed, is not, at this point, themselves to use ridicule on the children, but gradually to integrate the fact of ridicule with the moral lesson of living up to giri [i.e., duties or obligations]-to-the-world. [These] obligations . . . now gradually become a whole series of restraints. 'If you do this, if you do that,' their elders say, 'the world will laugh at you.' The rules

81. Id. at 262-63.
are particularistic and situational and a great many of them concern what we should call etiquette. They require subordinating one's own will to the ever-increasing duties to neighbors, to family and to country.\textsuperscript{82}

The earnestness with which this conditioning is undertaken by both the child's family and associates is unique in sociological experience. Most cultures that attempt to infuse this heightened sensitivity, this vulnerability of the ego, into the young, venture to hold merely the threat of rejection and loss of love out to them, in the hope that conformity will result. Only in the most incorrigible cases, perhaps, would actual abandonment occur, and certainly such is not the original intention. So extraordinary are the Japanese in this respect, however, that Gorer was prompted to comment thus:

It is worth emphasizing that the degree to which this is carried is very uncommon sociologically. In most societies where the extended family or other fractional social group is operative, the group will usually rally to protect one of its members who is under criticism or attack from members of other groups. Provided that the approval of one's own group is maintained, one can face the rest of the world with the assurance of full support in case of need or attack. In Japan however it appears that the reverse is the case; one is only sure of support from one's own group as long as approval is given by other groups; if outsiders disapprove or criticize, one's own group will turn against one and act as punishing agents, until or unless the individual can force the other group to withdraw its criticism. By this mechanism the approval of the "outside world" takes on an importance probably unparalleled in any other society.\textsuperscript{83}

Dr. Benedict's own research and experience with the Japanese provide ample support for this view, as related in the following paragraph:

This change of status is communicated to the growing boy by a new and serious extension of the pattern of babyhood teasing. By the time he is eight or nine his family may in sober truth reject him. If his teacher reports that he has been disobedient or disrespectful and gives him a black mark in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} Id. at 272-73.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Id. at 274, quoted from Gorer, \textit{Japanese Character Structure} 27 (The Institute for International Studies 1943).\
\end{itemize}
deportment, his family turn against him. If he is criticized for
some mischief by the storekeeper, ‘the family name has been
disgraced.’ His family are a solid phalanx of accusation. Two
Japanese I have known were told by their fathers before they
were ten not to come home again and were too ashamed to go
to relatives. They had been punished by their teachers in the
schoolroom. In both cases they lived in outhouses, where their
mothers found them and finally arranged for their return . . .
In any case the family shows that now it looks upon the boy
as their representative in the world and they proceed against
him because he has incurred criticism. He has not lived up to
his giri-to-the-world. He cannot look to his family for sup-
port. Nor can he look to his age group. His schoolmates os-
tracize him for offenses and he has to apologize and make
promises before he is readmitted.84

Shortly after the lesson of “giri-to-the-world” has been assimilated,
the Japanese child is taught “giri-to-his-name.” Learning this duty (or
obligation) to one’s name amounts to making the ego even more vul-
nerable to assaults from without than it already is. The child learns that
the concept of “honor” is intimately entwined with his name and that
insults are to be greatly resented. Coincident with this he learns that
such insults are in addition to be avenged, and from then on he is never
quite at peace with the world so long as he is carrying the burden of an
unvindicated trespass to his dignity. As a result, the hazing which most
Japanese boys must endure in the middle school or in the army cannot be
taken with equanimity or in the spirit of fun as it usually can in other
countries where it is practiced. The seriousness with which these re-
sentments are harbored is a yardstick of the ego-sensitivity of the typical
Japanese to slighting references, and thus to criticism or shaming tech-
niques in general.

A younger boy who has been made to grovel before an upper-
classman and run servile errands hates his tormentor and plans
revenge. The fact that the revenge has to be postponed makes
it all the more absorbing. It is giri-to-his-name and he regards
it as a virtue. Sometimes he is able, through family pull, to
get the tormentor discharged from a job years later. Some-
times he perfects himself in jujitsu or sword play and publicly
humiliates him on a city street after they have both left school.
But unless he sometime evens the score he has that ‘feeling of

84. Id. at 273-74.
something left undone' which is the core of the Japanese insult contest.85

Dr. Benedict has even suggested that the brutality of the Japanese Army during the world war was due in large measure to the humiliating stunts recruits were put through. This seems a trifle far-fetched at first, but not after one is acquainted with the reasoning in support of the hypothesis. "The draftees have often been described as coming out of their Army training with changed personalities, as 'true jingo nationalists' . . . . Young men trained in family life in the Japanese manner and deadly serious about their amour-propre may easily become brutalized in such a situation [as hazing]. They cannot stand ridicule. What they interpret as rejection may make them good torturers in their turn. . . . The tormented 'feel good' when they are able to settle scores with the tormentors."86 Rather than having "changed" her fundamental outlook since the Russo-Japanese war, as it has been said of Japan, the difference is better accounted for, Dr. Benedict feels, by the fact that "she did not consider that that nation [Russia] had sneered at her"87 and therefore, even as a victor, could treat her vanquished enemy with the greatest deference and respect and go to great lengths to avoid humiliating her. With America during World War II, such was not at all the case, at least from the Japanese point of view.

. . . [E]very Japanese was reared in the nineteen-twenties and -thirties to regard United States policy as 'taking Japan cheap,' or in their phrase, 'making her as faeces.' This had been Japan's reaction to the Exclusion Act, to the part the United States played in the Treaty of Portsmouth and in the Naval Parity agreements. The Japanese had been encouraged to regard in the same way the growing economic rôle of the United States in the Far East and our racial attitudes toward the non-white peoples of the world. The victory over Russia and the victory over the United States in the Philippines, therefore, illustrate Japanese behavior in its two most opposed aspects: when insults are involved and when they are not.88

It should not be surprising that a people so accustomed to detecting indications of insult or disapprobation from those of their own community would also be alert to ridicule and detraction coming from foreign

85. Id. at 277.
86. Id. at 277-78
87. Id. at 307.
88. Id. at 308-09.
quarters. Personal identification or emotional involvement with institutions—or even symbols of institutions—is of course not unique in human experience, but in Japan the importance of defending one's self-respect, even when only indirectly or by association as in this instance, from outside attacks has almost no equal.

