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Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Torts: Part Two

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however, any fair interpretation of the opinion compels a recognition of termination of immunity as one of the grounds for the Court's decision. Otherwise, over six pages of the Court's opinion must be discarded as idle ramblings. This portion of the opinion is too thoroughly documented by authority from other jurisdictions to be dismissed so lightly.

If termination of immunity is accepted as one of the grounds for decision in Hackney, serious doubt arises as to whether either Cox or Capps continues as authority, although neither was expressly overruled by the Court. Neither Cox nor Capps involves an action against a deceased parent, but this factual distinction seems unimportant as the disruption of family harmony is as unlikely in one case as the other. All who have considered the problem apparently treat the death of either parent or child, without regard to who brings the action, as sufficient to terminate immunity when the basic rule that death terminates immunity by destroying the reason for it has been adopted. Thus, unless what would appear to be artificial factual distinctions are made by the Court or unless the Court later abandons the position taken in Hackney, Cox and Capps should no longer be the law.

**TORTS: PART TWO**

*Philip C. Thorpe*

**FRAUD**

*Fox v. Southern Appliances, Inc.* was an action for specific performance of a contract to purchase land. The defendant refused to purchase, claiming that it had been misled by plaintiff's representations that the property could be used for commercial purposes, when in fact it was restricted to residential use. Although the zoning ordinance permitted commercial structures, restrictive covenants prohibited such a use. The contract provided that the sale was made

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* See Harlan Nat'l Bank v. Gross, 346 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1961); Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940); Logan v. Reaves, 209 Tenn. 631, 354 S.W.2d 789 (1962). In all these cases, other grounds may have been the primary basis for the decision.

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1 264 N.C. 267, 141 S.E.2d 522 (1965).
subject to restrictions appearing as a matter of record title. Plaintiff demurred to the defense on the theory that defendant's neglect in failing to check the record title made the defense of fraud insufficient. Despite the contract's provisions, the Court held that the pleaded defense was sufficient.

To what extent must a person make an independent investigation as to the truth or falsity of representations made to induce a sale? In actions for fraud, plaintiff must not only have relied upon the representations, but his reliance must have been reasonable. The precise question raised by Fox is whether reliance is reasonable when an investigation would have disclosed the falsity of the representations. In an earlier day the doctrine of caveat emptor prevailed. The buyer was under an obligation to beware and was required to investigate. Today there is little need to undertake an independent investigation. Several reasons explain this change in attitude. First, if the basis of the claim is an intentional misrepresentation, negligently failing to investigate would not defeat the claim. More importantly, courts have been moving away from strict caveat emptor for many years. In 1906 our Court stated:

It seems plausible at first sight to contend that a man who does not use obvious means of verifying the representations made to him does not deserve to be compensated for any loss he may incur by relying upon them without inquiry. But the ground of this kind of redress is not the merit of the plaintiff, but the demerit of the defendant; and it is now settled law that one who chooses to make positive assertions without warrant, shall not excuse himself by saying that the other party need not have relied upon them...

In general, a person may reasonably rely upon representations without investigating their truth. A few cases have required some investigation as to the truth of represented facts but they are not

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C. Griffin v. Lumber Co., 140 N.C. 514, 520-21, 53 S.E. 307, 309 (1906). In Griffin the defendant prevented the plaintiff from reading a deed.
in conflict with the line of authority represented by Fox. In such cases, an investigation was either simple to make, or the party claiming to have relied was better equipped to determine the truth or falsity of the representations than was the maker. Clearly, reliance on a statement is not reasonable in either situation. However, where an investigation would require an outlay of time, expense, or the hiring of special help, an independent investigation will not and ought not be required. Thus, in Fox, a title search would require an attorney’s services. It follows that defendant did not act unreasonably in relying upon the plaintiff's representations of the permitted use of the property without obtaining the title search.

**Strict Liability**

Since the 1963 decision in *Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros.*, the Court has been committed to the modern strict liability theory of the Restatement of Torts. We can anticipate decisions from time to time clarifying the Court's position concerning the application of the theory to a variety of situations. In *Trull v. Carolina-Virginia Well Co.*, plaintiff claimed that strict liability should be applied where his house received damage from vibrations caused by well-drilling on his land. Noting that the only similarity between *Guilford* and *Trull* was the claimed damage by vibration, the Supreme Court affirmed the granting of an involuntary nonsuit in *Trull*.

