Evidence-Dying Declarations-Appeal and Error
ness, however convenient and cheap it may be to reorganizers and however justly disappointing to recalcitrant minorities, who may be trying to force the majority to buy them out to get rid of them."

Obviously the right of unsecured creditors must be preserved, but must it be preserved at the expense of a much larger group of also meritorious parties and can it not be adequately preserved otherwise than in cash after a forced sale? It is practically impossible for a large corporation to reorganize without bringing in the old stockholders, first, because they control the technical ability to run the business and second, because they are more ready to put up the necessary funds in view of their previous investment. If creditors must be paid in cash, reorganization is unreasonably checked. Often it occurs that these creditors themselves are at a disadvantage in forced sales and distribution afterward. Their share of the proceeds may be, and, in fact, usually is only a fraction of their just claim. On the other hand, if the reorganized company were allowed to carry on the business, probably a much higher per cent of their claims would eventually be paid the unwilling participants.

Even if this were not true, it seems inharmonious with equitable principles that the technical rights of a few objectors should preclude a large majority of willing participants from a chance to recover their larger losses. Whether the obstructive tactics of selfish minorities are less dangerous than the chance of tyranny by the majority has not been decided by the highest tribunal or by any great weight of authority among lower courts. It would seem, however, assuming that the reorganization plan has been approved after deliberation by an accurately informed court, and a large majority of the interested parties assent, that the courts should have the power to make the plan binding, even though there is no sale and no cash is distributed to the dissenters. Upon consideration of the more recent decisions and dicta, it would seem that there is a trend toward recognizing such power in the courts, even in the absence of legislation.

M. C. M.

EVIDENCE—DYING DECLARATIONS—APPEAL AND ERROR—S. was convicted of murdering his wife by poisoning her with bichloride of mercury. Defendant appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, contending that a statement of Mrs. S. to her nurse had been erroneously admitted in evidence as a dying declaration. The statement was, "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me." It was made two days after Mrs. S.'s illness had begun, at a time when she was greatly improved and was not thought by her physicians to be dangerously ill. At the trial, the declaration was offered and received as a dying declaration. The defense had advanced the theory of suicide, and produced evidence that indicated a suicidal intent on the part of Mrs. S. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration, but was admissible for the purpose of rebutting the evidence of suicidal intent, and affirmed the conviction. Defendant brought certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Held, judgment reversed. Testimony admitted at the trial for an illegitimate purpose cannot be considered in the appellate court as if admitted for a different purpose unavowed and unsus-
pected, where the purpose in reserve would be unlikely to occur to unin-
structed jurors.¹

The holding that the declaration was not admissible as a dying declara-
tion, since the declarant, at the time of making it, was not shown to have
spoken without hope of recovery and in the shadow of impending death, is
in accord with the Indiana rule on dying declarations.² The great weight
of authority in other states also holds that a dying declaration is not ad-
missible as such unless it be shown that declarant was conscious of ap-
proaching death and had no hope of recovery.³

The unique feature of the principal case is its decision that evidence
admitted for an express purpose cannot be considered on appeal as if ad-
mitted for another purpose, even though no instruction limiting its effect
was asked for at the trial. It is generally held that the trial court is not
required to give instructions as to particular points, in a criminal case,
where no request therefor is made.⁴ In Indiana and a majority of the other
states, where evidence is admitted in a prosecution against two persons
jointly, but is admissible against only one of them, the other cannot com-
plain that the court did not limit the application of the evidence, where no
such instruction was requested.⁵ However, none of the cases establishing
this rule presented the question of evidence offered and received for an ex-
press purpose. Justice Cardozo, in the principal case, conceded that if the
purpose of the evidence had been left at large, the rule of the cases cited
above might apply, and defendant, not having asked for an explanatory
instruction, might not be allowed to complain on appeal as to the purpose
for which it was used. But where the testimony was offered for an illegiti-
mate purpose, the court held that the trial would become unfair if testi-
mony thus accepted could be used in the appellate court as if admitted for
a different purpose, unavowed and unsuspected.