[The Japanese] continually spoke of how 'the eyes of the world were upon them.' Therefore they must show to the full spirit of Japan. Americans landed on Guadalcanal, and Japanese orders to troops were that now they were under direct observation 'by the world' and should show what they were made of. Japanese seamen were warned that in case they were torpedoed and the order given to abandon ship, they should man the life-boats with the utmost decorum or 'the world will laugh at you. The Americans will take movies of you and show them in New York.' It mattered what account they gave of themselves to the world. And their concern with this point also was a concern deeply imbedded in Japanese culture.\(^9\)

Not only was there national concern about maintaining dignity in carrying out the war, but ever since the latter part of the nineteenth century when the industrialization and westernization of Japan was undertaken and when foreigners began to emerge prominently on the Japanese scene, have they shown concern about what other nations thought of them, or even of their traditional habits and attitudes. A number of Japanese institutions have actually been modified or done away with in deference to foreign—mostly Western—notions of morality. One was that of mixed bathing, nude, about which prior to this the Japanese felt no shame whatever.\(^9\) All efforts to change their attitudes about this came at the instigation of the Japanese government for, as might be anticipated, it would be the agency to take upon itself the task of sounding out foreign opinion and seeing that the entire Japanese nation kowtow to it. In the usual circumstances there would be little contact between most foreigners and the vast majority of the Japanese people, and the latter probably would not be in a position to sense any disapproval of the foreigners. But government functionaries are more readily exposed to the critical writings of foreign visitors, and it is they who, when personally encountering foreigners in an official capacity, would have to endure the imagined (or even real) disdain engendered in the visitors by these traditional practices.

\(^8\) Id. at 28-29.  
\(^9\) Id. at 268.
Among the other institutions to feel the effects of this desire to win outside approval was that of prostitution, though here only token submission to alien notions of propriety was achieved: the girls used to sit outside the houses, that prospective customers could leisurely and carefully assess their charms; now only photographs of the young ladies are on display on the exteriors of the establishments, and the clientele must content themselves with such makeshift aids in arriving at their decision.\textsuperscript{91} The same went for homosexual practices which, “In Old Japan . . . were the sanctioned pleasures of men of high status such as the samurai and the priests.”\textsuperscript{92} They were outlawed, but, as outlawing them was merely an expression of their desire to curry the favor of Westerners, no impact whatsoever was made on their real attitude toward it. In fact, they felt no moral attitude about it at all, nor did they about the widespread practice of autoeroticism. To them, both fall in the category of “human feelings,” about which moralistic attitudes are quite inappropriate so long as they are reasonably kept in their place and not permitted to interfere with the really weighty concerns of life, such as raising a family. Efforts were made, however, to curb some of the more obvious publicity the autoerotic instruments were receiving. (“No people have ever had such paraphernalia for the purpose.”)\textsuperscript{93} But again, official suppression of that which the Japanese had thoroughly accepted did not convince them of its inherent immorality.\textsuperscript{94}

Dr. Benedict has given close attention to the cultural interpretation and rationale the Japanese themselves place upon the character structure and psychological mechanisms typically produced by this process of sensitization of the individual to the judgments and critical evaluations of those about him. A brief review of her findings and analysis is well-suited for concluding the foregoing exposition of the features of shame which come into play once the individual is thoroughly imbued with a responsiveness to it. Nice semantic distinctions enter in here, and evidence how, for example, a cultural world view may impinge upon the substantive content of words in ways that are the bane of translators. The Japanese word for “self-respect” (jicho), as an instance, is synonymous with the word for “circumspection.” Whereas we, with more of a solid core of inner guilt sanctions, tend to identify self-respect with a clear conscience, that is, with not having “sinned” before God or before one’s self—whether other people know of it or not—the Japanese say

\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 186-87.
\textsuperscript{92} Id. at 187.
\textsuperscript{93} Id. at 188.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
that self-respect includes "watchfulness of all the cues one observes in other people's acts, and a strong sense that other people are sitting in judgment. 'One cultivates self-respect (one must jicho),,' they say, 'because of society.' 'If there were no society one would not need to respect oneself (cultivate jicho)." Dr. Benedict adds, however, that these extreme statements of external sanctions for self-respect overstate the case for them, as do the popular sayings of many nations, "for Japanese sometimes react as strongly as any Puritan to a private accumulation of guilt. But their extreme statements nevertheless point out correctly where the emphasis falls in Japan. It falls on the importance of shame rather than on the importance of guilt."

As previously stated, shame cultures may provide for persons who have been chagrined the wherewithal or means to overcome their disconcerting feelings, but confession is not one of them. It not only brings no relief as it does with guilt, but the very thought of making one's pecadillos known to others is abhorrent to a people whose every act and word is carefully calculated to conceal from those others one's weaknesses and shortcomings. "So long as [a man's] bad behavior does not 'get out into the world,' he need not be troubled and confession appears to him merely a way of courting trouble. Shame cultures therefore do not provide for confessions, even to the gods. They have ceremonies for good luck rather than for expiation."

The Japanese regard for the virtue of circumspection, or the ability to accurately perceive how others will respond to contemplated behavior, or even words, has been personified in what they refer to as the "observing self." This "observing self" acts somewhat as a mentor of shame (haji), and is inculcated in early childhood to accompany the individual throughout his life and guide him along the paths of proper behavior, i.e., behavior that will not evoke the ridicule or condemnation of his fellows. (This makes the concepts of the "observing self" and "internalized shame" sound quite alike, though Dr. Benedict does not suggest this analogy.) The "observing self" obviously represents the lifelong process of conditioning one's self to the reactions or expected reactions of others towards one's behavior. Stated another way, a Japanese learns at a very early age that the disapprobation of his family and associates is the worst thing that can happen to him, but he does not quite know which particular acts and words of his will merit their scorn and which their approval. But he starts learning soon enough by trial and error, and before long

95. Id. at 222.
96. Ibid.
97. Id. at 223.
has built up a considerable repository of past experiences which, at least by indirection, will guide him in his future conduct. The truly "virtuous" citizen (as they call one who "knows shame," i.e., knows how to orient his behavior to avoid being shamed), then, is the one who has most accurately attuned his senses of perception to the subtle nuances of response—whether of approbation or detraction—of those about him. He approaches a sort of moral perfection, as we would call it, much as a seeker after the Holy Grail achieves moral perfection by disciplining himself to adroitly sidestep "sin," even little sins.