The modern theory of strict liability rests upon the ultrahazardous nature of the injury-causing activity. Subsection 520(a) of the Restatement of Torts defines an ultrahazardous activity as one which "necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care...." Plaintiffs who wish to make use of

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10 Restatement, Torts §§ 519-23 (1938).
12 264 N.C. 678, 142 S.E.2d 622 (1965).
13 See Restatement, Torts §§ 519, 520 (1938).
strict liability must be prepared to prove that the activity which
caus ed their injury was ultrahazardous within this definition. Not
only did plaintiff in Trull fail to do so, but his initial pleading was
based upon negligence. Furthermore, the way in which damages are
caus ed is irrelevant. The Supreme Court was clearly correct in dis-
regarding this argument in Trull.

A more interesting question was presented in Trull, as well as
in the appeal, after trial below, of Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v.
Blythe Bros. Modern liability for ultrahazardous activity is not
absolute. However the defenses which will defeat a claim of strict
liability are not clear. Trull and Guilford suggest defenses that can
be used. In Trull, the Court based its holding in part upon the fact
that plaintiff had contracted for the defendant's services and thus
could not rely upon strict liability to recover. The Court's position
is clearly in accord with section 523 of the Restatement, which
denies use of the theory to any person who "takes part in it" (i.e.,
the ultrahazardous activity). It seems clear that anyone who invites
such activities upon his land should be proscribed from recovery
without a showing of fault. This is akin to the assumption of
risk defense in negligence actions. Several cases have denied to
plaintiffs any reliance upon strict liability where the ultrahazardous
activities were carried on for their benefit. In Guilford, the de-
fense was governmental immunity. The defendant argued that since
the city of High Point was supervising its activities, it was entitled
to the city's immunity. The Court held that since the city was not
immune from liability for inherently dangerous activities, the de-
fense could not benefit defendant.

Trull, Guilford, and a third case decided this year, Keith v.
United Cities Gas Co., raised a problem for practitioners in North
Carolina. The term "inherently dangerous" has been used in the past in several senses in the law of torts. For many years, it de-
scribed those products to which privity of contract did not serve to
bar actions against the manufacturer. In Guilford, it was used
both to justify imposing liability without fault and to limit munici-
pal governmental immunity. The Keith case used "inherently dan-
gerous" to describe standards of due care. Because of the multiple
usages, care should be taken to determine the correct use in a given
context before concluding that resort to liability regardless of fault
is warranted.

CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNITY AND SETTLEMENT

Prior to 1965, the Court took the position that an insurer of
one joint tort-feasor had no right to contribution from the other
joint tort-feasor. Two recent cases appear to overturn in part the
no-contribution rule. In Pittman v. Snedeke the plaintiff sued one
of two potential defendants. The original defendant filed a cross-
action against the other potential defendant. The jury found both
defendants' fault contributed to plaintiff's injury. The original de-
defendant's insurer satisfied plaintiff's judgment, and the original de-
defendant, pursuant to the right of contribution granted by the
judgment in accordance with G.S. § 1-240, sought execution against
the third-party defendant. Although the third-party defendant
argued that Herring v. Jackson denied the right of contribution
against a joint tort-feasor to an insurer who paid the judgment
on behalf of another joint tort-feasor, the Court affirmed the lower
court's refusal to enjoin execution by the original defendant. In
Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. the Court
allowed the original defendant's insurer to recover from the third-
party defendants under substantially the same facts.

Since earlier authorities were not overruled by Pittman and
Safeco, the Court apparently has distinguished two situations.
Where a plaintiff sues and obtains judgment against all joint tort-
feasors, the insurer of one of them cannot get contribution from the
others after satisfying plaintiff's judgment. However, where
plaintiff sues one, or less than all joint tort-feasors, contribution is
possible if the defendant brings the other joint tort-feasors into
the suit by a cross-action. The basis for this distinction seems to

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22 264 N.C. 749, 142 S.E.2d 694 (1965); 44 N.C.L. Rev. 142 (1965).
be the following. In the first situation, all tort-feasors have been
sued by the plaintiff. Because the defendants may not cross-claim
for contribution, the right to contribution remains inchoate, pend-
ing a second action. In the second situation, the cross-claim is per-
mitted, and the right to contribution is adjudicated prior to satisfac-
tion by the insurer. Subrogation then occurs pro tanto when the
plaintiff's judgment is satisfied.

The situation is, of course, anomalous. Under present law, the
insurer's right to recover contribution depends upon plaintiff's
choice of defendants. In defense of the Court, it must be pointed
out that neither the contribution statute nor any other statutes
lend themselves to a construction which would solve this particular
hiatus. By ruling as it has in Pittman and Safeco, the Court has
at least made it possible for the insurer to obtain contribution in
some cases. The obvious solution is an amendment to the contri-
bution statute, making clear the insurer's right to contribution under
all circumstances upon satisfying its insured's obligation to the
plaintiff.

