"Judicial Independence and the Budget: A Taxonomy of Judicial Budgeting" by Alexander Rosselli

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Article Title

Judicial Independence and the Budget: A Taxonomy of Judicial Budgeting Mechanisms

Authors

Alexander Rosselli, Indiana University Maurer School of LawFollow

Publication Date

4-13-2020

Abstract

This Paper addresses three aspects of judicial budgeting. First, it will identify the four broad families of constitutional provisions that consider the judicial budget. While the majority of procedures and requirements that govern judicial budgeting are found in statues, many nations’ constitutions explicitly address judicial salaries. Other constitutions only broadly address judicial budgeting. Second, we will analyze different approaches to judicial councils. Third, this Paper will address several different approaches to the judicial budgeting process. This includes how the judiciary’s budget is proposed, as well as how it is allocated and managed. Finally, this Paper will touch upon the tension inherent in judicial budgeting in democratic societies. While judicial independence is prioritized by most nations, there is a competing priority of ensuring efficient use of public funds. This tension can create problems as nations work to keep government spending in check, while continuing to honor judicial independence.

Recommended Citation

Rosselli, Alexander (2020) "Judicial Independence and the Budget: A Taxonomy of Judicial Budgeting Mechanisms," Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design: Vol. 5, Article 2.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijcd/vol5/iss1/2

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