Nevertheless, the burden of the "observing self," however much it may assist in avoiding "shame," becomes a not insubstantial millstone around the neck of the Japanese—as could be expected, observing the psychological toll taken and tensions that develop in persons in guilt cultures who feel constrained to lead all-too-saintly a life, and make the attempt by bottling up or denying completely some of the more basic drives and not allowing them even an indirect or substitute outlet. As testimony to the oppressive character of the "observing self," recurring symbols in Japanese folkways depict a state of human existence in which the "observing self" has been eliminated. Dr. Benedict also attributes to this their notions of "expert" self-discipline. Such "expertness" is thought of as making possible the elimination of the "observing self," and thus one may return to the directness of early childhood when shame was unknown, that is, when the "observing self" was not there to look over one's shoulder at one's every move. She presents evidence to suggest that even the appeal of Zen Buddhism to the Japanese lies mainly in the techniques it teaches for achieving the psychological frame of mind known as muga. Muga, at least for the Japanese, means a condition of "freedom and efficiency," with the "observer self" eliminated. Hence it is a much sought-after and highly cherished state of affairs indeed—a means for a person "To deliver [one's] self up to the ecstasy of [one's] soul. . . ."

The most extreme form in which the Japanese state this tenet, at least to the ears of an Occidental, is the way they supremely approve of the man 'who lives as already dead.' . . . [which means to the Japanese] that one lives on the plane of 'expertness.' . . . The philosophy which underlies muga underlies also 'living as already dead.' In this state a man eliminates all self-watchfulness and thus all fear and circumspection. He

98. Id. at 289.
99. Id. at 248.
becomes as the dead, who have passed beyond the necessity of taking thought about the proper course of action. . . . [It] means a supreme release from conflict. It means, 'My energy and attention are free to pass directly to the fulfillment of my purpose. My observer-self with all its burden of fears is no longer between me and my goal. With it have gone the sense of tenseness and strain and the tendency toward depression that troubled my earlier strivings. Now all things are possible to me.'

It is suggested, in view of the evidence implicit in Dr. Benedict's own words, that describing the elimination of the "observing self" as equivalent to a return to childhood when shame was unknown, is not the best interpretation. It is true that the "observing self" does not exist in childhood, i.e., training in circumspection has not yet begun at that time, but it hardly follows that the circumstances of childhood are what is being sought in their efforts to eliminate the "observing self." The uninhibited behavior and self-indulgence of early childhood would certainly not be appropriate in the adult pattern of life in Japan, and would seldom serve to make a Japanese feel "free and efficient" in his everyday dealings with his fellows. Similarly, the unrestrained activity of childhood would not likely help "the painter, the poet, the public speaker and the warrior" achieve the greatness and perfection they seek in training themselves in muga.

Rather than the uninhibited "shamelessness" of children, it would seem that what is referred to is the elimination of the "observing self" by becoming so adept in anticipating the reactions of others to one's words and acts that the highest approval—and never condemnation—is received from them. It is submitted that the "elimination" is actually nothing more than the patterns of correct behavior becoming so deeply ingrained that they are an automatic, habitual response, and one simply need no longer refer to his "eidetic other" as a guide to contemplated behavior. We would call this "gaining confidence in interpersonal relations," or becoming so sure of ourselves in dealing with others that blunders will not be made and thus we will not be made to appear ridiculous, that the anxiety normally accompanying these relations vanishes. The difference is that these matters are of far greater consequence for

100. Id. at 249-50.
101. Extensive information on this is presented in another section of Dr. Benedict's book. The prevalent permissive attitude in Japan toward uninhibited childhood behavior does not conflict, according to her description, with the fact that training in sensitivity to shame commences at a very early age, but space limitations prevent going into this in detail here.
them than for us. And too, this explanation would better account for their references to arriving at a plane of "expertness"—which otherwise is difficult to fit into a concept that the elimination of the "observing self" is in essence a return to the naturalness of childhood.

The "Windows of Satire" of Soviet Russia. During visits to the Soviet Union in the summers of 1958 and 1959, the writer encountered a peculiar application of public ridicule and shaming in that country. Though the precise means by which it was effected probably has neither historical nor contemporary counterpart, it appeared to be in no way at variance with other instances of public shaming that might be cited, at least with respect to the point that the end purpose of such activities is ultimately to achieve a certain measure of social control—whether the individuals concerned consciously recognize it or not.

So-called "Windows of Satire" (Okna Saitri) were observed in four geographically distant places and each under distinctly different circumstances, giving the impression of being a somewhat uniform, ubiquitous and even institutionalized phenomenon in the Russian society of today. Before proceeding with a more detailed characterization of these "windows," however, attention should be called to the fact that they were not of the same order as the bulletin boards and signs which lampoon certain general aspects of Soviet life. These latter may, for instance, deride citizens who watch television to excess, or parents who indignantly take schoolteachers to task about grades awarded by them to their offspring, but they do so without identifying any of the particular individuals who may have yielded to such vices. This generalized kind of satire is prevalent as well in the U.S.S.R., but will be seen under the identifying caption, Krokodil (Crocodile)—apparently an allusion to the archaic notion that a crocodile sheds tears over those whom it devours. Krokodil is also the name of the Soviet "humor" magazine, a publication devoted largely to parodying—constructively, of course— institutions and ways deemed worthy of ridicule or even reform.

The windows of satire, on the other hand, all dealt with specific acts of specific individuals whose behavior was considered contra bonos mores. On a collective farm, where most people would know the transgressors personally, their names apparently were thought adequate for singling them out, but in a city like Moscow not only would the full name and address be included in the displays in the windows, but also the year of birth, occupation and place of employment, and date the incident occurred. A recitation of the offense followed, along with a large caricature in color of the subject performing the antisocial deed—usually of a
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minor nature and probably punishable only under a public-nuisance type of ordinance if at all, were such sanction to be invoked in place of, or in addition to, making the person an object of public derision. Those in charge of the "Window of Satire and Humor" seen on a collective farm in the Ukraine near the city of Kiev even went to the trouble of composing poems (which actually rhymed in the original Ukrainian) to commemorate the events and mock the malfeasors.

