22 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 243 (2015)
The financial crisis sent shock waves throughout the European Union, the effects of which are still being felt. This article focuses on the institutional dimension of the crisis, and examines its impact on the relationship between the member states and the European Union, and between the organs of the European Union itself. The analysis is undertaken from a temporal perspective. It begins with consideration of the treaty provisions that shaped the balance of power within the European Union, and who bears the primary responsibility for this form of institutional ordering. It is argued that while there is a very considerable literature on democracy deficit in the European Union, there has been neglect of the constitutional responsibility that member states bear for the institutional status quo. The nature of this constitutional responsibility is elaborated in the first section of the article. This is followed by discussion of the shaping of the Treaty provisions concerning economic and monetary union, and the way in which these bear the imprint of the choices made by the member states as to the degree of intrusion into national economic governance by the European Union that they were willing to accept. The penultimate section of the article considers the role played by the different EU institutions during the crisis as it unfolded, and this is followed in the final section by evaluation of the interinstitutional consequences of the measures adopted to meet the crisis.
"The Financial Crisis, the European Union Institutional Order, and Constitutional Responsibility, Maastricht Treaty, democracy deficit, Lisbon Treaty,,"
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 22:
2, Article 2.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijgls/vol22/iss2/2