An additional aspect of contribution was before the Court in
1965. In Clemmons v. King contribution was denied because the
pleadings did not properly raise the question. The original defen-
dant, although he brought in a third-party defendant by means of
a cross-action, at no time alleged that his own negligence concurred
with that of the third-party defendant to cause plaintiff's injury.
Careful counsel will make certain that concurrent negligence is
pleaded. This can be done as an alternative to other theories, with
the concurring negligence pleaded conditionally.

Gibbs v. Carolina Power & Light Co. raised an interesting
question involving a claim for indemnity. Plaintiff's employer was
performing construction and maintenance work for defendant when
the plaintiff was injured because of the negligence of defendant's
employees. Defendant, claiming plaintiff's employer had agreed by
contract to indemnify defendant, sought to bring in the employer by
a cross-action for indemnity. The Court affirmed the trial court's
striking of the cross-action. It held that since the cross-action was

26 265 N.C. 199, 143 S.E.2d 83 (1965).
27 Id. at 202, 143 S.E.2d at 86.
28 265 N.C. 459, 144 S.E.2d 393 (1965).
not germane to plaintiff's claim, it was not proper. Since the Workmen's Compensation Act clearly indicates that neither the employer nor the compensation insurer are to be joined in actions by the employee against a third person, there was no authorization for the cross-action.

The significant thing to note here is that the problem is peculiar to workmen's compensation situations. In other actions involving indemnity claims plaintiff could assert his claim against either defendant. The cross-action would then be "germane" to plaintiff's action and would be permissible.

Two cases involving settlements need only brief comment. In Sell v. Hotchkiss the Court construed a covenant not to sue which had been obtained by one joint tort-feasor to permit plaintiff to bring an action against the other joint tort-feasor. Although the case was made difficult because of the complex and ambiguous language of the covenant, the Court found the intent of the parties was to reserve to plaintiff his right of action against the joint tort-feasor who had not settled. The second case, Bongardt v. Frink, presented to the Court a case understood best in contrast to its earlier decision in Keith v. Glenn. In Keith, plaintiff's insurer had made a settlement with defendant. Plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries, and defendant counterclaimed for his personal injuries. Plaintiff filed a reply, asserting the prior settlement, but alleging it was made against his wishes and without his consent. The Court held that plaintiff could either affirm the settlement, thus barring defendant's counterclaim but also barring his own action; or plaintiff could refuse to ratify the settlement, thus retaining his claim, but permitting the counterclaim by defendant. This case follows a series of earlier decisions establishing the rules permitting the insured's action, and the defendant's counterclaim.

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30 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(d), (e) (1965).
33 264 N.C. 185, 141 S.E.2d 259 (1965).
tion in Bongardt was somewhat different. There the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendant's counterclaim, setting forth the earlier settlement between defendant and his insurer. The plaintiff then was permitted to withdraw the reply and the case went to trial upon both plaintiff's claim and defendant's counterclaim. The Court held that defendant was not prejudiced by the withdrawal of the reply. Thus, after a settlement by the insurer, the insured is permitted to sue, and defendant is permitted to counterclaim despite the settlement. The plaintiff may rely either upon the settlement, or go to trial upon his claim, and defend against the counterclaim without insurance protection. Although it is best to be certain as to the insured's choice before proceeding, the trial court, according to Bongardt, has discretion to allow a withdrawal of a pleading which acts as a ratification of the settlement. An ill-made choice may be reversed, if done quickly.

TRIAL PRACTICE

Herbert Baer*

PROCESS

G.S. § 1-105.1 authorizes service of process by serving the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in cases where the defendant at the time of the accident in question was a resident of this state but has, since the accident, established residence outside of this state or departed from this state and remained absent for sixty days or more continuously whether such absence is intended to be temporary or permanent. G.S. § 1-98.2(6) authorizes service of process by publication where the "defendant, a resident of this state, has departed therefrom or keeps himself concealed therein with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid the service of summons."

In Harrison v. Hanvey plaintiff passenger alleged that defen-

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37 Since the insurer has satisfied its contractual obligations by settling, the insured cannot insist upon further protection. See Bradford v. Kelly, note 19 supra.

38 In Bongardt, the reply was withdrawn about one month after it was filed.

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1 265 N.C. 243, 143 S.E.2d 593 (1965).