In every instance the windows of satire were not in any manner of speaking merely informal bulletin boards on which a person at his own initiative might post items he considered suitable. They were all of well-constructed wooden frames with glass-paned doors and locks. Each door covered one "section," and each section was completely filled out by a white cardboard poster about two by three feet in size on which the caricature was drawn and details of the alleged offense were set forth. Undoubtedly these were replaced with new posters from time to time. One seen in a Moscow railroad station had an elaborate inscription painted on the wooden frame above to the effect that this was "Window of Satire No. 2" and that it was sponsored by "An Organ of the Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League, Moscow Junction of the Northern Railroad."

The third occasion on which a window of satire was noticed was along the main street, between the sidewalk and curb, of a city near Stalingrad which was built originally for the sole purpose of accommodating workers and their families employed in erecting the giant hydroelectric dam under construction there. It was seen from a passing bus just long enough to be identified, thus details of the satirical posters on view in it could not be recorded. The fourth was observed under similar circumstances: from a bus passing through a village of an estimated thirty or forty people located on the main highway about halfway between Moscow and Leningrad. Only texts of the first two windows mentioned above, therefore, are available for examination.

102. A photograph was taken from the moving vehicle, however, and shows the village window of satire painted in bright colors. A black-and-white close-up photograph of the window on the collective farm is also in the writer's possession, and shows the caricatures and inscriptions in full detail.

103. [Yaroslavsky Railway Station located on Komsomolskaya Square, Moscow]:

WINDOW OF SATIRE No. 2

An Organ of the Committee of the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League, Moscow Junction of the Northern Railroad

Donyetsko, Vasili Ivanovich
1930 year of birth Resides in the city of Babushkin
Medvedkovskoye Road
House 20 Apartment 35

Ran at full speed to catch a train April 5, 1958.
It is not surprising that the use of public ridicule to make examples of those who have defied the accepted norms and conventions of the community has taken a form such as the windows of satire in the Soviet Union. Considering Russia's large and growing population, and more importantly, the fact that increasing industrialization fosters increasing

Zaitsiev, Aleksandr Vasilyevich  
Resides in the District of Ashukinskaya  
Northern Railroad Moskovskaya Street, House 23  
Employed as a painter Renikovskaya Factory

Kalinin, Nikolai Vasileyevich  
Resides in Moscow Galyanovskaya Street, House 7 Apartment 74  
Employed in the 1st Stamping Dept. as a fitter-assembler.  
Were found in an intoxicated condition in the railroad station, disturbed the peace, accosted citizens, expressed obscenities.

Kuznyetsov, Anatoli Valentinovich  
1927 year of birth Resides in the city of Moscow  
District of Krasnosyelskaya House 16 Apartment 4  
Employed as an engineer at the All-Union Central Scientific Research Institute of the  
International Industrial Secretariat.

At the passageway to the platform, refused to present a ticket and called the platform ticket inspector obscene names.

[Collective Farm named after Stalin, near Kiev, capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic]:

WINDOW OF SATIRE AND HUMOR*

Komsomolka [member of Communist Youth Organization]  
Gorai, Maria Ivanivna  
Doesn't want to work anywhere.  
From time to time she goes to Kiev  
and makes 75 to 100 karbovantsi [Ukrainian rubles] a month.  
She comes home and starts  
breaking oven-forks over the shoulders of her old  
father, who actually works every day  
on the Collective Farm.

Maria has but one desire:  
"How to get money?"  
But work she doesn't want,  
Instead chases her father out to do it,  
But everyone knows that to get it  
And every day breaks  
One must labor.  
Stove-forks over the old man.

Ivanitski, Dmitro Kindratovich  
Takes advantage of all the privileges of a collective farm worker,  
but does not work on the Collective Farm.

On the Collective Farm he does not work,  
He has no "work-day units" to his credit,  
Instead he runs all over the village  
In search of the fast buck.

At times he sets out fishing nets,  
At other times works a bit on doors,  
And yet other times, drunk half to death,  
He spends the night in a gutter!

*Thanks are acknowledged to Mr. Andrew Turchyn of the Indiana University Libraries for assistance in translating the Ukrainian.
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urbanization and all that urban life inescapably implies—the depersonalizing of human relationships—such bulletin boards would be one of the few ways available for singling out the errant individual and exposing him to the repercussions of community feeling. And even the collective farms are more aptly described as "agricultural communities" than "farms" (the latter term suggesting the kind we are accustomed to), each having generally from two to twenty thousand people.

What is more difficult to account for is why, under what would seem the relatively anonymous and anything-but-intimate relations of life obtaining in present Soviet society, any extensive attempt at all has been made to enforce conformity to social ideals by means of the pressures of public opinion. The element of astonishment in encountering such a phenomenon there is that most culture groups in an environmental setting like that of the Soviet Union would have given up any concerted, programmed efforts at trying to make do under those circumstances what most frequently is productive of tangible results in small social groups with their customary face-to-face relations. Most cultures would long ago have turned to legal sanctions and the nurturing of an individualized sense of guilt. The Soviets, of course, have resorted to these as well, but they apparently feel that the force of public opinion is still potent enough—despite the theoretical opportunities for "escaping in anonymity"—that it may be relied upon to do at least some of the work of social control.

It is not implausible to suppose that the answer to this may be found primarily in the philosophical emphases of the culture. First of all, there is the comparative lack of ideals of rugged individualism in Russia, ideals which permeate the ideological atmosphere Americans breathe from childhood on to such an extent that most of us come to believe they are some sort of cultural imperative. In our eyes any group that does not at the very least give impassioned lip service to these ideals on every conceivable public occasion is a pretty namby-pamby bunch indeed. We picture the utter impossibility of some government bureaucrat erecting a window of satire on Main Street in the courthouse square with the idea of mocking the taxpayers who are his masters, and from this presume that it would be as abhorrent to a people brought up differently—despite the theoretical opportunities for "escaping in anonymity"—that it may be relied upon to do at least some of the work of social control.

