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Contracts-Recovery under Void Agreement

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Cooper's Glue Factory, 231 N. Y. 459; Green v. Whaley, 271 Md. 636; Stearns v. Barnett, 18 Mass. (1 Peisk) 443. But the court could have gone farther in its definition. Any act or promise will be sufficient consideration under the bargain theory, except (1) where there is an act or forbearance required by a legal duty that is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest and reasonable dispute if the duty is owed either to the promisor or to the public, or, if imposed by the law of torts or crimes, is owed to any person; (2) where there is the surrender of, or forbearance to assert an invalid claim or defense by one who has not an honest and reasonable belief in its possible validity. American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Official Draft, Chaps. 1-7, Secs. 75, 76, 86, 87, 88, 89, and 90. The result reached here is correct but the court could have safely adopted a definition of, consideration substantially similar to that adopted by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Contracts. The decision apparently is based upon contract law, but even though the court had in mind consideration in bills and notes, the result would not have been different. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value. Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. Negotiable Instruments Law, sections 24 and 25. Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1925, Vol. 3, sections 11383 and 11384.

C. F. B.

Contracts—Recovery Under Void Agreement—Plaintiff and defendant had entered into a contract whereby plaintiff was to take over the execution management of, and to underwrite, the defendant company for 20 years. The contract was declared void, after the parties had transacted considerable business under it, because it was against public policy. Plaintiff sued to recover for services rendered and money advanced on the faith of the unlawful contract. Held, claim for recovery of unused portion of fund advanced by plaintiff, and for recovery of another sum involving six unexplained items, allowed. In the course of its opinion, the court said: "Courts have very generally striven to do justice between the parties by permitting property or money parted with, or services rendered on the faith of such unlawful contracts, to be recovered or compensated for, notwithstanding the invalidity of the contract." Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mutual Casualty Co., 41 Fed. Rep. (2nd) 588.

The general rule is that the law will not enforce a contract founded on a violation of law. Clarke v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 Ind. App. 697; Duance v. Merchants' Legal Stamp Co., 231 Mass 113; Jackson v. City of Columbia, 217 S. W. 869; Railroad Stores v. Fabyan & Co., 197 N. Y. S. 815. Nor will it aid either party to an alleged contract, but will leave them both where it finds them. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Knox, 202 Ala. 694; International Coal & Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 293 Ill. 524; Baylston Bottling Co. v. O'Neill, 231 Mass. 498; People v. Carlin, 181 N. Y. S. 389. The reasons generally accepted for the observance of this rule are: (1) it operates to inflict punishment upon plaintiff for participating in unlawful transactions; McCullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639 (2) It warns those contemplating illegal transactions that they enter upon
them at their own risk and must bear all the consequences; *Russell v. Courier Printing, etc., Co.*, 43 Colo. 321. (3) It saves the courts from the indignity of attending to disputes of lawbreakers; *Smith v. Richmond*, 114 Ky. 303. (4) It permits the courts to be free to try suits of honest liti-

But the rule that courts will not aid a party to an illegal transaction to enforce it, set it aside, or recover back money or property is held sub-
ject to exceptions as well established as the rule; *In re Progressive Wall Paper Corp.*, 229 Fed. 489. Two of the categorical grounds for the excep-
tions are: (1) Plaintiff was ignorant of the facts making the contract
illegal. If plaintiff, when he conferred the benefit sought to be recovered,
was ignorant of the fact which makes the contract illegal, relief will be
afforded; Woodward, *Quasi Contracts*, sec. 137. (2) Plaintiff was not in
*pari delicto*. In the case of a contract *malum in se*, no difference in the
degree of delinquency of either party is recognized; but if the contract is
*malum prohibitum* and if plaintiff is not in *pari delicto*, restitution is
enforced; *Wenninger v. Mitchell*, 139 Mo. App. 420. "Probably no more
exact principle can be laid down than this, that if a plaintiff, though
culpable, has not been guilty of moral turpitude, and the loss he will suffer
by being denied relief is wholly out of proportion to the requirements either
of public policy or of appropriate individual punishment, he may be
allowed to recover back the consideration with which he has parted." *Williston

Although the parties are in *pari delicto*, the court may interfere and
grant relief at the suit of one where public policy requires its interven-
tion, albeit some benefit will thereby accrue to a plaintiff equally as guilty

Where a contract against public policy has been executed and benefits
received, and all parties are acting in good faith, compensation on the
*quantum meruit* or *quantum valebat* will be allowed. *Tallman v. Lewis*, 186 S. W. 296. In that case, the contract was against public policy because
one of the parties at the time of its execution acted in a fiduciary capacity;
and, he having executed it without objection, and actual benefits having
been received under it, all the parties acting in good faith, compensation
was allowed on a *quantum meruit* count for the reasonable value of the
services rendered. Where an illegal contract has been fully executed by the
parties, the courts will recognize the rights and titles resulting therefrom,
where the suit is not to enforce the contract itself. So it was held in
*Hall v. Edwards*, 194 S. W. 674, in which, after proof that defendant's
grantors, owning lots in section devoted to houses of prostitution, had
constructed and sold them for immoral purposes, and after evidence that
ture consideration passed, the court ruled that when a contract has been
executed without the aid of the courts by the voluntary acts of the parties,
the profit or estate realized is not contaminated. The conclusion to be
drawn from these and many similar cases is that the courts will, if one
side has executed completely and in good faith, award a *quantum meruit* or
*quantum valebat* compensation; and that if both sides have performed, the
courts will recognize their new position but will not do anything to change
it. The distinction here between executed and executory contracts must be observed; the former is used to designate contracts completed by both parties; the latter—for the purpose of clarifying the rule stated—, to describe a contract fully executed by one party, but not by both. Of course, there cannot be, to use terms logically, an illegal, executed contract: the phrase is a contradiction in terms; for the words illegal and executed each indicate the non-existence of contractual rights. The expression is one conveniently employed to describe what the parties thought they had. The cases enumerated, therefore, involve recovery to the extent that they reveal the courts recognizing and maintaining positions of parties illegally attained, or giving compensation to one who has in good faith rendered services under a non-existent contract.

