"Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its Reach Th" by Bryan N. Tramont

Article Title

Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its Reach Through Unenforceable and Unwieldy “Voluntary” Agreements

Authors

Bryan N. Tramont, Federal Communications Commission

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2000

Publication Citation

53 Federal Communications Law Journal 49 (2000)

Abstract

The character of a regulatory agency is most severely tested at the zenith of its power. When the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") breaks free of the limitations imposed by the law, the Commission’s leadership sets its own course. It is at these times, when legal oversight is at a minimum, that it becomes most important for the agency to "pay more attention to justice." Unfortunately, as outlined in this Article, the FCC has often failed this test of institutional character. In at least three contexts, the Commission has proven to be something less than a benevolent master. In each context, the current Commission leadership uses the vulnerability of licensees and the absence of legal oversight to advance its particular public policy agenda; impose many requirements it cannot or will not enforce; and facilitate the creation of vast company-specific regulatory regimes that undermine transparency and predictability.

Recommended Citation

Tramont, Bryan N. (2000) "Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands Its Reach Through Unenforceable and Unwieldy “Voluntary” Agreements," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 53: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol53/iss1/5

Download

Included in

Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons, Legislation Commons

COinS