67 DePaul Law Review 333 (2018)
This Article seeks to transcend perennial election versus appointment debates-including debates over campaign finance and the impact of "dark money"-by taking a closer look at why judicial selection is a contentious mess and discussing how it might be fixed. First, I present the case for elective and appointive systems. Second, I show that the arguments for each system are exaggerated or flawed.Third, I explore why it has been hard for proponents of each system to perceive and acknowledge those exaggerations and flaws, and propose ways to narrow the divide. Although the divide can and should be narrowed, I conclude that it cannot be eliminated altogether. Ultimately, which system is "best" will unavoidably turn on which selection system's core values take precedence in a given state at a given time.
Geyh, Charles G., "Judicial Selection and the Search for Middle Ground" (2018). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2768.