Where a contract made by a corporation to sell unissued stock for a price payable in installments, was not malum in se and not completely executed, a buyer was permitted to recover back money paid. Fitzgerald v. Guaranty Security Corporation, 239 Mass. 174. It appears therefrom that if the contract is not malum in se, courts will permit recovery, provided the contract remains executory; and that if the contract is malum in se, no recovery is allowed, even though the agreement is not executed.

So long as the contract is void as against public policy and remains executory or partly incomplete, either party may sue to set it aside and recover all he has expended or conveyed in part performance thereof. Boyd v. Boyd, 112 Ore. 685. And where a contract for illegal purposes was abandoned, there could be recovery of money deposited under it, provided recovery itself did not accomplish the illegal purpose or require resort to illegal portions of it. Green v. Frahm, 176 Cal. 259. While the courts will not assist in enforcing illegal contracts, either party may disaffirm executory contracts involving no moral turpitude, but simply prohibited by law, and recover money paid. Duane v. Merchants' Legal Stamp Co., supra.

When labor and materials have been furnished upon real estate under a contract containing an element violating a statutory prohibition, and when the contract remains entirely executory in that part which is illegal, and is disaffirmed because of its illegality, the disaffirming party has the same right to have compensation for the benefit conferred that he would have to recover for money or property received by the other party before disaffirmance of the contract. Eastern Expanded Metal Co. v. Webb, etc., Co., 195 Mass. 356. From the foregoing cases of this type, then, the rule appears to be that when the plaintiff withdraws from the contract before its illegal purpose is accomplished, he is entitled to recover.

One who expended money, renders services, or performs work under an agreement which is void and unenforceable, but not illegal, may recover for the value of his services and money expended in an action on a quantum count. Blair Engineering Co. v. Page Steel & Wire Co., 288 Fed. 662. And one who performs services for an individual or private corporation under a void contract may recover for such services on the ground that the law raises an implied promise to pay a reasonable value therefor. Staebler & Gregg v. Town of Anchorage, 216 S. W. 348; Murphy v. Mitchell, 254 Mass. 18. Recovery on the basis of a promise implied in law is recovery in quasi contract. Underhill v. Rutland Ry. Co., 90 Vt. 462.
Quasi contract rests upon the equitable principle that one may not enrich himself at another's expense; it rests, not upon the contract, but upon the obligation created by law in the absence of any agreement thereon. Miller v. Schluss, 218 N. Y. 400; Grossbier v. Chi., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 173 Wis. 503. But if the illegal contract is fully performed on both sides, there is no basis for quasi contractual obligations. Stansfield v. Kunz, 63 Kan. 797.

To establish the existence of any quasi contractual obligation, it must be shown, (1) that the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff; and (2) that the retention of the benefit by the defendant is inequitable. Woodward, op cit., Sec. 7.

**CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—POLICE POWER—REMOVAL OF GARBAGE—STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION—**

Appellant, Jansen Farms, Inc., collected from the Claypool Hotel Restaurant, the Thompson's Restaurant, and the Union Depot Restaurant, all the material left from the tables, and preparation of the food for the tables, by virtue of purchase from the owners. The material was deposited in special containers, which were kept free from flies and insects and emitted no noxious odors. These containers were collected daily, at a time when their collection by truck did not interfere with traffic. They were hauled to appellant's farm, two miles from the city, where appellant had erected a modern sanitary hog feeding plant, which is free from unpleasant odors, and there the contents were fed to appellant's hogs. In addition to this service, appellant recovered and restored to the owners the silverware inadvertently placed in the containers with the refuse material. Appellant's hogs were sold to an anti-hog cholera serum manufacturing plant. It was claimed that appellant's hogs produced a superior serum due to the mineral elements and vitamins in this material fed to his hogs.

Appellee, the City of Indianapolis (Sanitary District) maintains a garbage collection service, and a reduction plant, and produces and sells garbage grease and tankage. Appellee threatened to arrest appellant for collecting garbage, and to collect such material itself without payment to the restaurant owners. Appellee had not prior thereto collected it and the owners refused to permit it to do so.

Appellee brought an action to restrain appellant from collecting, hauling away, or disposing of any garbage found within the sanitary district of Indianapolis, which acts were alleged to be in violation of Sec. 10608 Burns' Annotated Statutes, 1926. Appellant filed a cross-complaint seeking an injunction to prevent appellee from interfering with its collection of food products, left from the tables, purchased from certain restaurants. Judgment was given for appellee on both the complaint and the cross-complaint. Appellant moved for a new trial alleging that judgment was not sustained by the evidence, and contrary to law. The motion was overruled. Appeal.

Held, judgment reversed with directions to grant a new trial. Jansen Farms, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis (Sanitary District), Sup. Ct., Ind., April 22, 1930, 171 N. E. 199.

The court in so deciding held the statute constitutional, on the grounds that though there was a property right in garbage as defined by the statute,