Whatever may have been the Weltanschauung of pre-Revolutionary Russia, Communist teachings since then have, on paper at least, certainly promoted to the utmost a feeling of collective responsibility on the part of every member of the society toward all other members, and in theory no affair of thought or conduct is too minute or too subjective to escape the ambit of this official doctrine. If conditioning in this has been successful, as it by and
large seems to have been—not necessarily in the actual, everyday behavior patterns of the average Soviet citizen, but in his announced personal philosophy—then there is reason enough to believe that he would show concern about having it pointed out to him how he had encroached upon the postulated interests and the well-being of the group. He would not be able to dismiss an accusation of this sort as would one thoroughly steeped in a tradition of individualism and absolute standards of morality—who would not be disconcerted in the slightest by what others thought of his obnoxious or eccentric behavior so long as he had not trodden upon his internalized moral code.

But we cannot disregard, in this connection, the fact that Mead and others have reported the emergence of a "Protestant personality type" in the Soviet Union, at least as a cultural ideal. And the Soviets have even gone so far as to have consolidated these ideals and personified them in what they call the "New Soviet Man," and the citizenry is constantly exhorted to become more like this abstraction, much as professing Christians are berated perhaps once a week to be more like what the "good Christian" is conceived to be. Obviously, the introduction of these circumstances into the picture complicates things. Not only would the Soviet Union apparently be attaching importance to guilt sanctions as well as legal sanctions, but even the windows of satire might be seen more as a guilt rather than a shame mechanism: at first blush it would seem that their effectiveness derives from shaming the individual before others for his conduct, but when we remember that a caricature placed in one of a number of railroad stations in a city of over seven million people is not going to shame him before many of the people actually in his personal acquaintance, then there seems to be reason enough to question our premises. Indeed, perhaps not one of the persons even remotely associated with the errant individual will ever learn of his misdeed, though advertising his address and place of employment is certainly calculated to preclude this from happening. Accordingly, the windows of satire could be regarded as an agency for pointing out to the social transgressor—and more importantly, to every member of the community—what deviations from the official moral code are, i.e., what the New Soviet Man would not do. That being the case, the situation

104. Instances of this are legion, as I am sure most travelers there can substantiate. In the city of Czernowitz, formerly belonging to Rumania but now completely Sovietized, I got into the usual conversation with several dozen Russians in a park, and during the course of it was asked what my occupation was. Upon replying that I was studying to be a lawyer, the following question was immediately put to me: "When you get to be a lawyer, are you going to work for the people or for the special interests?"

105. PIERS AND SINGER, op. cit. supra note 5 at 46.
would seem even more like guilt and its associated phenomena, especially if many of the "victims" may in fact resort to considerable escape in anonymity.

A way out of this conceptual dilemma may possibly be found by recourse to the criterion proposed by Piers and Singer. We must look to the nature of the threat posed to the individual. I would suggest that the threat of being derided in a window of satire is that of rejection and abandonment by those whose love and approval are important for the individual to retain. This of course returns the window of satire back to the shame-mechanism category, and perhaps this also goes for the idealization of the New Soviet Man, if the same threat can be linked to it. It may well be that not living up to the standards of the New Soviet Man does not make the Russians feel "guilty" at all: they may only feel that they will be ostracized and rejected by the group if they do not. This seems all the more well-founded in view of the Communist ideological emphasis on only allowing behavior, and even the expression of ideas, that fits in with the supposed needs of the entire community. This emphasis is very much akin to the emphasis of most primitive cultures, according to Redfield, who attributes to it in large measure the effectiveness of public opinion in controlling their respective societies. And that is a feeling of moral responsibility for virtually everything that happens within the group—a notion diametrically opposed to that of individualism.

... [T]he precivilized or "primitive" world view is a moral one in the sense that everything that happens is perceived as being related to the violation or maintenance of the group's ethical code. "To primitive man the universe is spun of duty and ethical judgment." An individual whose conscience is dominated by this moral interpretation of the universe will feel morally responsible for every piece of good or bad fortune which happens to the group, but he will also hold all the other members of the group responsible for it. And even individual good or bad fortune will be attributed, not solely to the moral qualities of the recipient, but to the virtues and vices of friends, enemies, witches and magic helpers as well. The primitive conscience is thus a social conscience in the sense that it shares its guilts and anxieties with others. Different cultures will, of course, differ in the detailed content of the moral code, methods of detecting and punishing violators, degree of specificity in defining crimes, etc., but the general feeling that no single individual is wholly to blame or wholly blameless for his own or his group's bad fortune seems to be a common feature of all of them.
In the primitive ethos and world view, each individual’s moral failures and achievements, his moral transgressions and conformities, are linked to his personal welfare and to the welfare of the group. And conversely, the general welfare of the group and the private welfare of each are dependent on the sum-total moral virtues and vices of the individual members. Drought, disease, bad crops, poor hunting, defeat in war all have moral significance, because they are seen in the beliefs of many primitive cultures as punishment for misbehavior and misconduct. Since these misfortunes are not limited to the "guilty" individual but may affect the entire group, everyone has a stake in enforcing conformity to the ethos; and everyone, until "the" criminal act or person is identified, experiences guilt feelings as he reviews his own record of past deviations from the group code. 

Of course, in this passage Redfield speaks loosely of "guilt," but since it is not made clear whether the primitives, in taking a furtive glance at their own moral scoreboard, are actually placed in fear of punitive retaliation—celestial or terrestrial—or whether it is just that they dread rejection by the group should they be found out (and the dark forces of the spirit world, from their point of view, might be the very agencies to blab), this may not be crucial. Information as to the possible existence of procedures for absolving the alleged guilt feelings would serve to narrow the field and identify the phenomena more closely. Disclosure of "the' criminal act or person" as a method of removing everybody's guilt feelings can hardly be equated with the usual expiatory rituals. And in any event, a belief in supernatural forces decidedly has no place in the Soviet world view. Furthermore, even if we discount the idea urged in some quarters that the reverent, consummately uncritical attitude of Communists toward the "State" and their faith that sheer beneficence must inevitably flow from unlimited, unhampered central authority—provided it is founded on the imperishable "truths" of social organization—is in reality nothing more than a new species of religion, it is still well within the canons of logical inference to tentatively embrace the following proposition: that the Soviets' insistence on conformity in all things in the name of the common weal—the droll conviction that justice to all is best promoted through an arrangement whereby any one individual may forthwith be shorn of the sum total of his rights if some
satrap in the service of the State declares that such individual's interests must yield before considerations of the general welfare, and that functionary's determination of the matter is conclusively deemed to be correct—that this emphasis so dominates their outlook on political and social life that it is at base indistinguishable from the unqualified attitude of collective responsibility entertained by many primitive folk.

