61 Federal Communications Law Journal 1 (2009)
Scholars and judges generally assume that the cornerstone of free speech doctrine is the distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws. Despite its wide acceptance, the distinction lacks any precedential or normative basis, unless it also accounts for another equally important distinction. The scholars' conventional view of content-analysis overlooks the difference between the government banning a book or recommending it. Content-based laws that suppress specific content, like banning a television show, should be problematic, but content-based laws that promote specific content, such as promoting educational and political shows, should not be.
Precedent and the First Amendment's underlying normative concerns both require this distinction and support content-based laws promoting democratic content. The precedent in almost every area of First Amendment doctrine applies minimal scrutiny to content-based promotion. To reach these results, courts usually claim to apply one of several "exceptions" to content-analysis, but these many exceptions actually add up to a rule: content-based promotion of speech does not receive heightened scrutiny. This rule serves the normative goals of the First Amendment. Exceptions to this rule-the most notable of which applies to emerging electronic media-are a judicial mistake that should be corrected.
"Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based Promotion of Democratic Speech,"
Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 61
, Article 2.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol61/iss2/2