Populist and Economic v. Feudal: Approaches to Industry Self-Regulation in the United States and England

Authors

Robert H. Heidt, Indiana University Maurer School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1989

Publication Citation

34 McGill Law Journal 39 (1989)

Abstract

English and American courts treat industry self-regulation very differently. American courts have been generally slow to acknowledge the legitimacy of self-regulation. Once they accept the need for some degree of self-regulation, however, the American courts, under the growing influence of the Chicago school, have become increasingly willing to uphold the regulation on the grounds of economic efficiency. The English courts have had less difficulty recognizing the legitimate role industry self-regulation plays. In determining the reasonableness of the regulatory scheme, however, the English courts adopt a protectionist approach which favours the status quo within the industry. These distinctions, the author argues, reflect fundamentally different attitudes towards both the concept of private rule and the role of the courts in the economic affairs of the country.

Recommended Citation

Robert H. Heidt, Populist and Economic v. Feudal: Approaches to Industry Self-Regulation in the United States and England, 34 McGill Law Journal 39 (1989) (1989).
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/902