Perhaps it would not be impolitic, by way of bringing to a close this brief and regrettably confined survey of the use of public shaming in the Soviet Union, to speculate on what the attitude of the Russian people themselves is toward the windows of satire. I must base my judgment of this solely on observations made of the individuals who came up to read the satirical posters in the Moscow railroad station as I copied information from them. My impression was that they did not regard them as some barely tolerable enormity foisted on them by the state. Quite on the contrary, their attitude seemed rather to be one of eager expectancy to see who had blundered his way onto the board this time. Such information evidently was considered a choice bit of gossip. The facial expressions of the onlookers, however, changed abruptly when they saw someone—obviously a Westerner—showing an abnormal interest in what they took for granted, and even taking it all down in a notebook. This included a militiaman (civil policeman) who caused me no little concern about what seemed at the time—it having been my first day in the U.S.S.R.—the hardly remote possibility of being taken into custody or at least invited to leave the premises in no uncertain terms. He said nothing, though, and I finished my note-taking.

My industriousness evoked a strange reaction, as though an entirely novel perspective on the matter had just been suggested to the Russians—one that likely would never have occurred in the absence of a stimulus from the outside. The change in their expressions from ill-concealed impishness to sullenness, almost a hurt resentfulness, seemed to say that their thought processes at that moment were something as follows: "If a foreigner can find such fascination in something of ours, they must not have it where he comes from. Maybe it isn't anywhere but here. Perhaps foreigners consider it barbaric and will tell everyone what the Russians are like. Why do we have Okna Satiri if no one else does?"

An indication was conveyed to me that the same sensitiveness to the opinions of others that makes the windows effective would cause the Russians to abandon the whole business if they thought other nations were snickering at them or considered them nekulturny ("uncultured"—an extremely derogatory word in Russian these days, connoting the swinish conditions many peasants lived in some years ago) because of their
use of such blatantly crude methods to get people to toe the line—much in the way the Japanese responded to adverse criticism of institutions they otherwise thought needed no justification whatever. Other instances could be cited of a concern in the Soviet Union for foreign opinion of certain of their endeavors.

But many engaging questions present themselves, and there are still numerous details to be filled in. Further investigation is suggested by the yet obscure origins of this remarkable expedient the Russians have concocted, and in the way of providing a statistical picture of the extent of its use throughout the country and information on possible variations of the windows under differing conditions. Did an older Russian tradition prompt it quite as a matter of course? Perhaps it is a natural extension of the practice of calling backsliders to task publicly that has been widely exploited in Soviet factories, for instance. Such an appraisal seems promising, but must remain mere conjecture until more facts are forthcoming.

A Résumé and Appraisal

Human behavior tends to be sanctioned, either positively or negatively, by the community in which it takes place. In so doing, society encourages or discourages behavior in accordance with whether or not it fits into the pattern of social ideals found in each group. Thus a degree of conformity is secured, and, to that same degree it is inappropriate to think of members of social groups as being brought up as free agents in a casuistic void, that is to say, escaping immersion in an array of ethical value judgments which, however, to all appearances, are of themselves cultural imponderables. The group invariably takes a strong lead in developing the individual along the lines of its own particular psychological and cultural plan—but one pattern out of the ostensibly infinite number of social schemata man seems capable of adapting himself to. Evidence would appear to amply demonstrate the futility of speaking of human society without this process taking place. If there is one thing the human animal cannot tolerate, it is leaving things alone, i.e., showing no concern about the activities and ways of his fellows. Seen from this vantage point, the intellectual barrenness of inquiring whether mankind has the power to choose between social control and no social control becomes manifest. If humanity has any area of discretion it is in choosing what measures of control it will have, according to their suitability and according to the ends to which it wants the control to lead. This point will be enlarged upon directly, but more attention should first be given to the sanctions themselves.
The most important consequence of social sanctions is that of reaffirming before the whole community the ideals which the sanctions themselves bolster and give concrete meaning to. In everyday parlance this reaffirming is thought of as "making an example" of those audacious enough to defy (or, rewarding those prudent enough to live up to) norms of conduct about which the feeling of the community is sufficiently intense to impel it to positive action. The effect upon the individuals to whom the sanctions are applied is decidedly a secondary one, from the social viewpoint in any case. The really salient point here is not only that the community, by means of the sanctions, endeavors to make known to every last member of it what behavior will not be tolerated and what behavior it considers eminently praiseworthy, but especially that it makes clear to all that if a particular act does not fall into the "unsanctioned" area between the two extremes of positively sanctioned and negatively sanctioned behavior, rather falling squarely within the province of one of the latter two, the actor can assuredly expect to be held answerable to the community for his conduct (or can expect tribute from the community, as the case may be).

As a rule, it is the familiarity, the propinquant relationships of small social groups that make possible the use of those non-legal sanctions which may be denominated "the pressures of public opinion," or shame sanctions. The impersonal conditions of complex cultures, on the other hand, usually require legal or authoritarian sanctions. Guilt sanctions, however, may be employed in both simple and complex cultures, not being dependent on the face-to-face relations of the smaller groups for their effectiveness. The lack of correlation between their use and the size or complexity of a society is in all likelihood an indication of a generic link between guilt phenomena and a culture's philosophical world-picture considered as a whole, as for example, if its religious concepts include that of a wrathful, punishing deity, it can be expected that a sense of guilt will pervade the intellectual and psychological aspects of the culture; but if the so-called religious emphasis is on an escape from or denial of the tensions and stresses of living—as in Buddhism—then whatever emotional quirks a people living under this philosophy might have, we would not anticipate finding among them a generalized sense of guilt and a subconscious hankering to be punished, or at least to confess things; and so forth. Thus, the existence of guilt sanctions and their distribution among various culture areas would be largely fortuitous, and not something a particular culture group would (or, perhaps in certain cases, even could) intentionally turn to as a means of social control, in the same sense it intentionally passes a legislative act to control human
conduct, for example. There may be an unconscious move in this direction, though, and it is not insupportable to imagine that as a culture grows in complexity and so must find new ways or supplementary ways to enforce conformity that, in addition to the more obvious alternative of introducing authoritarian techniques or legal institutions, the psychological branding of each denizen in its domain with abstract moral standards would have a distinct appeal. To the extent such guilt sanctions achieve the end of social control, the community need turn to fewer and less stringent legal sanctions.