In support of this reasoning, the court cited a recent decision of the
New York Court of Appeals, People v. Zackowitz.⁶ There it was held that
where the state was erroneously allowed to introduce evidence tending to
show murderous propensities on the part of defendant, the fact that de-
defendant later took the stand, so that this same evidence would
be

competent
to
impeach his credibility, did not cure the error of admitting it.⁷

The writer was able to find only one other case propounding the doc-
trine of the principal case. In that case, the state moved to strike out

¹Shepard v. United States (Kan.) (1933), 54 Sup. Ct. 22.
²Williams v. State (1907), 168 Ind. 87, 79 N. E. 1079; Watson v. State (1878),
  63 Ind. 548; Morgan v. State (1869), 31 Ind. 193.
³Brennan v. People (1906), 27 Colo. 256, 86 P. 79; Fuqua v. Commonwealth
  (1903), 73 S. W. 782; Collins v. People (1902), 194 Ill. 506, 62 N. E. 902; Gardner
  v. State (1908), 55 Fla. 25, 45 So. 1028; People v. Brecht (1907), 105 N. Y. S.
⁴Paulson v. State (1902), 118 Wis. 89, 94 N. W. 771; People v. Willett (1895),
  Zell v. Commonwealth (1880), 94 Pa. St. 258; Commonwealth v. Selesnick (1930),
⁵Thompson v. State (1929), 189 Ind. 192, 125 N. E. 641; State v. Romeo
  (1912), 42 Utah 46, 123 P. 530; State v. Shout (1915), 263 Mo. 360, 172 S. W. 607;
  Lytle v. United States, 5 Fed. (2nd) 622.
⁶254 N. Y. 192, 172 N. E. 466.
certain evidence. Before granting the motion the court inquired of defendant's counsel as to the purpose of the evidence. It was not admissible for the purpose named by counsel, and was stricken out. On appeal, defendant's contention that the evidence was offered for a different purpose was not allowed.8

In the instant case, the court went on to say that aside from the fatal objection outlined above, this particular declaration would not have been admissible as evidence of deceased's state of mind, even though it had been so limited at the trial. This declaration was an accusation of defendant. It was hearsay evidence of defendant's guilt. As Justice Cardozo put it, "Other tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be disentangled by a jury."

The rule of the principal case seems to be a reasonable restriction of the doctrine that it is never error for the court to fail to limit the evidence to its legitimate purposes, where an instruction to this effect is not asked.

S. F. S.

PERSONS—HUSBAND AND WIFE—WIFE'S RIGHT TO EARNINGS—Appellant, the administrator of the estate of Lydia Offenbacker, prosecuted this appeal from a judgment in favor of appellee, who is the wife of Lydia Offenbacker's son. For nineteen years prior to her death Mrs. Offenbacker, an invalid, lived in the home of her son and appellee and was cared for by them. For about five years of this period she was confined to her bed by illness so that she required the exacting and constant attention of her son or appellee. Mrs. Offenbacker frequently told appellee and her husband that she expected to compensate them for their services, and after her death, both filed claims against the estate, which were allowed. Appellant contends that such services as were rendered by appellee belong to her husband, and that when his claim was allowed it necessarily included any sum earned by appellee. Held, that such earnings were the separate property of the wife.1

The apparent conflict of Indiana cases arising under the statute which provides that "the earnings and profits of any married woman, accruing from her trade, business, services or labor, other than labor for her husband or family, shall be her sole and separate property"2 is due to the failure of the court to analyze the fact situation of each individual case. It has repeatedly been held in this state that services of the wife, unless performed in her separate business,3 or for third persons,4 belong to her husband as at common law.5 It is also settled that the husband may give

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8Lindsay v. State (1898), 39 Tex. Cr. R. 468, 46 S. W. 1045.
1Offenbacker v. Offenbacker (1933), 187 N. E. 903 (Ind.).
8Section 8740, Burns' Ann. St. 1926.
5Baxter v. Prickett's Administrator (1867), 27 Ind. 490; Jenkins v. Flinn (1871), 27 Ind. 349; Topst v. Topst (1875), 51 Ind. 61; Knappenberg v. Morris (1881), 80 Ind. 540; Board of Commissioners of Tipton County v. Brown (1891),