Home > JOURNALS > IJCD > Vol. 6 (2020)
Publication Date
5-11-2020
Abstract
In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently shooting at them?
A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power, and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for ensuring consensus-based support and the protection of minority interests, or are they merely political weapons that logjam governmental actions?
This Paper outlines the advantages and disadvantages of various minority veto design options in the context of consociational power-sharing arrangements, and inspects the formal legislative minority veto mechanisms in Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Minority vetoes can
In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently shooting at them?
A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power, and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for ensuring consensus-based support and the protection of minority interests, or are they merely political weapons that logjam governmental actions?
This Paper outlines the advantages and disadvantages of various minority veto design options in the context of consociational power-sharing arrangements, and inspects the formal legislative minority veto mechanisms in Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Minority vetoes can
In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently shooting at them?
A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power, and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for ensuring consensus-based support and the protection of minority interests, or are they merely political weapons that logjam governmental actions?
This Paper outlines the advantages and disadvantages of various minority veto design options in the context of consociational power-sharing arrangements, and inspects the formal legislative minority veto mechanisms in Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Minority vetoes can
In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently shooting at them?
A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power, and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for ensuring consensus-based support and the protection of minority interests, or are they merely political weapons that logjam governmental actions?
This Paper outlines the advantages and disadvantages of various minority veto design options in the context of consociational power-sharing arrangements, and inspects the formal legislative minority veto mechanisms in Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Minority vetoes can successfully protect minority groups' vital interests, but vetoes must be designed effectively in the consociational arrangement in order to avoid the veto's weaponization, political deadlock, and increased tension.
Recommended Citation
Haymond, Devin
(2020)
"Minority Vetoes in Consociational Legislatures: Ultimately Weaponized?,"
Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design: Vol. 6, Article 1.
Available at:
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijcd/vol6/iss1/1
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