The only generalization that may be put forward here is that the intimate circumstances of small communities make the pressures of public opinion feasible as a mode of social control, thus we may expect to find recourse to shaming procedures more frequently in them. In complex, populous societies the conditions are less favorable for cultivating methods of this sort, and as a rule a greater emphasis on instilling absolute standards of morality in each person, and on legal sanctions and their concomitant enforcement agencies will be encountered there. Neither is an unvarying rule, however. Some communities in which we would expect to find a major stress on shame sanctions take great pains to infuse internal standards of morality into their members. These standards, if transgressed, make the individual feel "guilty" for having "sinned" until he confesses, atones for his sin, is punished, or until his feeling of guilt is transferred ritually to an agency in the community existing for that purpose. Persons in such cultures may be quite oblivious to efforts of the group to mock them. Similarly, other groups, which belong among the most complex and impersonal of them, invoke with considerable success the sanctions of shame and ridicule, and the coercive power of the reactions of others. This is always a matter of degree, though, and does not imply in either case that other sanctions have been—or could be—abandoned. The degree to which these counter-tendencies go against the traditional currents, or against what situational factors such as population would seem to dictate in the way of sanctionary emphases, and the forms in which they are manifested may vary considerably, from the recently-emerging "other-directedness" of our own country and the officially endorsed doctrines of national togetherness of Soviet Communism, to the pathological sensitivity of the Japanese to how others regard one's behavior.

If the preceding observations seem somewhat anomalous, some light may be shed on the matter by taking into account environmental and cultural features of these societies: there are few people in the Soviet Union who have not had a steady diet of prescribed training in social con-
consciousness, whether they practice charity-begins-at-home privately or not; in America rugged individualism is perhaps more of a slogan than even the most vocal cynics have supposed—indeed, our elementary and high schools have for some time now been permeated to the core with the group-adjustment philosophy, so much so in fact that there appears to be overwhelming agreement among those in a position to judge, that academic subjects have been greatly neglected in favor of such emphasis; the special conditions of life in Japan, from the standpoint of physical environment, permit a degree of intimacy not ordinarily associated with highly populated, largely urban areas, but more importantly it is the early training in "shame" that makes the Japanese exceedingly sensitive to it. This last point can not be re-emphasized too much, for in virtually any society where shaming is employed in a thorough-going manner it is such process of conditioning that is mainly accountable for the end-product adult extravagantly responsive to manifestations of approval and disapproval in others. Intimate circumstances of life make shaming techniques effective instruments of control, but peoples in those cultures are almost never content to let things take their natural course. They are well aware that a lifelong process of conditioning, initiated in early childhood, redoubles the impact public opinion normally has on the individual.

Enough has been said already about the psychodynamics of shame and guilt, and their respective onsets, that they need not be reviewed in great detail here. It will suffice for most purposes to bear in mind only that it is the nature of the threat posed to the individual that is the most significant factor distinguishing shame from guilt. A great deal of the effectiveness of both shame and guilt sanctions comes not from real, but from irrational considerations. When a person does something he feels guilty or ashamed about, it is not so much that he fears actual punishment or actual rejection by others (though these elements may be present in addition, depending on the circumstances), but it is imaginary punishment and rejection, related by analogy with childhood experiences—which left such a profound impress on the individual—that really strikes fear in his heart.

In taking stock of the materials assembled here, with a view to following this presentation to its conclusion, an irrepressible temptation comes over one to abandon caution to the winds and set sail on the Sea of Indiscretion—and Presumptuousness. One wonders if anything can be gleaned from the accumulated labors of all those who have arduously and thoughtfully attended to the matters at hand, that might be of value to those students of society who believe that a scientific study of man, the psychological and social being, can create a better life for him in his rela-
tions with his fellows, in the way that a scientific approach has been able
to improve aspects of his physical existence and material environment.
What counsel can be tendered to the hopeful designers of future Utopias?
For the school believing that ultimate answers lie in extreme points of
view I see nothing that promises to cheer their hearts. In fact, if any-
thing emerges from the mass of data under consideration it is the ir-
refragable soundness of Terence's admonition for "moderation in all
things." Nothing seems to warrant the view that a society of human
beings without some form of social control lies in the years ahead, and
though it can not demonstrably be proved one way or the other, taking
this stand on the matter does not seem an especially daring thing to do
at the present time. Man has difficulties enough just in trying to cope
with the vexatious problems of social control that ever plague him, with-
out succumbing to the temptation to idly dream them away. If the no-
tion can only be acceded to that conflict is as much a part of man's ex-
istence as is the impermanence of his physical presence, and that this con-
flict, unregulated, is no more acceptable to him than utter regimentation
of his every move is acceptable to certain aspects of his psychological
being, then we can get down to particulars and perhaps decide which
compromises are desirable and which are not—rather than fritter away
our time speculating about hypothetical societies based on what man
clearly is not.

The question then is, what forms of social control should be
adopted? The answer, I fear, is more readily stated in the negative, at
least for the present writer, being congenitally beset with an express
congeries of prejudices and predilections. And I suspect also that the
upshot of these prejudices and predilections will provide little solace to
those who are disposed to think that one pattern of society is "just as
good" as another for the bare reason that all cultures have evolved
"naturally." When applied to the ways of mankind, the word natural
becomes for most purposes destitute of all practical utility. Indeed,
placing the stupendous psychological nature of man on all fours with
physiological and instinctual properties of the rest of the animal kingdom
is a remarkable commentary on the postulated logical faculties of human
beings. If anything is established by the anthropological and psychologi-
cal findings of the last several decades, it is that there is almost noth-
ing of which man is incapable when it comes to devising the life he
will live. The variations he evolves are bounded only by his imagina-
tion—which seems boundless.

