Document Type
Symposium
Publication Date
Winter 2012
Publication Citation
87 Indiana Law Journal 147 (2012)
Abstract
The secret-ballot election is the National Labor Relations Board’s preferred method for employees to determine whether they wish to be represented by a union. Employer domination of the election process, however, has led many unions to opt out of elections and instead to demand recognition based on authorization cards signed by a majority of employees. The primary objection to this “card check” process is that it is less democratic than the secret-ballot election. This Article places the issue in the context of the theoretical basis for claims of industrial democracy and argues that card checks are more consistent with the basic premises of industrial democracy than are extant Board elections.
Labor and Employment Law Under the Obama Administration: A Time for Hope and Change? Symposium held November 12-13, 2010, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana.
Recommended Citation
Moore, James Y. and Bales, Richard A.
(2012)
"Elections, Neutrality Agreements, and Card Checks: The Failure of the Political Model of Industrial Democracy,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 87:
Iss.
1, Article 10.
Available at:
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol87/iss1/10