The champions of prescriptive philosophy and prescriptive ethics
seem to me unquestionably to make out a good case. And this holds de-
spite the admitted difficulties of changing human habits, either collective or individual ones. In truth, the obstacles encountered in trying to modify clearly undesirable behavior patterns would seem to make efforts in this direction even more urgent for the simple reason that the person or persons involved are manifestly helpless to get out of their predicament on their own power—even when they themselves recognize the dubious worth of their habitual ways. I would think it extraordinary, for example, for anyone to insist that some of the extremes to which shame sanctions have been or are now pursued are from any conceivable point of view satisfactory for human beings anywhere, any more than the extremes to which guilt sanctions have gone or now go are satisfactory. When they completely dominate the individual and make of him a twisted mass of unrelenting anxiety, then the notion that a good stiff dose of social control is indispensable because all individuals in the society are beneficiaries of it, is reduced to a macabre and depressing joke. This is all the more apposite when regard is had for the fact that the requisite minimum of social control is easily attained without leaving a swath of human wreckage in its wake.

To sum up, it would seem desirable to instill some guilt sanctions in the members of a society if but for the reason that they are self-enforcing and require much less expenditure of effort than would legal sanctions alone. For most categories of behavior, in point of fact, more than one kind of sanction is presently invoked. Most people in our society would not commit illegal acts even if the law did not apply to them, because their internalized moral standards, or these coupled with shame sanctions, would keep them from it. The law by and large attempts to deter, or at least deal with, those who for one reason or another did not have these standards so firmly ingrained in them, or who are impervious to community opinion, or who, as a result of some contrary psychological disposition, feel compelled to transgress their moral code despite the sense of guilt that will befall them. The abnormals, of course, are another problem. It does not follow, however, that therefore justification exists for making a person feel guilty about things that can not be avoided, such as antisocial or "immoral" thoughts. These are quite natural and he should realize the fact. To make him feel guilty about them is to forever burden him with a sense of guilt. It is sufficient that he feels guilty enough about doing certain acts to keep from doing them. This is all social control demands.

And what about shame? Sanctions in this grouping appear to be more useful for bringing about the sort of conformity that results when everyone observes approximately the same canons of etiquette. Shame can
be used to cope with major social transgressions as well, but it, unlike guilt, is only operative if others know one has committed the forbidden act—unless the shame has become "internalized." Guilt, on the other hand, hardly seems appropriate for handling minor deviations from the accepted social niceties, since guilt feelings which would arise out of the *faux pas*—from which most people could never hope to be completely immune—would constantly have to be gotten rid of through some expiatory procedure or other if they were not to accumulate to precarious levels. Guilt, by its very nature, seems ill-suited for this task, just as shame, because of qualities inherent in it, make it somewhat inadequate for controlling the more serious kinds of antisocial activity. But those same qualities—the general requirement of an audience being present to witness the conduct in question—make shame a fitting agent for policing man's direct, personal dealings with one another, and achieving a quantum of conformity in them.

Although conformability in these relatively insignificant aspects of social behavior is not an absolute requisite of social order, few would dissent from the view that a certain amount of it is desirable, and that children should not be brought up wholly insensate to the reactions of others in these matters. Reactions from other people seem inevitable, and to teach the child a disregard of them is to risk his being rejected by society and becoming something of a hermit for the rest of his days. There is no question of maintaining social control here, but we are going beyond this and trying to set forth the conditions of a better human existence. The congenial association of one's fellows seems to be a deeply felt need of the psyche, and so the child may as well learn what he must do to partake of a normal amount of social acceptance, and avoid the loneliness so many experience for never having sufficiently learned the minimal requirements of interpersonal relationships.

It is a long step, however, from placing this much responsibility for the education of the child onto shame, to either developing it to such an intense degree that the individual feels hopelessly rejected at every little slip, or extending it into every compartment of human behavior such that he becomes a virtual slave to the opinions of others and suffers intrapsychically because of the lack of opportunity to express his individuality, or because of an excess burden of "circumspection" over his every slightest act.

I submit, then, this moderate proposal for moderation to the humanists who not only believe that the limits of man's potentialities are as yet unfathomed, but also believe that the means for achieving human
betterment can be as important, or more important, than the end itself—and to them alone.

LEGAL HISTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRIAL

The story of the public trial begins with the invasion of England by William the Conqueror in 1066. Although the Norman legal system differed from that of the Anglo-Saxons, William assured his new subjects that they were to be governed by the laws that had existed during the reign of Edward the Confessor. Except for a few changes in the substantive law and the establishment of a more centralized judicial system this promise was substantially fulfilled. There were at least two reasons for this policy of following the Anglo-Saxon legal customs. First, William had purported to be the lawful heir to the throne of Edward the Confessor. By maintaining the legal status quo there was always the slight possibility of convincing the conquered subjects of the truth of this assertion. Secondly, in this newly acquired kingdom he had the task of keeping the peace. There was nothing that resembled a public police force, nor did there exist, at that time, any machinery by which such a body could be established. By accepting the Anglo-Saxon customs and laws William was able to build upon an already existing system of law. By allowing this judicial system to remain as it was before the conquest the problem of policing the vast new kingdom was partially solved.

In early England the most common form of justice was carried out by the tribe or the community. Whenever a person committed a wrong against another member of the community he was considered as having

1. 1 Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law 67 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as Pollock & Maitland]; Jenks, A Short History of English Law 17 (5th ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as Jenks].
2. Potter, English Law and Its Institutions 10 (2d ed. 1943).
3. "... William, on more than one occasion ... promised to the English ... their 'law,' ... the rights they held, 'on the day when King Edward ... was alive and dead.'" Jenks, The Book of English Law 13 (5th ed. 1953).
4. In addition it may be recalled that the Norman law was largely unrecorded. That which was recorded was French. The English had a relatively sound body of recorded law. The laws of Edward the Elder, Edgar, and Cnut had been recorded. Upon his arrival in England William found a body of customs and laws in existence. 1 Pollock & Maitland 65, 67.
5. "These old customary rules were the ancient custom observed by the people for countless generations. They were administered only as such rules could be in a general meeting, or court, composed of all the freemen of the neighborhood ...." Potter, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7.